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ABSTRACT 
 
Sabine Ursula Mercer:  Ghosts in the Machine? Textual Self-Presentation from 
Conversion Narratives to Contemporary (Auto)biographical Fiction 
Although the quest for authenticity has been particularly foregrounded in self-
narratives from the nineteen-sixties onwards, its long tradition goes back to St Augustine. 
This thesis endeavours to trace a genealogy of texts that foreground the problematics of 
locating and narrating a self: from the confessional to the legacies of the literature of the 
double, through to the modern and postmodern novel.  
Ever since Augustine’s Confessions, the preoccupation with the transformation and 
shaping of subjective experience into narrative forms has wrestled with the problem of 
whether the activity is one of locating  the essence of a presumed unitary ontological self or 
of a continuous process of rewriting and constructing that self through narrative itself.  The 
inherent contradiction in the activity of writing a self has long been understood by writers 
who, over the last seven centuries, have addressed the problem of doubling the self in and 
as text.  Paradoxically, the inevitable dividedness that arises out of this process appears to 
reify the self even as it seeks to retain the illusion of presence.   
In this thesis, I intend to demonstrate, how preoccupations regarded as ‘postmodern’ 
or as ‘post-postmodern’ emerge out of a long tradition of problematizing the writing of the 
self.  Given the ephemeral nature of subjectivity as part of the on-going process of invention 
and projection, the impossibility of grasping any essential reality that can be located behind 
constructed textual masks serves to compound the problem.  The emergent textual self, or 
selves, disappoint as mere approximations of verisimilitude; they essentially fail to provide a 
valid rendition of the idea of the self in the mind: an homunculus within the supposed 
“Ghost in the Machine”.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Contemporary fictionalized self-narratives can look back at a long history of self-
representation in textualized form.  My thesis examines this complex tradition of thinking 
about selfhood in texts and the perennial problems of life writing: how writers at 
particular moments have tried to articulate a self – to model, embody, conceptualize and 
textualize selves – and how different strategies for self-construction may be seen both to 
manifest and challenge extant ideas about what it means to “have” a self.  Constructing a 
trajectory consisting of selected representative literary texts, from the earliest extant 
reflections on selfhood to the postmodern constant problematization and overt 
fictionalization of the self, my thesis offers a taxonomy of life-narratives that analyses the 
reworking of earlier conceptualizations of selfhood to reveal a continuous morphing into 
hybrid forms.  Explicit reflection on the intricacies inherent in process of writing about the 
self has been especially foregrounded in the contemporary period.   
 
Beyond this, the thesis attempts to offer a genealogy of self-representation 
through reflections on key literary and philosophical writings that have centrally 
concerned themselves with the problem of the self, from the moment of the very 
emergence of a concept of self to its current suppression, occlusion or dispersal in the 
discourses of postmodernism and neuroscience.  The thesis shows that “[v]iews coexist 
with those which have arisen later in reaction to them […] rival outlooks go on influencing 
and shaping each other.”1  
                                                          
1
 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, 1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2003) 497; Abbreviation used in parenthetical references henceforth is SS. 
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The centrality of narrative and the problematic role of memory in shaping self-
narratives has become one of the most fertile areas of interdisciplinary study in the last 
twenty years.  My thesis engages extensively with theories of memory, with textual 
constructionism and with phenomenological, psychological and psychoanalytical models, 
as well as those of contemporary cognitive neuroscience, in order to investigate how, at 
particular key historical moments, textual selves are constructed through intentionally 
emergent frameworks of understanding. Through a close reading of texts that I consider 
to be pivotal for each historical moment, the thesis attempts to elicit the nature of the 
shifts as well as the continuations in an on-going preoccupation with self-reference and 
introspection that is built into the Western tradition of literary autobiographical fiction 
and other self-reflexive modes of life-writing that relate the narrative self to larger 
constructs in history, society, and philosophy.  
 
My investigation offers a chronological and historical overview up to and including 
Part Two, but one which is interpretative and selective.  One aim of my thesis is to build 
up a sense of distinctive trajectories of self-representation that provide a genealogical 
entry into current and contemporary fictional modes and preoccupations of address.  This 
is designed to establish a foundation for the central argument of the thesis: I argue that 
the idea of conferring a distinct identity upon the self through self-reflexive construction 
in narrative is problematic, not only because the act of narration becomes part of the 
process of making a self, but also, as more recent texts demonstrate, textual structure 
and generic convention, social discourse and literary modes, shape and determine or 
constrain ways that a subject might present itself to itself, as a self.   
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However, writing as a mode of enquiry – how individuals convey to others who 
they are and how they transform life into narrative – is not just a postmodern 
phenomenon or preoccupation, but one that begins with St Augustine, “who introduced 
the inwardness of radical reflexivity and bequeathed it to the Western tradition of 
thought.” (Taylor, SS 131).  
 
Historical Frameworks and Dominant Discourses  
Part One of the thesis traces the earliest accounts of self-fashioning in different 
frameworks: from the religious confession to the intellectual reflection in essay form, to 
the application of the confessional mode in defence of the autonomous self.  The journey 
inward sought to explore the particularities of an individual or, more generally, to explain 
human nature, but instead of discovering wholeness, pre-modern writers became 
increasingly aware of the distance between the self that writes from the self that is 
written which, from the nineteenth century onwards, becomes overt in the production of 
split, doubled, aesthetized or socially constructed selves.  
 
The first three sections give a diachronic development of self-presentation from 
pre-modernism to Romanticism.  The shaping of modern identities, of the extended self 
in time, goes back to the inward turn of St Augustine in the fourth century.  This was 
followed by self-narratives in later centuries that captured and addressed the on-going 
concern with self-reflexive subjectivity in a variety of modes.   
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The Western idea of ‘self’ equated personal identity with the continuity of 
memory – the ability to think of oneself as being one and the same indivisible self at 
different times and in different places.  From the position of the convert, St Augustine 
recasts his life in a religious context in which confession demonstrates the transition from 
sinner to believer.  Memory integrates and transforms experience; it shapes and patterns 
the interior sense of the self, such that the conversion to Christianity is understood as a 
restoration of the unity of the self in the salvation of the soul. 
 
However, by the sixteenth century, the medieval faith in God’s grace and the 
immortal soul as the central aspect of a self began to be replaced with an enquiry into the 
conditions of the moral life.  To turn inward to the mind in order to explore largely secular 
issues, rather than to meditate on the soul and the works of God, was a new way of 
thinking about and reflecting on the self, which was part of the humanistic project that 
fused public and private aspects.  Montaigne, who took himself as the object of his 
studies, came to the conclusion that the self is a work in progress, elusive and never at 
one with itself, but continually shaped in the process of writing.   
 
Rousseau moved away from the Augustinian idea of confession as an articulation 
directed at God and turned it into a vindication for the preservation of individual 
autonomy opposing societal pressures.  The moral self is now based on the purity of 
feelings, which society purportedly corrupts or misinterprets.  Instead of Montaigne’s 
rational investigation, writing became a romantic aesthetic strategy of making the self, 
but the incongruence of inner life and outer appearances only manifested the rift 
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between the self that writes and the self that is written, thereby irremediably split in and 
by language.  
 
Psychoanalytic Doubling of the Repressed Self in a Moral Context  
Section four of Part One outlines the modification of confessional writing for the 
emergence of the fictionalized ‘split-self’, the double of nineteenth-century literature that 
was influenced by post-Darwinian theory, late-Victorian dual brain and dissociation 
theory.  The focus of the modern sciences of memory on pathological states and multiple 
personality was mirrored in the novels of that time in which dark impulses were exorcised 
and given ontological solidity; the double became an emblem of self-estrangement in a 
morally repressive culture that constitutes a rigid framework that makes imperious 
demands on the individual.  
 
Part One of this thesis provides a comprehensive overview for Part Two and Part 
Three in which these particular historical moments and their dominant discourses will be 
identified as precursors of modern and postmodern conceptions about the self.  The on-
going revision of ideas about selfhood came about in successive looping movements in 
which previous ways of conceiving the self were reworked and reformulated.  In the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Augustine’s examination of the light within – his 
immaterial, yet intelligible soul – could be seen to become the focus of an emergent 
epistemic paradigm, at a time “when knowledge about memory became a surrogate for 
spiritual understanding of the soul.”2  Increasingly from 1900, and especially in our own 
                                                          
2
 Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
1995) 197. 
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time, however, the soul is conceived as located in the brain and  in the nervous system, 
that “adapts, is tailored, evolves, so that experience, will, sensibility, moral sense, and all 
that one would call personality or soul becomes engraved in the nervous system.”3  
Accordingly, mid-twentieth-century literature can be seen to reconfigure the double 
theme with its convention of good and evil ‘dual selves’ by examining this material 
through verbal play that parodies the traditional relationship of psychological identity in 
mirror selves or by applying narrative structural doublings that show the crisis of the 
fragmented modern individual and the distorting power of memory.  
 
Competing models of the self contributed to increasing complexity in the ways of 
writing about the self.  Part Two and Three explore some of the connections between 
scientific and postmodern theorising by providing a study of twentieth- and twenty-first-
century autobiographical fictions, from Marcel Proust to Doris Lessing, to the 
contemporary writers A. S. Byatt and J. M. Coetzee.  Key connections between the 
sections concern the on-going preoccupation with the function of memory, intentionality 
and the role of belief and desire in the intersubjective and introspective constitution of 
self.  For example: just as nineteenth-century realist writing about the self was displaced 
by a shift to meta-representational reflection as the vehicle for a renewed engagement 
with ethical responsibilities, so too, more recently, postmodern texts become increasingly 
preoccupied with the unreliability and enactive reconstruction of memories of the past 
revealed in the new sciences of memory.   
 
                                                          
3
 Paul John Eakin, How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1999) 17. 
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Memory in Early Modernists’ Embodied Selves: Minds, Souls or Brains?  
Part Two examines the shift in the intellectual framework of early twentieth-
century literature to aesthetic modes of impressionism and post-impressionism.  Whilst 
still continuing with confessional narratives and reworking the double tradition, 
modernist writers like Marcel Proust in À la recherché du temps perdu (1913-1927) and 
Virginia Woolf in Mrs. Dalloway (1925) shift their emphasis to phenomenological issues 
around perception, which are exemplified in the temporal and spatial complication and 
situatedness of their protagonists.  Both novels foreground the question of the continuity 
of the self and both writers propose that the self might achieve a kind of transcendence 
of time when recovered through alternative mechanisms of memory to those of explicit 
or ‘conscious’ memory.  Instead of expressing the alienation of the self in or through 
writing, the early modernists’ self-understanding shows an awareness of temporal depth 
in which the self is constituted by and recovers self-presence through the aesthetic 
transformation of experience through images and metaphorical language that formulate 
concepts of soul, consciousness and the extended mind. 
Half a century later, cognitive linguistics posits a sophisticated model of metaphor 
production and comprehension that is central to the mind’s meaning-making capacities.  
The new focus on the experiential self highlights the limitations of an objectivist stance 
that is ontologically problematic because of its disembodied rationality.  In order to deal 
adequately with human activity, the neo-phenomenological approach4 seeks to integrate 
phenomenology with cognitive science and neuroscience by suggesting that thinking 
                                                          
4
 The term neo-phenomenology is used by Patricia Waugh in her essay “The Naturalistic Turn, the 
Syndrome, and the Rise of the Neo-Phenomenological Novel” in which she argues that some of the most 
interesting developments in contemporary fiction reflect a phenomenological turn, which “is part of a 
project to rescue the singularity of human experience from phantom objectivity, to understand the 
intersubjective processes that constitute our sense of self-presence or loss of it.”  
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originates in bodily experience and that the task is “to find some way to bridge this gap, 
to connect mind and body.”5  Furthermore, the philosopher Mark Johnson emphasizes 
the role of metaphor in language and non-linguistic cognition and puts forward 
arguments for the embodied nature of imaginative structures of understanding: 
“Imagination is our capacity to organize mental representations (especially percepts, 
images, and image schemata) into meaningful coherent unities. It thus includes our ability 
to generate novel order” (Johnson 140).  The existential-phenomenological approach 
develops a constructive theory of the ways in which imagination links cognitive and bodily 
structures for the generation of significant experiences, a preoccupation that is also 
evident in the works of Marcel Proust and Virginia Woolf.   
 
Confession and the Paranoid Doubling in Late Modernism 
Section three of Part Two concentrates on two late modernist texts that show a 
configuration of the Rousseauian confessional mode and the return to double themes in a 
parody of Freudian psychology.  In Vladimir Nabokov’s novels Lolita (1955) and Pale Fire 
(1962), the split between body and mind is portrayed in pathological states of paranoia 
and narcissism that imprison the self in a solipsistic universe in which the ontological 
nature of the real becomes problematic.  The dark side of the creative mind stylizes the 
self in aesthetic performances as a mode of defensive projection and introjection that 
obscures desires and manipulates others.  References to psychoanalytic therapy open up 
an ironic gap between acts and excuses, ultimately aimed at absolving the self from moral 
responsibility.  
                                                          
5
 Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason (Chicago: U of 
Chicago P, 1987) xxvii; Abbreviation used in parenthetical references henceforth is BM. 
9 
 
 
The Turn towards Postmodernism: Story-telling and Form-finding for The Multiple Self 
Section one of Part Three looks at a pivotal novel of the nineteen-sixties that 
might be regarded, retrospectively, as a turning point of entry into the postmodern in its 
application of metafictional modes to articulate the feelings of disenchantment of the 
modern fragmented self as a mirror of a fragmented society.  In Doris Lessing’s The 
Golden Notebook (1962), the alienated post-war self is conceived primarily as socially 
constructed, multiplied into false selves that mirror the imperative demand to perform in 
different roles in an advanced capitalist society. The compartmentalization of experiences 
into different frameworks fails to explicate what makes sense of moral responses and 
meaning and thus creates an unresolvable tension in which all frameworks for writing the 
self appear as inadequate models to continue with in the future.   
This seems like a major reorientation, but twenty-first-century neuroscience still 
holds on to the idea that the self is made through acts of language and some scientists, 
who take a strong position on the link between narrative and self, still back up the idea 
that selfhood or identity emerges through the lifelong trajectory of self-narration; their 
scientific model underscores the postmodernist view that there is no subject and that the 
self is made up of sheer narration, but is a self which is under constant conscious as well 
as non-conscious revision.   
 
The Postmodern Self: Multiplicity in the Narrative Perspective  
Section two and three of Part Three examine postmodernist fictional works by A. 
S. Byatt and J. M. Coetzee that show the tendency to deliberately fragment the self by 
10 
 
structuring multiple perspectives around pluralist viewpoints.  Through the employment 
of biographers as central characters, story-telling becomes a species of form-finding: in 
Byatt’s Possession (1990), the disenchantment with the nineteenth-century novel is 
reworked by applying a temporal double plot structure in which present-day identity is 
constructed though engagement with the literary past.   
J. M. Coetzee’s Summertime (2009) juxtaposes diary fragments with interviews 
that are manipulated by the biographer. The interviewees, who remember primarily their 
past selves, evidently confabulate; their account of the subject remains incongruent and 
conflicting, but the overall structure of the novel allows the author to give an ethical 
reflection on society. The novels display that the self cannot be apprehended in the form 
of some recognized narrative genre and that narrativity is essentially compromised by 
revision.  
The multiple drafts model of consciousness is one theory posed by empiricists and 
philosophical eliminativists, who question the very existence of a self and claim that the 
self has no substantial reality but is illusory in character as “the product of the stories that 
we tell ourselves about our lives so that we can knit together our experiences into a 
continuous plot.”6  From the premise that the narrative self is an abstraction, always 
subject to revision and “edited to accommodate fresh data”, reductionists deduce that 
the self is simply “the protagonist of all these narratives – a fictional object that Dennett 
compares with the center of gravity of a physical entity” (Woody 331).   
 
The model of the self without a substance is under critique for its exclusive 
allegiance to narrative: it is merely “real enough as a product of narrative, just as the 
                                                          
6
 Melvin J. Woody, “When Narrative Fails,” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.4 (2003): 329-345, at 
329. 
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center of gravity is a real product of theory. But neither would be real apart from the 
narrative or theoretical fictions that posit them” (Woody 331).  Woody points out the ex 
nihilo character of narrative theory and the reversal of agency:  by neglecting the 
experiential self as the producer of the story, the self is the product of narrative, affected 
by its own reinterpretation and rewriting: “[f]or if the self is wholly constituted by 
narratives, there is no room for an identical narrator who stands outside those narratives 
like a transcendental ego […] If the narratives produce the self, then the tale wags the 
dog: a change of story means a change of self.” (Woody 332). 
 
The Anxiety for Authenticity: A Return to the Romantic in Contemporary Aesthetics? 
The final section of Part Three serves as a conclusion that attempts to provide an 
outlook on how the notion of the self will continue to evolve through the awareness of  
bodily knowing and the relation to language that goes beyond the scope of ‘the linguistic 
turn’ of postmodernism with its scepticism and supposedly moral indifference. 
   
Twenty-first-century literature seems to rework romantic and modernist ideas 
about the importance of the emotional life.  My conclusion examines the contemporary 
novel Remainder (2005) by Tom McCarthy that points in the direction of an emergent 
neoromantic sensibility within the historical particularities of the new millennium.  The 
post-postmodern appears to demonstrate a return to realism through a mode of 
hyperrealism, albeit one that seems to call for a renewal of engagement with the social 
world through the structure of the feeling body.7  Humans are made aware of their 
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insignificance vis-à-vis the powers of an abstract global economy for, as individuals, they 
are situated in a technological network that has territorialized the social sphere and the 
private world: authenticity becomes the product of experience management in a culture 
of neo-corporatism.  Remainder provides an ethical criticism of the de-humanizing effects 
of neo-capitalism and its materialist assumption: no matter how much compensation 
money the narrator lavishes on his gargantuan projects of recreating memories, all efforts 
to make him feel as part of and being situated in reality fail to transcend the materiality of 
his re-enactments.  The tragedy of controlling reality through aesthetic realizations of the 
self becomes a parable for the contemporary world in which meaning and being have lost 
their depth value to surfaces and reproductions.   
Post-postmodernist writing seems to question the value of the authentic as the 
cornerstone of subjectivity in the absence of memory and takes a new direction with the 
phenomenon of experiencing oneself as a self in the absence of narrative.  This provides a 
distinctively changed conceptualization of the subject as oscillating between the attempt 
to define oneself through memory and the failure of the need to get back to a genuine 
understanding of the self.  
The mind’s capacity for figurative thought, creative leaps, and fictional 
representation is becoming an increasingly important focus for cognitive scientists, 
philosophers of mind and scholars of literature alike: “Literature documents and records 
                                                                                                                                                                                
writers, who came to prominence in the late nineteen-eighties, have been “responding to the perceived 
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cognitive and neural processes of self with an intimacy that may be otherwise unavailable 
to neuroscience.”8   
 
Return of the Soul: Can a Self be more than just Brain and Nervous System? 
Against Cartesian dualism – the idea of a disembodied mind – and the reductionist 
narrative self, Antonio Damasio posits the rootedness of thinking in bodily experience 
and, like William James before him, understands mind as “an emergent process, never 
separate from body.”9  Neuroscientists argue for an embodied theory of the self in which 
“self and memory as interdependent dimensions of consciousness, [are] anchored in the 
life of the body” (Eakin, Lives Become Stories 21).  The conceptual biological framework 
hinges on the irreducible relationship between body and brain without equating the 
physical brain with the experiential self.  Damasio points away from the notion of the soul 
as an absolute spiritual being with particularized faculties of its own by suggesting, as 
Rousseau had done before, that “[f]eelings form the base for what humans have 
described for millennia as the human soul or spirit.”10  
The contemporary turn to neuroscience as demonstrated in Damasio is a major 
reorientation to the body as the nexus of an affective core that resists the reductionist 
assumption of the soul or mind as locatable in the neural structure of the brain.  
Neuroscientific research strongly suggests that the mind is dependent on brain-body 
interactions in which the body provides a ground reference: “the body, as represented in 
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the brain, may constitute the indispensable frame of reference for the neural processes 
that we experience as the mind” (Damasio, Descartes’ Error xviii).   
According to Damasio, a sense of self emerges first at a simple level that over time 
develops on a more complex level into an autobiographical self, but the basic biological 
phenomenon of human consciousness is the feeling, experiencing self.11  The primary 
awareness of a self as a self is grounded in a stable representation of individual 
continuity, which serves as a mental reference for the organism within the conscious 
mind: the core self that represents body states is “the feeling essence of our sense of self; 
the other [autobiographical or extended self] is the enhancement of the image of the 
causative object, which dominates core consciousness” (TF 171).   
The autobiographical self is equated with identity, personhood and authenticity; it 
depends on memory for the representation of key events in an organized form.  Past 
experiences provide “a consistent set of previously memorized objects pertaining to the 
organism’s history, whose relentless recall is consistently illuminated by core 
consciousness and constitutes the autobiographical self” (TF 198).  Autobiographical 
memories are treated as objects of an organism’s biography such that the feeling of 
knowing in the “relationship between any object and the organism becomes the feeling 
of a feeling” (TF 313). 
Meaning, understanding, and rationality are seen to arise from, and are 
conditioned by, patterns of bodily experience; this experiential dimension connects the 
writing of Damasio to that of the philosopher Mark Johnson, who both acknowledge the 
role of narrative and the linguistic construction of the self but they also contribute to a 
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more integral view of mind/body theories by connecting cognition with emotion and 
reason with active imagination.  My contention is that literature has a role to play in 
continuing to bridge the explanatory gap between neural processes and qualia, i.e., what 
it is like to experience phenomenal states.  The conclusion shows that the move away 
from postmodernism responds to its perceived detachment from a social context and 
nonreferential language, reflected in the change from the narrative self to a 
phenomenological and neurobiological ‘affective’ model of the self: this move towards 
the recovery of emotion links back with Romantic and modernist preoccupations.  
However, as writers such as McCarthy demonstrate, fiction is still a verbal world, and the 
post-postmodern novel might be viewed as one that is attempting to reconcile the 
narrative self of the postmodern with the ‘affective’ self of the current moment of 
neurobiological preoccupation. 
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PART ONE: PRE-MODERNIST PROJECT OF ‘WRITING THE 
SELF’  
 
Section 1: Confessional Narrative and Religious Conversion in Saint 
Augustine’s Confessions  
 
The Confessions (397 A.D.) is regarded as one of the first autobiographical 
narratives that follow the journey of the self through time.  Augustine recalls what he can 
still remember about his earliest years and attempts to narrate his life by imposing order 
on his experiences.  His account illuminates the development of his beliefs and the 
formation of his character in the form of a story that shows the ascent from the opacity of 
ignorance towards the illumination of his soul by the sovereignty of God.  Albert Outler 
claims, in the introduction to his translation of the Confessions, that it was not intended 
as an autobiography, but shows that Augustine made “a deliberate effort, in the 
permissive atmosphere of God’s felt presence, to recall those crucial episodes and events 
in which he can now see and celebrate the mysterious actions of God’s prevenient and 
provident grace.”12   
By retracing the crucial turning points of his life, Augustine comes to understand 
his experiences through the lens of the religious convert’s imperative concern for the 
complete disclosure of his sins and to understand himself as separated from God by his 
own position in time.  In this respect, the Confessions illustrates a paradigm of self-
analysis that connects two aspects of thinking about the past and present; it is through 
retrospection and introspection that Augustine generates “a creative story in which key 
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recollections are linked to form a therapeutic autobiographical narrative.”13   The 
confusion that ensued from his confessed powerful impulse to iniquity leads Augustine to 
plead for help and illumination in an extended monologue directed at God as his 
interlocutor; he appeals for salvation from what he describes as his infirmity:  “[t]he 
house of my soul is too narrow for thee to come in to me; let it be enlarged by thee. It is 
in ruins; do thou restore it.”14  It is evident that he wants to recompose and heal himself 
from what he perceives as a ‘shattered’ and ‘disordered’ state; a condition that in the 
twentieth century will also be described as ‘split’ or ‘fragmented’.   
The spiritual journey towards conversion shows the transformation of the self 
which is conveyed to the reader through a transformation of the text itself: at the end of 
Book 9, the Confessions shifts abruptly from the narration of Augustine's early life to an 
atemporal introspective exploration of spirituality.  At this crucial point in the narrative, 
Augustine is able to reconcile his finite self with the infinite God and Book 10 
demonstrates that the whole of the Confessions can be seen “an exploration of man’s 
way to God, a way which begins in sense experience but swiftly passes beyond it, through 
and beyond the awesome mystery of memory, to the ineffable encounter between God 
and the soul in man’s inmost subject-self” (Outler 7).  Augustinian interiority has an 
intellectual dimension in which God becomes an object of discovery to the inner man, but 
also an ethical dimension, where the Confessions is concerned with “the moral, 
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intellectual, and spiritual matters through its author’s act of baring the heart, mind, and 
soul.”15   
 
The narrative is as much about the act of remembering as it is a narrative about 
the act of narrating in which experience is transformed with the hindsight of a Christian 
who experienced conversion “as effected as it were from outside himself, [which] left him 
with a conviction of man’s utter dependence on Divine grace which became the 
mainspring of his theology.”16  The disclosure of the motivation behind the theft of the 
pears reveals that it was not caused by hunger, as bodily needs would excuse the deed, 
but was brought about by wickedness, an insatiable desire for immorality itself: “I did not 
desire to enjoy what I stole, but only the theft and the sin itself […] A depraved soul, 
falling away from security in thee to destruction in itself, seeking nothing from the 
shameful deed but shame itself” (C II. iv. 9).  The Confessions shows the struggle to 
overcome profligacy and the religious endeavour that  “governs Augustine’s decisions in 
selecting those events from his life that would best represent the experience of a 
Christian mortal – one unworthy of salvation but hopeful of receiving divine Grace” 
(Goodwin 4).  The professed sincerity offers a testimony about the self in the rhetoric of 
confession, which suggests that a human subject is not only able to provide an account of 
past actions and their consequences but that through autobiographical writing in the 
confessional mode, “the writer bares the soul or the heart in an attempt to reveal those 
truth about the self that are intrinsic and, possibly, eternal” (Goodwin 7).   
 
                                                          
15
 James Goodwin, Autobiography: The Self Made Text (New York: Twayne, 1993) 4. 
16
 John Herdman, The Double in Nineteenth-Century Fiction (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990) 8. 
19 
 
The Paradox of Conversion: Time effects a Division within the Self 
 
With the Confessions begins the historical, philosophical, psychological process of 
writing about the self in the dialogue between the self and the other, which takes the 
form of an address to God.  Augustine makes a deliberate effort to recall the crucial 
episodes and events that show God’s providence and he constantly evokes the presence 
of God as witness, judge, and addressee of the narrative, which shows the urgency of the 
confessional imperative for “justification, validation, necessity, and indeed exemplary 
instance of writing one’s life, of finding the words that signify the self and its history.”17  
Conversion is a fundamental change that affects the present consciousness of the self by 
setting up a new relationship to God and the world with the effect that Augustine 
“arrived at historical and self-understanding by coming to recognize its contrast with the 
eternal present of God.”18   
The rhetorical and psychological structure of conversion aims at making life 
retrospectively intelligible by creating “a reference point for the literary construction of 
identity” and it “offers a language and an epistemological framework for the elaboration 
of a fundamental project.”19   The spiritual pilgrimage celebrates and praises the 
greatness and goodness of God to the point where Augustine comes to realize that “[t]he 
Creator is the Redeemer! Man’s end and the beginning meet at a single point!” (Outler 7).  
Augustine’s motivation and justification for writing an autobiographical confession, more 
than a decade after his dramatic conversion in the garden at Milan, is to show how his 
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conversion had been achieved and he relates each of his outward experiences to the 
development of his inner life by ordering the disparate materials of his story into 
significant form such that, finally, “the circle is closed, the life completed, but all at a 
higher level of value or being.”20  The act of submitting to God is the starting point for the 
genuine life and allows Augustine the first glimpse of his soul redeemed; as a convert, he 
has become pure immanence before an other-worldly future.  Although his interior world 
is cut off from other people, he realizes that his soul lies open before God.  
The process of self-analysis is disrupted when Augustine encounters aesthetic 
problems in his attempts to translate the psychological subject into a literary one: time 
has distanced him from his past and he is no longer the young man that he tries to 
recapture in the narrative.  Moreover, the moment of conversion to Christianity has 
complicated self-identity by dividing Augustine’s life into distinct and conflicting parts: he 
is at once the Augustine of “before” and the one of “after” the event.  The separation of 
the narrative voice after conversion, from the sinning subject of before to the reformed 
Augustine, introduces a temporal problem that indicates the difficulty for understanding 
the nature of temporal change as such:  the very act of narrating creates a version of the 
self, which Augustine tries to explain from the vantage point of the present moment, until 
he realizes that neither the future nor the past exist as such but all times are present 
simultaneously in consciousness:   
 
But even now it is manifest and clear that there are neither times future nor times past. 
Thus it is not properly said that there are three times, past, present, and future. Perhaps it 
might be said rightly that there are three times: a time present of things past; a time 
present of things present; and a time present of things future. For these three do coexist 
somehow in the soul, for otherwise I could not see them. The time present of things past 
                                                          
20
 M. H. Abrams in Avrom Fleishman, Figures of Autobiography: The Language of Self-Writing in Victorian 
and Modern England (Berkeley: U of California P, 1983) 69. 
21 
 
is memory; the time present of things present is direct experience; the time present of 
things future is expectation. (C XI. xx. 26)  
 
Augustine’s meditation on the passage of time shows that he is conscious about 
the phenomenon of tension “according to which an object is presented to consciousness 
[…] the presence to mind of future, of the present, and of the past.”21  Lyotard continues 
with an evaluation of the existence of the different temporal modes as presenting a 
threat of nonbeing, as “[a]nnihilating acts of intention since they set up their object, 
diversely but constantly, as absent: not yet there, no longer there, and the there now of 
the present, ungraspable” (45).  The self is caught between separation in time and union 
in consciousness with the effect that “the past, present, and future are related only by an 
intentional act such as the writing of autobiography” (Waugh, HS 1).  Memory gives 
continuity of being or provides an overall sense of being and the sense of who I am rests 
on the ability to recollect who I have been; it validates the contention that memory does 
not contain an event as such, but is a process in which the rememberer deliberately tries 
to make sense of past events. 
 
Self-reflexive Consciousness, Memory and Emotions 
  
 Augustine’s road to God took the passage through a “reflexive awareness of 
himself.”22  It was therefore imperative for him to understand the working of his memory, 
which he regarded as the chief faculty of the soul.  He explores and analyses the nature of 
memory in Book 10 of the Confessions where he claims that memory is part of the soul 
                                                          
21
 Jean-François Lyotard, The Confession of Augustine (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2000) 45. 
22
 Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1991) 27; Abbreviation used in 
parenthetical references henceforth is EA. 
22 
 
and the source of knowledge in all its forms: it contains perceptual knowledge, self-
knowledge and knowledge of God.  But part of his claim is that memory not only 
encompasses mind or soul but is identical with mind or soul.   Memory is at once a part of 
the self and constitutive of the self; Augustine says that remembering “I do within myself, 
in that huge hall of my memory […] I meet myself and recall myself – what, when, or 
where I did a thing, and how I felt when I did it. […] I can meditate on all these things as if 
they were present” (C X. viii. 14).  To regard memory as a deliberate act that constitutes 
something new points to its power of transformation in which feelings are retained “as 
images imprinted on the memory by the senses of the body, but also the idea of the 
emotions themselves.”23  Augustine points out his agency in that he is the one who 
selects and assigns meaning to memories; he says that it was he himself, who did or felt 
what he remembers.  He seems to be aware that in the process of remembering “there 
still remains an irreducible ‘I’ that is doing the remembering” and from that premise, it is 
logical to conclude that if the self were “consubstantial with its memories, there would be 
no agency external enough to collect and identify with these memories. The self would 
simply be a swarm of narratives without a subjective center.” 24  
 The faculty of memory is more than just the ability to remember or the act of 
remembering; it also encompasses cognition and acts as a repository of experiences and 
knowledge; it includes sensations and perceptions, imaginations and dreams, emotions, 
and an awareness of self.  Augustine blurs the concepts of memory, soul, self and mind:  
 
But even as this memory is experienced, it is identical with the mind – as when we tell 
someone to remember something we say, “See that you bear this in mind”; and when we 
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forget a thing, we say, “It did not enter my mind” or “It slipped my mind.” Thus we call 
memory itself mind. (C X. xiv. 21) 
 
It is through memory that the self is illuminated by God and becomes knowledgeable to 
itself.  By recalling the subject ‘Augustine’, the author ‘Augustine’ is transformed, but he 
does not become fully transparent to himself as he says: 
 
Great is this power of memory, exceedingly great, O my God – a large and boundless 
inner hall! Who has plumbed the depths of it? Yet it is a power of my mind, and it belongs 
to my nature. But I do not myself grasp all that I am. Thus the mind is far too narrow to 
contain itself. (C X. viii. 15)  
 
Augustine puts forward an existential argument: for him the existence of God is not so 
much a matter of reason but rather of faith, but reason, properly directed, reveals the 
soul’s vices. The God of faith exists in memory and allows the retelling of his path of 
conversion, the direct address to God also acts as a paradigm of the conversion 
mechanism.  As a literary text, the Confessions comprises a single speech act – one that is 
enacted in the presence of the silence of God – but one which might be fruitful to others, 
the readers, who are permitted “to overhear his admissions of guilt and his appeals for 
forgiveness. He does so in an effort to persuade fellow mortals to follow his example” 
(Goodwin 4).  Augustine’s telling about the agonizing struggles that he had waged with 
himself is illustrative of a profound philosophical investigation through an intimate 
revelation, which he directs at readers to induce their spiritual awakening.  Looking at the 
process of recomposition from a disordered state and the reconstruction of Augustine’s life 
through writing, Fleishman proposes that the Confessions was written to have a didactic 
impact on readers:  “not only does the hero of the tale achieve this uplifting or sublimation, 
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but the theoretical register of the text is raised from the personal to the generic, from the 
historical to the philosophic, from the experiential to the metaphysical” (69). 
 
The Self as the Reflection of God in the Soul 
 
Augustine sees his life only in its relation to the divine and his conversion is the 
turning point that gives a rhetorical and psychological structure to his sense of the chaos 
of experience, where it creates “a reference point for the literary construction of identity” 
(CC 2).  The will to record indelibly testifies to Augustine’s conviction that the soul 
transcends the biological entity and consequently, after his transformation through 
conversion and his turn to God, Augustine abandons his narrative, “which is a sign of the 
fact that the self that conversion produces cannot be squared with the self that 
conversion leaves behind. The essence of the convert as immanent to divine otherness 
defies narrative” (CC 174).   
 
Augustine’s epiphany is proof for himself that human nature can only be 
understood in the light of God’s perfection and that the self is the reflection of God and 
the source of the soul.  The objective of writing the Confessions is to make his mind 
present to itself and this is preliminary to making the workings of his mind present to his 
readers as well but, it is also a move in which Augustine “simultaneously seeks to know 
the God who is the embracement of his inner self” (Olney 871). To gain knowledge of God 
means to transcend the bodily senses and perceptions: 
 
What is it, then, that I love when I love my God? Who is he that is beyond the topmost 
point of my soul? Yet by this very soul will I mount up to him. I will soar beyond that 
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power of mine by which I am united to the body, and by which the whole structure of it is 
filled with life. (C X. vii. 11) 
 
Augustine takes the mind or the soul as the object of knowledge, but as one which also 
gives him the certainty of self-presence, which shows that for him the self is “contingent 
on the fact that knower and known are the same” (Taylor, SS 133).  The problem of 
translating a psychological subject into a literary one will intensify for his literary 
successors.  The confessional impulse provides a link between Augustine and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, but one in which the spiritual significance of redemption is turned into 
a worldly defence as part of explaining a self that is apparently misunderstood by others.  
Rousseau’s anxiousness to justify his deeds will develop into more overtly performative 
confessional acts that seem now almost to parody the modern idea of the narcissistic self 
and thereby provide an implicit critique of the penchant to immoralism as transgression, 
understood through the more psychological frameworks of the twentieth century.   
 
Section 2: The Emergence of the Modern Subject in Michel de 
Montaigne’s Essays 
 
Between the spiritual individuality of Saint Augustine and the later insistence on 
authenticity as the source of the self in Jean-Jacques Rousseau stands Michel de 
Montaigne – the most important figure in the bridging from the medieval confessor to 
the modern self.   Although Montaigne turns away from the rhetoric of conversion as the 
mode of writing about the self in time, he adopts the Augustinian stance of personal 
introspection.  Moreover, he does not organize the Essays around a central event, but 
develops the portrait of himself through a series of discontinuous fragments in which he 
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moves from one topic to another.  Montaigne is preoccupied with scepticism about the 
possibility of positive empirical knowledge and when he questions the first principle of 
knowledge, the reliability of the senses, he arrives at an understanding of its 
shortcomings.  He states that “our knowledge is weak in all senses; we neither see far 
forward nor far backward; our understanding comprehends little, and lives but a little 
while; 'tis short both in extent of time and extent of matter.”25  However, the essay form 
allows Montaigne to merge serious intellectual speculation, philosophical explanation, 
and the justification of beliefs with casual anecdotes that digress into personal 
ruminations.  By taking himself as the subject under investigation, he deduces from the 
particulars of his existence the universality of the human condition; he recognizes that 
“there is nothing in the world that is believed by all men with universal consent. Even 
within one and the same man, opinions change, sometimes because the judgment is 
affected by the changing condition of the body and of the passions of the soul itself.”26    
 
The Shaping of Modern Identity 
 
Montaigne follows the changing reality of his being through writing about topics 
and commenting on the variety of opinions; it is a self-exploration that “inaugurates a 
new kind of reflection which is intensely individual, a self-explanation, the aim of which is 
to reach self-knowledge by coming to see through the screens of self-delusion which 
passion or spiritual pride have erected” (Taylor, SS 181).  Montaigne discovers the 
uniqueness of each individual within the limits that nature imposes on the human form, 
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which is a decisive move away from Augustine’s spiritual search for the unity of the 
human soul and the perfection of an ideal self.  In fixing his thoughts on paper, Montaigne 
finds that the self is essentially unstable and, moreover, that the mind or soul is 
essentially incommunicable; a notion that will itself come to the fore in Rousseau’s The 
Confessions. 
 
The Fashioning of the Self and Sincerity in Personal Judgement 
 
The Essays, which were revised by Montaigne almost continuously until his death 
in 1592, are exercises in personal judgment made over matters of concern to every 
individual with an awareness of life’s complexity and significance.  They offer a picture of 
a self-made Renaissance man, who demonstrates an increased sense of subjectivity whilst 
maintaining common sense scepticism.  Montaigne does not attempt to present a 
continuous or detailed narrative history of his life, but he tells stories about the ills he 
suffers, the ideas he develops, the emotions he feels, and the books he reads.  His prolific 
writing aims to show that introspection is the key to understand oneself and others and 
he emphasizes that he writes not of men in general but of a particular one when he says:  
“I very much desire that we may be judged every man by himself and would not be drawn 
into the consequence of common examples” (E I. xxxvi).  The Essays constitute neither an 
autobiography in discontinuous parts nor are they written as sequential confessions but 
they give a distilled account of ideas and impressions that the author gained from 
personal experience and reflection: in “Of experience”, Montaigne remarks, “I study 
myself more than any other subject; 'tis my metaphysic, my physic” (E III. xiii). 
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Montaigne’s project is to gain self-knowledge through a detailed observation of 
his thoughts and feelings about ordinary experiences, which shows that his essaying is a 
decisive move away from Augustine’s spiritual search for the unity of the human soul 
through the reconciliation with God.  The psyche of the modern self is characterized by an 
inner distance from the self within the self, where the self turns its gaze upon itself as its 
own object of regard and which makes “it receptive to a notion of law that is no longer 
guided and imposed by the divine.”27  The self-discovery proceeds concurrently with the 
critique of self-interpretation and the proffering of doubt to the effect that the self-
portrait appears only indirectly through personal tone, attitude, or judgement.  
Nevertheless, Montaigne considers individual experience as fundamental for arriving at 
general truth and, in assigning truthfulness as the basis for virtue, Montaigne neither 
makes a radical break with the moral tradition, nor does he simply submit to the 
authority of custom; instead he claims that judgement is “the faculty responsible for all 
thought and interpretation, both discursive and intuitive. Moreover, he identifies his 
thoughts with his very self, and so in a sense we can say that Montaigne’s Essais are the 
essays of himself. To essay oneself is to critically study oneself.”28  His underlying 
humanistic principle is sincerity, which can be translated as self-consistency or truth to 
oneself.  Sincerity emphasises the value of the moral life by establishing congruence 
between actual feeling and avowal and Montaigne opens his book with a claim to 
sincerity: “Reader, thou hast here an honest book.”  During the Renaissance, the 
emerging ideal of sincerity was frequently evoked to critique a political culture in which 
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humans were caught between the religious ideals of the Reformation and those of the 
Counter-Reformation, producing a culture hardly conducive to direct and honest speech.   
By the sixteenth century, urban developments and an increase in social mobility 
had effected changes in the psyche of the individual; it was a time when “men turned in 
upon themselves, sought privacy, withdrew for privileged moments from urban 
pressures.”29  According to Lionel Trilling, “the enterprise of sincerity became a salient, 
perhaps a definitive, characteristic of Western culture for some four hundred years.”30  
The emergence of an introspective mood allowed doubt to be freely entertained and 
writing became a personal activity that responded to the “draining of value from public 
action, at least when the action accords with conventional expectations – for the latter 
tends increasingly to be seen as irredeemably inauthentic, somehow compromised and 
contaminated by the demands of conformism and theatricality.”31   The heightened 
awareness of a potential discrepancy between public appearance and private essence 
induced Montaigne to attempt an examination of the world’s affairs by relying on his own 
judgement.  Nevertheless, the ethic of the private life still emphasized the honesty and 
integrity required for the performance of public roles and, although Montaigne believed 
that it is possible, with sufficient curiosity, to “pry into the souls and the natural and true 
opinions of the authors”, for Montaigne, it would appear to be fallacious to conflate what 
is written with the author and expect a disclosure of personality: “[a] man may indeed 
judge of their parts, but not of their manners nor of themselves, by the writings they 
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exhibit upon the theatre of the world […] the matter preached and the preacher are 
different things” (E II. x).   
Montaigne seems to be prescient in seeing that writing can work as a textual 
illusion in which “subjects are themselves fictions, fashioned in reiterated acts of self-
naming” and that the problem of writing the self was “already understood in its full 
complexity by Montaigne” (Greenblatt 218-9).  In Greenblatt’s view, Montaigne “invents 
in effect a brilliant mode of non-narrative self-fashioning” (Greenblatt 252).   
 
Writing as Making: Documenting the Changes in the Self 
 
The withdrawal from society was a decisive stance that allowed Montaigne to 
concentrate on the workings of his mind, which he came to understand as the highest 
human faculty.  After discovering the uniqueness of his thoughts, he recognized that his 
writing had produced not only the Essays as a work of art, but that he himself had 
become a work in progress; identity is continually shaped in and through the process of 
writing.  Montaigne seems not to distinguish between mind, soul and self and, similarly to 
Augustine, he uses these terms interchangeably for describing an idea of the self that is 
never at one with itself.  He writes that “whoever will look narrowly into his own bosom, 
will hardly find himself twice in the same condition. I give to my soul sometimes one face 
and sometimes another, according to the side I turn her to” (E II. i).  Montaigne’s 
subjectivity is an awareness of himself without a stable content during the time of his life; 
every moment of contemplation brings a different ‘self’ to light.  In “Of the Inconstancy of 
Our Actions”, he effectively concludes with the insight that “man has attained no 
knowledge, not even about what is closest to him, his own self” (Hartle 187).    
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Instead of following religious dogma, Montaigne ponders about the inconsistency that he 
finds everywhere in the startling variety of opinions that is made about every subject; he 
calls it the “shifting and inconsistency” in which “[w]e fluctuate betwixt various 
inclinations; we will nothing freely, nothing absolutely, nothing constantly” (E II. i).   
 Rather than connecting the self with an Augustinian principle of perfection and 
eternal unchanging truth, Montaigne takes a radical self-reflexive stance in writing about 
the self as a self to the effect that he ”is able to reject the subjective break that radical 
conversion demands only because he views experience as an unbroken continuum of 
micro-conversions” (CC 61).  The self-portrait is conceived as a serial representation that 
documents on-going change and constant flux, which Montaigne accepts as his condition 
that partakes in the changeable nature of being.  However, the fluency of the self does 
not stand in violation of a perceived essence that emerges as the sum of experience and 
he attempts to find a constant identity in the unity of body, mind, and soul, when he asks:  
 
[t]o what end do we dismember by divorce a building united by so close and brotherly a 
correspondence? Let us, on the contrary, confirm it by mutual offices; let the mind rouse 
and quicken the heaviness of the body, and the body stay and fix the levity of the soul. (E 
III. xiii) 
 
Riley evaluates and explains Montaigne’s idea about the union of the self and his 
insistence of the indivisibility of the self: 
 
The Essays is an attempt to give a voice to that totality, to represent the fullness and the 
indivisibility of the self. And yet the very stability of character depends on the constant, 
momentary variability of mental life, so much so that it is an open question whether one 
is ever ‘self-identical’. (CC 61) 
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The realization of the ‘man’ is the ‘Book of the Self’, which also becomes the 
source of Montaigne’s paradoxical sense of being: the nature of the self is both made and 
explored with words and therefore, book and self are inseparable.  He concludes that “I 
have no more made my book than my book has made me: 'tis a book consubstantial with 
the author, of a peculiar design, a parcel of my life” (E II. xviii).  The making is not only of 
the book, but of the self of the writer through making the book; Goodwin argues that 
“[t]hrough analogies that develop over the course of the Essays, Montaigne makes his 
book stand for the ‘body’ of his life experience, and the writing within it stand for the 
‘voice’ that speaks from experience. Language makes experience and thought incarnate” 
(Goodwin 90).   The correlation of text with self is complete and unmediated, thus the self 
is presented as something created in or transformed by the process of fashioning, which 
echoes Heidegger’s understanding that “the artist is the origin of the work. The work is 
the origin of the artist. Neither is without the other.”32  
 
Artistic Self-Fashioning in Writing 
 
Montaigne described his ever-changing nature as the force that produces 
originality.  From this insight, he deduced that every human being has a unique design for 
representing a particular way of life in which the limits of the self are drawn by self-
knowledge that functions as an antidote to self-delusion, which provides an 
“indispensable key to self-acceptance” (Taylor, SS 179).  By means of experimenting with 
and by observing the subtlest of his changes, Montaigne became aware of the perpetual 
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change inside and outside of himself.  He noticed that everything is always shifting, 
changing, becoming, and he concluded that impermanence is the true nature of being.  
He spoke of the minute-to-minute changes within him, which made him wonder whether 
a person can ever be self-identical:    
 
I cannot fix my object; 'tis always tottering and reeling by a natural giddiness; I take it as it 
is at the instant I consider it; I do not paint its being, I paint its passage; not a passing from 
one age to another, or, as the people say, from seven to seven years, but from day to day, 
from minute to minute, I must accommodate my history to the hour: I may presently 
change, not only by fortune, but also by intention. (E III. ii)  
 
According to Riley, Montaigne views the writing of himself as “painting passage 
[peindre le passage], collapsing portrait and story into a single metaphor,” that gives “a 
tension between a conception of the self as a reified product and a dynamic process” (CC 
12).  Montaigne recognizes the impossibility of freezing the self in time, which stands in 
opposition to the mobility and causal irreversibility involved in narrating one’s life and the 
understanding of all its contradictions.  Movement and change are the essence of being; 
not only is Montaigne affected and moved by circumstances, but he is inherently unstable 
and immersed in the flow of time.  The conflicting  but equal, impulses that show the self 
both as a portrait and a story, help to account for a disjuncture between what Montaigne 
perceives as his subjective core and the narrative of the events and emotions that 
supposedly constitute it.  The written self has indeed become another self, a self that 
once was him, but is no longer as that self is absorbed into its own description.  With 
Montaigne’s Essays, identity starts to take its shape from the outside, which confirms that 
“in the sixteenth century there appears to be an increased self-consciousness about the 
fashioning of human identity as a manipulable, artful process” (Greenblatt 2).  The 
Renaissance artist began to impose a textual shape upon himself in which the self 
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becomes present to itself in the words written on a page, words “that claim not access to 
the inner life but existence as the inner life. And the characteristic of these words – as 
opposed to modern attempts to record the discourse of interiority – is their public 
character, the apparent impersonality of their rhetorical structure, their performative 
mode” (Greenblatt 87).   
 
Modern Scepticism: Attack on Reason, Judgement and the Defence of 
Faith 
 
For Augustine, knowledge began through the senses, but for Montaigne, 
perception is reduced by human intentionality that shapes reason to suit various needs of 
the individual.  He says that “[o]ur senses are not only depraved, but very often stupefied 
by the passions of the soul; how many things do we see that we do not take notice of, if 
the mind be occupied with other thoughts?” (E II. xii).  Reasoning is swayed by passions 
and feelings such that what is known today will be doubted tomorrow; he therefore 
questions the attainability of knowledge through the soul:  
 
What assurance then can we take of a thing so mobile and unstable, subject by its 
condition to the dominion of trouble, and never going other than a forced and borrowed 
pace? If our judgment be in the power even of sickness and perturbation; if it be from 
folly and rashness that it is to receive the impression of things, what security can we 
expect from it? (E II. xii) 
 
Virginia Woolf attributed the contradictions in Montaigne to the complexity of the 
soul, indicative of a more searching scrutiny of the inner life and she writes that although 
he “attempt[s] to communicate a soul,” the soul remains basically unknowable; we 
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cannot know “how she works or what she is except that of all things she is the most 
mysterious, and one’s self the greatest monster and miracle in the world.”33    
Montaigne sees an epistemological dilemma of defending faith on the grounds of reason 
because reason relies on individual judgement, which in turn relies on the senses and the 
senses cannot be trusted to grasp the truth.  In the “Apology for Raymond Sebond”, he 
defends the Catholic faith against Raymond Sebond’s natural theology and against the 
attacks of atheists, who construct their argumentation equally by appealing to reason: 
 
I always call that appearance of meditation which every one forges in himself reason; this 
reason, of the condition of which there may be a hundred contrary ones about one and 
the same subject, is an instrument of lead and of wax, ductile, pliable, and accommodate 
to all sorts of biases, and to all measures. (E II. xii) 
 
The critique of presumptuousness rests on the conviction that, “[t]o treat one’s 
conception of ‘reason’ as an objective standard for judgment, moral or otherwise, is to 
fail to be sufficiently self-critical” (Edelman 35).  But Montaigne’s project was to discover 
the nature of the self and part of his aim of essaying is to question judgement, to become 
self-conscious how those judgements developed and changed over time.  In his 
“Apology”, Montaigne contemplates the impermanence of received opinions:  
 
So that when any new doctrine presents itself to us, we have great reason to mistrust, 
and to consider that, before that was set on foot, the contrary had been generally 
received; and that, as that has been overthrown by this, a third invention, in time to 
come, may start up which may damn the second. (E II. xii) 
 
He recognizes that nothing certain can be established about one thing by another and, if 
neither senses nor reason can be trusted, then it is difficult to be sure that anything exists 
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or is present in some substantial and permanent way, whether it is the self, or anything 
external to the self, the objects in the world.  Universal agreements are phenomena with 
limited temporal validity but in essaying himself, Montaigne takes reflective ownership of 
his moral beliefs, which then become part of his very self.  Edelman elaborates on 
Montaigne’s sense of self-discovery and self-constitution in text:  
 
In reflectively re-affirming or rejecting his customary judgments, he is able, in a sense, to 
actively constitute himself as an individual, taking over as his own that which was merely 
given to him pre-reflectively, and eliminating what he comes to recognize as merely 
adventitious. (46)   
 
Edelman suggests that the process of doubt arrives at certainty about a moral self.  Yet,  
though the ideal of self-responsibility led Montaigne to explore his inner world, in   
writing about the self he also sets up an impasse where the affirmation of self-presence is 
haunted by the absence of the other: although he attempts to find his continued identity, 
he ultimately has to confesses the failure of “recover[ing] contact with the permanent, 
stable, unchanging core of being” (Taylor, SS 178).  His most salient insight is the 
realization that human beings cannot know anything to a level of certainty nor can they 
sense beyond the phenomena of experience and Montaigne concludes the “Apology” 
with scepticism about how knowledge could produce an understanding or could even 
provide proof for the existence of God: 
 
We do not satisfy ourselves with serving God with our souls and understandings only, we 
moreover owe and render him a corporal reverence, and apply our limbs and motions, 
and external things to do him honour; we must here do the same, and accompany our 
faith with all the reason we have, but always with this reservation, not to fancy that it is 
upon us that it depends, nor that our arguments and endeavours can arrive at so 
supernatural and divine a knowledge. […] God owes his extraordinary assistance to faith 
and religion; not to our passions. (E II. xii) 
 
37 
 
Montaigne’s argumentation in the “Apology” seeks to elucidate the error in reasoning for 
the existence of God.  On the contrary, he says, the lack of knowledge of God is a 
predicament of the human condition, which can only be overcome by faith.  His argument 
for transcendence is directed against “the hubristic presumption that reason, unaided by 
faith, is enough to validate the belief that God exists and has the properties traditionally 
attributed to him.”34    
 
Ann Hartle argues that to regard Montaigne as a sceptic–fideist is an attempt to 
reconcile his presumed scepticism with his apparently sincere expressions of religious 
belief, which becomes, as she says, “in fact a double-edged sword: at the same time that 
it destroys the presumption of the atheists, it undercuts Sebond’s project of a rational 
defense of the faith” (Hartle 191).  According to Lionel Trilling, sincerity can be defined as 
“the absence of dissimulation or feigning or pretence” (13).  With Montaigne, the notion 
of a timeless and transcendent self began to fade and with it, the belief that it is 
necessary to communicate private thoughts in order to make a contribution to public life.  
Montaigne inaugurated the individual exploration of both the world and the particularity 
of the self; his ethics of identity challenged the repressive mechanisms of both Church 
and State in early modern Europe.  Sass states that at this time the “polarization of inner 
from outer or public man has strong evaluative implications, for there is an increasing 
tendency to value the inner self above its ‘mere’ social roles”,  and he continues with the 
assertion that “ the sixteenth-century ideal of sincerity came, by the nineteenth century, 
to be replaced by an emphasis on a rival ethic – authenticity […] where the point is not so 
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much to be true to other human beings as to be true to oneself, to fulfill one’s own 
inherent being and potential” (Sass 99).  For Rousseau, the issue of morality hinges on the 
question of how to recover authentic moral contact with oneself and he answers it by 
demanding the freedom to follow the voice of nature within himself, what Taylor 
describes as “self-determining freedom. It is the idea that I am free when I decide for 
myself what concerns me, rather than being shaped by external influences” (Taylor, EA 
27).   
 
Section 3: Autonomy of the Self and the Sentiment of Being in Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s The Confessions (1781-88) 
 
By naming his autobiographical project The Confessions, Rousseau inscribes 
himself in the long tradition of confessional narratives, but he reworks the Augustinian 
conversionary paradigm – his conversion is intellectual rather than religious – and he also 
departs from Montaigne’s self-representational enterprise that aimed to reach self-
knowledge.  The Confessions shifts the external act of confessing to God to an internal 
struggle of consciousness based on feelings, which shows Rousseau’s determination “to 
separate his book from the spiritual tradition of confession as well as from the humanist 
tradition of self-study” (Goodwin 91).  Confession takes the form of a narrative about 
oneself but it is not self-analysis in a clinical sense.  Rousseau writes according to a 
protestant tradition that locates the self in interiority; he believes in making himself 
transparent to an extent that would allow his readers to gain access to his very soul.  
Rousseau contrasted the inherent good of nature within mankind to the corrupting 
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influence of society.  Consequently, he turns inward in the search for his authentic self, to 
write an account of “a man as he was within.”35   
 
The Freedom to be Authentic 
 
The sixteenth-century ideal of sincerity, adhered to by Montaigne, was replaced 
by the new ethic of authenticity in the increasingly secular society of the late eighteenth 
century.  The idea of a fixed and immortal soul began to be displaced by the transitory 
self; therefore, in his writing Rousseau replaces the religious polarity of God and subject 
with a new antithesis in which God is exterior: instead of turning to God, he advocates a 
return to nature, where absolute freedom could be enjoyed in the state of self-
sufficiency, if man could shed his pretences of perfection, which Rousseau sees as “the 
true source of his misery” (CONF 362).  His sentimental idealism assumed a fundamental 
likeness of all men in their natural state and he persists in regarding autonomy for man as 
the only possible route to a happy life, but it might be argued that Rousseau fails to 
recognise that dependence on others is inevitable.  Although he regards his uniqueness as 
the quality that separates him from others, at the same time, he sees himself as part of a 
common human nature that includes virtues as well as vices.  This leads Rousseau to 
doubt the sincerity of Montaigne because, in his Essais, Montaigne only confessed what 
Rousseau regards as likable faults.  Rousseau, however, believes that his project of 
authenticity is pre-eminent, because “there is no human heart, however pure, that does 
not conceal some odious vice” (CONF 479).  Thus, he praises the virtue of sincerity “itself 
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and by itself. In other words, Rousseau is the first to define the good as being oneself 
regardless of what one may be. And that is a radically new position.”36 
Accordingly, Rousseau sets out to write a superior autobiography by including all 
the facets of his personality in order to give a total account of his life that would explain 
how he came to be this particular human being, Jean-Jacques Rousseau; he does not even 
shrink back – or so it would appear – from injuring himself in the eyes of the world.  Ann 
Hartle argues that Rousseau offers a subjectified portrait of himself, one which “while 
aiming squarely at Augustine both on the level of structure and of an ideology of 
subjectivity, creates a radically different, modern version of the self” (Hartle in Riley, CC 
89).  Rousseau sets his inner experiences as examples meant to show the opposition 
between the natural self and the deformed cultural self in order to reveal the artificiality 
of contemporary society that has lost its touch with nature by its obsession with manners 
and possessions. On the one hand, he is eager to show his individual autonomy and 
writes The Confessions according to the paradigm of a self that is constituted by its 
“natural” feelings, memories and reflections; whilst on the other, he sets himself up as 
the archetype that represents humanity at large.  The search for nature becomes a search 
for paradise lost; it shows the gulf between an ideal autonomous self, based on essence, 
and the real self that is forced into self-policing under the disciplining gaze of a society 
where the self “is subjected to a field of visibility” and thus the internalized consciousness 
of man “becomes the principle of his own subjection.”37  Although Rousseau emphasises 
his need to remove himself from the influences of a society which he regards as 
degenerate and artificial, his project is doomed to fail, because the confession of guilt and 
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shame shows his need to exonerate himself in the very eyes of the society he rejects.  
Repentance is a social act and Rousseau responds according to the conventions of his 
time in which the compulsive need to examine how he is judged by others finally 
culminates in a condition of persecutory paranoia.  So, Rousseau’s obsession alternates 
between the realization that his insistence on an autonomous self is no more than a self-
preserving fantasy, directed to defend the self from a progressive possession by others, 
and his own persistent need for the possession of others in order to control what is not-
himself. 
David Hume, in his study of human nature, writes that the real state of the self 
“independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing.”38  Passion is 
the agent that takes the self as an object and constitutes the individual.  Hume’s idea 
accords with Paul De Man’s later views in that Rousseau writes his autobiography in order 
to fill the void within the self by recalling his emotional states in every situation.  But the 
emerging self in all its contradictions is not rendered as an empty entity, as De Man would 
see it, as “pure nothingness […] nothingness stated and restated by a subject that is the 
agent of its own instability."39  Because Rousseau’s narration states how he felt in certain 
situations and towards people, he posits himself and gradually builds his identity in 
relation to others.  What emerges in Rousseau’s sustained self-revelation is not mere 
“nothingness,” but an ironic polarity between the acclaimed ideal of a “natural” integrity 
of the self and an emerging debased and corrupted historical self.  The Confessions shows 
the contrast between Rousseau’s sentimental idealism and the social reality of 
eighteenth-century society, where mannerism governs social conduct by rules of 
etiquette and the preoccupation with appearances induces a continuous self-fashioning, 
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necessary to integrate individuals in an increasingly commercialized society.40  The self is 
continuously formed and changed in its relations with others, who act as mirrors for the 
theatrical representation that the self performs on the stage of social life. 
Rousseau sees the deformation of the self as an effect of social interaction with 
others who have lost their natural sensibility for simple pleasures through a 
preoccupation with money and position in society.  In the service of the intelligent, 
sophisticated Countess de Vercellis, Rousseau suffers from the effects of her egotism and 
coldness of manners and deplores that she “always seemed to me to have as little feeling 
for others as for herself; and when she did a kindness to anyone in misfortune, it was in 
order to do something good on principle, rather than out of any true compassion” (CONF 
84).  The Countess is presented as a rational being who calculates the effects of her 
actions to suit her purposes: she is the classical example of the calculating rationalist of 
modernity. In being reduced to the status of a servant, Rousseau acutely senses that he is 
judged on his utility value for her rather than on his intrinsic value, which he sees as a 
deformation and denial of his true nature.  He suffers from the inequality that his position 
entails and her judgment of outward appearances that obliterates his true self, “since she 
saw nothing in me but a servant she prevented my appearing to her in any other light” 
(CONF 85).  Rousseau concludes that society’s prejudice corrupts the self’s natural 
disposition, whereas, as an outsider, his judgment of others is more profound in that he is 
able to maintain “a very natural aversion for the apparent order of things” (CONF 85).  
But his aloof impartiality does not ignore the usefulness of others to himself, which 
becomes obvious when he repeatedly states that he made “some sound acquaintances, 
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who have subsequently been either pleasant or useful to me;” and regrets his neglect in 
this respect, “for not having cultivated sufficiently,” (CONF 206) or deplores the limited 
success of introductions where “only three were useful to me” (CONF 266).  His aversion 
only extends to his own self being judged on appearances, and he ridicules what he sees 
as pretences in others, who successfully navigate between obliging appearance and self-
interest. M. de Gauffecourt is the example of one, who in serving “his friends zealously, or 
rather making friends of those whom he could serve” is looking after his own interest; he 
is “capable of cleverly managing his own affairs whilst warmly pursuing the interests of 
others” (CONF 204).  Rousseau is aware that man in a social setting, “is a mere histrionic 
representation – every man takes one or another ‘position’ as the choreography of 
society directs” (Trilling 31).  To serve his self-interest, Rousseau maintains useful 
contacts in society; to some extent he realizes that his idea of an autonomous self is a 
fantasy, but it is a desired state to which he repeatedly returns.  He stubbornly insists that 
he wants to remain “free and virtuous, superior to fortune and man’s opinion, and 
independent of all external circumstances” (CONF 332).  This desire to exercise free will is 
in opposition to a social reality where his emotional and economic dependency on others 
is indeed excessive, especially in the case of women who are his means of psychological 
and often financial well-being.  
 
The Impossibility to be without the Other 
 
Rousseau desires to be understood and to be loved by others, especially women, 
who embody what he wants to possess.  But the subjective limitations of Rousseau’s gaze 
prevent him from seeing women objectively and from connecting with anything outside 
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himself; his subjectivity refuses alterity.  Mme de Warens combines mother-figure and 
lover to such an extent that Rousseau must incorporate her entirely: “I did not think, feel, 
or breathe except through her” (CONF 194).  In this exclusive symbiotic relationship, 
Rousseau sees the possibility for a complete possession of the other:  
 
We began imperceptibly to become inseparable and, in a sense, to share our whole 
existence in common. Feeling that we were not only necessary but sufficient to one 
another, we grew accustomed to thinking of nothing outside ourselves, completely to 
confine our happiness and our desires to our possession of one another. (CONF 213) 
 
Only when money squandering threatens to ruin his life with Mme de Warens, 
does Rousseau decide to leave for Montpellier with the overt intent of curing his 
ailments, but as soon as he sets out for the journey, he starts an affair in which he claims 
to be the passive party, who succumbs to the conquest of Mme de Larnage.  Whenever 
Rousseau needs closeness to satisfy his needs, he conforms to the expectations of others: 
In being described as charming, he gets his reassurance so that he “became charming 
indeed” (CONF 237).  His chameleonic behaviour is indicative of his narcissistic 
dependence on others and shows that he is more than willing to conform as long as 
changes are in accordance with his own needs.  He desires Thérèse as an intimate 
companion, but thinks of her merely as a substitute for Mme de Warens, as “a successor 
to Mamma,” thus, he poignantly calls her “aunt” (CONF 310).  But even she cannot fill the 
void that Rousseau feels in himself, which he describes as a singular need for assimilating 
“two souls in the same body” (CONF 386).  Incapable of moderation in distance or 
closeness to others, he craves “all or nothing,” and consequently spoils all his 
relationships with impossible demands for total submission (CONF 483).  As no mortal 
woman can match his ideal, he gets momentary satisfaction from dreaming of ideal 
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objects, his “celestial amours” are the nymphs of nature (CONF 398).  The narcissistic 
transference of desires on to others, who remain mysterious, distorts Rousseau’s relation 
with the world and imprisons him in his private consciousness.  Waugh explains that the 
“other” is constructed though the projection of our own desire with the result that “the 
‘Other’ thus becomes a sacred but empty category – a relation of difference with no 
positive terms – as inaccessible to reasonable understanding as to careful observation or 
even old-fashioned human sympathy.”41  Rousseau’s underlying problem is otherness on 
a moral as well as on an existential level; morality is the voice of nature within us, but 
“[t]his voice is most often drowned out by the passions induced by our dependence on 
others, of which the key one is ‘amour propre’ or pride. Our moral salvation comes from 
recovering authentic moral contact with ourselves” (Taylor, EA 27). The Confessions 
shows the life-time struggle within himself.  Thus, he is neither able to overcome his 
distance from others, nor to create unity in his own self.  Instead, the self is continually 
displaced by Rousseau pointing to his unrealized potential self: 
 
[T]he natural self he could have become had an encounter with mediation not intervened 
to change its trajectory.  In other words, he has to content himself with suggesting a 
possible, hypothetical self impervious to the aleatory that would exist if only there were 
no world, no other, no mediation.42   
 
In a capitalist society, the individual has lost the sense of its fundamental needs 
and Rousseau seeks to reinstate the goodness of a natural self by insisting on the purity of 
nature to which the exchange value of money becomes an obstacle: “I am less tempted 
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by money than by things, because between money and the desired object there is always 
an intermediary, whereas between a thing and its enjoyment there is none” (CONF 46).  
Freedom and independence are found in the enjoyment of things which are readily 
available or cheap, but when society repeatedly denies Rousseau the bare necessities, 
due to his lack of money, he is compelled to act against his conscience: he trades his 
religion for money and converts to Catholicism (CONF 65-74).  His desperate attempts to 
extricate himself from the influence of society and thus preserve a sense of wholeness are 
thwarted and he realizes that it is impossible to live outside the social framework that 
governs social norms: on his return to Geneva, Rousseau states that shame compels him 
to revert back to Protestantism, but he also admits that re-conversion was necessary to 
re-establish his rights as a citizen (CONF 366).  Rousseau deplores that his social existence 
depends upon others, who drive him into inauthenticity.  
 
The Performative in Representation 
 
De Man argues that Rousseau’s self is displaced by staging his guilt and shame, 
which points to the fact that the confession of sins is not necessarily a disinterested act of 
sincerity.  In “Autobiography as De-Facement,” he describes what he sees as a slippage 
from the cognitive to the performative: “as soon as the performative function is asserted, 
it is at once reinscribed within cognitive constraints.”43  The Confessions employs a style 
of language that effectively effaces its subject by hiding and revealing the subject at the 
same time which inscribes tension throughout the text between representation and 
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misrepresentation.  Although Rousseau asserts that his character is unitary and consistent 
in its purity of feeling, he nevertheless frequently claims that his life is marked by crises 
and change that makes it impossible to express his motives in narrative form without 
including “some hint of censure or apology” (CONF 352).  As time and circumstances 
change, the self also changes in its relations to others.  Rousseau must defend his altered 
feelings in order to assert the self at each moment in time by retrospectively explaining 
what caused his repeated conversion, how he was affected by circumstances outside his 
control.  For the description of these subjective upheavals, he employs a “hyperbolic 
rhetoric” (IC 238) to smooth over the contradictions in his reasoning; for example, what 
caused his alienation from his friends.  At first, he proposes that they shunned him 
because of what he describes as changes in his behaviour towards them: “It was less my 
literary fame than my personal reformation […] that drew upon me their jealousy;” but 
then he is adamant that it was envy about his success as a writer: “As long as I lived 
unknown to the public I was beloved by all my private acquaintance, and I had not a 
single enemy.  But the moment I acquired literary fame, I had no longer a friend” (CONF 
363).  Rousseau’s writing aims at regaining what he has lost, only to discover that 
conversion is irreversible and that “the repeatedly converted self […] becomes immanent 
to a lost version of its own essence” (IC 239).    
Rousseau’s dilemma is that he attempts to get beyond the medium of language 
for the articulation of his feelings, but he does not realize that in the very instance of 
articulation he produces a version of the self that exists merely as a textual 
representation.  He sets up textual versions of himself at different times of his life that 
show his inconsistencies and contradictions. Goodwin states that Rousseau’s portrait of 
the self’s doubleness is due to “the interplay between the original turbulence of past 
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experience and its present dramatization in writing,” (95) and Saunders agrees that “the 
view of the self as process produces a text that is itself in process.”44  The self cannot be 
represented in its totality, but rather as a layered text with multiple impressions “that 
combine and overlap in continual self-eclipse – and that must be reproduced in the 
reactions and representations of other minds.”45  It is the responsibility of the reader to 
see through the multifarious textual representations and re-construct the wholeness of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  Morrissey summarizes that Rousseau’s romantic project fails to 
recognize that the written self exists only as a linguistic construction: 
 
On the one hand, he refuses to recognize that language, by definition, is convention, 
hence inhabited by Otherness, and that writing is a way of being-for-others; on the other 
hand, in having recourse to writing, he is making of the immediacy of his intimate life a 
means to justify himself in the eyes of others and thus he loses his own authenticity.46 
 
Authenticity as a Feeling Self 
 
The ideal of authentic personal being stands at the very centre of Rousseau’s 
thought, but he inevitably fails to realize himself in language.  Hume takes the conscious 
subject to be a bundle of states of the soul that constitutes our perceptions or sensations. 
Rousseau experiences himself as a self-enclosed individual whose non-reflective feelings 
are known only to himself; he describes them as a succession of “confused emotions […] 
giving me the strangest and most romantic notions about human life, which neither 
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experience nor reflection has ever succeeded in curing me of” (CONF 20).47   Emotions 
that make him different from others are the proof for his uniqueness as a human being: “I 
am made unlike any one I have ever met […] I am like no one in the whole world” (CONF 
17).  In reference to Wordsworth and Rousseau, Trilling states that “[f]or both men the 
sentiment of being was an unassailable intuition […] it is through our conscious certitude 
of our personal selfhood that we reach our knowledge of others” (92).  Rousseau takes 
the unmediated flow of individual feeling as the locus of genuine selfhood and self-
knowledge: “I have only one faithful guide on which I can count; the succession of feelings 
which have marked the development of my being, and thereby recall the events that have 
acted upon it as cause or effect” (CONF 262).  For him, passions are the universal essence 
of the self and not the rational thought of modern learning; therefore, he refutes the 
ideas of the Count de Saint-Pierre for the enlightenment of mankind through knowledge 
as a selfish and futile desire that seeks “to make all men like himself instead of taking 
them as they are and as they will continue to be” (CONF 393).  In the words of Goodwin, 
Rousseau gives “priority of feeling over reason, the importance of inner truth over 
worldly success” (9).  Rousseau’s replacement of Descartes’s famous maxim “I think 
therefore I exist”, signals “a radical shift from a rational and instrumentalist to a more 
consciously aesthetic strategy for realizing Enlightenment aims.”48   Therefore, it is 
imperative that in telling his life history, Rousseau applies what he considers to be the 
highest standard of truth, the standard of a “sensitive heart” (CONF 19).  What he does 
not realize is firstly, the impossibility of making his feelings transparent to others and 
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secondly, that his actions are always judged by public opinion.  Rousseau’s self-absorbed 
individualism constructs a world of his own, which remains inaccessible to others.  
Others, who are unable to read his heart, consequently accuse him of misanthropy and 
other traits that he cannot recognize in himself (CONF 398).  Rousseau’s outer 
appearance and his inner truth are perpetually disjointed. 
 
Desire and Guilt 
 
Temptation always proves irresistible to Rousseau; he is easily affected by the 
immediacy of fulfilling his desires, which leads him to exchange his security and prospects 
for advancement in society for the freedom to follow his inclinations.  Although the Solar 
family finally assures his position to be “a young man of the highest expectations, who 
was not in his proper place but was expected to get there,” Rousseau decides to leave 
their service for the prospect of recovering “all the joys of independence” (CONF 99-100).  
Loss of autonomy threatens to throw the romantic self into the service of the other, 
whereas Rousseau seeks freedom from the imposition of external codes of conduct: by 
rejecting his duty to others, he paradoxically becomes self-alienated.  Trilling could be 
equally speaking of Rousseau, as he says of the young Rameau: 
 
His thwarted passion for what society has to offer goes along with a scornful nihilism 
which overwhelms every prudential consideration; he is the victim of an irresistible 
impulse to offend those with whom he seeks to ingratiate himself. And stronger than his 
desire for respect is his appetite for demonstrative self-abasement. (29) 
 
Guilt about his decision leads him to neglect his duties and, rather than blaming 
himself for his misconduct, he constructs an argument that stresses the agency of his 
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employers, who react to his negligence by threatening him with dismissal, which he then 
takes as an excuse for complete defiance.  Rousseau’s invocation of the emotional 
intends to show the true self, to present himself as he believes how he actually was, but 
he does not understand that his “truth of the heart” is merely a reflection of his own 
desire for purity and innocence but not how he appears to others.  In writing The 
Confessions, Rousseau tries “to recuperate and articulate what is lost in the self’s 
encounters with the world” (IC 238).  Indeed, what is always lost is the honesty of his 
motives in dealing with others by concealing his true motives.  Thus, in order to avert his 
apparent guilt, Rousseau disguises his motives for leaving the service by pretending that 
the actions of his benefactors have compromised his dignity.  The result is the creation of 
a subjectivity more concerned with how he actually felt in his relations to others, than 
with his actual relations to others as such.  De Man describes the double epistemological 
perspective in which confessional language and inner truth work together:  
 
It functions as a verifiable referential cognition, but it also functions as a statement whose 
reliability cannot be verified by empirical means. The convergence of the two modes is 
not a priori given, and it is because of the possibility of a discrepancy between them that 
the possibility of excuse arises.49 
 
Interestingly, he argues further, that the relation between guilt and excuse in The 
Confessions might be a reversal of cause and effect:  
 
It is no longer certain that language, as excuse, exists because of a prior guilt but just as 
possible that since language, as a machine, performs anyway, we have to produce guilt 
(and all its train of psychic consequences) in order to make the excuse meaningful. 
Excuses generate the very guilt they exonerate, though always in excess or by default. (AR 
299, emphasis added) 
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Looking at the above example, it seems to be more likely that the sequence of excuse 
followed by guilt is not quite as De Man explains.  The guilt comes first, because Rousseau 
knows that he deliberately behaved badly in order to force his employers to dismiss him.  
Rather than to appear ungrateful and morally in the wrong, his guilt provokes him to put 
agency in the hands of others, to relieve himself from having to act; he coaxes them to 
provide the excuse that he needs for leaving their service.  Retrospectively, Rousseau 
admits that he had behaved with injustice and ingratitude “in order to provide myself 
with an excuse […] I imagined that I could put them in the wrong and justify myself in my 
own eyes by claiming that my action had been forced upon me” (CONF 101).  In writing 
about his guilt that needed an excuse, he excuses himself in the eyes of his readers by 
pointing out that his on-going motive for extracting himself from the impositions of 
society is because he is weak, “easily discouraged, particularly in difficult and lengthy 
enterprises […] I looked on distant objectives as decoys for fools” (CONF 385).  This 
explains his character, which lacks the stamina for a steady advancement in society.  
Instead of slow progress, he prefers outbursts of energy, which always gratify his needs 
immediately but which leave him oblivious to the consequences that his actions have on 
himself or others. 
 
Inauthenticity in Representation 
 
In order to represent himself to others, Rousseau must act and he sets the stage 
for the protagonist he is devising: in the double role of narrator and protagonist he has 
the power to manipulate the point of view of others.  He claims to have made his soul 
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transparent to the world, to have truthfully depicted himself as he was then, but he 
manages to appear as he wishes to be seen.  Marshall explains that the creation of a self 
projects Rousseau into inauthenticity, into role playing, and although Rousseau writes in a 
variant beginning of The Confessions that “no one can write the life of a man but himself,” 
he also acknowledges that “in writing it he disguises it; under the name of his life story he 
makes his apology; he shows himself as he wants to be seen” (Rousseau in Marshall 105).  
Reality manifests itself in appearances, which can be true or false, but they have to be 
read correctly by others.  The evil of false appearance separates Rousseau from “the 
people he loves best” in moments which mark the end of his serenity and pure childhood 
happiness.  Although he is innocent and persistent in assuring his honesty, he is accused 
of having broken a hair comb and severely punished for the deed (CONF 29).  Rousseau 
suffers unjust punishment due to the incongruence between inner self and outer 
appearances and the impossibility to “communicate the immediate evidence of inward 
conviction. From that moment paradise is lost, for paradise was the state of transparent 
communication between mind and mind, the conviction that total, reliable 
communication is possible” (Starobinski 8).  The episode ends in the psychological trauma 
of no longer knowing who he is because of his inability to reconcile the two conflicting 
representations: innocence and guilt. Rousseau now realizes that his true self is 
inaccessible to others, because it remains “hidden, invisible, covered over by exterior 
traits that mask its true character with a type of false representation” (Marshall 108).  
Rousseau is misperceived by others and the self suffers for its appearance that other 
people do not share his truth.  Before the self senses its distance from the world, it 
experiences its distance from others through loss of respect for and confidence in others, 
resulting in secrecy, rebellion and lies (CONF 31).  Misperceived appearances increasingly 
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lead to social anxiety, a sign of the problematic relationship between the self and its 
representation in the world.   
Rousseau constantly aims at overcoming the difference between self and others in 
conforming to the thoughts and expectations of others, by fitting himself into “the 
representational grid governed by the other” (IC 238).  Initially, Rousseau characterizes 
himself as an ultra-modest man that “there was never, I believe, a creature of our kind 
with less vanity than I” (CONF 25). The effect of this claim makes Rousseau appear 
unnaturally vain as he sets himself up as an example for others to follow.  After his 
success as a writer it becomes obvious that his vanity was always hidden when he tells 
that his greatest misfortune was the “inability to resist flattery” (CONF 346).  Rousseau 
claims moderation as his virtue but always aims at extremes in order to be popular: 
“Anyone who excels in something […] is always sure to be sought after […] I shall be 
sought after, opportunities will present themselves, and my merit will do the rest” (CONF 
271).  But it is not always aggrandizement that leads him to pretend: repeatedly, 
Rousseau is driven by poverty or fate to present himself in a favourable light in order to 
coax others into fulfilling his needs.  He not only wants to be recognized as an equal, but 
needs to impress others, even if he has to resort to lying in “certain moments of 
incomprehensible delirium in which I was not myself” (CONF 144).  Thus, he pretends to 
possess abilities, even when it is evident that he has no talent at all to fulfil the 
expectations of others.  By imitating a composer he once knew and admired, Rousseau 
thinks that he could actually write musical scores himself: “I was so fired by this idea that 
without thinking that I had neither his charm nor his talents I took it into my head to play 
the little Venture at Lausanne, to teach music, of which I was ignorant, and to say that I 
came from Paris, where I had never been” (CONF 144).  Evidently, the actual performance 
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of his composition turned out disastrously, except for a short melody at the end, which 
Rousseau had plagiarized from his model composer.   
Marshall explains that Rousseau is aware of acting and making a spectacle of 
himself to the extent that The Confessions “both narrate and enact Rousseau’s 
exhibitionism and his obsessive concern with public opinion and the eyes of the world” 
(Marshall 102).  Ensuing feelings of shame and guilt provoke him to confess his sham to a 
member of the orchestra, but – as Rousseau might have anticipated – the man makes his 
secret public.  Public opinion is judgemental, therefore Rousseau makes his self-
revelations with the view to winning acceptance in society, but his honesty is not 
accepted; and he is ignored and humiliated.  Self-revelation offers the truth of the self, a 
truth that others might be persuaded to see, especially when vices are included which 
Rousseau intends as the proof for “his genuine innocence within fashionable society, 
which he regularly denounces as counterfeit and conspiratorial” (Goodwin 98).  By 
revealing his vices, he aspires to the status of the confessant as a hero, although under 
the proviso that his account might suffer from “defects of memory,” which do not trouble 
him too much as he tells his readers on the opening page of The Confessions, Book One:   
 
Here is what I have done, and if by chance I have used some immaterial embellishment it 
has been only to fill a void due to a defect of memory. I may have taken for fact what was 
no more than probability, but I have never put down as true what I knew to be false and 
veracity have I related what was laudable or wicked, I have concealed no crimes, added 
no virtues; and if I have sometimes introduced superfluous ornament, it was merely to 
occupy a void occasioned by defect of memory: I may have supposed that certain, which I 
only knew to be probable, but have never asserted as truth, a conscious falsehood. (CONF 
17) 
 
 
Sentimental Memory 
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Unlike Proust, Rousseau does not believe that a forgotten event could hide an 
essential truth; rather, memories have sentimental values that remind him of happiness 
past: the sight of a periwinkle is joyful because it reminds him of the simple delights he 
had shared with Mme de Warens in the countryside at Les Charmettes thirty years ago 
(CONF 216).  Retrospectively, he judges that “true happiness is quite indescribable; it can 
only be felt, and the stronger the feeling the less it can be described, because it is not the 
result of a collection of facts but a permanent state” (CONF 224-225).  But instead of 
stopping his narrative, he immediately continues his reminiscences over the next nine 
pages.  Even if memories are unreliable, they give opportunity for the writer to select true 
as well as false memories to create his own subjective truth, to present the plausible and 
to conceal the inconvenient.   
 Rousseau is in the paradoxical position of revealing and concealing himself in his 
writing because he must write and hide himself simultaneously: “[b]eing forced to speak 
in spite of myself, I am also obliged to conceal myself, to be cunning, to try to deceive, 
and to abase myself to conduct that is not in my nature” (CONF 263).  Rousseau not only 
views and experiences himself as an autonomous individual, a separate and unique self, 
but also as a self that is divided into a true inner self and a false outer self.  The false self 
appears in relations to others, through contact with society, whilst the true self 
experiences its separation from others.  
 
Society corrupts the Innocent Self 
 
Rousseau discovers “that other people do not share his truth, his innocence, and 
his good faith […] Before the self senses its distance from the world, it experiences its 
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distance from others” (Starobinski 10).  When other people’s perceptions fail to recognize 
what he knows to be his true nature and the true reason for acting or not acting, he 
concludes that the loss of the self is the effect of a depraved culture, which forces him to 
perform in roles that alienate him from others.  Linda Anderson explains what Rousseau 
gains from assigning a persecutory role to other people: it “confirms his shame and thus 
also, perversely, increases his pleasure; and it is because the pleasure is shameful and 
secret that it becomes all the more gratifying for him to reveal by confessing to it in his 
text.”50  Rousseau critiques the display of great passions in others as false appearances 
that intend to mask self-interest or vanity (CONF 144).  He does not realize that his own 
display of passionate feelings could be regarded as hypocritical.  Consequently, his project 
of presenting himself as a unified, autonomous subject is bound to fail.  Saunders 
describes the result as “a deferral, a displacement, a sense of fictionalization, which 
seems to conceal as much as it reveals, the self feels like an imaginary other” (190).  This 
“imaginary other” shows the disparity between ideal and outcome: it is the result of 
encounters with the world that lead the self increasingly further afield from integrity in a 
“repeatable chain of deaths which the self always somehow survives, but from which it 
emerges in an increasingly disfigured guise” (IC 236). Marshall concludes that Rousseau’s 
obsession with public revelation makes The Confessions “an avowedly theatrical book” 
(Marshall 102).  Rousseau is acutely aware that the intelligibility of his book rests on how 
he represents his life.  Thus, the book has become the stand-in for the individual it 
portrays.   
Rousseau replaces Augustine’s address to a transcendent being with himself in the 
role of the confessing subject that addresses readers with pathos.  His act of penance is 
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not conducted in privacy, “but before a forum of his future readers,” with guilt and shame 
intended as proof for the veracity of his confession (Goodwin 94).  Veliki explains the 
paradox that puts an end to Rousseau’s autobiographical project: it fails “because 
Rousseau has to use language to express his self and he remains irremediably split in and 
by language. His autobiographical texts aspire to truth but truth remains secondary to 
staging the drama of the self.”51  Words are the only means available to explain what he 
felt and Rousseau repeatedly asks the reader to sympathize or to share his feelings.  
Furthermore, he seeks to transfer his feelings on to the reader, to make him feel what he 
felt.  But from the point of view of the reader, the facts of feeling cannot be verified by 
anyone but the writer.  The significant truth of The Confessions is always relative to the 
self, which demonstrates Rousseau’s essentially solipsistic attitude of self-importance.  
Feelings are Rousseau’s absolute authority, thus, feeling inaugurates the truth and 
demonstrates his sincerity.  But inner certainty is not enough; it must be revealed to 
others and he writes for an imaginary audience, “the public which society created” 
(Trilling 25). 
Frequently, Rousseau offers incidences to his readers which he intends to be 
iconic representations of his character, but he takes no responsibility for the resulting 
image.  Instead, he repeatedly appeals to the reader to suspend judgement (CONF 261) or 
asks the reader to “sympathize with me in my grief” (CONF 42).  He defers the possibility 
of a final verdict by pointing out that he can never say enough to complete the picture of 
himself and his misfortunes, “I shall have only too much to say to my readers on that 
melancholy subject” (CONF 51).  He even warns his readers about the dangers of 
misunderstanding his testimony by pointing out: “my function is to tell the truth, not to 
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make people believe it” (CONF 192).  His pleadings shift the responsibility of assessing his 
character to the reader’s ability for correct interpretation: “The summing-up must be his, 
and if he comes to wrong conclusions, the fault will be of his own making” (CONF 169).  It 
is evident that Rousseau’s primary goal is to demonstrate the veracity of the narrative 
with reference to intimate feeling by insisting on the strict contemporaneity of every 
emotion that he communicates to his readers.  Whether the link between “inner” feeling 
and “outer” action is intentional remains a matter of interpretation, although it is obvious 
that Rousseau wants to be judged by his own standards and he seeks to justify his actions 
by referring to his emotions; thus it becomes possible to vindicate his betrayal of Marion 
by pointing to his good intentions:  
 
Never was deliberate wickedness further from my intention than at that cruel moment. 
When I accused that poor girl, it is strange but true that my friendship for her was the 
cause. She was present in my thoughts, and I threw the blame on the first person who 
occurred to me. I accused her of having done what I intended to do myself. I said that she 
had given the ribbon to me because I meant to give it to her. (CONF 88) 
 
His justification shows a paradoxical transference of his desire for Marion: He tells 
the reader that the stolen ribbon was intended as a gift for Marion, but in the moment of 
accusation, Rousseau had to deflect the disgrace of being a thief, a deed which he does 
not want to hide from his readers, only from the people present at the time of the 
incident.  Furthermore, for his reading audience only, he twists his argumentation so as to 
vindicate his accusation of Marion by revealing that he wanted to be desired by her and 
thus to believe that she would have stolen the ribbon for him.  Rousseau deflects his guilt 
and exonerates himself by appealing to the reader to take into consideration the 
unbearable state of shame he experienced at a young age, his weakness and confusion in 
being intimidated at the scene; he even rationalizes that he has derived the moral benefit 
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of having been cured for life “against any act that might prove criminal in its result” 
(CONF 89).  In other words, he excuses the cruelty of his action with specious reasoning 
that exonerates him from guilt.  Rousseau has to devise a system of internal coherence 
that can explain his action.  Joshua Landy describes the psychological process in which the 
intellect is corrupted by desire: “when an emotional investment is at stake, it does not so 
much reason as rationalize, constructing endless ‘pretexts’ for doing what we already 
wanted to do and believing what we had already decided to believe.”52  
De Man explains that words create rather than reflect the subject, which shows 
his suspicion regarding any claim to truth that is based on individual feeling, which is 
communicable but always unverifiable.  Thus, he states that “Rousseau can convey his 
‘inner feeling’ to us only if we take, as we say, his word for it, whereas the evidence for 
his theft is, at least in theory, literally available” (AR 280).  The same logic applies to 
Rousseau’s excuse for the abandonment of his five children to the Foundling Hospital, 
where he justifies the cruel deed by firstly stating that he acted virtuously in not 
concealing what he did, and secondly, by insisting that he “really saw nothing wrong in it” 
(CONF 334).  Furthermore, he presumes altruistic intentions in that the welfare of his 
children was at the forefront of his mind in stating that “I could have wished, and still do 
wish, that I had been brought up and nurtured as they have been” (CONF 334).  The 
excuse is empty rhetoric as the adult Rousseau cannot wish for a different childhood, 
especially for one which is unknowable to him in all its dire consequences. De Man 
reveals that the excuse is always unverifiable, because it exists only as an act of speech, 
which is “verbal in its utterance, in its effect and in its authority,” and its “purpose is not 
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to state but to convince, itself an ‘inner’ process to which only words can bear witness” 
(AR 281-2).  Convincing his readers of his moral superiority, Rousseau wishes not to 
apologize but to tell the truth, which compels him to compare his negligence as a father 
to the malice of others, who subsequently betrayed his confidence.  He twists his 
argumentation in order to play down his responsibility and claims that the lack of feeling 
justifies his action, because “a father’s feelings cannot speak very loudly for children he 
has never seen” (CONF 335).   Instead, he insists that the abandonment of his children 
was far less abominable than the disclosure of his secret to the public by his friends, a 
breach of trust, which he condemns vociferously:  
 
But to betray a friend’s confidences, to violate the most sacred of all bonds, to 
publish secrets entrusted to our bosom, deliberately to dishonour the friends we 
have deceived and who still respect us as they say good-bye – those are not faults; 
they are utter baseness and infamy. (CONF 335)   
 
The rhetorical trick of comparing two different deeds – the disposal of his children and his 
friends’ reactions – not only turns Rousseau into a victim but also deflects his own moral 
failure.  Rather than restoring a hidden chain of feelings, Rousseau presents an elaborate 
chain of reasoning in his defence against anticipated accusations.53 
De Man explains that the rhetorical act allegorizes the self which “disrupts 
continuity between cognitive and performative rhetorics. Confession produces truth 
(cognitive) by disclosing the deeds of the one confessing, but undermines itself as 
confession when this cognitive truth functions as excuse (performative).”  It is language 
that performs the truth in writing.  De Man relates to the Derridean “performative 
promise” and argues that the performative act is a necessity for the constitution of text, 
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because “language itself dissociates the cognition from the act. Die Sprache verspricht 
(sich); to the extent that is necessarily misleading, language just as necessarily conveys 
the promise of its own truth” (AR 277).  The act of writing a public self-portrait is twofold 
for Rousseau: To tell a subjective truth about his personal history and to explain his 
actions by excusing himself, an act in which the truth counts less than the oath.  
According to Derrida, Rousseau makes a performative promise, which is his 
“written promise to write this book in such and such a way, to sign it in conformity with a 
promise.”54  His intent to confess is Rousseau’s promise to perform an action, to tell the 
world about his misfortunes.  The excuse counts as a performative utterance, which does 
not just describe but has the potential to create reality and, in this respect, is not subject 
to the conventional true/false dichotomy. Excuses in speech-act theory are subject to 
“felicity conditions,” where they depend on the sincerity of the speaker.55  Rousseau is 
caught between the two functions of language, the rhetorical performative that excuses 
and the performative self-fashioning of the self in language, in the trope of allegory.  It is 
the figurative nature of allegory that always refers to something other than itself. Thus, in 
a Derridian sense, it is allegory which deconstructs the text and reveals the self as a 
construct of language and writing as a linguistic performance which inevitably fictionalizes 
the self.  The tropological structure that underlies all cognitions, including knowledge of 
the self, denies the possibility of a connection between language and subject.  The 
impossible act of putting the self into language inevitably entails a disfigurement of the 
self, which De Man ascribes to rhetoricity: 
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[While Rousseau's text] accounts for its own mode of writing, it states at the same time 
the necessity of making this statement itself in an indirect, figural way that knows it will 
be misunderstood by being taken literally. Accounting for the "rhetoricity" of its own 
mode, the text also postulates the necessity of its own misreading. It knows and asserts it 
will be misunderstood.56 
 
Indeed, Rousseau’s feelings of being misunderstood grow exponentially and reach 
such an extent that he feels under constant surveillance and persecution in writing The 
Confessions; he imagines being surrounded by spies, friends have become enemies who 
weave their intrigues, throwing him into an “impenetrable darkness” in which the 
intentions of others remain mysterious, their minds opaque to him (CONF 458).  Rousseau 
avoids the confrontation with others through the projection of his own desire on to 
others with the result that he can “understand neither the world nor [his] place in it: in 
losing the Other, Rousseau loses himself” (Morrissey in Starobinski xxiv).  This mounting 
pressure of imaginary barriers between himself and society compels him to complete his 
version of events before others can stop him. Rousseau sees himself as the victim of a 
society in which “public authority exists for the oppression of the weak and the iniquity of 
the strong” (CONF 306).  Lionel Trilling explains Rousseau’s dilemma in writing The 
Confessions; it “was not a gratuitous undertaking. It was the painstaking demonstration of 
the author’s authority to speak plain, to bring into question every aspect of society […] he 
is the subject of The Confessions. He is the man; he suffered; he was there” (24).   
Enfeebled by repeated attacks on his autonomy, Rousseau renews his resolve for 
independence by relying on his talent as a composer of operas, a task in which he had 
previously failed (CONF 308-309).  In the quarrels that surround his eventual success as a 
composer, he feels himself to be victimized by others who conspire against his 
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advancement in society.  His anxiety increases to such an extent that even after his 
success as a writer he feels alienated from his friends and the subject of their intrigues 
(CONF 338).  Every opponent turns into a grave enemy; he even feels besieged by his 
admirers, who avenge themselves when rejected by accusing Rousseau of arrogance and 
ostentation.  He feels persecuted by the public and even alienated from his own family, 
who also seem to conspire against him: “There were continual whisperings with my 
friends; everything was a secret and a mystery to me in my own house” (CONF 343).  The 
incomprehensible behaviour of others becomes an unbearable burden that threatens his 
autonomy: “I had hung a chain around my neck, and that only friendship had so far 
prevented me from feeling its weight” (CONF 382). 
  
Incongruence between Private Self and Public Self 
 
Rousseau develops a paranoid obsession with the other’s gaze that reflects the 
public’s opinion. Consequently, he “can only claim identity with his natural self because 
his public image has become so aberrant that not even he could possibly resemble it” (IC 
245).  The theatrical aspect is Rousseau’s negotiating of the relation between the private 
self and public self by attempting to exhibit himself completely to the point that nothing 
“must remain hidden or obscure” (CONF 65).  Repeatedly, Rousseau’s confused 
revelations intensify to such an extent that he refers to or includes letters verbatim as 
supplementary evidence, aimed to support his claims of innocence against the evil of 
others, but the exchange of correspondence only shows that he constantly misreads 
others and is in turn being misread by them.  Diderot writes, in a well-meaning letter, that 
his ignorance of public opinion turns his behaviour into a subject for misinterpretation, 
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that he will be “suspected of ingratitude or of some other secret motive,” if he continues 
to rely on the testimony of his conscience as the sole source for conveying his motives 
(CONF 442).  Diderot’s lucid insight into Rousseau’s psyche is not only seen as an 
impertinent judgement, but Rousseau also detects “some underhand dealings” that point 
to Diderot’s involvement in a conspiracy against him (CONF 443).57  Increasing paranoia 
even leads to his belief that Voltaire wrote Candide as a sly reply to one of his letters, 
which seems all the more ridiculous because Rousseau also says that he had never read 
the novel (CONF 400).  Undoubtedly, Rousseau suffered from paranoia, but in some 
instances he, the son of a watch-maker, who had ventured into a society in which he did 
not belong by right of birth, had cause to feel that society persecuted him repeatedly by 
thwarting his ambitions.   
Rousseau pursues a transcendent self that desires to merge with some absolute 
ideal of self and, above all, he desires to justify his individual existence.  The result is a 
fictionalized self that at once remains incongruent for the author and strangely puzzles 
readers with all its inconsistencies and contradictions of character.  “From Rousseau we 
learned that what destroys our authenticity is society – our sentiment of being depends 
upon the opinion of other people” (Trilling 93).  The negotiating between the disparate 
private and public selves, inaugurated by Rousseau, will be further elaborated in the 
consciously aestheticized self-portraits of twentieth-century modernist and 
postmodernist writings that emphasise the invented and projected nature of the self.  
Rousseau’s work effectively introduced the concept of the divided self of narcissism that 
becomes the preoccupation of writers from Virginia Woolf and Marcel Proust to Doris 
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Lessing and Vladimir Nabokov.  However, his narrative is expressive of the self’s elusive 
relations with its ‘selves’ may also be seen not only as kindling in time the idea of the self 
as a dissenter to itself, but also the idea of the self and its double.   
The range of primary source extracts that are available to show the evolving and 
often conflicting ideas about social identity that emerged from the new mental sciences 
between 1830 and 1890 is amply illustrated by Jenny Bourne Taylor and Sally 
Shuttleworth’s Embodied Selves: An Anthology of Psychological Texts (1998).  Section four 
will examine the literature of “The Double,” in which the repressed “Other” returns as an 
exteriorized split self.  The idea emerges first in the novels of Thomas De Quincey and 
James Hogg and was later explored by Robert Louis Stevenson and Henry James.  These 
texts are intended – albeit as a brief sketch – to show the transition between the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, from a predominantly moral, social, metaphysical 
idea of the self to one that is increasingly complicated by the rise of modern psychological 
theories of the self in medical and psychological accounts of human nature in the new 
psychophysical, Darwinian and biological discourses of the nineteenth century.  This will 
show how the “split” selves of Augustine, Montaigne and Rousseau are reinterpreted 
through the rise of psychoanalysis and the materialist account of the self.  By the 
twentieth century, the “self” emerges as a narrative, moral, biological, psychological, 
social, metaphysical subject and out of this complex legacy, the “decentred” subject of 
postmodern autobiografiction will emerge. 
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Section 4: The Dissociation of the Self in the Literature of the Double 
 
Since Immanuel Kant aimed to provide a "metaphysics of morals" by a priori 
reasoning from the concept of human beings seen as rational agents with autonomous 
wills,58 the question of one’s identity has become more and more part of the investigation 
into human nature.  The Romantic era had opened up the vast interiors of the self and 
Victorian writers began to dramatize the wider metaphysical question about the 
constitution of the self in the framework of moral and legal systems.  Jenny Bourne Taylor 
specifies the crux of the nineteenth-century enquiry into the nature of the self:  
 
Is there a co-ordinating power within each individual, formed through memory and 
shaping individual will, that constitutes the core of the self? Or are we nothing but a 
series of bodily sensations, cerebral reflexes and fragmented memories that together 
constitute the fiction of individuality?59  
 
The literature of the double attempts to give imaginative representation of “man’s 
relation to himself – and the fateful disturbance of this relation –.”60  In Victorian culture, 
the double becomes an emblem of self-estrangement that expresses the burden of a 
rigid, morally repressive culture, where evil is unconsciously designated to the half that is 
different, external, or other from oneself.  In 1914, the psychoanalyst Otto Rank 
proposed, in “Der Doppelgänger” (“The Double”, published in book form 1925), that “the 
‘double’ was originally an insurance against the destruction of the ego, an ‘energetic 
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denial of the power of death’, and probably the ‘immortal’ soul was the first ‘double’ of 
the body.”61  James Hogg dramatizes the literary motif of the double as the internal split 
between conflicting selves.  The psychological authenticity in the portrayal of Robert 
Wringhim’s double personality could be an effect of Hogg’s knowledge about split 
personality and hallucinatory mental disturbance that he gained during his visits to the 
Edinburgh Asylum.  Rank explains further that modern man, who developed “an over-
civilized ego” in an increasingly secularized civilization, “disintegrates by splitting up […] 
into two opposing selves.”62  Thomas De Quincey shows this split in the description of 
himself as he was before and after his descent into the hell of addiction.  The justification 
for seeking out an artificial paradise controls his confessional narrative and hinges on the 
excuse that “[i]t was not for the purpose of creating pleasure, but of mitigating pain in the 
severest degree, that I first began to use opium as an article of daily diet” (Opium Eater 
6). 
 
The Psychological Double and Dual Brain Theory 
 
The theme of the Doppelgänger or “Double” abounds in nineteenth-century 
literature.  Other writers, such as Robert Louis Stevenson and Henry James inherited 
psychological insights for their imaginative exploration of mental and moral dualisms 
from James Hogg and Thomas De Quincey, picking up the form of ‘splitting’ that was laid 
bare in Rousseau of a self, struggling to articulate its ‘essence’ or autonomy against the 
pressure of social conformism and construction.  Nineteenth-century novelists captured 
                                                          
61
 Otto Rank in Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, ed. Vincent B. Leitch (New York: Norton, 2001) 
940.  
62
 Otto Rank, “The Double as Immortal Self,” Beyond Psychology, 1941 (New York: Dover 1958) 65. 
69 
 
the growing sense of dissociation that ensued from an anxiety that orthodox beliefs and 
values could no longer be taken as factual truth.  In response to secularization and 
agnosticism, their writings became “predominantly concerned with moral conflict, with 
conflict in the human will, with the dialectic of spiritual pride, and especially with the 
problem of evil and the issue of free will” (Herdman 3-4).  
In James Hogg’s Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner (1824), the 
evil Gill-Martin is a projection of Robert Wingham’s anxiousness over his legitimacy; he 
can be seen as a double psychological entity that allows Robert to dissociate himself 
“from that part of his ego of which his conscious thoughts disapprove and from which he 
is trying to escape.”63  Hogg’s narrative may be read in the religious tradition, because it 
reworks the question of salvation in the setting of rigorous Puritan Christianity in which 
the elected were thought of as incapable of doing wrong.  To the Calvinist mind, the 
double posed an evocative metaphor for the contradictions inherent in the problem of 
salvation and to the Romantic sensibility of Hogg, the doubling of identity allows him to 
portray how the person marked out for salvation may indeed be the worst of sinners.  But 
paradoxically, the very assurance of being in an unassailable state of grace seemed only 
to confirm the sinfulness of such a belief when, at the pivotal moment of Robert’s internal 
conflict, Gil-Martin appears as the personification of his darker side.  Hogg’s splitting and 
doubling of character provides a metaphor for the essentially contradictory nature of the 
role set out in his title: a justified sinner is the paradox of the sinner immediately 
exonerated from his sins and therefore is both sinner and not sinner.   
Thomas De Quincey still uses the word confession in the title Confessions of an 
English Opium Eater (1821), but he inverts both the confessional paradigm and the 
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Romantic ideal of self-expression by presenting himself as a medical case rather than an 
autobiographical project.  The anti-confessional rhetorical style shows a transgressing 
subject who substitutes opium for God and intoxication for the Christian experience of 
religious conversion:   
 
This is the doctrine of the true church on the subject of opium: of which church I 
acknowledge myself to be the only member—the alpha and the omega […] Thou only 
givest these gifts to man; and thou hast the keys of Paradise, oh, just, subtle, and mighty 
opium!64 
 
In undermining the Christian context, confession becomes a mechanism for self-
fashioning, an “impulse to confirm the self as it is (the same) and the impulse to become 
or to make it strange, ideal, or permanent (the other)” (Fleishman 33).  By proclaiming 
that “[n]ot the opium-eater, but the opium, is the true hero of the tale” (Opium Eater 78), 
De Quincey decentres and destabilizes his biographical self with the intention of 
becoming an observer of visions produced through the consciousness-altering effects of 
the drug.  The digressive mode of writing allows for a continuous elaboration of the self, 
which creates an essentially modern form of subjectivity in which “space swells endlessly, 
and time expands to eons of consciousness, ‘far beyond the limits of any human 
experience.’”65  In a secular age, intoxication seems to promise the possibility of re-
establishing contact with the ineffable self.  
The reforming qualities of the confessional mode are undermined by the 
convoluted apology that seeks to pre-empt readers’ objections to his opium experiments.  
He shows a persistent fascination with the antagonistic forces of the drug: it is both a 
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demonic and destructive source of terror and one which gives unadulterated happiness, 
an “abyss of divine enjoyment” (Opium Eater 39).  According to De Quincey, opium acts as 
a tonic for the corrupted heart; it gives “a healthy restoration to that state which the 
mind would naturally recover upon the removal of any deep-seated irritation of pain that 
had disturbed and quarrelled with the impulses of a heart originally just and good” 
(Opium Eater 41).  Opium reorganizes the past through the reconfiguration of painful 
memories with the effect that they are “no longer painful to dwell upon: but the detail of 
its incidents removed, or blended in some hazy abstraction; and its passions exalted, 
spiritualised, and sublimed” (Opium Eater 45-46).  The pleasures of opium-taking “offer 
not merely the prospect of immediate relief from pain and anxiety but also an entirely 
new perspective from which to ‘consume the world’” and furthermore, “opium becomes 
a metaphor for aesthetic experience in general, a mode of seeing in which ethical 
considerations are laid aside and life can be viewed through the lens of art.”66 
A number of critics have argued that early nineteenth-century novelists, in order 
to address questions about human nature, began to initiate “a renaissance of fantastic 
fiction by discovering a strategy to articulate some of the most alarming anxieties of the 
age.”67  The literature of the double became one of the privileged ways of exploring the 
mysteries of the modern self, viewing subjectivity as marked less by rationality, order, 
and coherence, than by dream, nightmare, and psychical multiplicity, in which the 
contentious arena of post-Darwinian theory would eventually give impetus to the concept 
of degeneration.   
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In the second half of the nineteenth century, two modes of science vied to explain 
the split self: late-Victorian psychophysical science developed the dual-brain theory, 
which posited the brain as a double organ in which “the left and right hemispheres of the 
brain could function independently.”68  As early as 1884, Hall and Hartwell proposed that 
“so far as the brain represents it, the soul must be double.”69  But in France, there also 
emerged a new science that sought to explore the psyche: the emerging science of clinical 
psychiatry (1874-1886) that was also fascinated by double consciousness, split 
subjectivity and the phenomenon of multiple personality.  As modes of dissociations are 
medicalized, Ian Hacking states that during this period “a whole new discourse of memory 
came into being,” which quickly developed into the modern “sciences of memory,” and 
he argues further that the “purported knowledge of memory, quite self-consciously was 
created in order to secularize the soul” (4, 5).  Dissociation theory hovers somewhere 
between the experiential, the physical and the metaphysical, disturbing the Cartesian 
categories of mind and body. The ‘double’ may be read as expressive of this new scientific 
and philosophical contestation of the metaphysical idea of a self. 
 
Scientific Psychology and Dissociation Theory  
 
The use of doubles in late nineteenth-century novels has often been associated 
with the rise of psychoanalysis and Sigmund Freud, but some years before Freud 
published his earlier writings, Stevenson implemented the dualistic occult in his writings 
to show humanity’s essential doubleness by seizing upon “the new discoveries of 
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scientific psychology” (Herdman 127).  In his introduction to “The Double as Immortal 
Self”, Harry Tucker writes that Rank posits that “[t]he primitive concept of the soul as a 
duality (the person and his shadow) appears in modern man in the motif of the double, 
assuring him, on the one hand, of immortality and, on the other, threateningly 
announcing his death” (The Double xvi).  In his seminal work, The Principles of Psychology 
(1890), William James – who trained in medicine and philosophy and is the founder of 
modern psychology – also shifts away “from psycho-physiological paradigms towards a 
more dynamic psychology, in which subjective mental states are not immediately tied to 
biology” (Fin de Siècle 268).   
Rather than attempting to extend an already well-established scholarly discussion 
of the early scientific context of late nineteenth-century doubling, therefore, this section 
will seek to relate this material and medical shift to focus on the double in relation to the 
performative, moral, metaphysical and narrative issues that have already been 
established as emerging out of the earlier confessional tradition.  Rousseau’s idealism of 
“nature” is increasingly underpinned by the biological idea of instinct that found 
expression in many theorists after Darwin.  The double and the idea of multiple 
personality laid the foundations for the later shifts in the twentieth century, from the idea 
of a divided to a modern self in writers such as Vladimir Nabokov and Doris Lessing. The 
literature of the double might be seen as positioned between the legacies of the 
confessional tradition and the rise of modern conceptualisation of the self in the writing 
of the twentieth century.   
In Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, Dr Jekyll’s double-consciousness produces a physical 
double: Mr Hyde.  Stevenson represents the paradox of one man, who is two, but 
essentially one: Dr Jekyll splits into two distinct beings, but the death which he intends for 
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his double kills the self.  In “The Jolly Corner,” Spencer Brydon encounters his ghostly 
alter-ego that shows a likeness which has been detached from the ego and has become a 
shadow, reflection or portrait of an alternative ‘Other.’  Pierre Janet’s theory of 
dissociated consciousness provides a compelling conceptual framework for understanding 
Stevenson’s and James’s representation of duality.  Janet formulated his theory of 
multiplicity in his first psychological papers (1886-1887), where he “invented the very 
word dissociation in its present psychiatric sense” (Hacking 44).  Today, the medical 
syndrome, built out of Janet’s work on dissociation and traumatic re-enactments in 
hysterical patients, is termed “dissociative identity disorder,” which emphasises the 
“disintegration, the loss of wholeness, the absence of person” (Hacking 266).  Of 
importance and interest is Janet’s theory of dissociation, where the lack of synthesis 
between a traumatic past event – an integrated experience that has bearing on the 
present – and the repetition of the past as an isolated event without any association with 
a personal sense of self, does not suggest the loss of identity, but rather the splitting or 
doubling of identity.  The medical and historical contexts of this new psychology have 
been explored in detail in many contemporary studies, for example by Anne Harrington in 
Medicine, Mind, and the Double Brain (1989), an examination of the neurological sciences 
in the period 1860-1900, a time when philosophical concepts and scientific rigor were 
combined in the studies of the brain, and by Rick Rylance in Victorian Psychology and 
British Culture 1850-1880 (2000), in which he traces the historical development of 
psychological debates, from a theory of the soul to one which understands the human 
mind as a part of the natural world, by referring to the works of some of the nineteenth-
century central figures of early brain research:  the psychologist Alexander Bain, who was 
an early proponent of scientific psychology and published Mental and Moral Science: A 
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Compendium of Psychology and Ethics (1868);  and  the philosopher G. H. Lewes, who 
published a multi-volume work on The Problems of Life and Mind, which includes The 
Physical Basis of Mind (1877) and Mind as a Function of Organism (1879).  However, my 
aim in this section is to contextualize the work done by these early brain researchers, who 
concentrated on the biological aspect of the mind and reduced it to the materiality of the 
brain, with some of the literary reflections on the duality of human nature that emerged 
in the second part of the nineteenth century.  
 
Doubling and Dual Brain Theory in Robert Louis Stevenson’s “The 
Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde” (1886) 
 
As early as 1878, Robert Louis Stevenson anticipates the psychology of the double, 
when he concludes that “man is twofold at least; that he is not a rounded and 
autonomous empire; but that in the same body with him there dwell other powers, 
tributary but independent.”70  In “The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde”, Stevenson 
explores the idea of dual personality in an imaginative allegory in which the 
interdependent relation between the good and the evil parts in one person is chemically 
revoked.  The story’s structure is based on  late nineteenth-century medical case studies 
about the duality of the brain and thereby gives “literary intelligibility to late-Victorian 
psychological theories of the 1870s and 1880s that differed markedly from psychoanalytic 
understandings of the drives, as well as the conflict between the conscious and 
unconscious realms of psychic life” (Stiles 882).  Dual-brain theory posited that the left 
and right hemispheres of the brain could function independently; figuratively speaking, Dr 
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Jekyll’s chemical experiment separates and segregates the incongruous parts of his self as 
if he “performs a fictional corpus callosotomy, splitting the nerve fibers that connect two 
brain hemispheres, thereby giving each hemisphere an independent and unchecked life 
of its own” (Stiles 885).  The artificial division of a compound human nature into dual 
hemispheres splits the self into separate entities; the double, Mr Hyde, appears as the 
reified product of Dr Jekyll’s (and Stevenson’s) notion that “man is not truly one, but truly 
two.”71   
Stevenson explores the potentially heretical possibility that all human beings have 
a double nature and the story may be read as “a fictional case-study in what was known 
at the time as ‘morbid psychology.’”72  Morbid is Jekyll’s desire to violate natural law, to 
annihilate the “curse of mankind” (JH 82) that binds good and evil together, or in 
psychological terms, to force the split between the ego (rational side) that stands for the 
soul and the id (instinctive side) that is primitive animalistic and stands for the body.   
 
Degeneration Theory 
 
Hyde is the product of a Calvinistic pride that needs to suppress the dark side of 
human nature in order to maintain peace in the soul, but he is also “the expression of 
moral lowness according to post-Darwinian thought” (Mighall xxiv).  Max Nordau 
published his major work Entartung in 1892 (Degeneration 1895), in which he sought to 
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pinpoint the insidious forces of modernity.  Degeneracy represented the shadow side of 
the philosopher Herbert Spencer’s optimistic imagining of evolution: it was the very 
opposite of received ideas of progression and instead, it predicted the rise of disease, 
insanity, feebleness, idiocy, sterility, and extinction.  Jekyll represents the peak of 
evolution, while Hyde stands for its lowest point: he may be read as a presentation of the 
product of social and scientific discourses of “degeneration theory.”  In this perspective, 
Jekyll’s overdeveloped sense of sinfulness urges him to transfer his animalistic drives on 
to the “other”, so that he can be morally absolved from Hyde’s crimes; Jekyll’s economy 
calls for each self to be ”housed in separate identities,” so that his “life would be relieved 
of all that was unbearable” (JH 82).  Rank explains that the undesirable primitive side that 
frightens us “is to a large extent the product of our own imagination” and that “the fear 
of this ‘primitiveness’ within ourselves is obviously the result of an unsuccessful attempt 
to deny it” (Beyond Psychology 63).  In separating the antagonistic elements within, Jekyll 
believes that he is liberating himself and, at the beginning of his experiment, Hyde 
appears benign, he is “merely Jekyll’s unrepressed spontaneous existence” (Miyoshi in 
Herdman 135). 
Hyde’s unmixed essence of evil makes him appear more animal than human 
being;  unlike other men, he is not composed of varying degrees of good and evil and his 
defectiveness is physical.  Stevenson evokes animal forms and repeatedly describes Hyde 
as a primitive being, “ape-like,” (JH 47, 96, 97) who hisses like a snake and snarls like a 
beast (JH 39, 40).  For the characterization of Hyde, Stevenson draws on the concept of 
degeneration as developed in Nordau, who situates evil in “certain physical 
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characteristics, which are denominated ‘stigmata,’ or brandmarks.”73  Hyde is indeed 
described as “particularly small and particularly wicked-looking” (JH 48) but, without any 
particular physical details that would corroborate the theory of degeneration as being 
written on face and body, Hyde’s deformity is a “deformity without any nameable 
malformation” (JH 40).  Stevenson seems to imply that it is in the opinion of others that 
Hyde gives “a strong feeling of deformity” and has “a haunting sense of unexpressed 
deformity,” (JH 34, 50) whereas for Jekyll, his other self “seemed natural and human” (JH 
84).  In The Decent of Man, first published in 1871, Charles Darwin argued that human 
beings have evolved from higher primates.  This argument gives a new perspective to the 
Rousseauean idealism of man epitomized in a natural state of innocence.  After the 
psychology of the late nineteenth century had established a causative link between 
automation, the loss of one’s will, and the fragmentation of oneself due to the incapacity 
to maintain a unified identity without the exercise of conscious volition, the closeness of 
man to nature becomes a threat to the understanding of the rational mind of civilization 
and the belief in advancement though culture.  
The psychological double Jekyll/Hyde juxtaposes the two characters within Dr 
Jekyll: one represents the socially acceptable personality; the other externalizes the 
uninhibited and primitive self.  Jekyll symbolizes the conscious, rational and restrained 
part of the mind that acts with respectable professionalism in daylight; Hyde signifies the 
unconscious suppressed counterpart that comes to the fore in nocturnal transgression. By 
assigning irrational excesses to the other, Jekyll’s consciousness can stay undisturbed and 
he is adamant about his moral appearance in public; in order to carry his “head high,” he 
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has to disguise his “impatient gaiety of disposition” with a mask of “more than commonly 
grave countenance” (JH 81).  What begins as a sober observation about Jekyll’s 
personality becomes a general theory about the dual nature of man, which Stevenson 
explores in a form that mocks the genre of Gothic romance.74  In her introduction to Dr 
Jekyll and Mr Hyde, Jenni Calder explains that “the point about Jekyll is not that he is a 
moral and decent man, but that he has always been leading a double life. And he is 
leading a double life because he has aimed so high” (11).  Stevenson depicts the climate 
of Victorian society as universally repressive, where nobody can escape the fear of guilt.  
Even the undemonstrative lawyer Utterson is in the grip of a rigid morality that haunts 
the self with unsubstantiated qualms, he feels “some touch of that terror of the law and 
the law’s officers which may at times assail the most honest” (JH 48). 
 
Duplicity and Repression 
 
Ambitious morality forces Jekyll to live in a “profound duplicity” that splits his self 
into an outer moral self and, at the same time, dictates a systematic repression of the 
immoral self (JH 81).  Only by turning himself into the person of Mr Hyde can Dr Jekyll 
enjoy transgression without guilt, because the “lower elements of [his] soul” have been 
fully assigned to Hyde, thereby freeing Jekyll from moral responsibility for the evil deeds 
of his other self (JH 83).  Stevenson chose to split the self physically rather than to 
relegate evil drives to a Freudian unconscious, which a few decades later would serve as 
“a kind of receptacle of the individual’s ‘badness’; the unconscious became a kind of 
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private hell which housed the evil self” (Rank, Beyond Psychology 38).  Paradoxically, the 
dual personality of Jekyll with his counterpart Hyde means that there are two characters 
and one character at the same time, which can be explained by the twofold nature of the 
concept of duality.  Dury explains that Jekyll and Hyde “form a clear dualistic opposition 
yet are also seen as a complementary pair making a unity, so that boundaries disappear 
and fixed meaning (based on oppositions) is challenged.”75  In his confession, Jekyll 
illuminates the paradox of his “two natures,” that he was always “either […] radically 
both” (JH 82).  Karl Miller comments that duality has two meanings, that “there are two 
of something,” but also “that some one thing or person is to be perceived as two.”76  The 
component parts can be partners or antagonists; they may complete, resemble or repel 
one another.  At first, Jekyll and Hyde share the full consciousness of each other’s 
character and motives so that the evil double initially appears to be a relief for the 
suffering self that is burdened with an almost morbid sense of shame.  
 In the double Hyde, Jekyll personifies his own evil impulses as an attempt to form 
an ethical contrast and to dispel the evil safely away from the self.  Initially, Hyde begins 
as the weaker side of the two; he appears as the “incredibly sweet” companion under 
Jekyll’s control: “the moment I choose, I can be rid of my Hyde” (JH 44).  But with each 
instant of transgression, Hyde grows stronger in equal measure as Dr Jekyll gets weaker, 
until Hyde dominates once he is unleashed with greater frequency.  Arata explains that in 
the final stage of transformation in the laboratory the changes of personality have 
become fluid and “Hyde is no longer Jekyll’s opposite but his mirror image […] the 
doctor’s body metamorphoses continually from Jekyll to Hyde and back again, as if to 
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indicate that we need no longer distinguish between them.”77  Now Jekyll is 
disadvantaged in that evil and weakness still persist in him, whereas Hyde is “freed from 
“Jekyll’s countervailing good qualities, [he] can exploit the weakness to gain the upper 
hand” (Herdman 135).  Hyde splits from Jekyll and gains autonomy to such a degree that 
he is able to dominate and eventually arrogate Jekyll.  The hierarchical relationship 
between Jekyll and Hyde hinges on Jekyll’s excessive conformity to the codes of 
respectability and public opinion, which defeats him, because “ while there is always a 
part of himself that wants to be Hyde, there is nothing in Hyde that wants to be Jekyll” 
(Herdman 136).  Despite Dr Jekyll’s initial statement that he was attracted to Hyde by 
feeling “younger, lighter, happier in body,” he nevertheless soon realizes that the juvenile 
Hyde is an inferior self (JH 83).  
 
The House as a Metaphor for Duality 
 
The house that Jekyll and Hyde share is a metaphor for the two personalities: 
Hyde’s entrance is on the ravaged side of the building, blind with no windows; it is the 
back-door of Dr Jekyll’s property that seems inaccessible with “neither bell nor knocker” 
(JH 30).   One side presents the surface of respectability, the secret and blind side points 
to the hidden self and to the unspeakable.  When Utterson speculates about the relation 
between Jekyll and Hyde, “I thought it was madness […] and now I begin to fear it is 
disgrace” (JH 36), his suspicion is confirmed by Dr Lanyon’s judgement of Dr Jekyll’s 
change, “too fanciful for me. He began to go wrong, wrong in mind” (JH 36).  The 
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suspense about two identities instead of one continues until the ninth chapter, when Dr 
Lanyon witnesses the transformation of Hyde into his friend Jekyll.  Before then, the story 
had involved two individuals, Jekyll and Hyde and up to that point, it is feasible to 
speculate that Hyde was indeed blackmailing Jekyll for some former misdeeds.  Initially, 
Utterson suspected that Jekyll’s acquiescence was forced by “the ghost of some old sin, 
the cancer of some concealed disgrace” (JH 41).  Speculation on the nature of past deeds 
that cannot be spoken of point towards perverted forms of behaviour as defined at the 
time; it could suggest homosexuality, but Jekyll averts Utterson’s hint at this subject by 
replying that “it isn’t what you fancy; it is not so bad as that” (JH 44).  What “that” stands 
for is left unexplained, which invites readers to supply their own interpretation about the 
nature of the relations between Jekyll and Hyde.  The technique of suspense delays the 
complete explanation until Dr Lanyon reveals that two people are in fact only one person: 
that the impeccable Dr Jekyll also includes the abnormal Mr Hyde.  At that point the 
dichotomy of evil and good is revealed as a myth and the final pages of Dr Jekyll’s 
confession illuminate the narrative retrospectively.  The central argument of the story 
explicates the dilemma of moral life in the Victorian era; a morality that is threatened by 
the unconscious workings of the mind and the eruption of repressed or denied aspects of 
the self. 
 
The Uncanny Other in Henry James’s “The Jolly Corner” (1908) 
 
In Rank’s evaluation, novels such as The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde 
dramatize the terror of the double as a “moral aspect of the subject in a hero possessed 
by an evil self” (Beyond Psychology 69) and he continues that “[i]n such psychological and 
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moralistic presentation of the Double, their authors are dealing with illusions in a more or 
less split personality” (Beyond Psychology 70).  In Henry James’s short story “The Jolly 
Corner”, the double appears as a disfigured ghostlike twin, a dreaded mirror of Spencer 
Brydon’s fear of unrealized otherness.  The central theme is Brydon’s return to the house 
of his childhood and confrontation with the ghost of an unrealized but possible future 
self.  Brydon is preoccupied with phantasies about himself as a different other and 
Millicent Bell aptly summarizes James’s tale of unrealized possibility as a fable that deals 
with the psychological condition of disavowal where “the presence of the unlived life in 
the life that is lived,” eventually leads to an identity crisis.78  In a critical moment, Brydon 
actively projects his fantasy of his other possible self onto a ‘double’, who has “a capacity 
for business and a sense of construction. These virtues, so common all round him now, 
had been dormant in his own organism – where it might be said of them perhaps that 
they had slept the sleep of the just.”79  In his consciousness, Brydon constructs his alter 
ego, the self he would have become, had he stayed and followed the prescribed path of 
commerce in America. 
Brydon is safe with his childhood-acquaintance Alice Staverton as both share 
nostalgia for the past and Alice acts as his “mirror”, who reflects his thoughts and 
feelings.  Brydon’s desire to know about the other that might have been him is essentially 
a metaphysical search to understand and accept who he is now.  James’s use of a ‘double’ 
foregrounds the insecurity of personal identity and questions our belief in a single, unified 
identity by staging the drama of the present self in confrontation with a possible past self. 
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The Uncanny Other as a Possible Alternative to the Present Self 
 
The tension between past and present emerges in Brydon’s comparison of the old 
New York of his childhood with the modern city of the present.  After thirty-three years of 
his adult life, spent in different parts of Europe, Brydon strongly feels the startling 
contrast between the onset of modernity and his memories of the past preoccupation, 
which intensifies his consciousness of the present.  The present environment has changed 
and instead of revisiting a familiar urban landscape, everything seems strange.  In a 
Freudian sense, Brydon’s frightening personal experience is a classic example of Freud’s 
uncanny: “that species of the frightening that goes back to what was once well known 
and had long been familiar.”80  In his introduction to The Uncanny, Hugh Haughton 
explains the frightening quality of the Freudian ‘uncanny’: it is a concept that “reminds us 
not only that there is no place like home, but that, in another sense, there is no other place. For 
Freud, our most haunting experiences of otherness tell us that the alien begins at home, wherever 
that may be” (xlix). 
 
Alice Staverton is Brydon’s ally in his nostalgic hankering for a bygone era, a trait 
which Brydon did not value earlier, but now, confronted with its memories, he feels 
comforted by “the ugly things of his far-away youth,” which have taken on a charming 
appearance when compared to “the modern, the monstrous, the famous things” (JC 162).  
During the time of his sojourn in Europe, New York has changed into a “vast wilderness of 
the wholesale,” (JC 164), and now Brydon’s traditional values and proportions “are under 
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siege by the crudely palpable facts of modern economic and urban reality.”81   The once 
familiar city has lost its familiarity and turned into an uncanny place that Brydon cannot 
reconcile with the New York of his childhood memories.  The uncanny is associated with 
situations in which different models of reality clash and the resultant incongruities denote 
“a paradoxical mark of modernity” (Haughton xlix).   
Feeling like a stranger in his home, Brydon dissociates himself from the place, 
which turns unreal in the terms of the two semantic contents of the word ‘uncanny’ with 
its roots in the double-notion of unheimlich as in ‘uncanny’ or ‘eerie’ and also meaning 
‘unhomely’ (Freud 124).  Brydon is haunted by the idea of having become another person, 
which finally leads to an uncanny encounter with himself as the “other”, which has always 
been a possibility, his potential American self.  In Brydon’s case, the “other” is not a 
return of a repressed self, but rather born out of prolonged introspection with 
melancholy and nostalgia, in which “the uncanny derives from intellectual uncertainty” 
(Haughton xliii). 
 
Nostalgia and Guilt 
 
The obsession with the possibility of having become another person, if he had 
made a different choice at a crucial point in his adolescence, indicates Brydon’s guilt 
about his European past and his feeling of inferiority in the money economy of America: 
“I believe I’m thought in a hundred quarters to have been barely decent” (JC 171).  His 
remorse is directed at the opinion of others, who define his public self, and he compares 
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his past “selfish frivolous scandalous life” with an idealized image of himself as a possible 
American tycoon, who “would have anticipated the inventor of the skyscraper” (JC 165).  
Thus, in speculating about the lost opportunity, Brydon dissociates and projects himself 
“into the other, the real, the waiting life; the life that […] began for him, on the jolly 
corner” (JC 174).  The jolly corner resonates with memories of his early childhood and 
family life; it is associated with the personal and the intimate, it is “the opposite extreme 
to the modern” (JC 181).  The jolly corner is Brydon’s refuge and an “alternative to the 
world of cultural change” (Reising 118).  Furthermore, in Henry James’s view, houses are 
symbols for the self; he describes the self as “a haunted tenement” with an expansive 
interior (Fogel in Thompson 193).  Following James’s analogy, the old house is a 
substantiation of Brydon’s psyche; it gives a metaphorical setting where the psychological 
drama of Brydon’s encounter with his ghostly double takes place.  The space of the house 
is transformed metaphorically into a mystical other world, surreal and warped as a 
“watery under-world,” contained in a “glass-bowl” (JC 186, 174).  There are several 
distorted visions in the story, which indicate Brydon’s unsettled state of mind and giving 
evidence of the discord he feels within himself.  Since his repatriation, time has become 
distorted in his feelings to such an extent that it seems that “he would have lived longer 
than is often allotted to man” (JC 161). Brydon needs to explore his mental state of 
disconnection with the past through repeated wanderings inside the old family home, 
which contains the memories of old relations, but the interior appears unfamiliar and  
“immense, the scale of space again inordinate” (JC 185).  The lower ground with its black-
and-white marble squares anchors him safely in childhood, but the upper floors, the 
depth of the empty rooms, symbolize Brydon’s “forsworn possibilities,” the “mystical 
other world that might have flourished for him had he not, for weal or woe, abandoned 
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it” (JC 174).  In Brydon’s mind, the house at once contains memories of birth, childhood, 
and adolescence and the possible “other”.  Now, with growing uncertainty about his true 
self, Brydon is prone to idealize the “other.”  In contrast to Brydon’s distress, Alice shows 
the serenity of a unified person, who has always been destined to become herself; in 
Brydon’s view, she is a wholesome being, a “perfection nothing else could have blighted” 
(JC 171).  In a conversation, Brydon reveals that as a young man he had perversely 
refused “to agree to a ‘deal’,” which would have predetermined his future career in 
commerce (JC 168).  He imagines that following the path of money-making in New York 
would have made of him “what it has made of dozens of others” (JC 170).  His character 
would have developed differently if he had obeyed his father’s wishes regarding his 
future and indeed, by staying in New York he would have become another person, 
“something nearer to one of these types who have been hammered so hard and made so 
keen by their conditions” (JC 170).  Passion for money as a main objective would have 
deformed his nature, a deformation which he later sees in the missing two fingers of his 
ghostly double.   
In their conversations, Brydon and Alice play their projections and introjections of 
each other back and forth with Alice as the reassuring partner.  Alice had repeatedly 
dreamt about the “other,” which Brydon interprets that she had dreamt about him, but 
Alice insists that her dream was about this other and not him and avoids giving Brydon 
any details (JC 172).  Brydon hints at his unchanged love for Alice in that he would have 
married her long ago, that “without my exile, I shouldn’t have been waiting till now - ?” 
(JC 171).  Alice in return intimates that his absence has spoilt none of her feelings towards 
him.  Brydon recoils from openly declaring his love by diverting the subject; instead, he 
doubts that he is good enough for her.  But in this matter, Alice wants him to trust her 
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judgement so that he doesn’t have to torment himself any longer.  Finally, she senses that 
her assurance alone does not satisfy Brydon; that indeed, no one can answer this 
essential question of the “other” except Brydon himself.  Alice tries to communicate that 
she doesn’t care for Brydon’s unrealized potential, that she loves Brydon as he is in the 
present and not his spectre.  But immediately, she senses an ulterior motive; that it is 
Brydon’s narcissism that needs to know: “Oh, you don’t care either – but very differently: 
You don’t care of anything but yourself” (JC 172).  Brydon negates a possible connection 
between what he is now and what he might have been: “He isn’t myself. He’s the just so 
totally other person,” (JC 172) which Alice later confirms in her last sentence, “and he 
isn’t – no, he isn’t – you” (JC 193).  In the dénouement, Alice adopts Brydon’s 
differentiation between himself and the ‘other’ but states that he reached the ultimate 
aim of his experience in saying that “you came to yourself” (JC 192).  This could be 
interpreted that Brydon encountered his own dark side that exists in opposition to his 
conscious principles.  
Brydon is inexplicably drawn towards his old family house where he spends most 
of his nights searching for his other self.  The house is now an empty shell, but for Brydon, 
the house is still filled with presences of deceased family members, which for him, 
represent “within the walls, ineffaceable life,” and Brydon wants to find his place (JC 169). 
He seeks to overcome what he sees at this moment as the loss of a “fantastic, yet 
perfectly possible development” and metaphorically describes the resulting other self as a 
“full-blown flower,” which in his youth laid dormant as a “small tight bud” (JC 170).   
The house is the place where Brydon believes that his other self can be found and 
he wants an encounter, even if he were to come to face with something monstrous, 
hideous and offensive, but Alice assures him that even in such form, he would, 
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nevertheless, have appealed to her as someone “powerful and quite splendid” (JC 171).  
At first, Brydon grows increasingly confident in his exploration, with “the assurance of 
calm proprietorship” (JC 173) and feels prepared to meet the other.  Sensing that “his 
alter ego walked,” Brydon is eager to meet him and expose the unknown “other self” (JC 
175). The pursuit becomes a surreal quest in which Brydon enjoys his instinctive impulses 
and imagines himself in the role of a primeval hunter with “a consciousness, unique in the 
experience of man” (JC 176).  But his confidence as master of the situation is lost in the 
moment he suspects that the encounter with his other self is imminent: suddenly he 
realizes the danger to the self immanent in such knowledge, even to possibly drive him to 
suicide by jumping out of a nearby window.  He resolves “never, on my honour, to try 
again” (JC 183). He can ameliorate his feelings of cowardice by thinking that he has done 
the other a favour in giving up the idea of confrontation, but whilst passing a door on his 
way out, which he had seen closed before, he is now convinced that “should he see the 
door open, it would all too abjectly be [his] end” (JC 185).  The shame about his former 
indecisiveness leads him to recoil from pursuing again the assurance he had previously 
sought in the encounter with the spectre.  Brydon is now in a defensive mode and no 
longer wishes to see his other self.  When his alter-ego confronts him, he refuses to 
recognize himself in the other’s face; instead the face appears monstrous, “unknown, 
inconceivable, awful, disconnected from any possibility” (JC 188).  The face of Brydon’s 
would-be American identity appears distorted, therefore unrecognizable, and in this 
decisive moment “he denies it to be him as the only possible means of psychic escape.”82  
It is necessary for Brydon to dissociate himself from a deformed self that would have 
resulted from his acquiescence to his father.  Brydon bemoans that this “other” is the 
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unhappy one in that “he had been sold” (JC 188, emphasis added).  His vis-à-vis is now an 
opponent, who bears the “face of a stranger” (JC 188).  What he had desired to reveal 
now horrifies him and he faints; but, parodying the Narcissus legend, he does not die 
from his desire to see his other self but is resuscitated by Alice.  It is possible to read this 
episode as a meeting of complementary aspects of the self:  the conventional 
businessman meets the bohemian outsider in himself. Both aspects are present in 
Brydon, although in unequal portions.  Whilst assisting with the renovation of his other 
house, Brydon discovers that some commercial skills are also part of his character, 
although they are buried “in a compartment of mind never yet penetrated” (JC 163).  
Such an interpretation again points to the bud-and-flower analogy, where both selves 
share the same bud as their origin, but differ in their maturity. 
After regaining consciousness the next day, Brydon senses that it is “really the 
great thing, he had come back to” (JC 189).  There is ambiguity in this statement: What is 
the great thing that Brydon came back to? I argue that Brydon is immensely relieved to 
have come back to his own self, that he is finally reconciled with his past life.  He feels the 
beauty of his mental rebirth in that it has “brought him to knowledge,” which sets his 
mind at peace so that at last he can enjoy “the serenity of certitude” (JC 189).  His second 
discovery is his love for Alice; now that he has been reassured that he is good enough for 
her, he can reciprocate her feelings and allow her to “keep” him (JC 190).  Still, Brydon 
reproaches himself for his inability to connect to the image of his other self: “I was to 
have known myself” (JC 192).  Again, it is Alice, who reassures him and explains that his 
nightmarish experience and her dreams of the other were mere mental constructions of 
possible alternatives.  She insists that Brydon is unique and distinct from the other: “isn’t 
the whole point that you’d have been different?” (JC 192).  Contrary to Brydon, Alice is 
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not horrified by the possible other, she states that she nevertheless would have 
“accepted him” (JC 193).  And she makes clear that her acceptance is not focused on the 
millionaire Brydon, but comes out of sympathy for the unhappy, ravaged man with ruined 
eyesight and a severed right hand; that she could and would have loved this Brydon all 
the same.  
Critics disagree about the significance of the missing two fingers.  Auchincloss sees 
them as a sacrificial disfigurement, the price one has to pay for success in American 
capitalism (Auchincloss in Thompson).  Under the premise that Brydon can be read as an 
autobiographical character (James had returned to his birthplace New York, in 1904, after 
twenty-one years spent in Europe), I argue that one interpretation might be that the 
severed right hand stands for castration angst: the dream-like body image speaks of 
castration as a penalty for unrealized artistic potential, or more specifically, the castration 
of the writing hand could be read as the manifestation of an unconscious artistic anxiety.  
The story of the self as a fictionalized monstrous ghost-like figure plays with the 
transference and countertransference of an unrealized possibility that James articulates 
from a safe distance.  Imaginative fiction substantiates his dreaded alternative future, but 
fortunately, for an author “[w]riting fiction is like remembering what never happened” 
(Hustvedt 175).  In this sense, the story is both a fable about the modern self and an 
‘autobiografiction’ about the emergence of the writing self. 
“The Jolly Corner” is a parable about the modern condition of impermanence and 
transience, the loss of ontological security and the negative side of a cosmopolitan 
existence.  Brydon’s preoccupation with his desires and nostalgia for the past induces a 
narcissistic and sentimental self-reflexiveness that projects the self onto the ‘other’.  
From a Freudian point of view, Brydon’s alter-ego embodies a possible outcome, the 
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alternative which “had [he] been realized might have shaped [Brydon’s] destiny, and to 
which [his] imagination still clings” (Freud 143).  Brydon’s destabilized psyche initially 
produces the double as an intriguing figure, who turns unacceptably wicked in the 
moment of imminent encounter and threatens the annihilation of the self.  Otto Rank 
explains that historically the meaning of the double has shifted from “a symbol of eternal 
life in the primitive,” to “an omen of death in the self-conscious individual of modern 
civilisation” (Beyond Psychology 76). 
 
Rousseau’s idealized loss of his “natural” other is reworked and becomes part of  a 
fictional other self in James, who, like Stevenson, dramatizes the split-self as the moral 
and existential condition in the modern world through the motif of the double, the 
evocation of place, the development of modes of meta-representation.  Characters like 
Brydon and Alice attempt to read each other’s motives and intentions, which leads to a 
dramatization of the self as both intersubjectively related in externalized behaviour and 
as an internalized psychic object relational structure.  Continuing from the standpoint of 
the emergent psychology of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Part Two 
and Three of this thesis will engage with the perspectives established in Part One, whilst 
also entertaining alternate theories that were proposed as counterpoints to the 
physiological psychology that made up the orthodox opinion at the turn of the century.  
The emergent problematic split self will become the prototype for the portrayal of 
narcissistic paranoid selves in Vladimir Nabokov’s novels. 
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PART TWO: MODERNIST CONCEPTION OF THE SELF – POST-
ROMANTIC AESTHETIC AUTOBIOGRAPY 
 
As seen in the last section of Part One (The Dissociation of the Self in the Literature 
of the Double), the late nineteenth-century understanding of the self in was moving from 
the notion of a given, stable, and singular self, towards the possibility of the self as being 
unstable, fragmented, and multiple.  These changing concepts of subjectivity found 
expression in textual strategies that employed psychological and moralistic presentations 
in the literature of the Double, in which the self was understood to exist as a duality.  
Stevenson regarded the splitting of a person into the socially accepted form and its 
clandestine opposite as the result of an unbearable Victorian moral repression and he 
dramatized the moral aspect of the subject in a hero possessed by an evil self; Henry 
James imagined the conflict between a possible other self and the conscious self as the 
mourning for the unrealized potential of the self.  These authors explored the idea of a 
conflict between the conscious and the unconscious realms of psychic life and their 
literary representation of the self is conscious of the fact that the written self is inevitably 
alienated from the ontological self through the act of writing.   
The later post-Edwardian writers explicitly repudiated their predecessors as old-
fashioned materialists, who ignored the interior of the mind and focussed instead on 
objective descriptions of events and perceptions: Virginia Woolf valued “Mr. Wells, Mr. 
Bennett, and Mr. Galsworthy” as authors who “spend immense skill and immense industry 
making the trivial and the transitory appear the true and the enduring.”83  Virginia Woolf and 
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Marcel Proust sought to revive the power of the aesthetic for redeeming and 
transforming the self in a modernist style in order to recover any kind of self-presence. 
Both tried to overcome the gap between writing and the self, the problem of, in Paul Jay’s 
words, “how to use one medium – language – to represent another medium – being” by 
moving self-reflexively into the aesthetic (Jay 21).  Both wrote imaginatively in fictional 
narratives about their temporal experiences by freeing themselves from the linear 
aspects of time and thus exploring the depth of temporal experience in “tales about 
time.”84  David Harvey proposes that somewhere between 1910 and 1915 the relations 
between representation and knowledge underwent a fundamental transformation, which 
he ascribes to “a radical change in the experience of space and time in Western 
capitalism” (Harvey 29).  Montaigne, in his time, did not fully grasp the central 
contradiction inherent in any autobiographical project, that there is an ever-present 
ontological gap between the self who is writing and the self-reflexive protagonist of the 
work.  But he had touched on the notion that the self is formed in writing and connected 
to the work, which becomes even more prominent in Proust, who transformed his life 
through the construction of an aesthetic subjectivity, and in this respect, found the 
meaning of his own existence embodied in the artwork he had created.  The work 
subsumes the writer by converting his transitory actual existence into the eternal realm 
of art: “Proust proclaims the permanent triumph of literature over time; A la recherche 
succeeds in the creation of an enduring identity and fiction.”85  Proust not only saw 
writing as a continuation of life by other means, but also as a possible means for 
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transcending his own mortality through the enduring artwork, a project that Marcel 
contemplates in Time Regained:  
 
How much more worth living did it appear to me now, now that I seemed to see that this 
life that we live in half-darkness can be illumined, this life that at every moment we 
distort can be restored to its true pristine shape, that a life, in short, can be realised 
within the confines of a book. (Proust in Ricœur, TN 147).   
 
His work can be said to inaugurate an era where the self is as much written as 
writing, and where the paradoxes of the written self constituting the self of writing will 
eventually become foregrounded as the axis of the postmodern text and such 
poststructuralist themes as that of Roland Barthes in “The Death of the Author” (1967), 
Michel Foucault in “What is an Author?” (1969), and Jacques Derrida in “Structure, Sign 
and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” (1967).   
 
Section 1: Expressivist Turn in Marcel Proust ‘s À la Recherche du 
Temps Perdu (1913-27) 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the view of the self as self-present can be 
seen as moving to a view of the self as a construct.  The creative fashioning in the process 
of expression reinvents a life, which echoes the general cultural phenomenon of 
individualization that transformed West European and American societies.  Again, one 
might argue that, following Rousseau, to understand the self was not simply to describe 
what was evident in a reflexive analysis of the mind, but constituted a task of discovering 
and bringing to light what was hidden within. Art became a process of expressing, of 
making manifest, a hidden nature and, by so doing, creating and completing the discovery 
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within the form of artistic expression.  Modernist writers tried to present the self 
aesthetically with the effect that “life begins to be perceived as having a form, like the 
form of a work of art” (Saunders 77).  An interesting tension begins to develop between 
the idea of the self as ‘discovered’ and the idea that the self might only be discovered 
through its invention, i.e. that style creates what it expresses and that the ‘self’ exists only 
through infinite modes of interpretation and even misinterpretation.  
Rising urbanization saw the advent of a consumer culture, where the reinvention 
and re-creation of identity became essential for establishing a sense of self.  A new 
commodity culture emerged, one which compensated for the individual’s feeling of a loss 
of self-determination at the end of the nineteenth century when “the market economy 
became reconstituted as a corporate economy and society became reorganized as a 
‘capitalist’ society – i.e., a society configured as much around market relations as  
community relations.”86  As writers tried to capture the elusive and unstable identity of 
the self, autobiography moved toward one of its most characteristic twentieth-century 
forms, the autobiographical novel.  Max Saunders states that “from the 1870s to the 
1930s autobiography increasingly aspires to the condition of fiction” (21).  Therefore, it 
became increasingly difficult to distinguish between “autobiography invaded by fiction 
and the first-person fiction involving the autobiography of the author” (Buckley 115).  
Modern autobiographical novelists seek to solve the problem of literary self-
representation by consciously fictionalizing the self, which supports the artistic conviction 
that the essential self is only accessible through the aesthetic: this is Proust’s central idea 
as he understood the impossibility of capturing the self in a straightforward expressive 
autobiography.  Through aesthetic production, Proust endeavours to access and to 
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communicate his inner essence.  This led Middleton Murry, for example, to suggest that, 
even before Proust’s death, his work “marks the arrival of a new sensibility to which the 
only parallel is Rousseau’s Confessions.”87 However, as the true self is too individual to be 
represented in direct language and is, in any case, hidden even from its owner, artistic 
transformation of experience thereby becomes the key for authentic introspection.  
Proust does not merely recount events in a straightforward narrative; instead, he seeks 
out the specific access routes to the retrieval of long-term memories.  He uses involuntary 
memory, which is recollection recovered through sensations, as well as impressions and 
metaphorical language, to write about the elusive self, which, according to Landy, 
“cannot be expressed in but only revealed through language” (115).   
William James explains that changes in the self are a result of the constant flow of 
impressions that shape the self.  Repetition plays an important role as it allows an 
accumulation of stimuli over time, a build-up of effect: 
 
In every sphere of sense, an intermittent stimulus, often enough repeated, produces a 
continuous sensation. This is because the after-image of the impression just gone by 
blends with the new impression coming in. The effects of stimuli may thus be superposed 
upon each other many stages deep, the total result in consciousness being an increase in 
the feeling's intensity, and in all probability, […] an elementary sense of the lapse of 
time.88  
 
À la Recherche du Temps Perdu is a modernist text that examines the working of 
memory and time and, in this respect, now seems prescient in its foreshadowing of many 
of the findings of cognitive neuroscientists a half-century later.  The narration flows along 
with the recurrence of memories evoked by stimuli that constantly promise to reveal and 
shape the character of the narrator, which shows not only that “Proust achieved the 
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penetrating insight that feelings of remembering result from a subtle interplay between 
past and present,” but also that the role of memories is vital for identity, because “our 
sense of ourselves depends crucially on the subjective experience of remembering our 
pasts.”89 
 
Rediscovering what is Real 
 
Half a century before Proust wrote about his special moments of sudden happiness, 
Wordsworth, after having inadvertently crossed the summit of the Alps, recorded a 
moment of heightened experience after an initial disappointment.  In “The Prelude or, 
Growth of a Poet’s Mind”, some hidden essence is suddenly revealed and brought to the 
poet’s consciousness in “a flash”:  
I was lost; 
Halted without an effort to break through; 
But to my conscious soul I now can say-- 
"I recognise thy glory:" in such strength 
Of usurpation, when the light of sense  
Goes out, but with a flash that has revealed 
The invisible world, doth greatness make abode90  
 
This moment attains a personal dimension when “the light of sense goes out” and it 
suggests the suspension of the poet’s intellectual efforts at the moment when his inner 
vision takes over, allowing an insight into “the invisible world.” Now, with renewed 
artistic vigour he can continue with the composition of the poem.  Similarly, Proust 
locates truth within the mind of the perceiving subject and states that the past cannot be 
recaptured through intellectual efforts, but lies buried in lost sensations.  A successful 
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rediscovery relies on chance and needs a serendipitous occurrence, stimulated by an 
object or a sensory experience in the present that reveals that hidden past: 
 
And so it is with our own past. It is a labour in vain to attempt to recapture it: all the efforts 
of our intellect must prove futile. The past is hidden somewhere outside the realm, beyond 
the reach of intellect, in some material object (in the sensation which that material object 
will give us) which we do not suspect. And as for that object, it depends on chance whether 
we come upon it or not before we ourselves must die.91  
 
The chance combination of sensation with a material object is the Proustian ‘formula’ for 
involuntary memory, when his sense of an entire childhood seems to spring up as he 
tastes the famous madeleine with tea.  In this moment, what Proust foregrounds is the 
problem of ‘qualia’ for the modernist writer: if I only can describe what I feel or 
experience, how can words convey this apparently private and ineffable experience?   
This problem will be discussed later in this section. 
 
Expressing Impressions 
 
Writers like Proust come to face the problem of rendering experience artistically 
and in order to investigate how they became artists, to develop new aesthetic forms for 
autobiographic novels: the Künstlerroman is based on autobiographical experiences and 
thematizes the question of life-writing, of how to write the autobiographical.  “A la 
recherche is the progenitor of a family of twentieth-century novels which conclude with 
their protagonists' decision to produce a novel” (Kellman 1247).  Goodwin explains 
Proust’s conceptual framework: “through a narrator named Marcel, Proust renders in 
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these books a personal account of experience and, centrally, of the evolution of a writer’s 
consciousness” (14).  The fictional life of the protagonist closely parallels Proust’s actual 
life, but ultimately, it is an artistic version and therefore Landy cautions against the 
temptation to conflate the life of Proust with that of the protagonist Marcel, because 
although “many of the episodes in the novel have echoes in Proust’s own experience […] 
this is only to say that Proust, like other artists, fashioned something beautiful out of that 
experience – not that he fashioned himself in the process” (18).  Landy lists enough facts 
that would prevent a strict equation of Marcel the character with Marcel Proust the 
author and points out the fallacy of confusing two ontological levels: to resist the 
temptation to attribute the novel to Marcel, who is just about to write the novel at the 
end, instead of Proust, who wrote the novel in which a character named Marcel will write 
the novel that we have just read.  It is the paradox of the self-begetting novel, which 
“projects the illusion of art creating itself” (Kellman 1245).  The closure of the novel 
evidences the trajectory that developed the artist “to the point at which he is able to take 
up his pen and compose the novel we have just finished reading” (1245).  Landy regards 
the circular logic of the self-begetting novel as too simplistic, because ultimately, “it is 
Proust’s novel, and it is Marcel’s autobiography, but it is not Marcel’s novel” (42).  
Instead, he advocates separating the novel into discrete entities, which, when read 
according to “a system of meanings, expressions, and effects,” can be classified as 
“autobiography, fictionalized autobiography and fiction with autobiographical 
borrowings” (Landy 43).  Marcel’s signature is evident in one part as opposed to that of 
Proust in another, which reveals the author’s intention to write the novel from the 
perspectives of different persona, an author-figure and a Marcel-figure, but they all are 
ultimately, “artistic choices made by Proust” (Landy 44).  The impossibility of making 
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classifications regarding what could or could not count as autobiography has been 
pointed out by Goodwin who, (in citing Northorp Frye), “finds that autobiography ‘merges 
with the novel by a series of insensible gradations’” (14). 
Similar to the spiritual autobiography of St. Augustine, Marcel’s vocational 
transformation compels him to write an account of his conversion in which he re-creates 
his experiences by putting them into words. As in St. Augustine’s Confessions, his writing 
is inspired by “a creative, and therefore fictional, impulse to select only those events and 
experiences […] that go to build up an integrated pattern” (Goodwin 14).  The meaning-
making of memory has been developed in the framework of neural network models in the 
theory of neuroscience, where it is “known as connectionism”, which “has abandoned the 
idea that memory is an activated picture of a past event” (Schacter 71).  Instead of a mere 
replica of past events, memory works and constructs “a unique pattern”, such that 
information is combined “in the present environment with patterns that have been 
stored in the past, and the resulting mixture of the two is what the network remembers” 
(Schacter 71). 
Proust’s autobiographical writing is a complex process of creating a stable self 
through narrative and stylization.  And, as it is Proust’s final work, it is the artist-persona 
who wrote himself into existence through the construction of a textual world, as Kellman 
sees it philosophically: “the self-begetting novel begets both a self and itself. It recounts 
the creation of a work very much like itself, but it is also the portrait of a fictive artist being 
born” (Kellman 1251).  Landy is more cautious in his judgment of Proust’s success in 
capturing the totality of a self, but at least, through the fictional Marcel, Proust makes “a 
successful (or at least preliminary) effort at self-fashioning” (47).  But Landy also proposes 
that the search for a finite self is illusory because the living self always remains incomplete, 
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contingent and subject to infinite revision and he therefore recommends that the reader 
views the novel “not as Proust’s own life ‘realised in a book,’ all of its individual acts and 
aspects forged into a unity, but precisely as one more act in that life” (126).  
 
The Fictive Experience of Time unfolds within a Fictive World 
 
Proust wrote his novel at a time of intellectual fecundity that saw a sudden 
proliferation of new theories about memory, the self and time.  The intellectual tenor of 
the historical moment was dominated by a network of competing theories that took 
different vantage points: metaphysical, psychological and medical frameworks each tried 
to give an exhaustive explanation of a phenomena that was named alternatively either 
mind, or soul or brain.92  
Proust seeks to fulfil two objectives: to create art and to write about the self.  Art 
must articulate and transcend the essence or reality of life below appearances and, being 
a post-Freudian autobiographical novelist, he investigates and analyses the workings of 
time and memory in order to uncover a new way of understanding the self.  Jack Jordan 
explains Proust’s creative invention that makes a three-dimensional account possible by 
introducing the new dimension of time: “As Einstein’s theories helped move Euclidean 
geometry from two (‘plane’ geometry) and three (‘solid’ geometry) dimensions into the 
curvature of his four-dimensional space-time continuum, so do Proust’s theories 
concerning memory – with the introduction of time – result in this new view of 
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psychology.”93  Before neuroscience discovered that memory is actually a ceaseless 
process and not just “a repository of inert information,” Proust had “presciently 
anticipated the discovery of memory reconsolidation” (Lehrer 85). 
 Transformation by artistic subjectivity re-creates the consciousness of an artist at 
any given time in the past and thereby gives meaning to that life.  As the self cannot 
observe itself directly, it needs the reflexive power of consciousness that looks at itself 
looking and what Proust discovers in looking back is his constantly changing self.  Proust 
reflects on the experiences and consciousness of his past selves and explores what caused 
the self to change in its history, how it became a plurality of selves.  But it seems that 
Proust still believes “that these selves hide an indivisible, core self – an unconscious, 
metaphysical essence beneath the conscious self that lies at the surface, divided by the 
contingencies of time, space, society, emotions – of any phenomenological situation” 
(Jordan 111).  Yet, the self is always relational and always in temporal change, personal 
identity is no more than a fleeting concept: because the self is only a self in relation to 
others and because the present self exists always in relation to its own past selves, 
personal identity is never stable or complete but rather in a process of constant built-up. 
A new perspective on memory was given by William James in The Principles of 
Psychology, when he focussed on memory as a conscious phenomenon of association.  He 
regarded memory as a “psychophysical phenomenon,” which shares a bodily and mental 
side and he explained that “[t]he bodily side is the functional excitement of the tracts and 
paths in question; the mental side is the conscious vision of the past occurrence, and the 
belief that we experienced it before” (655).  At the end of the twentieth century, the 
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psychologist Endel Tulving described the conscious experience of remembering as 
“mental time travel, a sort of reliving of something that happened in the past.”94   
Memory lies latent and is ready to be recovered at any time and, in this respect, the 
past can be recalled to the present.  William James declared the physical existence of 
what he calls the “primary memory” and he described it as a permanent substratum that 
consists of neural pathways, which are the physical traces that habit has forged into the 
brain:  
But an object of primary memory is not thus brought back; it never was lost; its date was 
never cut off in consciousness from that of the immediately present moment. In fact it 
comes to us as belonging to the rearward portion of the present space of time, and not to 
the genuine past. (646-647) 
 
Landy lucidly explains how selfhood is structured and expanded in a multitude of overlaid 
strata:  
Not only do we change over time […] but we cannot achieve unanimity within ourselves at 
any given moment.  In fact, the simultaneous multiplicity is even greater […] since on 
[Proust’s] model the diachronic becomes synchronic: our various incarnations do not simply 
replace one another but remain with us forever, in the background of our consciousness, 
forming a complex geological structure of several superposed strata.” (101-2) 
 
The self grows by encompassing all the diachronic selves accumulated over time 
and Proust accommodates both synchronic and diachronic variations of the self that show 
the self in its consecutive states as they are “sedimented over time; at any given instant, 
we are the sum of an extremely large set of existences, many of which are entirely 
unknown to us, and all of which cohabit simultaneously in the mind” (Landy 110).  Roger 
Shattuck affirms the succession of selves, but negates the possibility of the mind 
becoming aware of this plurality. He writes that “[n]o matter how we go about it, we 
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cannot be all of ourselves all at once […] to summon our entire self into simultaneous 
existence lies beyond our powers. We live by synechdoche, by cycles of being.95  
À la Recherche du Temps Perdu, (In Search of Lost Time, also translated as 
Remembrance of Things Past) was published between 1913 and 1927, and it opens with a 
long and detailed description of the semi-dream state in which the narrator gradually 
reconstructs his physical surroundings. Proust evokes an earlier time that has no date and 
no place in which moments integrate in fragmentary impressions.  The memories of how 
his body had felt during previous occasions of waking up in different locations provide an 
entry to and make available details of that past: 
 
My body, still too heavy with sleep to move, would make an effort to construe the form 
which its tiredness took as an orientation of its various members, so as to induce from 
that where the wall lay and the furniture stood, to piece together and to give a name to 
the house in which it must be living. Its memory, the composite memory of its ribs, knees, 
and shoulder-blades offered it a whole series of rooms in which it had at one time or 
another slept; […] my body, would recall from each room in succession what the bed was 
like, where the doors were, how daylight came in at the windows, whether there was a 
passage outside, what I had had in my mind when I went to sleep, and had found there 
when I awoke. (RTP 5) 
 
Proust gives an example of how memory resides within the body and recalls a 
whole series of rooms in which Marcel had previously slept.  In those fluid moments 
without boundaries, between the conscious and the unconscious, the chronology of time 
can be transcended; as Marcel notes: “perhaps, while I was asleep I had returned without 
the least effort to an earlier stage in my life, now for ever outgrown” (RTP 2).  Sleep 
seems to break the thread of the self such that “with the loss of an internal, subjective 
reality founded on a solid notion of self, the narrator also loses the external reality of an 
objective world anchored in fixed notions of time and space” (Jordan 100).  Time is lost in 
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the sense of time gone, but in reality, the echo of memories has never ceased and whilst 
asleep, memories of the past, in principle, become all available at once, because the 
sequence of time no longer exists when consciousness is suspended.  Henri Bergson 
attempted a detailed study of consciousness as it is experienced and Proust’s idea of  
transcending time in sleep comes close to Bergson’s idea of duration (la durée), which is 
enfolded time of inner consciousness where present and past are interwoven and made 
available at the same time.  La durée is a “qualitative multiplicity”, which is 
“heterogeneous and yet interpenetrating, it cannot be adequately represented by a 
symbol; indeed, for Bergson, a qualitative multiplicity is inexpressible.”96  Bergson’s ideas 
in Time and Free Will, 1889, and in Matter and Memory, 1896, suggest that memories 
remain stored within us indefinitely, albeit most of them are not accessible until 
reactivated or recreated by events or thought in the present. Bergson’s insight that “a 
human being who should dream his life instead of living it would no doubt thus keep 
before his eyes at each moment the infinite multitude of the details of his past history,”97 
is turned into a metaphor for lost time revived in the sense of contemplation by inscribing 
it within duration: “When a man is asleep, he has in a circle round him the chain of the 
hours, the sequence of the years, the order of the heavenly host” (RTP 3).  The positivistic 
world-view, based on fixed references in time and space disintegrates in sleep, when 
memories that were stored indefinitely may suddenly become available all at once in 
dreams.  Thus, Landy sees in Proust’s line a striking echo of Henri Bergson’s claim that 
memories can return unbidden and the novel exemplifies the modernist turn from the 
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bipartite notion of the self to a changeable self that exists in the flow of experience, 
between the present perception of itself in the world and the memories of its past.   
The novel is concerned with the operations of the mind: the relationship between 
the mind and time; how time changes memory.  Proust picks up Montaigne’s idea of living 
in the flow of time, but whereas Montaigne sees his former selves as locked in the past, 
as something that has-been, Proust experiences the flow between the past and the 
present self, which echoes Henri Bergson’s placement of experience in memory.  But 
reality shifts not only within the self, change is also a characteristic of the world outside 
the self. Proust believed that “only the artist was able to describe reality as it was actually 
experienced.”98  Judith Ryan points out that there is a fundamental division that runs 
throughout the novel: “a profound split between the quest for the elusive reality behind 
appearances and a belief in the value of present sensation, between an adherence to a 
dualist metaphysics on the one hand and empiricist associationism on the other.”  As 
such, she states that conflicts emerge due to the seeming incompatibility of “two ways of 
seeing reality, one in terms of what we ‘know,’ one in terms of what we ‘see.’” 99  
Similarly, Landy explains that the fragmentation of seeing the world and others is due to 
the constant changes of the self, of its knowledge and its attitudes (105). 
Ortega y Gasset, however, evaluated the success of Proust’s artistic work quite 
differently.  He claimed that Proust discovered a new way of seeing, that he indeed 
invented “a new way of treating time and situating oneself in space.”100  Rather than 
using his memories as materials for reconstructing former realities, in his view, Proust 
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does the opposite, “he wants literally to reconstruct the very memories themselves. Thus, 
it is not things that are remembered, but the memory of things, which is the central 
theme of Proust” (Ortega y Gasset 506).  Proust intuitively knew that memories require a 
transformative process because memories can never directly represent reality, “they are 
imperfect copies of what actually happened” (Lehrer 89). Lehrer explains the theory of 
remembering according to neuroscience: Memory is not a repository of inert information 
that accumulates over time but has the property of plasticity, which continually 
transforms what is remembered and is itself altered as a result of remembering: “every 
time we remember anything, the neuronal structure of the memory is delicately 
transformed, a process called reconsolidation” (Lehrer 85). Thus, with each act of 
remembering, the memory itself changes; it moves further and further away from the 
objective becoming increasingly idiosyncratic, each time the content reveals “less about 
what you remember and more about you” (Lehrer 85). 
 
The Narrative Self is the Self in Time 
 
Proust applies a fundamental distinction between the sources of sensations that 
stimulate memory.  Visual sensations are extensive: they describe spatial relations 
between the observer and the object; all others are intensive and Lennon claims that 
“what we taste, smell, hear, feel is, it might be argued, only in time. In the search after 
lost time, the visual is irrelevant.”101  Vision works differently to taste, sound or odours: 
because of the distance between viewer and object, visual sensations are projected onto 
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the object, whereas all other sensations are perceived as if they originated within the 
body. This explains the different workings of the mind in viewing the church steeples (this 
episode will be discussed later) as opposed to the overwhelming reaction to the 
taste/smell sensation of the madeleine with tea. 
Proust distinguishes between two modes of memory: he demeans voluntary 
memory that is at the service of the intellect and therefore cannot revive the past 
authentically; the will only produces pictures, but “nothing of the past itself” (RTP 57).  
Lehrer states that “one of Proust’s deep insights was that our senses of smell and taste 
bear a unique burden of memory” (Lehrer 80).  The taste and scent of the madeleine 
steeped in tea is not only an example of the workings of involuntary memory that acts as 
a catalyst between the present and the past, but the experience also channels Proust’s 
childhood by releasing hitherto buried memories through a sensation common to both 
the present and the past and, in this way, memory does not restore lost time, but 
restores a self that was lost.  The entry into the past that these moments make possible is 
deeply significant, as in such moments the fragments of his past begin slowly to 
reassemble themselves and the ecstasy of the madeleine opens up the recaptured time of 
childhood; thus a moment bienheureux intuits an essential self by an act of momentary 
transcendence of human constraint, which comes close to a religious epiphany: 
 
And at once the vicissitudes of life had become indifferent to me, its disasters innocuous, 
its brevity illusory—this new sensation having had on me the effect which love has of 
filling me with a precious essence; or rather this essence was not in me, it was myself. I 
had ceased now to feel mediocre, accidental, mortal. (RTP 58, emphasis added) 
 
Memories, which the body contains in the form of sensorial traces, are uniquely 
sentimental; they are feelings that open the narrator to memories of his childhood by 
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connecting him to a hidden region of the self.  The record of the remembered taste needs 
to make contact with some other fragment of experience, an experience that 
immediately accesses the structure of the brain, “directly to the hippocampus, the center 
of the brain’s long-term memory” (Lehrer 80).  Landy explains the effect of sense stimuli 
that circumvent the intellect: “[w]hen an odor, texture, or sound returns us to a former 
state, we are not dragging into the light a set of impressions that have long since 
departed but, instead, summoning up a part of us that is still very much present within 
our mind” (110).  The taste of the madeleine in the present does not immediately propel 
him back into the past, but the sensation provides a link to all the memories of Marcel’s 
childhood in the village of Combray: 
 
But when from a long-distant past nothing subsists, after the people are dead, after the 
things are broken and scattered, still, alone, more fragile, but with more vitality, more 
unsubstantial, more persistent, more faithful, the smell and taste of things remain poised a 
long time, like souls, ready to remind us, waiting and hoping for their moment, amid the 
ruins of all the rest; and bear unfaltering, in the tiny and almost impalpable drop of their 
essence, the vast structure of recollection. (RTP 61) 
 
For Proust, the senses of smell and taste are the most stimulating, for they give 
access to the vast structure of memory and put the present into the vicinity of events in 
which the experience was originally ingrained.  It is the result of the sensual effect in the 
present that the memory of the many madeleines, eaten as a child, can return.  William 
James explains that firm and repeated exposure to a stimulus is the precondition for 
future remembering:  
 
The first condition which makes a thing susceptible of recall after it has been forgotten is 
that the original impression of it should have been prolonged enough to give rise to a 
recurrent image of it, as distinguished from one of those primary after-images which very 
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fleeting impressions may leave behind, and which contain in themselves no guarantee 
that they will ever come back after having once faded away. (Principles of Psychology) 
 
A moment bienheureux does not give a replica of the past, but rather the past 
itself; it brings back the entire associative context, which briefly gives the impression that 
the present is effaced.  Unique to the individual, it reveals an individual truth through a 
sensation in the present that is not visual but gustatory.  Landy explains the emotional 
self in space and time: “if today’s madeleine tastes the same as it did thirty years ago, it is 
because there must be a part of us at least that has not changed in between times, a 
permanent aspect underlying all of the mutable selves” (112).  Proust seems to agree with 
the view that smell and taste provide a shortcut to the memories of a past self without 
the involvement of the intellect; that involuntary memory is beyond the control of the 
conscious mind and therefore occurs arbitrarily and unexpectedly; it lies dormant in the 
unconscious waiting to be recalled by a particular taste, sound or smell which then 
“recreates some part of the past with a sensory immediacy and reality that the conscious 
act of memorizing is unable to capture” (Cruickshank 227). Cruickshank continues to 
explain the amplifying effect of involuntary memory, because it abolishes “time (in the 
chronometric sense),” whereby “a greater unity is restored to the self and the moment of 
memory takes on a unique richness and multiplicity” (Cruickshank 227).  Landy proposes 
that it is involuntary memory which “indicates the existence of, and affords access to, a 
unique and diachronically stable self” (113).  Involuntary memory connects the present 
self with its past self.  
 
That the past exists somewhere beyond the reach of the intellect was formerly 
explored by Henri Bergson.  In 1888, Bergson argued that the intellect alone cannot 
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grasp the concept of time that governs the reality of duration and change.  His belief 
that we could only understand ourselves through intuition also became a cornerstone 
for Proust’s understanding of reality.  The madeleine episode is an example of Bergson’s 
concept of durée in which involuntary memory is Proust’s aesthetic device to express 
the interpenetration of moments of time in order to remove the barriers between 
reality and the consciousness of that reality.  Involuntary memories have a greater 
authenticity than voluntary memories, because they are understood to have no 
intermediary.  
 
Truth has an essential Relationship to Time 
 
It is sense perception and not intellect which is the instrument of truth; therefore 
Proust values sensations over intellect, involuntary memory over voluntary memory, 
because “voluntary memory does not recall the experience itself; it recalls the experience 
as reworked by intelligence and at least partially translated into concepts.”102  Landy 
summarizes Proust’s position as being that “the only type of knowledge we care about, 
the only kind that can transform our life, is knowledge of subjective ‘truths,’ and such 
knowledge is granted by intuition” (10).  Intuition needs sensory cues in order to produce 
the vividness of involuntary memory, to open the way toward recollection.  A physical 
sensation in the present can stimulate a forgotten sensation of the past, which prompts 
the re-creation of the circumstances that surrounded the original sensation with the 
result that the past becomes alive in the present.  The claim is that involuntary memories 
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are more vivid than those which are recalled voluntarily, because the former retain their 
freshness and detail in the unconscious mind, hermetically sealed and thus unmodified by 
time, until the moment when they are recalled into the waking consciousness by chance.  
Beckett explains involuntary memory as that which “has been registered by our extreme 
inattention and stored in that ultimate and inaccessible dungeon of our being […] the 
essence of ourselves, the best of our many selves.”103  In other words, the truth that was 
buried in lost sensation becomes the basis for the self when recovered at a later time, 
when time that was lost is regained.  With the becoming present of the past, the 
phenomenological structure of time is broken, overcome and transcended. Thus, Proust 
realizes that the unity of the self in time is fictional; the self does not exist in time but 
outside the contingencies of time.   
Proust calls his experiences, these special moments of revelation in which the self 
transcends the flow of chronological time, moments bienheureux, (fortunate moments), 
which have the power to bring the self into contact with the essence of reality.  As a 
modernist writer, he “could speak about his experiences of the eternal only by freezing 
time and all its fleeting qualities” (Harvey 21).  Involuntary memory not only replicates 
the past but also reveals what was hidden in the recesses of the mind.  These privileged 
moments liberate the self from the order of time by affording “a true re-instantiation of 
an earlier experience” (Epstein 217).  Landy explains the connection between knowledge 
and involuntary memory: “The knowledge yielded by involuntary memory (including the 
understanding of involuntary memory itself!) comes not through reasoning but through 
epiphanic insight. It is thus ‘more precious’ than ‘truths which the intellect educes directly 
from reality’” (164).  Similarly, Lennon explains that “a moment bienheureux [...] always 
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relates to the real – indeed, to what is most real. Even more importantly, a moment 
bienheureux relates to presence, not absence, to knowledge, not ignorance. In fact, a 
moment bienheureux is an absence overcome” (Lennon 57).  His assessment is not 
incompatible with Ryan’s view that Proust’s epiphanies do not transcend the order of 
reality but are psychic phenomena that reveal the relation between two experiences: 
“[w]hat seem like epiphanies are not insights into another realm but the re-emergence 
and reintegration of portions of his consciousness that have become temporarily 
disconnected. The narrator is unable to make these connections until involuntary 
recollections actually make the past present for him” (Ryan 188).  
The question is whether essences are tangible and can be found in the mind 
through memory.  Bergson had written that the self is unaware of itself most of the time: 
“[t]he greater part of the time we live outside ourselves, hardly perceiving anything of 
ourselves but our own ghost, a colourless shadow which pure duration projects into 
homogeneous space.”104  Freud concurs with Proust’s insight that the gleam of his own 
projections is bouncing back because “the self is like a slide in a magic lantern. By looking 
at its projection in a work of art (here the written word), one can study the nature of the 
unconscious that produced it” (Baudry in Jordan 113).   
Epstein states that each sensation takes part in a chain of associations and that it 
is the power of involuntary memory to foreground “the contextual information that 
shaped the remembered episode” (Epstein 220).  Furthermore, Epstein claims that an 
experience of involuntary memory adds something to and enriches the self by raising 
awareness to something that has been forgotten, but which suddenly returns and takes 
on new meaning: 
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We become aware of aspects of a period of time that we were not previously aware of, 
and we feel that we are experiencing it in a way that we never experienced it before. In 
fact, we have experienced it before, but with different emphasis: the contextual 
information that had fallen into the background has now been brought into the 
foreground. The passage of time has made this information novel once again, and thus we 
attend to it. (221) 
 
 
Beckett describes the instances of involuntary memory as an immediate, explosive 
and total deflagration, in which the past object is not merely restored but “in its 
brightness revealed what the mock reality of experience never can and never will reveal – 
the real” (Beckett 33).  Similarly, Morrison and Stack explain that the taste sensation of 
the present “stimulated the recollection of the past taste sensation and hence the past 
occasion itself” (605). But they continue to state that the consciousness experiences a 
conflation of past and present; in this moment, both events are not merely experienced 
as similar but as identical, whereby the past has become absorbed into the present:  
 
The two modes of temporality have merged into a new kind of synthetic unity and 
experience. The past has been both re-called and pre-served. As recalled and preserved, 
the past is not only in the present. It has become, in Heidegger’s language, a presence 
(Anwesen), a presence which is unique insofar as it is of the past and hence retains its 
essential quality of ‘been-ness’ (Gewesenheit). The remembrance and the memory are 
thus a ‘been-presence’. The ordinary experience of time as a succession of discrete 
moments – of ‘nows’ – has been transformed by virtue of a mergence of two moments,  a 
past and a present one, into a bipolarized  unity.105 
 
Proust recovered the problematic Romantic notion of lost unity, which Beckett 
phrases in a more dramatic,  but poetic language: “the total past sensation, not its echo 
nor its copy, but the sensation itself, annihilating every spatial and temporal restriction, 
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comes in a rush to engulf the subject in all the beauty of its infallible proportion” (Beckett 
72-73).  Epstein claims that Proust’s moments bienheureux can be understood as an 
experience in which the “dimly-felt contextual information that surrounds the more 
salient sensory information in the focus of consciousness,” (219) comes to the surface of 
consciousness and thus, in these privileged moments, “we become aware of the network 
of memories and goals that guides the stream of thought – a network that is usually only 
vaguely sensed in the ‘fringe’ of consciousness” (Epstein 222).  He further argues that 
Proust’s division of awareness into two components roughly corresponds to William 
James’s ideas about the structure of consciousness with distinct elements termed “the 
‘nucleus’ and ‘fringe’” (Epstein 214).  
Lehrer examines the material basis for this view of memory in the work of the 
contemporary brain sciences.  Contemporary neuroscience looks at prions, a class of 
proteins that displays an astonishing amount of plasticity: although prions have a 
particularly sturdy structure, they also have an element of randomness built-in, which 
makes them unpredictable.  These properties lead scientists to assume that prions and 
their neighbouring dendrites are essential for the functioning of memory: in the prions, 
memories are preserved as almost immortal, but it needs neurotransmitters to change 
the dendritic details and cause a cellular shudder, for memory to reappear, but each time 
slightly altered.  Lehrer explains that “every time we conjure up our pasts, the branches of 
our recollections become malleable again,” which makes the past “at once perpetual and 
ephemeral” (Lehrer 94). 
Proust’s knowledge of the self is that self is transcendental and relational; it is 
based on existence in the flux of time and on relations between the self and the external 
world.  To put an ephemeral world into order, Proust’s language is preoccupied with 
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significations and metaphorical allusions that give an instantaneous effect.  External 
objects and other people are always seen in their relation to the narrator, relative to his 
own consciousness and subjectivity that shapes individual perspective.  Marcel’s 
awareness about the nature of his own self takes place among the ‘otherness’ of things.  
The recognition of his own centrality as the originator of experience turns everything 
outside himself into perspectival appearances.  Nothing exists independently, but only as 
a phenomenon that can be felt and lived through.  Morrison and Stack state that “the 
world for Proust is not an objective being-in-itself, but a lived-world (Lebenswelt). What is 
sought in this ‘world’ is its meaning” (Morrison and Stack 613). Proust’s novel is 
preoccupied with temporality and with subjectivity that connects former memories with 
sensory impressions in the present.  Thus, white hawthorn hedges are perceived as 
having an architecture associated with churches, chapels and altars (RTP 188), but 
moreover, they take the narrator back to after dinner church services on Saturdays, 
specifically in the month of May, when the altar was perennially decorated with 
hawthorns (RTP 151).  Proust’s remembering stems from comparing and combining a 
present sensation with a past one.  Roger Shattuck explains the particularity of perception 
that involves going back in time:  
 
Proust set about to make us see time. […] Merely to remember something is meaningless 
unless the remembered image is combined with a moment in the present affording a view 
of the same object or objects. Like our eyes, our memories must see double; these two 
images then converge in our minds into a single heightened reality.106       
 
But the white hawthorns do not reveal a deeper meaning.  Even though Marcel 
tries to relax his mind by first concentrating on other objects and then returning to the 
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hawthorn-blossoms, this time fixing them more intensely.  Indeed, voluntary efforts fail to 
produce the desired effect; the renewed experience does not offer enlightenment and 
the  images need to be deciphered: “the sentiment which they aroused in me remained 
obscure and vague, struggling and failing to free itself, to float across and become one 
with the flowers” (RTP 190).  The rapture only happens shortly afterwards through the 
discovery of the pink blossoms that reverberate and intensify Marcel’s festive mood:  
 
And, indeed, I had felt at once, as I had felt before the white blossom, but now still more 
marvelling, that it was in no artificial manner, by no device of human construction, that 
the festal intention of these flowers was revealed, but that it was Nature herself who had 
spontaneously expressed it. (RTP 191) 
 
By connecting the memory of looking at the hawthorns to his emotional state, the 
pink blossoms take on a new meaning; they become an emblem of holiday festivity in an 
episodic memory.  Schacter explains the working of memory, where the blossoms are 
stored as a fragment of an episode, which is then transformed in “the recollective 
experience of the rememberer” (70).  In Marcel’s memory, nature seems to celebrate the 
holy day and the image of the hawthorns gives a privileged access to reality in which the 
hawthorns become transformed into “a Catholic bush indeed” (RTP 192).  Proust explores 
the phenomena of consciousness where consciousness arises by first becoming aware of 
objects, followed by the act of deforming and recreating the object, a process which 
Landy describes as a “perspectival distortion imposed by intuition” (82).  Epstein too sees 
it as the result of an “associative network within which the stream of thought meanders” 
(Epstein 224).  Both explanations reveal that the hawthorn bushes are nothing in 
themselves.  They can only convey a message to Marcel if he allows them to take on 
significance; thus he imbues them with specific values that mirror back his own mood so 
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that he can “discover in things, endeared to us on that account, the spiritual glamour 
which we ourselves have cast upon them” (RTP 115).  Beckett speaks of Proust’s 
representation of perception in almost religious language; it is one in which objects of the 
physical world are described as Proust’s potential “elements of communion,” if they 
become part of “some immediate and fortuitous act of perception,” which is a “sacred 
action,” in a process of “intellectualised animism” (Beckett 36).  Epstein explains the 
perspectival nature of knowledge in more prosaic linguistic terms.  He claims that many of 
Proust’s comparisons are not standard metaphors based on similar features, “but 
something one might term narrative metaphor, in which one event is compared to 
another event that has a similar social or emotional structure” (Epstein 223).   
Perceived reality in which the shifting nature of objects is experienced through 
mutable sensations is similar to Jean-Paul Sartre’s thought that because consciousness is 
essentially void, it needs encounters with external objects in order to accrue identity over 
time.  John Cruickshank makes the connection between Sartre and Proust: “Similarly, the 
finding of our identity through objects recalls the statement in L'Etre et le néant that 
'consciousness is a void except in so far as it can project itself into objects in the outer 
world.’”107  Sartre’s self must project itself into objects, whereas for Hume the self has to 
introject objects, because otherwise, the self “independent of the perception of every 
other object, is in reality nothing” (Hume 340).  Cruickshank explains how the two 
protean elements – the shifts, which simultaneously take place inside individuals and 
outside in reality – work together: “Our knowledge of others, which has now become a 
shifting personal perspective on a shifting external reality, will ultimately be 
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impressionistic. The impressionism inherent in our knowledge of people arises from the 
fact of subjectivity operating in a restlessly shifting human world” (223).  
Ortega y Gasset noted the parallelism of impressionism as a pictorial style, which 
negates the external form of real objects in order to reproduce their internal form, with 
the world-view of impressionist philosophers at the end of the nineteenth century.  Landy 
agrees that Marcel’s intuition stems not from the intellect but rather from immediate 
insight that places him “directly in touch with objects of cognition. As a result, the prose 
poem is very close to impressionist paintings” (58).  Ortega y Gasset explains that “the 
impressionist does not draw the object; he attains it by accumulating tiny dabs of color, 
each one of which is formless in itself, but all of which together, in combination, are able 
to engender before half-closed eyes the vibrant presence of the object,” which is similar 
to the impressionist philosopher, who maintains that reality is made up of emotive and 
sensory states, “a flux of odors, tastes, lights, pains, and desires, a never-ending 
procession of unstable inward reverberations” (508).  Through the projection of 
sensations, which are qualities of the mind, onto objects that are external to it, objects 
become unstable because their appearance changes in space, through time, and also 
under the observer's subjectivity, his instinct, or personal presuppositions, which forge 
more idiosyncratic associations.  
Although vision is direct, it distorts through reductions in point of view.  Bergson 
had noted that the distance between the self and objects plays a crucial role in our 
perception, that “the size, shape, even the colour, of external objects is modified 
according as my body approaches or recedes from them” (Matter and Memory 6).  
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Bergson’s thinking here is close to that of the phenomenological philosopher Edmund 
Husserl, who had also provided explanations for the phenomenon.108   
Proust also writes about the plurality of perspectives, experiences in space and 
time.  He starts with the alternation between three-dimensional and two-dimensional 
perception as a paradigm for his inquiry into the nature of reality.  Three church steeples 
change their position in relation to each other, an effect of change in perspective or point 
of view through the movement of a carriage, but the appearance of the steeples also 
changes in time.  Cruickshank explains that Marcel’s impressionistic account involves a 
second movement in which “each spire itself changes in appearance as the light and 
atmosphere alter throughout the day” (224).  The narrator describes the changing 
appearance of the spires as he visually perceives them, as an optical illusion that shifts 
external reality: the steeples cease to be merely static objects but present new aspects 
with every movement of the perceiver in space and, simultaneously, also through the 
passage of time:  
 
I caught sight of the twin steeples of Martinville, on which the setting sun was playing, 
while the movement of the carriage and the windings of the road seemed to keep them 
continually changing their position; and then of a third steeple, that of Vieuxvicq, which, 
although separated from them by a hill and a valley, and rising from rather higher ground 
in the distance, appeared none the less to be standing by their side. (RTP 247) 
 
Proust is not merely stating the optical illusion of three steeples standing next to 
each other but more importantly, he raises our awareness of two possible ways that 
reality can be perceived: the steeples can be seen through the intellect that knows that 
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the steeple of Vieuxvicq is some distance from the steeples of Martinville, or they can be 
seen as they appear as phenomena – as though they stand on the same plane – which is 
the result of having been “filtered through a standard human subjectivity at a particular 
set of spatiotemporal positions” (Landy 58).  The brain conceives of phenomena in the 
context of a specific environment and Morrison and Stack explain that phenomena arise 
out of perspective, they are “momentary transitory appearances relative to 
consciousness” (612).  But Landy points out that “perspective itself breaks down into two 
aspects, the universal (one shared, or potentially shared, by any member of the human 
race) and the individual (one that varies from person to person)” (57, emphasis added).  
Optical illusions are universal, mundane occurrences, based on the biological human 
apparatus for perceiving the world, whereas the individual perspective is singular.  Early 
cognitive psychologists sought to demonstrate “that perception is a constructive process 
dependent not only on the information inherent in a stimulus but also on the mental 
processing of the perceiver.”109  
Proust writes about a special artistic ability in perceiving that uncovers meaning in 
physical phenomena when, later that afternoon, Marcel suddenly feels a strange 
sensation in looking at the spires of Martinville for a second time.  Now the spires seem to 
have lost their material surface and appear to reveal their essence:  
 
And presently their outlines and their sunlit surface, as though they had been a sort of 
rind, were stripped apart; a little of what they had concealed from me became apparent; 
an idea came into my mind which had not existed for me a moment earlier, framed itself 
in words in my head. (RTP 248)   
 
                                                          
109
 Brenda Milner, Larry R. Squire, and Eric R. Kandel, “Cognitive Neuroscience and the Study of Memory,”   
Neuron 20.3 (1998): 445-468, at 445.  
123 
 
Marcel had intuited something beneath the surface of the spires which he 
describes as “something analogous to a charming phrase, since it was in the form of 
words which gave me pleasure,” (RTP 249) and in his essay he expresses what for him “lay 
buried within the steeples of Martinville” (RTP 249).  Proust seems to be convinced that 
external reality can be known better through the artistic reconstitution of the original 
experience and Morrison and Stack explain that “the surface features of actual objects 
hold within them, as it were, something more real than their phenomenal, mutable 
aspects. The capacity to attend to the essences of things is gradually developed in the 
narrator […] an evolution which parallels his development as an artist” (610-11).  The 
appearance of the church steeples is a general observation that differs from Marcel’s 
subsequent personal appropriation of the steeples through idiosyncratic metaphorical 
language.  His mind makes them unique, thus “the steeples” can become “my steeples” 
(RTP 248, emphasis added).  Beckett views Proust as an artist who is able to capture 
essence, because he is able to suspend briefly the “death of habit” in perception, 
whereby he grasps the essence of objects and gives them a particular aesthetic form, in 
which “the object is perceived as particular and unique and not merely the member of a 
family” (Beckett 22,23).  The perceptual distortion of objects makes it possible to write 
about the spires in a new way; once their depths have turned into surfaces, they are 
appropriated into stylistic expression that Marcel can claim as emanating from himself as 
he is the one who perceives them.  
Artistic transformation of experience liberates the habitually concealed essence of 
objects.  According to Gilles Deleuze, Proust’s art achieves a veritable transmutation of 
matter through style, as Proust explains:   
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[T]ruth – and life too – can be attained by us only when, by comparing a quality common 
to two sensations, we succeed in extracting their common essence and in reuniting them 
to each other, liberated from the contingencies of time, within a metaphor.110   
 
In order to convey the experience of touching on essence, Proust must reconstruct 
the connection of associations and he achieves this task by the metaphorical use of 
language that works in chains and links. Metaphor is a key role, not simply a stylistic frill, 
in the Proustian perspectival knowledge-system that sees causation as the result of the 
connection between the metaphysical world of the psyche and the external, physical 
world.  Epstein explains Proust’s thinking with metaphors as existing at a complex level 
that “allows the writer to do more than just describe individual sensations: by comparing 
one experience to another, the entire network of thoughts, memories and inferences 
common to both can be evoked” (Epstein 223).  Ryan denies the possibility of getting 
behind the veil of appearances and states that it is a delusion to look for essences.  And 
because there is no access to the “thing in itself,” what is left is “nothing more than 
impressions” (Ryan 180).  But impressions play a crucial role in the creative process and 
therefore Epstein argues that Proust is not merely recounting his past, but that “he also 
observes his memory in action, and he uses these observations to develop a 
comprehensive theory of conscious experience and artistic creation that potentially has 
profound implications for any scientific theory of consciousness.” (214). 
  
Impressions Regained 
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Proust understood that memories are always a fiction about ourselves.  In his 
paper, Epstein argues for putting both aesthetic experience and conscious 
phenomenology on a neural basis by elucidating “some tentative connections between 
three very different domains of observation: Proustian aesthetics, Jamesian 
phenomenology, and neuroscience” (Epstein 214).  Proust seems to argue that it is 
precisely the artistic process that transforms the memory of impressions with 
imagination, which reveals truth, although this truth is not only strictly personal but 
moreover, it becomes mutable through time.  According to Jordan, Proust is able to unite 
“the internal, subjective truth of the ‘plaisir spécial’ with an external, ‘objective’ truth of 
some seemingly insignificant object in the world, ties them together in a metaphor, 
creating a bond as strong as that of causality in the sciences” (Jordan 113). Indeed, Proust 
brings together two disparate objects by means of a subjectively necessary connection 
that reworks experience, which generally means that sensory impressions have to be 
translated into language and his use of metaphor lends some kind of timelessness to his 
style. 
The viewing of the steeples of Martinville is one example of a privileged moment 
that in turn generates writing.  Marcel’s composition tells of his happiness in having found 
this medium for channelling his experiences that he “felt that it had so entirely relieved 
my mind of the obsession of the steeples, and of the mystery which they concealed” (RTP 
250).  Evidently, Marcel’s perspective on the mystery is highly imaginative; his poetic 
account is verbose with its numerous metaphors and animation of objects, so the imagery 
tells us almost nothing about the steeples themselves, but only about their place in 
Marcel’s subjective conceptual framework.  In juxtaposing the narrative with the “prose 
poem,” Landy elucidates the significant differences between the prose account and the 
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poetic version of Marcel’s experience where the steeples have lost their initial thing-like 
aspect and are now linked through contiguity and analogy:  
 
The poem brings two fresh features into the description, a series of images and a set of 
personifications […] The steeples resemble birds, pivots, flowers, and girls; they are 
capable of autonomous movement (“timidly seeking their way,...drawing close to one 
another”), equipped with distinguishing character traits (Vieuxvicq is “bold” and also 
disdainful, “taking its proper distance” from the other two) and endowed with agency—to 
the point, indeed, of bearing responsibility for their “actions” (Vieuxvicq being censured 
as “dilatory”). (56)  
 
Landy explains further that the heterogeneity of the imagery is due to the time of the day 
leaving a fourfold impression on Marcel’s mind that creates a new sort of order:  
 
The steeples remind Marcel of birds while the sun still gilds their peaks, but when the sun, 
having set, gives them a rosy glow, they are “no more now than three flowers painted 
upon the sky” […] And when, finally, the steeples suggest legendary maidens, they are 
completely bathed in darkness. (69) 
 
Marcel’s metaphors indicate features of his perspective and, to that extent, 
metaphors are necessary within his subjective world, but they are not standards of 
objective truth.  Proust communicates that there is only one universal objective truth that 
is essential to every human being: it is the uniqueness of each perspective and thus, 
Marcel’s metaphors simply reveal himself.  Landy agrees that “Proust does not set out to 
produce metaphors that illuminate the objects concerned […] instead he sets out to 
produce metaphors that illuminate the subjectivity of the character he has created” (74).  
Cruickshank claims that Proust assimilates his impressions, memory and imagination into 
his fiction and thereby “reveals the authentic nature of reality and, by doing so, genuinely 
exists himself” (227).  If his concept about “the authentic nature of reality” includes the 
subjectivity of the character and moreover, also extends to include the author it could be 
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said that through writing, Proust brings his subjective self into being. The metaphorical 
imagery expresses the mind of its creator or, in the laconic assessment of Judith Ryan, 
Proust’s idiosyncratic description of the towers reveals “simply the person he was when 
he wrote the piece” (183).  Time is regained in style, in a vision or in an internalized 
impression that is again lost when time is eternalized by putting it into a metaphor, which 
is extra-temporal: “[i]n order to be regained, the impression must first have been lost as 
an immediate pleasure, prisoner to its external object” (Ricœur, TN 149-50).   
Reality changes, even when viewed from a fixed position, due to varying light 
conditions at different times.  The passage of time affects the appearance of objects, 
which is prominently described as changes in colour.  On the stonework of the church of 
Saint-Hilaire different colours can be perceived, as the light and atmosphere alter 
throughout the day and also take on different aspects according to the seasons: on “a 
misty morning in autumn” the stones appear as “a ruin of purple, almost the colour of the 
wild vine,” which changes in the evenings to “violet velvet,” and the slates of the base “in 
the hot light of a summer morning, blaze like a black sun” (RTP 83-85).  Proust expresses 
that time cannot be understood in its objective aspect – the time of the world – but only 
subjectively and phenomenologically: time can only be experienced as change.   
The many instances of involuntary memory in Proust’s novel provide a rhythmic 
structure in the novel, an artistic patterning that unites the various strands of Proust’s 
view of the memory process.  Pierre Janet, amongst others, had offered a metaphysical 
reaction to positivistic trends and had put forward claims for the existence of a spiritual 
realm. In resurrecting large blocks of time through the involuntary process, the 
Bergsonian durée is simulated, but the past self is not reconstituted in the process.  
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Malpas quotes Lyotard, who considered that Proust’s “excess of time” in the text finally 
eludes consciousness, which has the effect that  
 
the true character of the narrator remains finally unpresentable. However, despite this 
gap in presentation, the narrative itself retains a traditional form that presents the story 
as a unified whole. For Lyotard, this makes Proust’s work nostalgic, and therefore 
modern: “it allows the unpresentable to be invoked only as absent content, while form, 
thanks to its recognisable consistency, continues to offer the reader or spectator material 
for consolation and pleasure.”111 
 
Section 2: The Self in Post-Impressionist Writing – Virginia Woolf’s 
Mrs. Dalloway (1925) 
 
Modernity is equated with a certain mode of experience of space and time, which 
might be seen to become the primary aesthetic problem for early twentieth-century 
writers.  Impressionist writers such as Proust constructed their narrative by drawing on, 
and attempting to convey in writing, sensations that stimulate memory; in this respect, he 
“tried to recover past time and to create a sense of individuality and place that rested on 
a conception of experience across a space of time” (Harvey 267).  Woolf admired Proust’s 
work and how he had described experienced time subjectively as sequential time of 
consciousness which “breaks with traditional models [and] is closely related to the rise of 
new kind of individualism.”112  In Mrs. Dalloway, characters plunge into their pasts, 
continually retaining and projecting themselves; Paul Ricœur writes that “[t]he art of 
fiction here consists in weaving together the world of action and that of introspection, of 
mixing together the sense of everydayness and that of the inner self” (TN 104).  
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Modernist Subjective Consciousness: Turn to the Inner Life  
 
Virginia Woolf engaged with the artistic theories of her time, linking her responses 
to a much wider literary and cultural context, evident in her fascination with the post-
impressionist exhibition of 1910 (Jane Goldman, The Feminist Aesthetics of Virginia 
Woolf: Modernism, Post-Impressionism, and the Politics of the Visual 2001).   
Post-impressionist writers such as Woolf sought to transgress mere impressionism 
by implementing a structural framework that makes explicit the frictions and tensions 
that are constantly at work in the self as it constitutes itself in space and time.  Although 
individual identity is “formed in a nexus of relationships and influences without which it 
cannot emerge from the background of the crowd […] there is a tension between the 
desire for autonomy, and the necessity, in forming identity, of both interrelationships 
with others, and the boundaries of space and time.”113  Modernist writers experimented 
with new literary forms that would express their view of the self as fragmented by and 
through time and, more particularly, they wanted to show how the mind works for the 
constitution of the self through memory that connects the self with its past and with 
others.  For the depiction of the changes they witnessed in their respective societies 
during the years 1890-1920, their fiction blends personal experiences with cultural 
memory; Max Saunders states that Virginia Woolf’s writing was particularly concerned 
with a rejection of authority, “the patriarchal-institutional complex that binds us into its 
structures of linearity, time and authority“ (271).   
Woolf breaks these structures by describing experience as fragmented and fluid 
without coming to a conclusion about its meaning.  The major characters in Mrs. 
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Dalloway perceive their identity as fragmented and inconclusive as they oscillate between 
experiences in the past and present.  Paul Sheenan argues that Woolf attempts to capture 
the flux of modern life in new ways by articulating “not one but two interpretations of 
experience, as both flux and fragmentation.” 114  He further asserts, however, that the 
wavelike fluidity and isolated particularity stand not in opposition to each other, but are 
“bound in a relationship of meaningful tension,” where they operate “along an axis, as 
covariant properties of experience. Like wave-particle dualism, the two modalities do not 
cancel each other out but exist in tandem, coextensive of each other. The chief 
consequence of this variability is to render meaning radically unstable” (Sheenan 128).   
Instead of copying established novelistic forms, Woolf experiments with a structured 
narrative style, which is “a literary form that brings the transcendent into the actual,” 
(Hussey 154) or, in other words, her novels bring into being the shape that she saw 
lurking behind the shimmering veil of appearances: the flowing streams of sensation and 
the particularity of the heterogeneous moment.  Her artistic vision sought to make a 
textual contingency from fragments through echoes and reverberations in themes and 
characters.   
Modernist writers like Woolf began to understand the impossibility of 
representing the world in a single language and consequently, their art “took on multiple 
perspectivism and relativism as its epistemology for revealing what it still took to be the 
true nature of a unified, though complex, underlying reality” (Harvey 30).  Woolf’s sense 
of reality is somewhat contradictory in that it is both fragmented and whole; the self is 
fragmented, but desires and imagines unity.  
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Individual Identity over Time 
 
In Mrs. Dalloway (1925) the unity results from Woolf forging an aesthetic 
connection between the simultaneity of moments.  She borrowed the concept of 
geometrical forms from post-impressionist painters, who had moved away from the 
traditional view that the unity of the form is first and foremost a decorative and stylistic 
aspect of the work and had consciously arranged the constituent parts of their work in a 
structural patterning, which influenced Woolf’s literary technique.  Another influence was 
the art critic Roger Fry, who had organized the first post-impressionist exhibition in 1910, 
and his particular interest in Paul Cézanne, which he expressed in Vision and Design 
(1920).  Ann Banfield sees Fry’s visual art theory as dualistic, “the product of a thinking 
which also gave rise to Moore’s, Russell’s and Whitehead’s persisting dualism, in which 
‘the world of universals’ coexists with ‘the world of existence.’ There are two realities, 
one sensible and the other inaccessible to the senses; nonetheless, ‘both are real and 
both are important to the metaphysician’” (Bertrand Russell at page 100 in The Problems 
of Philosophy, cited in Banfield 13).  Woolf recognized the potential for expressing the 
effects that modernism had on the human consciousness and the possibility for a novel 
aesthetic structure for our “ever-changing impressions that are held together by the thin 
veneer of identity” (Lehrer 172).  In painting, the symmetry in formal design 
communicates and, according to Roger Fry, it conveys, “the intensity of a dramatic 
conflict by the sublime balance of two opposed poles.”115  In order to achieve such an 
effect in Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf arranges the different strands of the plot and connects the 
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characters in patterns of doublings, parallels, echoes and reverberations.  Fry’s art 
criticism credits Cézanne with the transformation of Impressionism into Post-
Impressionism, because in his art “Cézanne thus showed how it was possible to pass from 
the complexity of the appearance of things to the geometrical simplicity which design 
demands” (Roger Fry Reader 83).   
 
Fictive Temporal Experiences 
 
Woolf took the paradigm shift in Post-Impressionistic design and applied it to Mrs. 
Dalloway, where an intricate system of formal relations adds depth to the portrayed 
characters and, furthermore, it shows the hidden spatiotemporal relations between 
them. The structure allows Woolf to describe the temporal and spatial confusion that 
exists within the self; her main characters are concerned with the present, they are 
shown as situated in the here and now, but sudden transportations back to the past 
frequently interrupt their present thoughts in “a series of loops that gives its specific 
distension to the narrated time’s extension” (TN 104).  Woolf follows her characters in 
their day-to-day activities and thus “manages to expose the profound in the quotidian” 
(Lehrer 172) or, as Ricœur says, “the art of fiction here consists in weaving together the 
world of action and that of introspection, of mixing together the sense of everydayness 
and that of the inner self” (TN 104).  Clarissa Dalloway is an ordinary woman on an 
ordinary day and, although Woolf makes her a representative of a social group, she is 
shown as having affinities with other characters from different classes.  Woolf describes 
life as it appears outwardly by giving an account of how a character is seen by another, 
but she also gives a detailed psychological picture of the inner life with its moments of 
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insight as well as the deepest concerns and anxieties that are normally hidden in social 
conduct. How and to what effect the past influences the present becomes a major subject 
in Mrs. Dalloway; Woolf’s post-impressionistic writing style makes explicit that there is “a 
potential in human experience for perceiving a time out of time, for overcoming the limits 
of actual life through apprehension of a different mode of being altogether” (Hussey 117).  
It is Woolf’s aesthetic goal to point out that the self is never absolutely situated in the 
present but dispersed in time and space.  Clarissa Dalloway’s notion of being everywhere, 
not just “here, here, here,”116 exemplifies how Woolf apprehends a reality behind 
appearances.  She believes in a transcendent order beyond the self; that beyond 
appearances there exists an unchanging self, which has no name but can be intuited in 
special moments that allow access to an inner world that she describes as being normally 
“hidden behind the cotton wool of daily life.”117   
 
Fictive Refiguration of Time: Double Awareness through Memory 
 
In Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf constructs a sense of past and present subjectivity through 
the memories of characters that allows each of them to imaginatively unite their past and 
present selves in their own minds.  Clarissa herself is doubled into an interior and exterior 
self – her private self and her social self – and she cannot decide which one is the more 
real.  Her memories of Bourton play a double role: they interrupt the present moment, 
restore her sense of identity by connecting the present self with her past youth, with the 
time before she became Mrs Dalloway.  The decision to marry Richard instead of Peter still 
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unsettles her thoughts, “[f]or they might be parted for hundreds of years, she and Peter […] 
but suddenly it would come over her” (MD 7).  “[C]ontrary to a Proustian return to the past, 
where the present seems to be temporarily effaced, the Woolfian memory process 
integrates the past and present in the search for a definition of selfhood.”118  Spoken or 
written phrases echo when remembered or reflected on by someone.  Clarissa greets Peter 
by exclaiming "[h]ow heavenly it is to see you again!" (MD 44), followed by an evening 
letter that tells Peter "[h]ow heavenly it was to see him” (MD 169).  Her words annoy him in 
that they bring the loneliness of his hotel-room to the forefront of his mind.  The reflective 
movement of Peter’s thoughts extends to imagine Clarissa’s emotions and actions after he 
had left her that afternoon and to thoughts about his past.  Roberts explains the dynamic of 
Woolf’s recurring sentences that allow the mental movement backwards and forwards in 
time with the example of the strokes of Big Ben that mirror the experience that various 
characters have of time:  
 
"The leaden circles dissolve in the air," unites with each iteration a specific place with a 
given hour; with each repetition it also moves us forward along the stream of the June 
day. And as the leaden circles dissolve farther and farther out into space (like the circular 
ripples set in motion by a pebble thrown into a pond, or a shilling into the Serpentine), 
the present, the past, the future-London, India, Bourton – coalesce in the various streams 
of thought that form the fabric of the novel.119  
 
Woolf seeks for a formal shape that could present the self as constituted through 
past and present selves and also to show an order that is beyond the self, to express 
something that exists beyond the limits of space and time.  She found inspiration in the 
works of post-impressionist painters for whom formal design is the principal trademark 
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and, according to Roger Fry, its profound effect is in giving the onlooker – or reader in 
Woolf’s case – a pleasurable aesthetic experience through the “recognition of order, of 
inevitability in relations.”  In post-impressionist works of art, meaning emerges from an 
intricate system of relations which are reconfigured through the aesthetic emotional 
response of the onlooker to the formal arrangements of the work rather than from 
passing on more kinetic “sensations or objects or persons or events” (Fry in Roberts 836-
837).  Memory stretches time from past to present, which repudiates clock time in favour 
of time lived and experienced in the individual mind.  In this sense, Proust and Woolf 
support Bergson’s idea that the mind has a reality of its own, where time is in flux and 
present only in the sense experience of the observer.  
 
Irreconcilable Perspectives on Time 
 
The manifold correlations, echoes and reverberations between the characters in 
Mrs. Dalloway provide a framework around each individual that shows them as being part 
of an architectural whole.  The formal meta-structure of this whole is figured through the 
striking of Big Ben that “manifests the horizon of time by which all actual being is 
bounded,” (Hussey 116-117) and, according to Showalter, it “acts as a temporal grid to 
organize the narrative.”120  Big Ben’s clock time is the same for everyone, but the sound 
of the leaden circle of Big Ben is echoed by the bell of St. Margaret’s that always rings two 
minutes after Big Ben.  Hussey suggests  that the belated bells of St. Margaret are a 
metaphor for individual time that works according to its own measure that “[i]f Big Ben 
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strikes clock time, the bell of St. Margaret’s seems to sound lived time: it does not 
coincide with the authoritative strokes of Big Ben, but seems ‘like something alive’” 
(Hussey 122).  Big Ben’s public and irrevocable chimes suggests that human chronological 
time must end with death, which Clarissa identifies as her own time, as she feels 
threatened by her recent illness.  
Both mechanical clocks are accurate from their own point of view and each clock 
gives a correct measure of its own proper time.  Big Ben measures time absolute, 
“indifferent, inconsiderate,” and gives “first the warning, musical; then the hour, 
irrevocable” (MD 52, 128).  In contrast, St. Margaret’s clock seems like a moody organism 
that is “shuffling in with its lap full of odds and ends, which it dumped down as if Big Ben 
were all very well with his majesty” (MD 193) and “the late clock sounded, coming in on 
the wake of Big Ben […] like the spray of an exhausted wave” (MD 140) or “like a hostess 
who comes into her drawing-room on the very stroke of the hour and finds her guests 
there already” (MD 54).  The tension between bodily lived time and mechanical clock 
time arises from the workings of the mind that can change instantly between past and 
present, which explicitly emphasizes “both the temporal and social dimension of selfhood. 
As Ricœur has argued, the time of human existence is neither the subjective time of 
consciousness nor the objective time of the cosmos. Rather, human time bridges the gap 
between phenomenological and cosmological time.”121   
After leaving the house in the morning, Clarissa is immediately transported back 
to a crucial time in her youth at Bourton and to the memory of Peter Walsh and his ever-
present pocket-knife.  At the next moment, she reappears on a street in Westminster, 
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seen through the perspective of an onlooker and suddenly, Clarissa is flung back into the 
present by the sound of Big Ben.  This is an example of the phenomena that Otto Rank 
described as a “clash between two worlds in which man attempts to live simultaneously, 
the natural world and the man-made world,” (Beyond Psychology 13) and Woolf’s 
doubling of clocks emphasises that there is a “the great discrepancy that exists between 
the time of the waking mind and that ticked off by clocks” (Hussey 121). The chiming of 
Big Ben is a constant reminder of mortality and the fact of death that temporalizes human 
beings is strongly felt by many characters.  
 
Temporal Configuration: Resonances and Ruptures 
 
Woolf takes over the idea of doubles from Stevenson and James but she develops 
further their ideas of the split self and the ghostly alter-ego.   Doubling appears as a 
structuring device for streams of consciousness and places; different minds are occupied 
with similar concerns and often present in the same locations: “[t]he unity of place, the 
face-to-face discussion on the bench in the same park, is equivalent to the unity of a 
single instant onto which the narrator grafts the extension of a span of memory” (TN 
104). “A bridge is built between these souls both through the continuity of place and the 
reverberation of an internal discourse in another person” (TN 105). 
Modernist fiction continues to experiment with the externalization and 
internalization of the double as a literary device in order to write about the psychology of 
the self, its relation to society and how society shapes the self.  In a diary entry for 14 
October 1922, Woolf writes that she intended Mrs. Dalloway as “a study of insanity & 
suicide: […] Mrs. D. seeing the truth, SS seeing the insane truth. The pace to be given by 
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the gradual increase of SS's insanity on the one side; by the approach of the party on the 
other” (Showalter xxvii).  Woolf links the minds of characters by shared themes that exist 
in their thoughts and by similar or different reactions to phenomena. The fundamental 
affinity between Septimus Smith and Clarissa Dalloway emerges through their explicit 
awareness of being isolated from others and their textual kinship is substantiated in their 
reflections on loss and death.  Both are characterized primarily through their distinctive 
modes of thought such that the description of their inner world “presents not the 
mimesis of a world, not even the self-conscious mimesis of a world, but the self-conscious 
mimesis of the perception and constitution of a world through minds that are also 
constituted in and through that world (ordinary minds on an ordinary day).”122  This 
ordinary day in June 1923 is coloured by physical and spiritual death in the aftermath of 
the First World War: the shadow of the millions, who died in the war, and the threat of 
imminent death is felt by everybody; Clarissa “always had the feeling that it was very, 
very dangerous to live even one day” (MD 9).  Peter’s thoughts about Clarissa’s recent 
illness are linked to the final stroke of St. Margaret’s bells that toll “for death that 
surprised in the midst of life” (MD 54).  In his view, Clarissa’s decision to marry Richard 
Dalloway had “stifle[d] her soul,” (MD 83) just as he had predicted at Bourton that her 
predilection for convention and propriety would bring about “the death of her soul” (MD 
65).  Septimus, on the one hand despairs about his inability to feel, that “human nature 
had condemned him to death” (MD 99) and, on the other, he completely repudiates the 
possibility of death by affirming that “there is no death” (MD 26).   
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Both Septimus and Clarissa have a potential to perceive “a time out of time, for 
overcoming the limits of actual life through apprehension of a different mode of being 
altogether” (Hussey 117).  Clarissa assuages her “horror of death” by following a 
transcendental theory in which death does not reduce the self to an ultimate state of 
nothingness but liberates something hidden, from “the recesses of the heart” (MD 74). 
Some core self disseminates through the world, partaking in other people and places, 
Clarissa hopes “that somehow in the streets of London, on the ebb and flow of things, 
here, there, she survived, Peter survived, lived in each other, she being part, she was 
positive, of the trees at home; of the house there […] part of people she had never met” 
(MD 9-10).  Something hidden might transgress the borders of the body that in life isolate 
one being from another: she calls it “the privacy of the soul” (MD 139). Clarissa hopes 
that essence might continue to exist in other people, the “unseen part of us, which 
spreads wide, the unseen might survive, be recovered somehow attached to this person 
or that, or even haunting certain places after death […] perhaps – perhaps” (MD 167).  
Hussey writes that “Clarissa suggests an ‘essence’ that is somehow ‘truer’ than the 
‘apparitions’ of it which are identities in the shared world,” but he also states that “[t]he 
novel does not attempt to analyse what this essence might be” (Hussey 28).  Whatever it 
is that remains after death, it is liberating and beyond pain, love or religion, which 
explains Clarissa’s emotional response to Septimus’s suicide, why “she felt glad that he 
had done it; thrown it away” (MD 204).  To others, Clarissa appears blasé and, by putting 
on the mask of a cultivated and domesticated wife, she conceals the suffering that links 
her to Septimus.  Her empathy with the dying Septimus is a bodily sensation that 
reconstructs his jumping out of the window, “[u]p had flashed the ground; through him, 
blundering, bruising, went the rusty spikes.  There he lay with a thud, thud, thud in his 
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brain, and then a suffocation of blackness. So she saw it” (MD 201-2).  Death emerges as a 
possible solution to overcome the limits of the body, the isolation of the self in the body, 
and Clarissa hopes that her theory could “explain the feeling they had of dissatisfaction; 
not knowing people; not being known. For how could they know each other?” (MD 167).  
Sally Seton mirrors Clarissa when she admits that knowledge is limited to speculation and 
haphazard conclusions about others, “for what can one know even of the people one lives 
with every day? […] Are we not all prisoners?” (MD 211). Hussey explains that “[t]he 
problem of identity is intricately bound up with that of knowing others, and because 
relationships form such a constantly shifting and widening web of interconnections there 
is no way of isolating one identity” (Hussey 28).  It is true that one cannot live without 
others and society, but it is equally true that the self is imprisoned in the body and 
restricted in perception.  In “A Sketch of the Past”, Woolf describes the wall that is 
between the self, the world and others; she imagines it metaphorically, as “lying in a 
grape and seeing through a film of semi-transparent yellow” (65).  Peter Walsh thinks in a 
similar metaphor about the mind/soul that moves around murky waters but he also 
acknowledges the need for catching up with the world:  
 
For this is the truth about our soul, he thought, our self, who fish-like inhabits deep seas 
and plies among obscurities threading her way between the boles of giant weeds, over 
sun-flickered spaces and on and on into gloom, cold, deep, inscrutable; suddenly she 
shoots to the surface and sports on the wind-wrinkled waves; that is, has a positive need 
to brush, scrape, kindle herself, gossiping.” (MD 176)   
 
Peter thinks of what is affecting our lives, individually and socially.  Otto Rank aptly 
describes how the mind is not restricted to processing phenomena intellectually, but is 
also “actual living in and with the flow of events following its changing currents as we 
swim along fully aware of its dangerous under-currents” (Rank 18). 
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Clarissa’s youthful ideas about identity are the result of the world’s intricate inter-
connectivity, which lets her believe in odd affinities, “that to know her, or any one, one 
must seek out the people who completed them; even the places” (MD 167).  Clarissa 
fears death because she genuinely loves “life; London; this moment of June” (MD 3).  It is 
Septimus “who kills himself, and who serves as Clarissa's double. He is linked to Clarissa 
through his anxieties about sexuality and marriage; his anguish about mortality and 
immortality; and his acute sensitivities to his surroundings, which have gone over the line 
into madness” (Showalter xxxvii).  Clarissa’s meditations on ageing and death are 
contrasted with those of Peter Walsh, who responds to the subject very differently.  He 
attempted to recapture his sense of youth and virility by proposing to a young woman 
already married in India, but now he hopes that Daisy will reconsider the plan, because he 
fears that he might “fail to come up to the scratch” (MD 173).  Although he is only six 
month older than Clarissa, the maid perceives him as being “elderly” and later, alone in 
his hotel room, and in his dream, Peter thinks of himself repeatedly as a “solitary 
traveller,” who is “elderly, past fifty now” (MD 62, 63).  His disappointment about 
unfulfilled ambitions, the waning of youth and virility, is compensated for by following 
women in the street, fantasizing about the possibility of a sexual adventure, and his 
compulsion of “constantly fiddling with the pocket-knife which symbolizes his 
masculinity” (Showalter xiv). 
In Mrs. Dalloway, lost or denied names are significant markers for lack of 
confidence and Hussey observes that names have a positive as well as a negative side, 
“they can not only help form identity, but can also disperse it” (Hussey 32).  For Clarissa 
the thought of being regarded as Mrs Richard Dalloway is a source of inner insecurity; she 
feels that she is “not even Clarissa any more,” which gives her “the oddest sense of being 
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herself invisible” (MD 11).  The name Dalloway alienates and threatens her sense of 
selfhood, reducing her to an adjunct of her husband.  The importance of a name as an 
assurance for identity becomes clear when Richard exasperatedly insists that his name is 
“Dalloway” and not “Wickham” (MD 67).  Peter Walsh feels that his real self is hidden in a 
secret name that he likes to think might be known to the young woman he follows in the 
street, “his private name which he called himself in his own thoughts” (MD 57-58).  
Although his parents had given him an unusual Christian name to make him unique 
amongst the many men called Smith, Septimus cannot draw identity from it (MD 92).  
 
The Dissolution of Identity: Madness as Reason’s opposing Concept 
 
Woolf sets the emotionally struggling Clarissa against the clearly insane Septimus, 
who withdraws from reality and builds up an inner world of his own.  Whereas Clarissa 
can look back to her youth and sheltered life at Bourton, for her memory retains “the 
sunnier landscape of the belle époque, in full knowledge of its ravaging in the war,”123 
Septimus’s disturbed perception of reality is an after-effect of wartime shell-shock; an 
experience that has made it impossible for him to feel himself in the present or actualize 
himself in relation to others.  He is isolated in a timeless world in which he denies the 
death of his friend Evans.  Hussey explains that “Septimus’s sense of the oneness of the 
world is a refusal to admit death: if he does not recognize the passage of time, he need 
not admit death” (Hussey 124).  Initially, Septimus regards with equanimity his inability to 
grieve, perceiving it as a correct masculine response, socially appropriate: “far from 
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showing any emotion or recognising that here was the end of a friendship, congratulated 
himself upon feeling very little and very reasonably” (MD 95).  When numbness becomes 
his general condition, it devastates his relations with his wife and alienates him further; 
Septimus feels punished and cut off from life.  Woolf describes him early on as “lately 
taken from life to death” and Septimus sees himself as a “drowned sailor” (MD 27, 74).   
 In this shattered world, Septimus feels disembodied, ghostlike; the world outside 
begins to disintegrate into unreality with no distinction between life and death.  The loss 
of existential feeling annihilates his sense of selfhood: Septimus’s “body is one more 
object in that world, bobbing up and down in the breeze along with the trees, feathers, 
and birds” (Hussey 14).  As he walks among the living as a skeleton, his arm is nothing 
more than “a piece of bone” (MD 17).  Septimus lacks an affective orientation towards 
the world to the point where his “unembodiment causes a serious disjunction between 
his perceptions and those of others around him” (Hussey 14).  He cannot take interest in 
reality, although Rezia implores him to look at the playing children and at the sheep in the 
park, because “such attention would necessitate embodiment for him, and thus feeling 
and recognizing death” (Hussey 15).  Instead of having a body that could experience what 
Damasio terms, the “feeling of a feeling” (Descartes’ Error xiii), Septimus has lost his 
fundamental sense of self and cannot readjust to the world around him and lives “behind 
a pane of glass,” (MD 96) or, to borrow an expression from William James, he feels “as if 
there were ‘a wall between me and the world’ or as if I were ‘sheathed in India 
Rubber.’”124  Septimus needs to build up a world of his own in order to protect himself, 
but instead of gaining relief, he suffers from the imagination of terrible guilt that 
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alternates with delusions of grandeur.  He believes that he is in communication with the 
dead that “Evans was speaking. The dead were with him” (MD 102).  He lives a mystical 
union between his self and all that is beyond the self and he has completely become part 
of the larger whole where the birds reveal to him the secrets of the world that “in the 
meadow of life beyond a river where the dead walk, how there is no death” (MD 26).  
Hussey explains that “in order to stave off the madness that Septimus feels this 
disjunction threatens him with, he translates his sensations into an inexpressible ‘religion’ 
of which he is the prophet, and gives meaning to a world that he sees might well be 
meaningless.” (Hussey 14).  His belief in transcendence is the insane mirror of Clarissa’s 
theory and whereas Septimus can no longer relate to the actual world and he “sees 
himself as wholly essence, as soul, […] Clarissa remains rooted in her embodied, time-
bound, actual life” (Hussey 124).  Woolf exemplifies in the struggling characters of 
Clarissa and Septimus the conflict of living in a modern metropolis, where “[t]he deepest 
problems of modern life flow from the attempt of the individual to maintain the 
independence and individuality of his existence against the sovereign powers of society, 
against the weight of the historical heritage and the external culture and technique of 
life.”125  Septimus distorts reality to the point of madness because he feels threatened not 
only from within but also from without: although outwardly he appears to be physically 
intact, his sense of self has disintegrated and lost “that complex feeling of being rooted in 
the body and its sense of proprioceptive situatedness in a world” (Waugh 10).  Drs 
Holmes and Bradshaw only treat the physical aspects of the body and as they cannot find 
anything wrong in that respect, there is no prescription other than rest and reflection in 
isolation.  Bradshaw recognizes the severity of his condition, but turns Septimus into an 
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impersonal case, because “doctors like Bradshaw deny the self” (Lehrer 173).  
Consequently, he fails to see Septimus as an individual and simply groups him with similar 
men who, affected by war, often threaten to kill themselves.  Sir William Bradshaw is a 
figure of authority with an interest in maintaining the social order and fighting the 
uncontrollable that threatens that order.  Septimus’s madness is not seen as mental 
suffering but as the loss of reason and “[i]t is this sense of proportion that sets [Sir 
William Bradshaw’s] entire professional and social life within monumental time” (Ricœur, 
TN 106).  The intellectualization of mental alienation as an illness of judgment or 
understanding “could not conceive of delirium as being the manifestation of profound 
emotional suffering, the way in which the madman could speak out – albeit deliriously – 
to interpret his pain” (Ehrenberg 16).  Septimus cannot express himself readily enough 
within Bradshaw’s consultation timeframe of “three-quarters of an hour,” he can only 
stammer "I – I – –" (MD 107, 108).  “Bradshaw’s imposition of his middle-class and 
middlebrow ideology on his patients resembles imperialism in the violence it does to 
existing ways of believing, thinking, feeling, and living.”126  Septimus is a morbid individual 
who suffers in a seemingly healthy civilization and Bradshaw’s goal is to adjust deviants 
like Septimus to the accepted norm in the prevailing social order.  Similarly to Septimus, 
Richard wants to but cannot say that he loves Clarissa; instead of speaking the words, he 
conveys his message symbolically by presenting her with a large bunch of roses.  The 
bourgeois ideology allows for substitutes. Clarissa can accept the roses as a token of love 
and they make her happy, “she loved her roses” (MD 132).  Rezia’s roses are not 
symbolic; she bought them out of pity when they “were almost dead already” (MD 102).  
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In contrast to Septimus, who has lost his connection with the world, Clarissa’s 
precarious sense of belonging to the world is compensated for by her participation in 
social rituals.  She is part of a leisure-class where there is no economic struggle for 
existence and Woolf points out the social gulf between people as typified by the 
‘Dalloways’ and the millions of ‘Smiths.’  Woolf succeeds in depicting the class isolation 
and the separate worlds of social reality, but moreover, she shows that emotional 
repression is a common characteristic.   Zwerdling notes that the central concept in Mrs. 
Dalloway is concerned with “solidity, rigidity, stasis, the inability to communicate 
feelings.”127  Clarissa is the victim of the English class-system that compels her to live in 
the boredom of polite society and she is aware that she has had to pay a price for her 
complacent and secure lifestyle: by rejecting the adventurous Peter and marrying the 
dependable Richard, she relinquished the possibility for fulfilment in a passionate 
relationship for the social role of a society hostess.  Although Richard has not been as 
successful in his career as was originally envisaged, Clarissa finds security as his wife and 
refuge in the shelter of their home where she can “crouch like a bird and gradually 
revive” (MD 203).  The nuclei of Clarissa’s social life are the parties, which are emblematic 
of Clarissa’s drive to conform to the existing social order by restricting the guest list to the 
socially acceptable and beneficial people, but furthermore, the parties attest to Clarissa’s 
creative will, which tries to “mak[e] order out of apparent disorder.”128  Her role as a 
hostess of social gatherings satisfies her inherent desire to construct her world by 
combining people who – in her view – should know each other:  
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Here was So-and-so in South Kensington; some one up in Bayswater; and somebody else, 
say, in Mayfair.  And she felt quite continuously a sense of their existence; and she felt 
what a waste; and she felt what a pity; and she felt if only they could be brought together; 
so she did it.  And it was an offering; to combine, to create; but to whom? An offering for 
the sake of offering, perhaps. (MD 133-134) 
 
Poor cousin Ellie Henderson mirrors Clarissa’s fear of gradually becoming invisible 
in society. Although Ellie is also past fifty and belongs to the same social strata, her lack of 
money means that she will not add glamour to the party. Therefore, in Clarissa’s opinion, 
Richard “did not see the reasons against asking Ellie Henderson,” (MD 132) but Clarissa 
understands that Ellie’s “three hundred pounds’ income” is not sufficient to dress 
fashionably (MD 185).  Seeing Ellie at the party, both Sally and Peter are united in their 
thinking that Clarissa was hard on people, which they had first noticed many years ago at 
Bourton in Clarissa’s dismissive attitude towards a young woman who had a baby before 
she was married.  Clarissa’s social ambition ranges from people who might be able to 
foster her husband’s career to people with money and aristocratic affiliations, “[s]he 
loved Lords; she loved youth, and Nancy, dressed at enormous expense by the greatest 
artists in Paris” (MD 194-5).  The superficiality of ritualized social conduct and utility value 
is symptomatic of the alienation of the self from feeling and Simmel explains that the 
metropolitan person substitutes emotional conduct for rationality and mannerism, a 
significant shift ”to a sphere of mental activity which is least sensitive and which is 
furthest removed from the depths of the personality” (62).  
 
Memory unites Present and Past Selves 
  
148 
 
“Clarissa has an inherent desire to combine, in the hope of somehow discovering a 
revelatory order to the world. As this hope is perpetually defeated, the combinative 
instinct doubles on itself: her parties become ‘an offering for the sake of offering, 
perhaps.’” (Hussey 50).  Her self-esteem rests on being part of London’s social scene as a 
facilitator who kindles, illuminates and socially creates by giving people a chance to meet 
and connect.  Hussey continues to explain that Clarissa’s urge to combine people is a 
characteristic activity for self-preservation; in socializing she can see her own reflection, 
through being with others Clarissa finds her identity.  Her social function gives meaning to 
her life and, although Peter uses the term derogatively, it defines Clarissa’s being: 
 
That was her self when some effort, some call on her to be her self, drew the parts 
together, she alone knew how different, how  incompatible and composed so for the 
world only into one centre, one diamond, one woman who sat in her drawing-room and 
made a meeting-point, a radiancy no doubt in some dull lives, a refuge for the lonely to 
come to, perhaps; she had helped young people, who were grateful to her; had tried to 
be the same always, never showing a sign of all the other sides of her – faults, jealousies, 
vanities, suspicions […]. (MD  40) 
 
This drawing herself together is necessary for Clarissa to balance her fear of 
invisibility against her public appearances.  Each day, Clarissa has to draw herself together 
and assemble into her “diamond shape” (MD 41).  According to Peter, Clarissa has the gift 
to make herself real to others with her “extraordinary gift, that woman's gift, of making a 
world of her own wherever she happened to be” (MD 83).  Lehrer points out that we 
continually create our presence, “[t]his is what we all do every day. We take our scattered 
thoughts and inconstant sensations and we bind them into something solid. The self 
invents itself” (Lehrer 174).  Woolf uses the diamond metaphorically; it is not only 
Clarissa’s symbol for the unity of the self but it also denotes the moment of the seminal 
kiss she once received from Sally Seton.  In her memory, the kiss attains a tangible quality,  
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“[a]nd she felt that she had been given a present, wrapped up, and told just to keep it, 
not to look at it – a diamond, something infinitely precious, wrapped up” (MD 38-39). The 
diamond stands for something obscured but pure, a symbol for the uncorrupted self that 
is buried beneath appearances.  Clarissa thinks of Septimus’s suicide as the heroic act of 
“defiance,” for the preservation of something most precious, the thing that really matters 
(MD 202).  The motive for suicide is “the resistance of the individual to being levelled, 
swallowed up in the social-technological mechanism” (Simmel 62). 
 Both Septimus and Clarissa also mirror other characters:  Miss Kilman’s repressed 
lesbianism mirrors Clarissa’s fleeting lesbian experience with Sally Seton, in which Clarissa 
also mirrors masculine desire: “She did undoubtedly then feel what men felt. Only for a 
moment; but it was enough” (MD 34). The university-educated Miss Kilman, who is not 
allowed to lead an intellectual life in a male-oriented society, but has to content herself 
with teaching privately for a living, is the opposite of Clarissa and her leisurely life-style.    
The tension between the two women is class resentment on Miss Kilman’s side, which 
prompts her to wish for Clarissa to be “in a factory; behind a counter” (MD 136).  Clarissa 
rejects Miss Kilman, because she evokes an uncomfortable social awareness that fate had 
been fortunate: 
  
For it was not her one hated but the idea of her, which undoubtedly had gathered in to 
itself a great deal that was not Miss Kilman; had become one of those spectres with which 
one battles in the night; one of those spectres who stand astride us and suck up half our 
life-blood, dominators and tyrants; for no doubt with another throw of the dice, had the 
black been uppermost and not the white, she would have loved Miss Kilman!  But not in 
this world.  No. (MD 12-13) 
 
Social conventions force Miss Kilman to deflect her desire for Elisabeth and project it onto 
objects she can safely devour, but even the pleasure of eating a pink éclair is denied to 
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her, whereas Clarissa can indulge her passion for gloves at any time. Social refinement 
prevails and through reaching for her gloves, Elisabeth finally breaks away from Miss 
Kilman.  Gloves, shoes and dresses protect as well as extend the body and appear to 
Clarissa more real than her body.  Her torn green evening dress is a second skin which 
Clarissa impulsively hides from Peter, “like a virgin protecting chastity, respecting privacy” 
(MD 43).  Symbolically, she protects herself with her scissors against Peter’s pocket-knife. 
 
Temporal and Spatial Experience 
 
Woolf is interested in revealing the ordering principle that connects the two 
different concepts of reality:  on the one hand, each individual constitutes reality through 
understanding relationships with others, and on the other, the world exists outside and 
independent of the self. In connecting the two theories, Woolf aimed to reveal the hidden 
pattern that lies behind the “cotton wool” in order to get at “some real thing behind 
appearances” (“A Sketch of the Past” 72).  Her metaphysical belief system acknowledges 
an underlying connectiveness between our understanding of being in the world and the 
world that exists outside us: 
 
I might call it a philosophy; at any rate it is a constant idea of mine; that behind the cotton 
wool is hidden a pattern; that we – I mean all human beings – are connected with this; that 
the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work of art. […] there is no God; 
we are the words; we are the music; we are the thing itself. (“A Sketch of the Past” 72) 
 
In Mrs. Dalloway the principal literary device that shows the relations between 
the characters is their connection through a polarity that complements Woolf’s view of 
the self.  Although Clarissa Dalloway and Septimus Smith sometimes move in close 
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proximity to each other, they remain unaware of the other and never meet on the streets 
of London on that fateful day.  Their separate movement emphasizes their different class 
memberships: Septimus belongs to the lower strata, whereas Clarissa’s social relations 
mirror her status of being the wife of a member of the Parliament.  By plotting them in a 
doubling mode, Woolf shows that Septimus and Clarissa as individuals belong to some 
kind of order beyond themselves.  Although they are divided by class, they are connected 
by their thoughts, which appear as reverberations of phrases and in the image of the sun 
that appears in both minds.  
The general prospect of life with all its imponderability is a constant source of 
terror for Clarissa.  She is depressed by prospects of ageing and death, “the dwindling of 
life; how year by year her share was sliced,” (MD 32) with the result that “narrower and 
narrower would her bed be” (MD 33-4).  In moments that threaten her sense of stability, 
for example when Clarissa learns that she hasn’t been invited to Lady Bruton’s luncheon, 
a quotation from Cymbeline calms her fear of insubstantiality and social invisibility, “Fear 
no more the heat of the sun / Nor the furious winter’s rages” (MD 10).  Although Clarissa 
feels disturbed and compulsively returns to the past, she manages to keep her fears in 
check and to hold on to her sanity by slipping into her social self.  Roberts explains that 
Clarissa and Septimus are “not separate and individualized characters, but opposite 
phases of an idea of life itself. Their reality consists not of themselves as persons, but of 
their relationship to each other as forms” (Roberts 837).  On the afternoon before his 
imminent suicide, Septimus hesitates for a moment thinking that he need not do it and 
“did not want to die.  Life was good.  The sun hot” (MD 164).   
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Identity continually and psychologically expands and re-creates itself when the 
present and the past are juxtaposed, because every emotion or sensation deriving from 
“exceptional moments” – the intense images of scenes and objects that are retained in 
memory freshly through time – the past changes its shape continuously in response to 
the present forces.  Thus, human identity is always in process without a final form in time 
and space.  The flashes of illumination display a view of consciousness that establishes 
continuity of the past within the present. 
In Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf reveals “the ‘emotional significance in the [relationship 
between] time and space’ by making time and space an integral part of the novel’s form” 
(Roberts 840).  Clarissa’s calm, happy stream of consciousness, triggered by her looking at 
and smelling the flowers in a flower shop, is suddenly interrupted by the disruptive and 
uncanny appearance of a motor car, which sounds like “a pistol shot in the street 
outside!” (MD 14).  The automobile invades both the city and the modernist text and 
signifies the changing experience of time and space.  An example of time that stretches 
into space is Lady Bruton dozing on a sofa after the lunch she has just shared with Richard 
and Hugh.  At first, her thoughts wander back to scenes from her youth and then follow 
Richard and Hugh as they walk across London.  Ann Banfield explains that while she dozes 
“the text presents to us their simultaneous existence far from her, never threatened by 
her temporary extinction in a snore.”129  Woolf describes the gradual diminishing of Lady 
Bruton’s consciousness during the process of falling asleep as the thinning of a spider’s 
thread:  
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And they went further and further from her, being attached to her by a thin thread (since 
they had lunched with her) which would stretch and stretch, get thinner and thinner as 
they walked across London; as if one's friends were attached to one's body, after lunching 
with them, by a thin thread, which (as she dozed there) became hazy with the sound of 
bells, striking the hour or ringing to service, as a single spider's thread is blotted with rain-
drops, and, burdened, sags down.  So she slept. (MD  123) 
 
The stretching and sagging of the thread imaginatively visualizes the receding of Lady 
Bruton’s consciousness at the same time as Richard and Hugh gain spatial distance.  Lady 
Bruton’s thin thread “is consciousness itself, attached by immediate memory to the 
receding lunch guests, by sensation to the sounds of afternoon; its stretching and 
unwinding measures the increasing distance of sleeper from world” (Banfield 221).  
During the time it takes her to fall asleep, Lady Bruton’s mind is still connected to the two 
men until the sudden moment when her mind is erased by sleep and the thread snaps.  
The narration combines the movement of Lady Bruton’s mind in time and space with the 
physical movements of Richard and Hugh.  
 
In this novel, Virginia Woolf extends her interest in memory, a theme which Proust 
had reintroduced a few years before.  Whereas Marcel’s involuntary memory needed 
stimulation from specific sensory reminders, Clarissa Dalloway experiences intermittent 
instances of being transported back in time.  When memories of her past flare up, the 
present moment is overpowered by the thoughts of her past.  Similarly to Proust, Woolf 
continues with the aesthetic shaping of the self in text and, by reading Mrs. Dalloway as a 
fictional autobiography, it becomes obvious that she is acutely aware of the invasiveness 
of social forces, a theme that had been introduced by Rousseau.  Woolf emphasizes the 
embeddedness of each individual in their social strata by describing the protagonists’ 
obsession with clothes, dress codes and manners.  All these performative aspects of the 
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self point to Woolf’s belief that the self is shaped out of culture and has to respond to 
cultural and social pressures; the feeling of the need to conform is pervasive and is 
internalized in the same way in which speech is constantly being internalized as thought 
by characters, who seem to echo the thoughts of the narrator as well as those of other 
characters.  Woolf reworks the double theme: rather than exteriorizing the good and bad 
aspects of a self, as was the custom in the nineteenth-century literature of the double, 
her doubling(s) seeks to explain damaging aspects of controlling social and medical 
authorities that divided people into sane or insane beings: Clarissa and Septimus embody 
a psychological doubling, the ego and alter-ego, the externalisation of acceptable and 
non-acceptable aspects of a self.   
 
In the next section, the double theme enters into a further evolution that started 
with Rousseau’s narcissism and then intensifies into a pathological paranoid self: the 
portrayal of solipsistic and paranoid minds in literature moves closer to a postmodern 
view of self as doubled, fragmented and split. 
 
Section 3: Emotional Blindness, Narcissistic Doubling and Paranoia 
 
Vladimir Nabokov, asked in an interview with Alfred Appel, about the role of the 
Doppelgänger motif in his fictions, dismissed the notion that he consciously employed a 
doubling of characters in his novels; he insisted that "[t]here are no 'real' doubles in my 
novels," and even claimed that "[t]he Doppelgänger subject is a frightful bore."130  It is 
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certainly true that Nabokov’s characters are not just simple double figures in the 
traditional sense: in Lolita and Pale Fire there are no ghostly split-selves or psychological 
exteriorised evil selves, as was the convention in nineteenth-century Doppelgänger 
literature.  Instead of doubles that embody opposed aspects of a single individual, 
Nabokov’s doublings are mirrors of narcissistic desire.  Appel states that “[t]he unified, 
definitive self is a joke to Nabokov, for the infinite possibilities of its development are 
circumscribed by the warped mirror in which we perceive ourselves and the world.”131  
The warped mirror of the deluded mind obfuscates reality: it severs the self from the 
world and others and replaces reality with an artistic order.  Nabokov is concerned with 
the solipsistic self that is preoccupied with the centrality of his own consciousness that 
creates an individually aestheticized reality with the artist-as-hero self at its centre: the 
protagonists in Lolita and Pale Fire suffer from insatiable desires that are outside of 
accepted norms and, consequently, they try to pacify their consciousness and cover up 
guilt by turning to artistic pretensions in the hope that a transfiguration of their actions 
into an artwork could exonerate their deeds.  Humbert Humbert constructs a moral plane 
for his obsession by associating himself with well-known artists and his main argument of 
defence is that he is not a “brutal scoundrel” but a poet, who writes transcendent poetry 
of nymphet love, which is special because “it belongs to another class, another plane of 
sensitivity.”132  In his obsession with John Shade’s poem “Pale Fire” Charles Kinbote 
appropriates the intended meaning – Shade’s reflection on his life – and claims that it is 
the glorification of himself as the king and of the kingdom of Zembla.  His elaborate and 
monomaniacal interpretation is full of homosexual innuendos and the fantasy world 
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becomes Kinbote’s surrogate for his sad reality.  Ellen Pifer writes that “only in his dreams 
and his wildest Zemblan fancies does mad Kinbote manage to transmute the ‘drab prose’ 
of his unhappy existence into ‘strong and strange poetry’.”133  
 
Doublings and Mirrors in Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita (1955) 
 
Although all events and dialogues are narrated in the idiosyncratic voices of 
Humbert and Kinbote, the author Nabokov is never absent.  In his introduction to The 
Annotated Lolita, Alfred Appel observes that “[w]hen perceived by the reader, the 
involuted design of each novel reveals that these characters all exist in a universe of 
fiction arrayed around the consciousness of Vladimir Nabokov, the only artist of major 
stature who appears in Nabokov’s work” (L lvi).  The novels reveal Nabokov’s fascination 
with literal and metaphorical doubling and mirroring techniques, which produce “layer 
after tantalizing layer of images, shapes and grades of associations and connections that 
create alluring patterns of meaning and significance.”134  Similarly to Woolf’s structural 
patterning, “verbal cross references” weave an intricate design that deliberately 
challenges the relationship between the reality of life and the narrative that tells about 
that life (Appel, L lix).  In Pale Fire, the attentive reader can discern an intriguing pattern 
of interlacing themes and details between the lives and works of John Shade and Charles 
Kinbote and in Lolita, Clare Quilty’s farcical depravity mirrors Humbert’s obsession; they 
are united in their artistic, but ultimately self-centred ambitions.     
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The magnitude of verbal play and supposedly serendipitous repetitions creates a 
matrix of mirrors – a stylistic device that makes the reader conscious that every page is 
pronounced and self-conscious art, evident in word-games: the metaphors, puns, 
anagrams, palindromes and alliterations parody the traditional double literature and, 
according to Michael Wood, the narration divided into different narrative planes turns 
the novels into textual games: “Lolita […] is a novel pretending to be a memoir with a 
foreword; as Pale Fire is a novel pretending to be a critical edition of a poem.”135  The 
prevalent novelistic form is parody and Appel enumerates the different types of form that 
can be discerned: 
 
Pale Fire is a grotesque scholarly edition, while Lolita is a burlesque of the confessional 
mode, the literary diary, the Romantic novel that chronicles the effects of a debilitating 
love, the Doppelgänger tale, and in parts, a Duncan Hines tour of America conducted by a 
guide with a black imagination, a parodic case study. (Appel, “The Springboard of Parody” 
213) 
 
Reading Nabokov’s novels as textually involuted games gives pleasure only to 
readers who are willing and able to play the game, so the interplay of text and audience 
avoids the Scylla of looking for authorial intention as well as the Charybdis of 
undecidability; this interpretation leads Wood to claim that “[t]he author is not dead in 
Barthes’ sense: [he is] just crazy, or conspiratorial, like the narrators we are looking at” 
(Wood 118).  In Lolita and in Pale Fire, the solipsistic protagonists pursue “a fantasy 
kingdom, an absolute realm of being where […] reality loses ‘the quotes it wears like 
claws.’”136  Clearly, Humbert Humbert’s narcissistic mind projects his desires onto the 
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world, which solipsizes and distorts others; his delusions come close to insanity, whereas 
Pale Fire’s Kinbote appears to have crossed the border and gone beyond the pale of 
sanity: his paranoid mind builds its own solipsistic world so that he constantly has to 
defend his fantasy kingdom against the asserted reality of others.  Anything that does not 
fit his self-made universe becomes a threat against his self.    
Humbert’s imaginary memoir parodies the confessional tradition: in the style of 
De Quincey’s Confessions of an English Opium Eater, the putative editor, John Ray, Jr. 
subtitles the text in his foreword as “the Confession of a White Widowed Male,” (L 5).  
Similarly to Rousseau’s Confessions, Lolita is also permeated with self-analysis, self-
castigation, and self-justification, but it parodies De Quincey’s preface of 1821 in which he 
does not acknowledge any guilt.  John Ray Jr.’s critical assessment condemns H. H. as “a 
shining example of moral leprosy” (L 7).  Humbert writes his defence for an imaginary 
trial, in which he imagines readers in different roles and consequently, his tone shifts and 
he frequently “addresses his readers in a whole array of voices: respectful, diffident, 
confidential, insulting. He pictures us as his judge and jury” (Wood 113).  Humbert is a 
double in himself, as his name Humbert Humbert suggests, who writes his confession as 
“Humbert’s novelisation of Humbert’s life” (Wood 118).  The doubling of his name 
immediately alludes to Humbert’s narcissistic ego that reduces the outside world and 
others to a reflection of his self, his dreams and desires: 
 
There was a double bed, a mirror, a double bed in the mirror, a closet door with mirror, a 
bathroom door ditto, a blue-dark window, a reflected bed there, the same in the closet 
mirror, two chairs, a glass-topped table, two bed tables, a double bed." (L 121, emphasis 
added)  
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Appel describes the room at The Enchanted Hunters as a hall of mirrors in which the 
reflections of the double-bed is an externalization of Humbert’s state of mind;  the 
multiplied image of the bed becomes a haunting presence in “a bewildering little prison 
of mirrors, a metaphor for [Humbert’s] solipsism and circumscribing obsession” (Appel, 
“The Springboard of Parody” 205). 
Regularly, however, Humbert also addresses the reader as his double, thereby 
inviting him to share his point of view or, at the very least, to be drawn into unwitting 
complicity with it.  The narration shows Humbert’s compelling manipulation of his 
audience: he turns his unknown readership into something familiar, first by exclaiming 
“my reader,” (L 76) then adding successively more personal touches that range from an 
intimate “comrade,” (L 169) to the capitalization of the word reader to give the 
impression of a name, “O, Reader, my Reader,” (L 205) and finally, he invokes Baudelaire 
in his appellation “Reader! Bruder!” (L 264).  This implicit allusion to the poem “Au 
lecteur” that prefaces Les Fleurs du mal, in which Baudelaire accuses his readers of 
hypocrisy, suggests a cautionary function:  readers should stop pretending moral 
indignation and acknowledge the alluring aspects of the protagonist’s and his alter-ego’s  
depravity.  Humbert and Quilty mirror the readerships’ interest in voyeurism and the 
pornographic and the textual titillation parodies and appears to pander to their penchant 
for explicit pornographic content.  Baudelaire, who was identified with the Decadent 
Movement in France in the late nineteenth century, mirrors Humbert’s own decadence, 
which is even more prominently mirrored in his nemesis Claire Quilty.  Frosch explains the 
decadent reflections in Lolita: 
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Described as the American Maeterlinck, Quilty is a fin-de-siècle decadent and thus the 
final, weak form of Humbert’s romanticism; his plays reduce the themes of the novel to 
the sentimental and the banal; the message of one of them is that “mirage and reality 
merge in love” (L 203). Quilty […] incarnates the ironies of Humbert’s quest: to possess is 
to be possessed; to hunt is to be hunted.137  
 
The figure of the decadent dandy personifies self-centred opulence and the 
wealthy playwright Quilty fits this profile: he indulges in eccentric unsavoury hobbies, 
such as gluttony, sexual and sartorial excesses.  But he remains coarse in comparison to 
Humbert, who appears as a parody of Baudelaire’s metaphysical dandyism that elevated 
aesthetics to a cult for the satisfaction of refined passions: Humbert’s prose is arty when 
he displays a “dandyish taste for alliteration” (Wood, 112).   
For the justification of his deeds, Humbert connects himself with artists as the 
precursors of his obsession in order to convince the reader that his desire is nothing out 
of the ordinary. He claims, in the manner of Rousseau, that “I have but followed nature” 
(L 137).  He also mentions Poe, who had married his thirteen year old cousin and he will 
later, on two occasions, add the name “Edgar” as his middle name, and he refers to 
Dante, who “fell madly in love with his Beatrice when she was nine” as well as Petrarch, 
who “fell madly in love with his Laureen” when she was twelve (L 21).  Humbert insists 
that the large age difference between man and nymphet is a natural condition, and 
therefore, his desire is – again invoking Rousseau – the desire of a natural man.  He even 
employs anthropological arguments to justify the intercourse between different 
generations as an existing phenomenon: “marriage and cohabitation before puberty are 
still not uncommon in certain East Indian provinces. Lepcha old men of eighty copulate 
with girls of eight, and nobody minds” (L 21).  Humbert seeks to excuse by giving skewed 
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examples:  it is not known when, or in what form exactly, the historical couples actually 
had physical contact.  Besides the far-fetched exotic examples, Poe was twenty-six when 
he married Virginia and not thirty-seven as Humbert was in the year when he first met 
Dolores.  Humbert seeks to prove that moral judgment is a question of attitude and that 
the mores of Western society mark him as “an unfortunate victim of an arbitrary social 
convention.”138  Only for a moment does Humbert’s argument convince, but on 
reflection, the reader is left with the suspicion that Humbert tries to deceive himself and 
others.  He presents his desire for nymphets as a primordial condition that is the 
prerequisite and prerogative of all artists; consequently Humbert’s objectifying and 
appropriating Dolores is justified when he turns her from daemon into muse by stating 
“and what is most singular is that she, this Lolita, my Lolita, has individualized the writer’s 
ancient lust, so that above and over everything there is – Lolita” (L 46-47).  
  
Stylization of the Self and Others 
 
Humbert’s exaggerated aestheticism is comparable to the modern sensibility 
termed Camp, which Susan Sontag describes as the modern dandyism of the twentieth 
century.  Camp understands the world through stylization: it transforms the natural into 
the unnatural, which has the effect that “things-being-what-they-are-not … Camp sees 
everything in quotation marks.”139  The rhetorical framing with quotation marks imbues 
things with desire-driven significance and turns them into products of culture that stops 
them from being merely things-in-themselves.  Nabokov concedes that novels are self-
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contained artificial worlds but he also points to the phenomenological nature of reality in 
which a work of literature exists “like a picture in a picture” (Appel, ‘Interview with 
Nabokov’ 136).  Nabokov asserts that “there is an average reality, perceived by all of us, 
but that is not true reality: it is only the reality of general ideas […] Average reality begins 
to rot and stink as soon as the act of individual creation ceases to animate a subjectively 
perceived texture.”140  In stressing the “act of individual creation,” he comes to 
understand reality as “one of the few words which mean nothing without quotes” 
(Nabokov in Connolly 15).  A metaphysical statement in Pale Fire confirms this world-view 
and Nabokov actually uses quotation marks: “the basic fact that ‘reality’ is neither the 
subject nor the object of true art […] creates its own special reality having nothing to do 
with the average ‘reality’ perceived by the communal eye”141 (PF 106). Camp, as a cultural 
phenomenon, expresses the human agency in creating reality and understands “Being-as-
Playing-a-Role. It is the farthest extension, in sensibility, of the metaphor of life as 
theatre” (Sontag 280).  It follows that identity can only be understood as “a kind of artistic 
construct, however imperfect the created product” (Appel, L lvii).  Furthermore, Humbert 
Humbert’s and Charles Kinbote’s exhilarating aesthetic stylizations are directed at 
readers; both attempt “to dethrone the serious, to annihilate hierarchies of judgement” 
(Waugh, HS 43). 
Humbert’s affinity with Poe is obvious when he re-enacts Poe’s poem ‘Annabel 
Lee’ and it adds a poetic notion to his obsession with “a certain initial girl-child,” also 
named Annabel, who is Lolita’s precursor (L 11).   His grief following Annabel’s sudden 
death mirrors Poe’s lamentation for his cousin, who also died very young; Humbert makes 
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it explicit that this tragic event ended his emotional development. From that moment on, 
he is haunted by her ghostly presence which prevents him from entering into an adult 
erotic relationship.  He grows into Humbert, the misanthropist and marries the adult 
Valeria, who is for him merely “a soothing presence, a glorified pot-au-feu, and animated 
merkin,” with one important, albeit short-lived attraction, that is to say for “the imitation 
she gave of a little girl” (L 27).  But as soon as the impression of “little girl” has worn off, 
he realizes that he has married “a large, puffy, short-legged, big-breasted and practically 
brainless baba” (L 28).  Humbert’s cynical and angry narration clearly accuses  Valeria of 
deceit; he presents himself as the victim of a lewd woman and makes a strange excuse 
that claims innocence and corruption at once, “I, on my part, was as naïve as only a 
pervert can be” (L 27).  A “naïve pervert” is a strange oxymoron that gives a partly comical 
and partly unsettling effect, but is indicative of Humbert’s complex negotiation between 
his mental struggle with the moral and psychological issues that conflict with his desire: 
there is a “great tension sustained between Humbert’s mute despair and his 
compensatory jollity” (Appel, “The Springboard of Parody” 211).  Rhetoric is the mask 
behind which Humbert hides moral responsibility by interpellation directed at his 
audience asking to “[i]magine me, reader […] masking the frenzy of my grief with a 
trembling ingratiation smile.” (L 249)142  He sometimes slips into a comic role that puts 
the joke on him, which emphasizes his alleged innocence, but more often, he tries to blot 
out the cruelty of his actions by seeking approval from outside himself: he appeals to 
readers’ complicity with his “verbal vaudeville” (Appel, “The Springboard of Parody” 211).  
Humbert ridicules others, especially women, with dark eloquence and stylish snobbery.  
                                                          
142
 Interpellation in the sense that Nabokov anticipates the Althusserian concept of interpellation: Humbert 
hails the reader to accept his condition as natural and, possibly to identify and recognize that they also 
might share his desires. 
164 
 
His reduction of an adult woman to a girl-child clearly deprives Valeria of identity and his 
aside shows that he deprecates women as such: “(in whom I see, maybe, the coffin of 
coarse female flesh within which my nymphets are buried alive)” (L 177).  According to 
Humbert’s design, Valeria is turned into a laughable figure when she no longer functions 
in her role of “the stock character she was supposed to impersonate” (L 29).  His 
description of Valeria reflects society’s hypocritical evaluation of women, which oscillates 
between the female viewed as either childlike or monstrous.  In either case, the myth of 
woman as ‘other’ presents an intractable problem with the effect that it denies women 
the faculty of reasoning and consequently, it justifies male dominance and validates male 
superiority over them.  Thus, it becomes possible for a male, confused by female 
behaviour, “to substitute an objective resistance for a subjective deficiency of mind; 
instead of admitting his ignorance, he perceives the presence of a ‘mystery’ outside 
himself.”143  Earlier on, Humbert had stated that he is cursed with a special sensibility that 
divides females into normal girls and nymphets; he suffered in a “world [that] was split. I 
was not aware of not one but two sexes, neither of which was mine; both would be 
termed female by the anatomist” (L 20).  For Humbert, a woman is something aberrant 
and abominable per se, and his potentially flattering comparison of Charlotte Haze’s 
features to Marlene Dietrich immediately becomes a sardonic critique of both women.  
Charlotte is described reservedly in a double negative, she is “not unattractive,” but 
nevertheless, she is only a “weak solution of Marlene Dietrich” (L 39), which “is a brilliant 
and dismissive metaphor, since it manages to turn both Charlotte and Marlene Dietrich 
into chemical concoctions” (Wood, The Magician’s Doubts 23-24).  Deprecating others is 
Humbert’s first strategic step in his self-defence: his sneering protects him from entering 
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into authentic relationships with women and justifies his callousness.  Through his use of 
language, alternating between elegant but misogynistic irony and insincere contrition, 
Humbert controls the narrative: his goal is to win the readers’ sympathy.                     
Not only Valeria’s, and later Charlotte’s positioning is assigned by Humbert, the 
misogynist, but he also imagines for himself different roles: “Humbert the Terrible 
deliberated with Humbert the Small whether Humbert Humbert should kill her or her 
lover, or both, or neither” (L 31).  Furthermore, Connolly argues that Humbert’s solipsism 
excludes his actual role as a husband and that his phrase “the Humberts” refers only to 
himself: 
 
Normally one would think that the phrase ‘the Humberts’ would refer to the couple, 
Humbert and Valeria, but the ensuing comment on the debate between Humbert the 
Terrible and Humbert the Small leads to another possibility, that the phrase refers solely 
to Humbert and his warring impulses. This would be consistent with his fundamental self-
absorption. (Connolly 79) 
 
 
Humbert’s self-obsession knows only its present state and is blind to others, which 
excludes him from social relationships and prevents empathetic knowledge.  After Valeria 
had revealed that there is another man in her life, Humbert cannot recognize the taxi-
driver in their presence as her paramour.  This foreshadows Humbert’s blindness towards 
Quilty as the man to whom Lolita is attracted. Because Humbert lives in a universe of 
fiction, he constantly misjudges and misperceives others and himself.  Lacking a unified 
self, his many disguises reflect his desires and megalomania: opposite Lolita he appears in 
his “adult disguise (a great big handsome hunk of movieland manhood),” (L 41) and calls 
himself “Humbert le Bel,” (L 43) and thinks of himself as “the glamorous lodger” (L 51).  
Humbert often refers to himself in the third person so he can shift agency to another 
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Humbert: he is not responsible, it was the other, “Humbert the Cubus [who] schemed and 
reamed” (L 73).  By splitting off the unsavoury part of his personality, Humbert attempts to 
“create the impression that it was not he, but the ‘other’ in him who stealthily fondled 
Lolita, who plotted the crime” (Tamir-Ghez 81).  Moreover, Humbert assigns to his body an 
eerie agency of its own; instead of saying “I”, he uses synecdoche to deflect moral agency: 
“my glance slithered,” (L 41) “my hand creep up,” (L 48), and finally, on the bed in the hotel 
room with Lolita, his fingers metamorphose into “tentacles,” which suggests animal-like 
qualities (L 132).  Tamir-Ghez suggests that “[t]he split is between body and mind, and the 
body is presented as acting on its own, against the inclinations of the soul, or, as he himself 
summarizes it: ‘While my body knew what it craved for, my mind rejected my body’s every 
plea’” (81).  Humbert feels haunted by his urge to break the taboo and fears that his 
cravings are the “forerunners of insanity” (L 20).   
His prolonged craving for Lolita turns him into “Humbert the Wounded Spider,” 
(L 56) who then becomes a defeated “Humbert the Humble” (L 57) after Lolita had 
rejected his advances.  In his delusion he thinks of himself as having “all the 
characteristics which, according to writers on the sex interests of children, start the 
responses stirring in a little girl: clean-cut jaw, muscular hand, deep sonorous voice, 
broad shoulder” (L 45).  In repeatedly pointing out the attractiveness of his “manly 
looks” (L 55), Humbert appears sickly conceited and consequently, the judgement of his 
appearance remains questionable, especially when he describes his set of teeth early on 
as “a cesspoolful of rotting monsters behind his slow boyish smile” (L 46).  Whether the 
description of his teeth is simply a metaphor for his moral depravity, or his actual dental 
condition, or both, is unclear, but will later be confirmed in both senses, when Humbert 
describes a serious dental operation, which had left him with “only a few upper and 
167 
 
lower front teeth” (L 293).  That the only healthy teeth he retains are his canines, points 
to Humbert’s dark and predatory nature, which also emerges in a sinister metaphor that 
describes his eye in close proximity to Lolita; his eye becomes an aggressive weapon, a 
“bared eyetooth” (L 50).  Part of Humbert’s delusion is claiming the power of 
omniscience and omnipotence that makes him the epicentre of the Haze household.  He 
imagines himself as an inflated pale spider who presides by “sitting in the middle of a 
luminous web and giving little jerks to this or that strand” (L 51).  In this regard, 
Humbert’s egotism resembles the spider who spins his cobweb out of “materials 
extracted altogether out of [its] own person.”144  In an allegorical debate between the 
spider and the bee, Jonathan Swift sets the modern writers’ claims to superiority in a 
satirical parable and personifies the moderns in the figure of the spider.  Like the spider, 
who feeds on other creatures and uses his digestive products for his architecture, 
Humbert’s conceited ignorance (attributes that are personified as father and mother of 
the deity Criticism in Swift) obliterates the value of others in his narrative.   
To reconcile his grandiose self-image with his puny reality, he needs the 
affirmation of other minds that mirror back his monstrously inflated ego, or it will be 
proven that he is merely a pathetic individual.  Sass explains the absurdity of self-
enclosure in a separate world where the solipsist is “[c]aught up in the intensity and 
seriousness of his own scrutinizing effort […] thus cutting himself off from any possibility 
of effective action, of real discovery, or of meaningful communication with his fellow 
human beings” (Sass 73).  Humbert fails miserably in his eerie game of mental 
deduction: after he had wrongly concluded that Lolita was not in the house but 
immediately heard Lolita’s voice, he is turned into a deflated spider.  Humbert the 
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Spider, who draws other creatures into his web, is an appropriate image for the traps 
that Humbert concocts for Lolita.  As grandeur alternates with self-accusation in the 
text, Humbert’s peculiar sardonic eloquence produces intriguing and amusing effects, 
but also an unsettling disgust in the reader.  Moral questions are raised only to be 
immediately covered by Humbert’s justifications, which show that he is indeed “a vain 
and cruel wretch who manages to appear ‘touching’” (Nabokov in Wood 107).   
 
The Blindness of Desire in an Over-Aestheticized Solipsism  
 
Since the death of Annabel, Humbert had had to live with her haunting presence, 
“until at last, twenty-four years later, [he] broke her spell by incarnating her in another” 
(L 17).  The suggestion, or at least his implicit understanding of it, is that the trauma of 
losing Annabel has fixed his sexual desires on pre-pubescent girls.  He claims that his first 
love affair has damaged him and catapulted him out of time.  At the time, he was 
Annabel’s peer, but afterwards he “found [him]self maturing amid a civilization which 
allows a man of twenty-five to court a girl of sixteen but not a girl of twelve” (L 20).  
Again, he is confused about his place in time: he is not twenty-five but thirty-seven at the 
time he meets Dolores.  His obsession with finding another Annabel leads Humbert to 
seek her in girls’ features that are characteristic of what Humbert coins “nymphets” (L 
18).  But what are nymphets?  In her introduction to Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita: A 
Casebook, Pifer explains the etymology of the word and its special connotation in the 
novel as something supernatural and restricted in growth: 
 
[t]he word nymphet, which Nabokov was proud of contributing to the English language, 
hints at the dire consequences this imaginative transformation has for the child. [It has] 
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many associations with myth, particularly the wood or water sprites of Greek mythology 
and religion. (9) 
 
 
Pifer then cites Johnson and Coates, who explain the meaning in entomological terms, as 
“’an immature stage of a hemimetabolic insect’ which, unlike a butterfly, ‘does not 
undergo complete metamorphosis’” (Pifer 9).  Time is arrested and Humbert lives in a 
fantasy where time is enchanted; his transformation of the twelve-year-old Dolores Haze 
into a bewitching nymphet reminds one of Rousseau’s ideal objects: instead of mortal 
women, Rousseau preferred the nymphs of nature, who became his “celestial amours” 
(CONF 398).  Nabokov stresses the affinities between Rousseau and Humbert when he 
has Humbert refer to himself as Jean-Jacques Humbert.  Humbert’s self can wear many 
masks and choose many roles, but for him, nymphets must remain static, which mirrors 
his endeavour to keep Lolita in the present immature stage of development, through his 
artistic pretensions that attempt “to fix once and for all the perilous magic of nymphets” 
(L 136).  It is not Humbert himself or other men who are seen to be dangerous, but it is 
the nymphets themselves, and he has therefore to protect himself by controlling them.   
Humbert’s terminology underscores the exotic and disturbing quality of 
nymphets, but this term also indicates a stunted being.  He claims that he can distinguish 
nymphets from ordinary girls:  
 
Between the age of nine and fourteen there occur maidens who, to certain bewitched 
travelers, twice or many times older than they, reveal their true nature which is not 
human, but nymphic (that is demoniac). You have to be an artist and a madman, a 
creature of infinite melancholy, with a bubble of hot poison in your loins and a super-
voluptuous flame permanently aglow in your subtle spine […] in order to discern at once, 
by ineffable signs […] the little deadly demon among the wholesome children. (L 19, 
emphasis by Tamin-Ghez) 
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Humbert’s use of fairy-tale language suggests a mysterious, dark and dangerous 
nature that only affects men with certain sensibilities: artists and madmen, two groups that 
are compatible and even become synonymous in the concept of artistic madness seen as 
god-like creativity.  Nabokov mocks the Nietzschean idea of Dionysian madness that 
rebukes morality in favour of a powerful “transfiguration of genius and the world of art; in 
order to glorify themselves, its creatures had to feel themselves worthy of glory; they had 
to behold themselves again in a higher sphere […] This is the sphere of beauty.”145  
However, that does not mean to say that, as Martin Green argues, Lolita contains a 
straightforward utilitarian moralistic message: Nabokov “energetically avoids every 
suspicion of the ordinary, of the obvious, of the morally or intellectually banal.”146  For 
Nabokov, the artist is a kind of hero, whose genius is above and beyond ordinary morality, 
because his art is able to “confer immortality, of a consciously limited and conditional kind, 
by ‘singing’ its subject, ‘celebrating’ the experience it describes, however painful or ignoble 
that may be” (Green 371).  The irony of Lolita is the failure of Humbert’s artistic aspiration:  
the book is not written in the spirit of “an ethical openness to the other,”147 it is not, as 
Humbert declares, “about Lolita” (L 255), but about his own demons, the anguish and 
delusion he suffers as a self-diagnosed “nympholept.”  He celebrates himself as the 
narcissistic subject of his art.  The narcissistic transference of his desires on to Dolores 
distorts the real world of adults and children and perverts their relationship.  As Lolita, 
Dolores is no longer human but becomes a mythical being, a figment of Humbert’s 
                                                          
145
 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner (New York: Random, 1967) 44. 
146
 Martin Green, “The Morality of Lolita”, Kenyon Review 28.3 (1966): 352-377 at 353. 
147
 Patricia Waugh, “Creative Writers and Psychopathology: The Cultural Consolations of ‘The Wound and 
the Bow’ Thesis” in Madness and Creativity in Literature and Culture, ed. Corinne Saunders and Jane 
Macnaughton (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 177-193, 192; Abbreviation used in parenthetical 
references henceforth is WP. 
 
171 
 
imagination.  Nabokov parodies the narcissistic desire to arrest time in making Humbert 
Humbert an inverted double of Oscar Wilde’s Dorian Gray.  The wish to remain forever 
young is displaced in Humbert, who desires that time will not pass for Lolita so that she will 
never outgrow her “magic nymphage” (L 176).  But even Humbert must admit that time 
passes for everyone, that “she would not be forever Lolita. The word ‘forever’ referred only 
to my own passion, to the eternal Lolita as reflected in my blood” (L 67).  He contemplates 
a monstrous incest scenario that would generate Lolita doubles for his entire life (L 176).  
Thus, Humbert tries to fix the image of his nymphet onto a definite developmental stage 
that denies Lolita’s autonomy; she is only of interest to him as long as she conforms to “his 
fantasy of the nymphet – a fairytale ‘girl-child’ who must ‘never grow up’” (Pifer 9).  Time is 
the enemy and if it were possible, Humbert would keep his “aging mistress” (L 192) in a 
deep-freezer with an expiry label that dates “around 1950” (L 176).  
 
Anxiety and Moral Responsibility 
 
Nabokov’s protagonist foreshadows a trend in the general belief that emerged “in 
the 1960s and ‘70s when art and mental disturbance seemed closely linked.”148  Alvarez 
describes the revival of the Dionysus myth as a “new and disturbing” development, in 
which madness becomes a device for the liberation and renewal of the self.  Waugh 
argues that the myth of the artist mirrors contemporary anxiety and expresses the 
ubiquitous social resistance to an instrumental rationality that purports to offer an escape 
from “the iron cage of rationality.” (Waugh, WP 181).  The myth became powerful by a 
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consensus of public and artists “that the work and the life are not only inextricable but 
also virtually indistinguishable” (Alvarez 195-6).  Against the magical power of nymphets, 
Humbert declares himself to be helpless and, as one of their victims, he becomes one of 
the “nympholepts” (L 19).  There appears to be a method in Humbert’s madness in that 
he replaces responsibility and free will by admitting mental illness, because “insanity 
places the madman outside the realm of ethical responsibility – legally, the mad are not 
held responsible for their actions” (Waugh, WP 183).  In his writing, Humbert may seek to 
embrace creative madness as an excuse for what he did to Lolita, but as Alvarez 
concludes, there is no therapeutic remedy in writing because it merely churns up sickness 
and perversely gratifies through repetition.  Humbert’s declaration that he is not the only 
sufferer who is overpowered by “some immortal daemon disguised as a female child” (L 
141) is a strategy that seeks to exonerate his actions and to absolve him from moral 
responsibility.  Similarly to Rousseau’s self-justificatory convolutions, Humbert’s excuse is 
that nymphs are a fetish and that he cannot control himself vis-à-vis their seductive 
power; they condemn him to live a “life of pederosis” (L 57).  In meeting Dolores Haze, 
Humbert rediscovers the image of Annabel; he instantly identifies her as “my Riviera love 
peering at me over dark glasses. It was the same child” (L 41).  In resurrecting and 
replicating Annabel in Lolita’s body, Humbert enters a mythical world of “awe and 
delight,” with himself in an imagined role as “the fairy-tale nurse of some little princess” 
(L 41).  His blindness to the real American child Dolores is convenient, because it allows 
him, as he intimates to the reader, “to ignore Lolita's states of mind while comforting my 
own base self” (L 289).  From his first emotional response to Dolores, Humbert confuses 
time, identity and his younger self with his present self.  He thinks that Dolores “had been 
safely solipsized” as Lolita on the Haze sofa (L 62) but, viewed from her perspective, 
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Humbert had “condemn[ed] her to the solitary confinement of his obsessional 
shadowland” (Appel, “The Springboard of Parody” 207).  After Humbert had gained full 
control over Lolita in the hotel room at “The Enchanted Hunters,” he takes on the role of 
a poet and becomes an “enchanted traveler” (L 117, 168).  Humbert’s artistic pretext 
obfuscates his desire to possess her and since desire precludes a necessary detachment, 
he cannot perceive her non-conceptually, or in Kantian terms ‘disinterested’ as the child 
she really is. 
Ironically, Lolita’s first step to free herself from Humbert will be her encounter 
with Quilty, the author of a play with the title “The Enchanted Hunters” (L 202).  When 
Quilty follows them on their journey, Humbert will indeed experience a nightmare and 
turn into a “hunted enchanter,” as was foreshadowed in Miss Pratt’s misnomer of Quilty’s 
play (L 198).  Humbert contemplates obliteration of Lolita’s autonomous identity by 
drugging her so that he might possess her in an inert state on their first night in the hotel: 
her unawareness of the act would stop time for her, keep his conscience clean, and fit his 
earlier fantasy of an “intangible island of entranced time where Lolita plays with her likes” 
(L 19).  Only with one difference: Humbert wants to play with her, whilst he forces time to 
stand still for Dolores.  His warped sense of time and place displaces the actual child, the 
person whom he cannot see but through the eyes of desire.  His idea of Arcadia, where 
nymphets dwell and time stands still is the key to understand Humbert’s crime, which “is 
to lock this girl out of her history, to shut this lively but not exceptional persona away 
from her time and her place and her peers (Wood 116, emphasis added).  In a lucid 
moment, Humbert almost realizes that he actually “sees very little of Lolita through the 
haze of his obsession” (Wood 115).  He briefly acknowledges the difference between the 
real person and his fantasy: “What I had madly possessed was not she, but my own 
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creation, another fanciful Lolita – perhaps, more real than Lolita; overlapping, encasing 
her; floating between me and her, and having no will, no consciousness – indeed, no life 
of her own” (L 64).   
Humbert puts forward a more convincing theory about what had started his 
perversion.  Similarly to Rousseau’s account about the loss of his childhood innocence 
when he was disbelieved and wrongly accused, Humbert asks the reader “to believe that 
Annabel prefigures Lolita; that the interruption of his affair with Annabel at just the 
wrong moment caused his fixation on little girls, opened the obsession into which Lolita 
will fall” (Wood  119).  The damage he suffered in his adolescence caused an on-going 
urge for pre-pubescent girls; a pattern of obsession that he cannot escape; repeatedly, he 
tells us that he suffers from mental breakdowns. When Humbert diagnoses himself, he 
probably gives a correct assessment, which results in a paradoxical situation: if he is a 
madman who “is sane enough to identify his affliction,” his lucid awareness could testify 
to his sanity (Wood 120).  Humbert’s rhetoric and his artistic pretensions alternate 
between the glorification of his guilt and despondency, which puts a veil between the 
avowed honesty of his confession and the ethical implications of his actions; it raises 
moral questions in the reader’s mind about responsibility: can Humbert be exonerated, 
even though he denies others the freedom to be themselves and does not notice the 
suffering he inflicts on them?  He is lucid enough to occupy both the role of patient and 
analyst in one person and claims that he was able to hide from others “his real sexual 
predicament” (L 36). 
The game of manoeuvring these roles mocks the psychiatric profession, which 
mirrors Nabokov’s repeated attacks on Freud and psychoanalysis. Furthermore, the 
devilish delight in subverting analysis lets Humbert appear as “slightly crazy, as well as 
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very funny,” but also sinister and shocking as in the connection between psychotherapist 
and rapist in his aside to the reader, “(as the psychotherapist, as well as the rapist, will tell 
you)” (L 115).  Humbert seems to say that he has his share in both good and bad and his 
exaggerated self-conscious assessment of his character can convince the reader through 
its twists and turns to the effect that “he really is saying what he pretends he is only 
pretending to say” (Wood 120).  Apart from the Foreword with Ray Jr.’s excessive 
moralizing, Humbert’s continuous discourse mutes others by his exclusive control over 
the narration, which mirrors his impulse for attaining power over others.  
Mirroring can also produce humorous effects in order to deflect from the 
seriousness of an action, as in Humbert’s prolonged fight scene with Quilty, but more 
importantly, doubles and mirrors are Nabokov’s aesthetic strategy for the conveyance of 
his ethical outlook that imbues his work with deep moral resonances without Nabokov 
having to employ crude didacticism.  In a letter to Edmund Wilson, Nabokov defends his 
position against narrow-minded criticism that reduces the meaning of his book to a 
depiction of social phenomena and advises that “[w]hen you do read LOLITA, please mark 
that it is a highly moral affair and does not portray American kulaks.”149  Appel also sees 
that there is an intended morality, which is not expressed in overt statements; however, 
“Lolita is a moral novel in the fullest sense. Humbert is both victimizer and victim, culprit 
and judge. Throughout the narrative he is literally and figuratively pursued by his Double, 
Clare Quilty, who is by turns ludicrous and absurd, sinister and grotesque” (Appel, “The 
Springboard of Parody” 225).  Nabokov’s moral message is that Humbert is guilty of 
extreme narcissism, but that he leaves the moralizing to Humbert, who is marred with 
solipsistic blindness that reduces people to “constituent elements of his own designs, 
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designs that he believes to be artistic” (Connolly 39).  Humbert uses certain deeds and 
characteristics of Lolita to twist his arguments and to deflect his guilt.  Finding out that 
Lolita is not a virgin alleviates his guilt and it seems ironic that after Humbert’s slow 
stalking of Lolita, it is she who seduces him – at least this is what Humbert claims had 
happened – but he also states mysteriously that “she was not quite prepared for certain 
discrepancies between a kid’s life and mine” (L 136). He might not have raped her in the 
strictest sense, but there remains a palpable uneasiness that he might have misread her 
advances; even his ensuing frantic fantasy of redecorating the hotel dining room with 
murals is full of disturbing and violent images, which end with the sinister line that evokes 
the pain he has inflicted on Lolita:  “stinging red, smarting pink, a sigh, a wincing child” (L 
137).  Wood points out that “[t]he larger effect of the games in Lolita is to make the text, 
or anything resembling a text, into a metaphor, an image for what is readable and 
misreadable in the world” (Wood 104).  
In the second half of the novel, Humbert projects his self-reflexive narcissism on to 
a pursuer, who will in turn become the pursued. The shadow of Quilty’s car follows 
Humbert and Lolita around and Humbert will later address Quilty as his double. Otto Rank 
speaks of the mirror and the shadow “as images, both of which appear to the ego as its 
likeness” (Rank, The Double 10).  Claire Quilty is not only a name that makes a pun on 
‘clearly guilty’ and a figure for the projection of Humbert’s guilt, but according to Appel, 
he is also “a parody of the psychological Double” (Appel, L lxiii).  Appel summarizes that 
Lolita is a game of doublings in which Quilty is “both a parody of the Double as a 
convention of modern fiction, and a Double who formulates the horror in Humbert's life” 
(Appel, “The Springboard of Parody” 213).  The shadow of the unknown pursuer obsesses 
Humbert’s thoughts, he suspects that “another Humbert was avidly following Humbert 
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and Humbert’s nymphet” (L 219).  Ironically, he decides to dismiss his suspicion as a 
figment of his persecution mania, although it will turn out that there was indeed another 
“heterosexual Erlkönig in pursuit” (L 242).  After Humbert learns the identity of this 
pursuer, Quilty doubles as his imaginary evil fugitive brother, whom he is “free to trace 
[…] free to destroy” (L 249).  After detecting in various hotel-registers Quilty’s traces in 
sophisticated allusions and word-plays, Humbert acknowledges that “his type of humor 
[…] the tone of his brain, had affinities with my own” (L 251).  He notices other similarities 
in sexual taste and appearance: Quilty prefers young girls, (and boys), has a purple 
bathrobe and a peculiar way of interlacing his speech with French expressions (L 296, 
299-300).   
Nabokov attacks the convention of the good and the evil, the dual selves of the 
traditional Doppelgänger fictions.  Humbert undermines the doubling by reversing the 
person in question when he describes himself as having ape-like features: he is “lanky, big 
boned, wooly-chested”, has “thick black eye-brows,” (L 46) and an “ape-ear” (L 50). 
During their confrontation, Quilty also calls Humbert “you ape, you” (L 300).  Frosch 
lucidly points out that “an ape is not only a beast but an imitator” and both characters are 
mirrors in the “matrix of doubleness,” where “the double serves as a second-order reality, 
or parody. The double Quilty parodies Humbert who parodies Edgar Allan Poe” (Frosch 
46). The maze of mirrors holds the animal Humbert captive, as the phrase “legal captivity” 
in John Ray Jr.’s Foreword had suggested (L 5).  In his Afterword, Nabokov remarks that 
his inspiration for writing Lolita came from “a newspaper story about an ape in the Jardin 
des Plantes who, after months of coaxing by a scientist, produced the first drawing ever 
charcoaled by an animal: this sketch showed the bars of the poor creature’s cage (L 313). 
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Similarly to the ape in the Jardin des Plantes, Humbert sits in the cage of his 
narcissistic frame of mind and cannot get beyond what separates him from the world of 
others.  In order not be the only ape in that cage, he perceives in Dolores ape-like 
features:  she has “long-toed, monkeyish feet,” a “monkeyish nimbleness,” and he will 
later buy “a bunch of bananas for my monkey” (L 53, 60, 215).  Humbert draws Dolores 
into his cage, but he is dimly aware that he has damaged the child in his “obsessive dream 
of Lolita which captured the actual child and took her away” (Wood 115).  It is the mind 
that designs the inner world and also explains the outer world, which emerges in John 
Shade’s poem in his description of the visible phenomenon of a rainbow as a reflection 
caused by a thunderstorm in a different location. This reflection on the human condition 
lets Shade conclude that “we are most artistically caged” (PF 32). 
Consequently, the shadow of the unknown pursuer becomes a haunting presence 
for Humbert and, after learning the identity of Quilty and his perverted sexual designs for 
Lolita, he sets out to pursue his nemesis.  Humbert projects his own guilt onto Quilty, who 
becomes an ideal scapegoat for Humbert’s qualms.  But Humbert’s weak effort to 
position himself as the slightly morally better of the two fails, because the novel’s design 
refutes  the dichotomy of good and evil and shows instead various levels of uncertainty.  
During their verbal confrontation they accuse each other of Lolita’s corruption.  Quilty 
denies that he had kidnaped Lolita, and his defence points back to Humbert when he 
claims to have “saved her from a beastly pervert;” Humbert insists on his “inner essential 
innocence” in his disturbed “poetical justice” poem, in which he condemns Quilty to 
death (L 300-2).  Overall, Clare Quilty’s deranged appearance and frankness in admitting 
that he likes to make private movies, so-called “sexcapades” repulses the reader.   He 
appears even more farcical when he hysterically tries to avert Humbert’s wrath with 
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bizarre offers of a freakish lady, the charwoman’s daughters and granddaughters, his 
wardrobe and house, a photographic collection of “eight hundred and something male 
organs,” and the final promise to be able to attend executions (L 300-4).  Quilty’s 
depravity presents an obvious mirror for Humbert’s tormented conscience and in vilifying 
Quilty he seeks to exonerate himself: “Humbert would let some of us believe that when 
he kills Quilty […] the good poet has exorcised the bad monster, but the two are finally 
not to be clearly distinguished” (Appel, “The Springboard of Parody”, 229).  During the 
ensuing confrontation, Humbert discovers that there are more similarities between 
himself and Quilty.   
Humbert’s identification with Quilty and his desire to purge himself becomes 
evident when he targets at his own sweater for shooting practice. The sweater is a 
powerful symbol for Humbert’s desperate act of projection and “[i]t may well be true that 
in killing Quilty Humbert seeks to kill himself, or that part of himself he hates […] 
Humbert’s murder of Quilty is symbolically interpreted – as a paradigm for the process of 
art” (Pifer, Nabokov and the Novel, 107).  Humbert kills Quilty for the abstract good of art 
– as he understands art as the basis of his existence – because “[o]ne had to choose 
between him and H.H., and one wanted H. H. to exist at least a couple of months longer 
so as to have him make you [Lolita] live in the minds of later generations” (L 311).  The act 
of murder is turned into artwork and the horror of killing is undermined in Humbert’s 
account of the fight with Quilty that ends in a comical jumbling of personal pronouns, 
"[h]e rolled over me. I rolled over him. We rolled over me. They rolled over him. We 
rolled over us" (L 301).  The entanglement of their bodies, expressed as a linguistic 
confusion, adds irony to the bathetic description of Quilty’s murder, which reaches its 
apogee in the bizarre chase around the house. The effect of Quilty’s refusal to die is to 
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render the idea of exorcism absurd “by his comically prolonged death throes, which […] 
burlesque the gore and rhetoric of literary death scenes” (Appel, “The Springboard of 
Parody” 231).  The act of killing Quilty also parodies the traditional simultaneous deaths 
of literary doubles:  Humbert does not drop dead the very moment Quilty dies, but 
immediately senses his failed attempt to make a sinister ‘second self’ responsible for his 
immoral deeds.  After he realizes that his guilt is morally non-transferable he knows that 
he is inescapably trapped in and engulfed by it, such that “[f]ar from feeling any relief, a 
burden even weightier than the one I had hoped to get rid of was with me, upon me, over 
me” (L 304).  The last words echo the earlier wrestling scene, but now there is no more 
differentiation between the two men and instead of the shifting between ‘him,’ ‘me’ or 
‘us’, he says merely ‘me,’ three times over.  His own guilt is reflected back to Humbert, 
which literally sticks to him, when his body is “all covered with Quilty” and his dead alter-
ego is maimed in a linguistic jumbling as “Quilted Quilty” and “Clare Obscure” (L 308).  
Identity emerges not in the form of a simple duality or as “a neatly divisible self,” but as a 
“patchwork self” (Appel, L lxvi).  Humbert is Quilty and vice versa, but Quilty is also a 
separate character and not a mere projection of Humbert’s confused mind, which makes 
him into “that mind’s nasty analogue, a material semblable and frère. He is an aspect of 
Humbert’s self-image which has got loose, seceded, and taken over a part of the plot” 
(Wood 127).  
Both Humbert and Quilty claim that they meant well and had no intention to harm 
Lolita, which clearly is not true.  Quilty poses in the mask of the good uncle and insists 
that he “gave her a splendid vacation. She met some remarkable people” (L 300).  He 
conveniently leaves out that he is also, according to Lolita, “a complete freak in sex 
matters, and his friends were his slaves” (L 278).  Humbert hides behind a paternal role 
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and compares his concern with sick Lolita to that of “any American parent,” but in his 
following sentence he reveals that her illness caused his inconvenience in that he had to 
give up “all hope of intercourse” (L 242).  He even applies concealed force, disguised as 
parental care, to impose his sexual demands on her and tells us that whilst “thrusting my 
fatherly fingers deep into Lo’s hair from behind, and then gently but firmly clasping them 
around the nape of her neck, I would lead my reluctant pet to our small home for a quick 
connection before dinner” (L 166).  Factually, Lolita is his private slave and Humbert 
exploits her sexually and exclusively.  By contrasting his deeds with Quilty, he tries to 
convince the reader that he is not quite as evil as the decadent Quilty, who wanted Lolita 
to participate in pornographic films and orgies.  But his arguments remain unconvincing, 
considering that Lolita was free to leave when she disagreed with Quilty’s proposal, 
whereas Humbert’s threats held her in terror and captivity for two years.  
Nabokov is highly conscious of the ways in which the imagination can distort the 
world, envelop a person in a solipsistic bubble, and impair the capacity for authentic 
relationships with other people.  Nabokov implies that Humbert Humbert misuses the 
imagination to conjure up nymphets and that he claims madness in order to circumvent 
moral qualms in his misuse of Dolores: Humbert’s desire wants to triumph over social 
reality with its moral code of forbidden relationships.  In Lolita, Nabokov is preoccupied 
with the way in which the Nietzschean aesthetic of Dionysian madness that goes beyond 
good and evil is appropriated through the myth of the artist to exonerate and cover up 
personal responsibility.  In that sense, he is exposing the darker side of the camp 
mentality.  In Pale Fire, Nabokov develops this critique through an inverted mirror, 
reflecting on the Freudian reductionism that is used to perpetuate the irrationality of the 
myth of creative madness and the view of the artist as driven by  
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excessively powerful instinctual needs. He desires to win honour, power, wealth, fame 
and the love of women, but he lacks the means for achieving these satisfactions. 
Consequently, like any other unsatisfied man, he turns away from reality and transfers all 
his interest, and his libido too, to the wishful construction of his life of phantasy, whence 
the path might lead to neurosis. (Freud in Waugh, WP 188) 
 
Psychosis and Schizophrenia in Pale Fire (1962) 
 
Pale Fire is explicit about the dangers of creating and entering deluded artistic 
world(s) that displace the real and substitute for authentic art.  It shows not the artist but 
his critic as the madman, who is trapped in his delusions and resorts to a fantastic world 
he controls and is at its centre.  Imagination seems to have a double-edged effect on 
mental health: it can express innermost ideas and concerns in an artistic context with a 
liberating and therapeutic effect that reasserts the self, but the artist also needs to be 
able to step back and leave his creation behind, otherwise he risks bending reality into a 
solipsistic fantasy.  In a conversation with A.S. Byatt, Ignês Sodré refutes the idealized 
notion of madness as a prerequisite for an artist and proposes instead that “to create 
something you have to be at your sanest: that part of you is the part that creates.”150  
With regard to Gustave Flaubert and Thomas Mann, Sodré sees madness not as an 
essential part of the artist, but as something that both writers were acquainted with and 
could transform successfully into art. 
Whereas a certain degree of solipsism is a desirable prerequisite for creativity, 
when excessive fantasy takes over the mind, is becomes the hallmark of psychosis and 
disconnects the subject from reality.  Reality comprises both what is outside, the external 
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reality and also the internal, psychic reality of an individual and if psychic reality no longer 
relates to the external, the mind will suffer from paranoiac and schizophrenic states.  The 
epistemological centrality of the schizoid mind questions the ontological nature of the 
real, thus reality itself starts to become problematic and challenging to such an extent 
that epistemological processes are reified into ontological certainties.  This solipsistic 
creation of a reality apart is similar to the process of reading, when readers enter a 
fictional world in which every detail must be of significance.  With its cross-references 
between its four parts and multiple identities of Kinbote, Pale Fire is explicitly about the 
dangers of diegetic and non-diegetic interpretation and shows them as activities that lend 
themselves to paranoia and delusion.  When realities blur and one fictional world 
impinges upon another, it also questions the ontological basis of our world. 
In the Foreword, Charles Kinbote betrays his disturbed mind from the first page, 
when he intrudes on the reader with his preposterous assumption that Canto Two is 
“your favourite” (PF 13).  His irrelevant comments on  John Shade’s poem “Pale Fire” are 
either banal, “medium-sized index cards […] pink upper line […] fourteen light-blue lines”, 
or simply absurd, “[t]here is a very loud amusement park right in front of my present 
lodgings” (PF 13).  It is clear that the Foreword is not a disengaged critical appraisal of 
John Shade’s autobiographical poem; instead, the following pages show Kinbote’s 
bewildering mixture of self-centred objectives and his over-elaborate interpretation of his 
relations to others.  Kinbote believes that it is his prerogative to annotate the poem 
because of his supposedly deep friendship with the celebrated American poet.  The 
reader starts to doubt the reality of a close bond between the two when Kinbote states 
that the friendship was “precious for its tenderness being intentionally concealed” (PF 
23).  Kinbote also finds it unacceptable to share the work with “Prof. H. (!) and Prof. C. 
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(!!)” (PF 17).  He gives no reasons, but the punctuation speaks of his indignation about 
possible outside interference that would jeopardize his appropriation of the poem and 
could rival his aberrant exegesis.  Kinbote is well aware that the poem’s meaning is solely 
in relation to John Shade’s life, which is unacceptable for mad Kinbote, who “suffers from 
classical paranoia in all its three main forms, namely “delusions of grandeur” (he believes 
that he is the exiled king of Zembla, that the poem is about him), “erotic paranoia” (he is 
convinced of Shade’s deep esteem: “John Shade valued my society above that of all other 
people,” (PF 22) although Shade is merely benevolent towards him), and “persecution 
mania” (his fear of assassination).151 Delusions of grandeur turn Kinbote into a parallel 
universe, a virtual reality. 
Similarly to Humbert Humbert, Kinbote prepares the reader to acknowledge him 
in the mask of an exiled king by asking to “imagine […] a historical personage whose 
knowledge of money is limited to the abstract billions of a national debt; imagine an 
exiled prince” (PF 17).  In advising his readers to imagine him in this way, he insinuates 
that the image is actually true and that the poem will reveal the mystery about his 
person.  Nabokov challenges the notion of fictional reality by creating three imaginary 
worlds that interlink: the fictional reality of New Wyre in America in which the fictional 
country Zembla is known to exist, so it is not fictional on an intra-diegetic plane; but there 
is also another fictional Zembla inside Kinbote’s mind with himself as “the Zemblan King, 
Charles the Beloved” (PF 62). This king leaves Zembla with “the Zemblan translation of 
Timon of Athens, which he takes with him all the way […] to New Wye, and on to the 
desolate log cabin,” where Kinbote subsequently writes his commentary.152  Charles 
Kinbote invents himself as king and Wood argues that “Kinbote’s self is invented, 
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precarious; that it has a past or has a double” (The Magician’s Doubts 178).  Kinbote 
invented a mask to conceal an unhappy and unfortunate past and “Botkin is the past 
Kinbote has peeled off” (The Magician’s Doubts 179).   The past double only rarely and 
obliquely shines through the narrative and without much significance: in an explanation 
of the Zemblan word Botkin “(one who makes bottekins, fancy footwear)” (PF 83); in a 
personal experience evaluated as happy, which betrays an intimacy that overlaps the 
Kinbote/Botkin construct, “(happily, Prof. Botkin, who taught in another department, was 
not subordinated to that grotesque ‘perfectionist’)” (PF 125); a double is hinted at in the 
question if the name Kinbote “was a kind of anagram of Botkin or Botkine” (PF 210).  
More is revealed in the Index, which gives a strange prominence to the pale character of 
Botkin, with descriptions that all allude to Kinbote and in parts (the V. and American 
scholar of Russian descent), could even refer to Nabokov: 
 
Botkin, V., American scholar of Russian descent, 894; kingbot, maggot of extinct fly that 
once bred in mammoths and is thought to have hastened their phylogenetic end, 247; 
bottekin-maker, 71; bot, plop, and boteliy, big-bellied (Russ.); botkin or bodkin, a, Danish 
stiletto. (PF 240) 
 
Wood explains that Bodkin is “the creature beneath the floor of Kinbote’s double fiction” 
(Wood 185). 
In Pale Fire, Kinbote not only contends the position of John Shade, but actively 
seeks to obliterate the primacy of the poet in order to impose the contents of his inner 
world on Shade’s poem “Pale Fire”.   Only the first few lines of his elaborate Commentary 
are concerned with its autobiographical meaning in relation to Shade; immediately 
Kinbote swerves from the waxwing in the poem to himself observing birds in New Wye, 
and before the end of the page, he begins to connect the waxwing with “the armorial 
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bearings of the Zemblan King” (PF 61-2). From then on, the Commentary is merely the 
pretext for an interpretation that Kinbote imposes on the text: 
 
By the end of May I could make out the outlines of some of my images in the shape his 
genius might give them; by mid-June I felt sure at last that he would recreate in a poem 
the dazzling Zembla burning in my brain […] At length I knew he was ripe with my Zembla. 
(PF 66-7, emphasis added) 
 
Kinbote seemingly justifies his appropriation of the poem by presuming that his 
influence actually resulted in a priming of Shade, although he then coyly foreshadows his 
role as interpreter, because the poem “cannot be regarded as a direct echo of my 
narrative” (PF 67).  Throughout the Commentary, it is in fact grandiosity that Kinbote 
displays by repeatedly invoking modesty; moreover, he claims that he acted as the poet’s 
muse who inspired the poem: “the sunset glow of the story acted as a catalytic agent 
upon the very process of the sustained creative effervescence that enabled Shade to 
produce a 1000-line poem in three weeks” (PF 67).  Kinbote draws the two texts even 
closer together by asserting that they reflect each other: 
 
There is, moreover, a symptomatic family resemblance in the coloration of both poem 
and story. I have reread, not without pleasure, my comments to his lines, and in many 
cases have caught myself borrowing a kind of opalescent light from my poet’s fiery orb, 
and unconsciously aping the prose style of his own critical essays. (PF 67) 
 
Kinbote thinks that he is privy to the intended meaning of the poem by claiming to 
have been Shade’s confidant: “let me add in all modesty, he intended to ask my advice 
after reading his poem to me as I know he planned to do” (PF 15).  According to Kinbote, 
the exegesis of the poem is clear, there cannot be “one doubtful reading” (PF 14). He 
states as fact that his “own past intercoils [in the poem] with the fate of the innocent 
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author” (PF 16).  It soon becomes clear that Kinbote expected to find his own fantastic 
story, which he had told Shade over the few months of their acquaintance, transformed 
into a paean of praise for Zembla and its king, that is Kinbote himself.  Kinbote’s “lonely 
mind invents the fantastic landscape of Zembla, which mirrors the psychological state of 
its self-styled ‘king’” (Pifer, Nabokov and the Novel 113).  The character Kinbote is set up 
as a parody of the Freudian analyst in that he “draws exclusively from his own 
repressions, obsessions, and desires in interpreting the latent content behind the 
manifest material of ‘Pale Fire’, constructing a self-validating narrative aimed at his own 
glorification and immortalization.”153  
The obstacle to Kinbote’s possession of the poem and a rival for John’s attention is 
Sybil, who is her husband’s true confidante.  Kinbote regards her influence as 
counterproductive to his designs and concludes that “she made him tone down or 
remove from his Fair Copy everything connected with the magnificent Zemblan theme” 
(PF 75).  His statement presupposes that Shade had actually intended to use the Zemblan 
story, but that it is due to Sybil’s interference that John was dissuaded from including it.  
It is the fame, the genius of Shade, as well as the utilitarian value of his poem that Kinbote 
wants, not true friendship.  Kinbote’s obsessive desire to establish himself as a constant 
presence is driven by his determination to make Shade the agent, who brings into being 
what Kinbote desires most: the acknowledgement of his Zemblan fantasy kingdom.  
Kinbote clearly harbours misgivings and deliberately aims to induce doubts about 
Shade’s genius by pointing out his physical lack of likeness to the ideal of Romanticism 
that saw the reflection of great minds in graceful features.  The elaborate description of 
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Shade’s appearance makes Kinbote appear witty and turns Shade into a laughingstock.  
The picture of a “fleshy Hogarthian tippler of indeterminate sex,” effectively denies 
genius and ends with ridicule, “[h]e was his own cancellation” (PF 23).  Although Kinbote 
claims to have been the closest of his friends, his account betrays indifference to the 
person by mocking Shade’s appearance and also shows his intent to diminish and 
undermine the artistic importance of Shade in relation to “Pale Fire”.  In the Commentary, 
Kinbote defends his usurpation of the text by a fantastically elaborated interpretation of 
each line that affects a metaphorical link between Kinbote, Shakespeare, and the title of 
the poem: Shakespeare’s play, in which the moon stands for an arrant thief who snatches 
his pale fire from the sun, is comparable to Kinbote, who steals the lines from another 
man’s work and interprets them to accommodate his delusion of grandeur.  Kinbote 
wants pre-eminence for his Zemblan world and the poem to reflect what he had told 
Shade, therefore he has to construct “a symptomatic family resemblance in the coloration 
of both poem and story” (PF 67).  Kinbote equates his real crime regarding the poem with 
his stylistic mimicking of Shade’s scholarly writings.  Although he has done more than just 
borrowing “a kind of opalescent light from my poet’s fiery orb,” he condescendingly 
confesses only to “unconsciously aping the prose style of his own critical essays” (PF 67).   
Kinbote will use the poem as a vehicle for the transmission of his own narrative by 
covering the intended meaning – mature reflections on a poet’s life.  The last lines of his 
Foreword foreshadow the mad ambition for his Commentary:   
 
without my notes Shade’s text simply has no human reality at all since the human reality 
of such a poem as his (being too skittish and reticent for an autobiographical work), with 
the omission of many pithy lines carelessly rejected by him, has to depend entirely on the 
reality of its author and his surroundings, attachments and so forth, a reality that only my 
notes can provide. To this statement my dear poet would probably not have subscribed, 
but, for better or worse, it is the commentator who has the last word. (PF 25) 
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Kinbote takes his conviction that the content must be what he wants it to be as an 
excuse for a mad crime: “Kinbote has literally, arrantly, stolen the poem […] and 
metaphorically stolen it too, since he wants to endow it with a meaning which is all his 
own” (The Magician’s Doubts 180).  After Shade’s death, Kinbote feels a “bitter hot mist 
of disappointment” (PF 164) because the poem turns out not to be “[t]he complex 
contribution I had been pressing upon him with a hypnotist’s patience and a lover’s urge” 
(PF 232-233).  Kinbote cannot accept that the poem reflects merely John Shade’s 
autobiography and thoughts in verse-form; when he realizes that his world has been left 
out, he turns into Shade’s “mad amanuensis” (Pifer, Nabokov and The Novel 112).  
Sass explains the disappointment as an effect of “the phenomenology of solipsism: 
solipsistic experience seems to demand the felt presence of an other consciousness who, 
in a sense (and paradoxically), seems to constitute the solipsist.”154  Because Shade has 
denied Kinbote’s solipsistic fantasy, Kinbote takes his revenge. 
Similarly to Humbert, who manipulates the reader with his absolute control over 
the diegesis, Kinbote attempts to control all stylistic parts of Pale Fire, including – more or 
less ingeniously – John Shade’s poem.  Although in the Foreword and Commentary 
Kinbote asserts his right as annotator, the texts betray Kinbote’s chaotic mind and show 
his compulsion to impose himself on the text of the poem.  The Index shows an even 
tighter grip by listing keywords that amount to an inventory of his solipsistic reality:  
 
Kinbote’s egotism, never more comically to the fore than in the Index, explodes itself, 
explodes his pretext for surrounding Shade’s poem with Zembla, but what does it matter, 
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he almost seems to think, here is Zembla, and nothing but Zembla, and he is its king. 
(Boyd, Nabokov’s Pale Fire 65)   
 
The index does not reference the ontological world of New Wye and its people, 
but subsumes everything and everybody in relation to himself under the entries “Kinbote, 
Charles, Dr.” and “Shade, John Francis” (PF 242-3, 245-6).  Naturally, most incidents 
mentioned under Shade’s entry also emphasize Kinbote’s agency and he even 
preposterously refers to Shade’s poem as “their joint composition” (PF 246).  
 
Paranoid Criticism 
 
Criticks I saw, that other's names efface, 
And fix their own, with labour, in the place; 
Their own, like others, soon their place resign'd, 
Or disappear'd, and left the first behind.155  
Alexander Pope, Preface to Edition of Shakespeare (1725). 
 
The antagonism between the poet and his critic is the Leitmotif in Pale Fire that 
Nabokov treats with irony by casting the critic in a paranoid role.  The mad Kinbote is 
Nabokov’s personification of a critic who usurps the role of the artist with ultimately dire 
consequences.  Nabokov satirizes the collapse of the distinction between creative and 
critical writer and seems to agree with Matthew Arnold, cited by David Lodge, in that 
“[t]his view is antithetical to the view of criticism as complementary to creative writing, 
aiming at objectivity, striving ‘to see the object as it really is.’”156  Kinbote’s blatantly 
aberrant interpretation that deliberately twists and turns the words of Shade’s poem to 
fit his Zemblan fantasy becomes Nabokov’s attack on New Criticism’s literary theorists 
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and their attempt to divide the literary text from its creator by postulating that it is “a 
free-standing, autonomous object, containing meanings that are specific to the context 
provided by the text.”157  Nabokov points to the dangers of limiting criticism to merely 
contextual interpretation that shows no respect for the author: in completely ignoring 
Shade’s autobiographical intention and by stating that the poem is really only a pale 
reflection of Kinbote’s artistic genius, the Commentary is Kinbote’s attempt “to sort out 
those echoes and wavelets of fire, and pale phosphorescent hints, and all the many 
subliminal debts to me” (PF 233).  Kinbote’s hubris parodies deconstructive literary critics 
who produce meaning by constructing their own tales out of a text and thereby adding to 
it “the product of [their] own ingenuity, wit, and resourcefulness in the exercise of 
semantic freeplay” (Lodge 146).  The Commentary and Index neatly connect to and cross-
reference every line of the poem, which could be interpreted as Nabokov’s intention to 
carry Derrida’s idea of ‘play’ to extremes;  Pale Fire does not celebrate playfulness, there 
is a sombre undertone: Kinbote literally steals the poem and then imposes the might of 
his exegesis over the dead body of the poet.  Kinbote is clearly an opportunist, but 
beyond that, he is a dangerous and deluded artist manqué.  Lodge could be equally 
speaking of Kinbote’s elaborately confused Zemblan story as he says of Derrida’s work: “a 
kind of avant-garde literary discourse – punning, allusive, exhibitionistic, and teasingly 
provocative to those who are not simply baffled and bored by it” (146).  Distaste for 
professional criticism shows in the figure of the paranoid Charles Kinbote and Nabokov 
implicitly critiques the tendency in modernism to put pressure on artists as well as on art 
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critics as professional classes by imposing “collective expectations.”158  David Trotter 
explains the symptoms of professional anxiety:  
 
Paranoia is a delusion of magical power. One of the curious side-effects of the 
professionalization which transformed psychiatric theory and practice during the 
concluding decades of the nineteenth century was a systematic analysis of the ways in 
which professional people go mad. Paranoia, the psychiatrists maintained, was the 
professional person’s madness of choice. (7) 
 
Kinbote replaces the reality of New Wye with numerous entries that build up a 
genealogy and geography of his fantastic Zembla, but his last entry gives a mythical 
account of Zembla without any context to other countries in the world, it becomes a 
short and vague “distant northern land” (PF 248).  Louis A. Sass calls the oscillation of the 
mind between different realities the “‘double bookkeeping’ of schizophrenia, [in which] 
the two worlds of experience differ according to their felt ontological status. One, 
experienced as objective, is perceived in the normal fashion. But the other realm is felt by 
the patient to exist only ‘in the mind’s eye’” (Sass, Paradoxes of Delusion 43).  The reality 
of the external world is acknowledged but is put in the service of the reality of the mind.  
In contact with others, schizophrenics appear elusive, even uncanny, and in New Wye, 
Kinbote appeases hostility towards him with polite smiles and by discounting it as 
“nonsense” (PF 23). Others cannot penetrate and damage his self-esteem, because he 
lives in the grandeur of “Charles the Beloved” (PF 62).  The withdrawal into Zemblan 
fantasy, where promiscuous homosexuality is the norm, frees Kinbote of his anxiety and 
constraint that govern American reality, where “[a]t a level beneath his unshakeable self-
satisfaction he is aware of the intense dislike he generates around him for his 
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homosexuality and his megalomanic narcissism” (Boyd, Nabokov’s Pale Fire 60).  Zembla 
is the exteriorized landscape of Kinbote’s schizophrenia; his reality is blurred and 
although he knows that he exists in the world of New Wye, he is also present in the world 
of Zembla: as the former king, who is now in America and as the assassin Gradus/Botkin, 
who sets off to kill the king, but who will kill the poet instead.  The death of Shade is most 
fortuitous, because it presents Kinbote with the opportunity to physically seize the index 
cards, which reflects the depth of his desire for the completed poem and his belief that it 
could substantiate his delusion and act as a textual proof that Zembla, and by extension 
he as King of Zembla, actually exist.  The substitution of meaning substantiates his world 
and defines the limits of Kinbote’s imprisonment within a chaotic life that forces him to 
dream up a freedom and order beyond ordinary reality.  Sass points out the paradox that 
lies at the centre of schizophrenic solipsism: there is still a need for others, who are 
willing to testify that the delusional world exists, which “undermines or contradicts the 
solipsistic sense of power and security” (Madness and Modernism 300).  
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PART THREE: POSTMODERN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SELVES 
 
Nabokov parodied the traditional double literature by putting his narcissistic 
and paranoid protagonists into a “matrix of doubleness” with regard to other 
characters.  Lessing uses pervasive structural doublings that turn the text into a 
network, which makes the novel more than the sum of its component parts; it shows 
“the relation of the parts to each other.”159  A double reflexivity occurs “both 
structurally (insofar as the narrative is implicitly derived from preparatory notebooks 
concerned with attempts to write fiction)” and politically, because it is “thematically 
about Leftist politics […] exploring communism and its contractions, adopting a stance 
explicitly critical of war and Stalinism.”160   
Moreover, The Golden Notebook shows affinity with Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway in 
that both “overturn the “characteristic ‘doubles’ novel of the nineteenth century […] 
they explode the male doubles novel of the last century.”161  Woolf’s protagonist 
thinks of herself as simultaneously being the Clarissa of the past and the Mrs Dalloway 
of the present, who is split into a private self and social self, but Lessing moves away 
from this earlier dualistic representation of the self to entertain a concept of self 
splintered into multiple roles and identities.  
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Section 1: Doris Lessing’s The Golden Notebook (1962) 
 
In the nineteen-fifties, theoretical approaches to the self in its social-cognitive 
context were preoccupied with developmental psychology and the concept of the 
‘relational self’, in which knowledge about the self is linked with knowledge about 
significant others and each linkage embodies a self-other relationship.  William James had 
already articulated that the self is fundamentally interpersonal (The Principles of 
Psychology 1890) and the American psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan developed a theory 
of psychiatry based on interpersonal relationships and he conceptualized that the self is 
in fact an interpersonal self-system (The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry 1953).  In the 
nineteen-sixties began a counter-culture with the work of R.D. Laing and others on the 
divided self; a self that is split into a suppressed authentic essence and an outer 
inauthentic self-construction that conforms, or appears to conform to social expectations.  
Both trajectories fed into a new socio-political concern with roles and performativity, 
associated with the work of the sociologist Erving Goffman, who conceptualized the 
presentation of self in everyday life as an on-going process of impression management in 
which performance, interpretation and adjustment are altered to fit the particular social 
situatedness of the individual.162    
Lessing, however, can be seen to move beyond R. D. Laing’s notion of the divided 
self, which re-articulated the double in psychoanalytical/existential terms, drawn from 
Sartre’s reading of Hegel.  Instead, she constructs Anna Wolf diachronically out of the 
multiplicity of her different selves at different times, “the many selves Anna is in her own 
name (e.g., ‘the “Anna” of that time, ‘that other Anna’s eye is on me’, ‘the Anna who goes 
                                                          
162
 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 1959, (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1969).  
196 
 
to the office’, ‘younger, stronger Annas’, ‘sick Anna’” (Sprague 5).  The “other self” is in 
fact a temporal self that is unified by her name, but Anna is also a subject without a 
centre, who exists in many versions on several narrative levels; literally she is “a 
composite of various socially constructed roles or positions that cannot be reconciled: 
social self, political self, sexual self, gendered self, parenting self, artistic self.”163  The self 
operates in multiple contexts and in each context the self is constituted differently, 
because it is “caught within incommensurable language games only ever offering a 
knowledge of the world relative to the scope of their conceptual frameworks.”164   
Wittgenstein introduced the idea of language games in 1951 in his Philosophical 
Investigations, introducing a further dimension to the mid-century rethinking of self, 
roles, performance and play, already seen at work in the context of Nabokov’s writing. 
According to Lyotard’s reading of Wittgenstein, different sets of rules make up the whole 
of who we are: 
 
A self does not amount to much, but no self is an island; […] even before he is born, if only 
by virtue of the name he is given, the human child is already positioned as the referent of 
a story recounted by those around him, in relation to which he will inevitably chart his 
course.165  
 
Over the course of life, identity is built up and changed by taking up and leaving 
frameworks; identity is made up by the different roles in which the self is socially situated 
in different discourses, or what Lyotard calls “language games”, at any one time.  Because 
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there is an indeterminate number of “language games” this experiential heterogeneity 
makes it potentially difficult for the self to reconcile its conflicting positions, a situation 
that “Lyotard calls the differend, which is the experience of incommensurability and the 
conflict that implies.”166  The term differend describes a situation that cannot be 
reconciled because it is characterized by a clash of absolute differences.  According to 
Lyotard, the experience of incommensurability is connected to the sublime; in both cases, 
when language fails to represent what is essentially unrepresentable, the self is left 
without the possibility of expressing his or her own perspective or feelings.  In this 
respect, Lessing writes about the dilemma of postmodern subjectivity and accepts 
formlessness as an alternative to “the traditional humanist notion of the centered, 
rational, self-determining subject” (Michael 40).  While The Golden Notebook carries a 
modernist nostalgia for unity, it also shows a postmodern understanding of the 
fragmentation of the self. 
Writing at this particular moment in 1962, Doris Lessing became a prophet of the 
crisis of the modern individual and to this effect, The Golden Notebook is a prescient 
novel which accommodates, for the first time, the sense of discontinuity in the self that 
came as a result of the dissolution of certainties, the loss of faith and the omnipresence of 
terror: the shadows of apocalyptic experience in a new age of global violence.  It could be 
said that “Lessing introduces a theme she pursues throughout her career: the spiritual 
and moral bankruptcy of the West in its blind adherence to a narrow and instrumental 
concept of rationality” (Waugh, “Postmodern Fiction and the Rise of Critical Theory” 76).  
The Golden Notebook is positioned at a crossroads between late modernist and the 
emergence of postmodernist writing:  Lessing shows a profound nostalgia for, rather than 
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rejection of, the great novels of the past, through Anna’s wish to complete the modernist 
project by writing a book that is “powered with an intellectual or moral passion strong 
enough to create order, to create a new way of looking at life.”167  In her frame novel 
“Free Women”, Anna adheres to realism and its strong moral attachment to values, 
mirroring Lessing’s own reflection on herself as a writer.  Lessing is aware of the difficulty 
of writing in the form of realism and yet she is reluctant to eschew its values; she 
discusses this conundrum in A Small Personal Voice, a collection of essays and interviews 
covering three decades.  However, by embedding the modernist nostalgia for stability 
that grand narratives had promised in a postmodernist structure these narratives are 
implicitly questioned, which disrupts and undermines the various language games.  The 
rules of modernism are broken by invoking the unpresentable in presentation itself and 
Lessing starts to formulate what Lyotard later describes as the postmodern sublime, 
where “the accent can fall on the power of the faculty to conceive, on what one might call 
its ‘inhumanity’ […] and on the extension of being and jubilation that come from inventing 
new rules of the game.”168  The Golden Notebook shows the failure of the old rules and 
the emergence of postmodern aesthetics, it sets up an inquiry “into new presentations” 
for the unpresentable. But instead of the sense of “joy” that Lyotard attributes to 
postmodern writers who wrote in the two decades after the publication of The Golden 
Notebook, Lessing, in the nineteen-sixties considered her novel a failure, because it 
reproduced scepticism without finding a solution to the chaos of competing narratives.  In 
this sense, Lessing realized the impossibility of reconciling the different language games 
that make up a culture.  The German philosopher Jürgen Habermas opposed Lyotard’s 
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postmodernism and argued for the need to continue the rationalist Enlightenment 
project of modernity.  Art should provide reconciliation and Habermas insisted that the 
experiences of art must form a bridge over “the gap between cognitive, ethical, and 
political discourses, thus opening the way to a unity of experience” (Lyotard, The 
Postmodern Condition 72).  Lessing’s novel situates itself in the dilemma of whether to 
continue the project of modernity, or to become ‘post’modern. 
Lessing, among other intellectuals and writers, eventually dissented from the 
Communist Party because of growing disillusionment with Communist ideals, betrayed 
under Stalin’s repressive leadership, but also rejecting a rationalizing modernity in spirit.  
The New Left Movement was inaugurated in the nineteen-sixties in England because of 
the failure of orthodox Communist Parties to come to terms with their own past, 
especially after they had learned about the brutality of the Soviet forces’ retaliation 
against public protesters, who had rallied against Soviet-imposed politics in the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956. In the view of many Western intellectuals, the authoritarian character 
of Stalin’s communism had betrayed the values of humanism.  Writing of the time of the 
post-Stalin ‘thaw’ (1954-55), Lessing describes her growing scepticism towards ideologies 
in general and in particular her torment when the horrific details began to emerge about 
the grim Russian reality:  a newspaper snippet in the red notebook states that it was 
unknown “how many people were executed, imprisoned, sent to labour camps or died 
during months of interrogation in the great Soviet purges of 1937–39, nor whether a 
million or twenty million people are engaged in forced labour in Russia today. Statesman” 
(TNG 244).   
Lessing conveys her intensely conflicted relationship with the British Communist 
Party in the aftermath of these events: her disappointment with the belief in Communism 
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as an inspirational force that unites people through its dedicated faith in humanity.  The 
short report that brought out the truth about the horror of the labour camps made it 
impossible for Anna to accept the self-deceptive myths of Communist aesthetics any 
longer and in the red notebook, she is shown moving towards a recognition that 
Communists engage in a totalizing Lyotardian “language game” that seeks to explain 
everything in a single grand narrative with the consequence that dissidents are 
suppressed, excluded or wiped out.   
Communism had failed to provide political answers to human misery, which 
meant that the struggle for a sustainable existence had seemed to fall back on the 
resources of the individual self for liberation.  Retrospectively, Anna writes about her 
informal identification with Communism in Africa as a moral obligation, but without an 
ability to provide any unifying power to compose a self, “there were always two 
personalities in me, the ‘communist’ and Anna, and Anna judged the communist all the 
time” (TGN  87).  Lessing seeks to explore the fictional problem of what kind of structures 
a novelist can devise that might possibly transpose the complexity of individual 
experience accurately into aesthetic form, without relying on the essentially linear form 
of narrative fiction.  The writer Anna Wulf mirrors in many ways Lessing’s own concerns 
as a female writer: she too is torn between the contradictions of her role as a woman and 
her aspirations as an artist; through Anna, she tries “to understand and ultimately 
transcend the biological and social expectations.”169   
As in the earlier novels, examined in this thesis, that foreground processes of 
dissociation, the overarching leitmotif here is the psychological theme of splitting, but 
here, dissociation is a deliberate strategy for survival, which is mirrored in the fragments 
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of the five notebooks which supposedly interrupt Anna’s autobiographical novel.  The 
construct of the autobiographical frame novel presents a paradox in so far as the whole 
structure of the novel becomes circular and this becomes evident to the reader towards 
the end of the novel when Saul gives Anna the first sentence of “Free Women”: the novel 
that she will write, but which at this point, the reader has nearly finished reading.  Lessing 
thus remakes the self-begetting structure of Proust’s novel, but confines it to a single 
frame narrative. 
The notebooks are a reification of Anna’s fragmented consciousness; they 
substantiate her frustration with and the conflicts of having to perform in different 
social roles, the frames that govern the self in social context, according to the sociologist 
Erving Goffman.  Each sequence of the five notebooks sections is framed by a section of 
the conventional novel, which is ironically titled “Free Women.”  The interruption of the 
restrictive form of linear narration develops a formal dynamic that mirrors the 
psychological movement of Anna; it “symbolizes her relation to herself, her body, to 
other people, and to society in general.”170  The Golden Notebook as a whole is 
composed as “a critical exploration of the nature of fiction and the mechanism by which 
a novel communicates its meaning in a specific cultural environment.”171  Lessing 
critiques the requisite compartmentalization of so-called ‘psychic normality’ as 
detrimental to the individual psyche, when she shows Anna’s need “to divide herself up 
for survival, as her author uses it to anatomize the West and expose the destruction 
which breeds about its heart” (Waugh, HS 135).  The discontinuity within the self mirrors 
the increasing social fragmentation in the second half of the twentieth century and the 
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belief of many, including Lessing, that unprecedented violence was an apocalyptic 
feature of life in an age of extremes.   
 
Autobiography in and as Fiction 
 
By 1960, autobiographical writing in the twentieth century had moved away from 
the confessional format and also from the “unmediated casting of biography in the mode 
of realist narrative.”172  Readers and reviewers of The Golden Notebook tended to read 
the novel as autobiographical and to imply that Anna is one of Lessing’s alter-ego figures 
remarking that “there are ample parallels between the author’s own remarkable life and 
the lives and preoccupations of her characters” (Rubenstein 4).  But in this novel, Lessing 
moved away from traditional first-person singular autobiographical writing and instead, 
chose to construct fictional selves that represent the plurality that make up an individual 
“l”.  In this respect, it can be said that autobiographical fiction is a means of self-
revelation that seeks to capture the psychological truth of the writer at a particular 
historical moment: that the self is at least in part the product of historically framed self-
interpretation.  For – if the self can only ever be written in a fictional mode, then the 
question of “autobiographical referentiality becomes altogether a matter of fiction, 
whereas it should by definition be a matter of fact.”173  This suggests that 
autobiographical writing is a performative act in which the self is created in language, 
even if subjectivity is therefore inauthentic, Lessing states that “there was no way of not 
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being intensely subjective.”174  She realizes the irony that lies behind the endeavour to 
escape from subjectivity: it is impossible to write autobiographically, but equally, it is 
impossible not to write autobiographically, because if one writes “about oneself, one is 
writing about others, since your problems, pains, pleasures, emotions – and your 
extraordinary and remarkable ideas — can’t be yours alone” (Lessing, Preface TGN 13).  
Lessing seems to feel responsible for transforming her experiences and emotions 
imaginatively in order to “speak representatively for the experiences of a wider 
humanity” (Waugh, HS 136).  That concept of the self as historically shaped and 
profoundly influenced by outside forces is manifested in Anna’s crisis when she feels 
surrounded by inexpressible forces of mass evil that stultify her mind: instead of writing, 
she covers her walls with newspaper reports about wars, revolutions and other atrocities. 
Reality has become too painful for a rational, or even written, narrative response.  It is 
too complex to order so montage and assemblage take the place of storied orderliness. 
Lessing clearly advocates the responsibility of artists in general and of novelists in 
particular, because the novelist has an advantage that is “denied to any of the other 
artists.  The novel is the only popular art-form left where the artist speaks directly, in 
clear words, to his audience” (“The Small Personal Voice” 21).  Her emphasis on speaking 
in “clear words” should not be mistaken as an invitation to return to the writing mode of 
nineteenth-century realism that was built against the backdrop of shared beliefs in the 
community, in God and the struggles of everyday existence.  On the contrary, Lessing is 
well aware of the difficulty of traditional realism that is unable to “accommodate the 
complex of events and issues that her experience led her to regard as most pressing” 
(Hite, “(En)gendering Metafiction” 484).  Experimental novelists like Woolf and Lessing 
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relinquished the linear time sequences, reliable authorial perspective, and consistency of 
representational mode through which the nineteenth-century "realistic" novel created a 
seemingly accurate reproduction of the social world.  For both writers, the assumed 
transparent window, the mirror of language, remains blind because of the overuse of 
linguistic concepts to such an extent that language is no longer adequate “to express the 
richness of our experience” (Lessing, “The Small Personal Voice” 5).  Schwartz explains 
that “[w]hile the text loses its reference to the world as we ordinarily know it, it 
establishes a second-order reference to presenting us with a world whose unusual 
characteristics may lead us to further understanding of ourselves and our possibilities.”175 
In his essay of 1936, “The Storyteller,” Walter Benjamin argued that the world had 
been transformed after the First World War by a general shift in experience, due to the 
traumatic events that people had witnessed, which had left them incapable of 
communicating with each other and therefore mutually alienated.  At that time, 
according to Benjamin, the decline of the storyteller therefore correlated with a dramatic 
increase in the dissemination of information; unrelated news items took the place of 
‘story’ and Benjamin writes that “never has experience been contradicted more 
thoroughly than strategic experience by tactical warfare, economic experience by 
inflation, bodily experience by mechanical warfare, moral experience by those in 
power.”176  Without narrative as a source of wisdom, modern individuals had become 
unable to engage themselves in discourse and meaningfully connect their experiences; 
instead, artificial concepts had replaced natural experience in the new fast-paced and 
information-driven era.  In addition to the short-lived news value that information 
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provided for the reader, Benjamin claims that narration broke away from the communal 
oral tradition with the emergence of the novel that told of life out of the imagination of a 
single individual.  But storytelling is seen as having the power of communicating 
experience, useful for giving timeless, transcendental moral or practical advice without 
the addition of psychological analysis or interpretation.  The openness of the story made 
it flexible and adaptable to interpretation; thus it could become historically resituated, 
reflecting on the changing conditions of different ages and cultures.  Furthermore, each 
specific listener was allowed to understand the story in relation to his or her own 
situation, because “the psychological connection of the events is not forced on the 
reader. It is left up to him to interpret things the way he understands them, and thus the 
narrative achieves an amplitude that information lacks” (Benjamin 89).  This personal 
understanding and assimilation of the story enabled listeners – the storytellers of the 
future – to change the story slightly and thereby to leave a trace of their individual 
experiences and interpretations upon the framework of the story.  Benjamin proposes 
that the “traces of the storyteller cling to the story the way the handprints of the potter 
cling to the clay vessel” (Benjamin 92).  In this way, the storyteller contributed to the 
vitality of a collective’s memory, which gave the story organic and timeless qualities that 
Benjamin misses in the modern novel, which, in his view, merely reflects the experience 
of a solitary individual and does not allow for the integration of the story into the reader’s 
own experience: “Memory is the chief preserver of tradition and storytelling the chief 
transmitter; but the privatisation of life characteristic of modern culture is proving fatal to 
storytelling. Storytelling has become artificially confined to the novel, a creation of print 
technology and of the bourgeoisie.”177  Whereas storytelling had a didactic purpose that 
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was rooted in community values and could be shared with others, novels merely indulge 
the individual reader, who is the counterpart of the isolated novelist: 
  
The birthplace of the novel is the solitary individual, who is no longer able to express 
himself by giving examples of his most important concerns, is himself uncounseled, and 
cannot counsel others. To write a novel means to carry the incommensurable to extremes 
in the representation of human life. In the midst of life’s fullness, and through the 
representation of this fullness, the novel gives evidence of the profound perplexity of the 
living. (Benjamin 87) 
 
Benjamin’s scepticism about the ability of the novel to convey experience or 
expound moral issues is based on his view that the modern novel deliberately lacks any 
directive impetus; instead it takes an ironic distance that undermines grand narratives by 
exposing the frames of their discourses. In doing so, the novelist reveals the limitations of 
competing explanatory models by focussing on relations, whether they are social, 
economic, or personal.  The Golden Notebook exposes the psychological need for grand 
narratives, for the continuity of the dream for a better world, even in the light of 
contradicting evidence:   Anna is too scared to change her esteem for the father-like 
figure Stalin and wants to hold on to the possibility that he did not know about the 
atrocities that were committed under his rule, and, even if he had been mad and a 
murderer, she defends her position by stating that “we all have this need for the great 
man, and create him over and over again in the face of all the evidence” (TGN 172).  
However, the tentative disparity between idealism and disillusionment turns the 
enthusiastic story of a comrade’s impressions of a larger-than-life Stalin in Anna’s view 
into “an exercise in irony,” “a very skilful parody of a certain attitude […] But what 
seemed to me important was that it could be read as parody, irony or seriously. It seems 
                                                                                                                                                                                
(London: Secker, 2007) 40-64, 50. 
207 
 
to me this fact is another expression of the fragmentation of everything, the painful 
disintegration of something that is linked with what I feel to be true about language, the 
thinning of language against the density of our experience” (TGN 301).  The Communist 
Party was more interested in perpetuating a myth in order to maintain a common ground 
of solidarity, even if the romantic fictions betrayed the truth.    
The point is that truth escapes any attempts to confine it in totalizing narratives, 
which points out the profound insecurity of the modern individual, who realizes that 
“anything might be true anywhere, there’s never any way of really knowing the truth 
about anything. Anything is possible — everything’s so crazy, anything at all’s possible” 
(TGN 172-3).  Anna understands that holding on to Communism would mean for her 
participating in a discrete language game that perpetuates a view of the world that is only 
comprehensible within the terms of its own ideology.   
In addition to the inefficient medium of language, Anna experiences her memory 
as distancing as well as selective.  To write truthfully about her experiences in Africa 
becomes impossible because she sees that her younger self is different from what she is 
now:  
 
I get exasperated trying to remember – it’s like wrestling with an obstinate other-self who 
insists on its own kind of privacy. Yet it’s all there, in my brain if only I could get at it … 
How do I know that what I ‘remember’ was what was important? What I remember was 
chosen by Anna, of twenty years ago. I don’t know what this Anna of now would choose. 
(TGN 148)    
 
 
Anna’s struggle with memory shows that Lessing is aware of the difficulty of writing 
autobiographically.  She takes it as a matter of fact that autobiography is the story of a 
self, which depends on a temporal vantage-point that contains true and false memories 
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and in this respect it “has a good deal in common with a novel.”178  Lessing states that in 
order to write, the novelist has to enter a character’s frame of mind by drawing on 
different levels of experience: 
 
When I wrote The Golden Notebook I deliberately evoked the different levels to write 
different parts of it. To write the part where two characters are a bit mad, I couldn’t do it, 
I couldn’t get to that level. Then I didn’t eat for some time by accident (I forgot) and found 
that there I was, I’d got there. And other parts of The Golden Notebook needed to be 
written by ‘I’s’ from other levels. That is a literary question, a problem to interest 
writers.179  
 
 
The significance of the involvement of the “I” is finally dismissed as a literary technique, 
which gives the impression that Lessing feels uneasy about autobiographical traces being 
present in her fiction, but it can be argued that “[i]n the autobiographical epic the artist 
understands that she has no right to speak for the age without attempting to depict the 
self within that age” (Arlett 78).  Like novels, autobiographies must have a shape; 
memories need to be shaped by choices, which should conform to the “pattern in our 
minds” (Lessing, “Writing Autobiography” 159).  Looking back through the distance of 
time on the past selves of different ages detaches the present self from its past so that 
these selves seem to appear “as – almost – someone else. You float away from the 
personal” (Lessing, “Writing Autobiography” 154).   
 
The Dispute between Classical Realism and Modern Realism  
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Though emerging out of earlier controversies within Marxism, it was in the 
nineteen-thirties that the debate, largely though not wholly, between Georg Lukács and 
Bertolt Brecht about the conception of realism and its relation to modernism, entered the 
critical mainstream.  Lukács essentially argued that Brecht’s desired “estrangement” 
effect was an artificially imposed formalistic device, which, in his view, only served to 
alienate further an already alienated audience.  In Lukács’ view, Brecht prevented the 
development of a true socialist realism by relying on abstract functions that lack “the 
treatment of representative, yet individualized, characters in psychological conflict.”180  
Lukács, the socialist writer, championed the continuation of classical bourgeois realism 
for its ability to mirror society in its entirety and to reveal the economic system 
responsible for the human plight.  Objective, yet critical, realism must embrace 
commitment to the point where “the reader vicariously experiences the reintegration of a 
seemingly fragmented, dehumanized world” (Lunn 15).  Lukács critiqued the modernists 
for their overemphasising of formal aspects over content; in his view, their neglect meant 
that they recorded only appearances and mirrored irrational subjectivism.  Thus, they 
lacked critical impetus as well as humanist values by merely reflecting “the immediate 
experience of chaos, alienation and dehumanization in advanced capitalist society, 
instead of carefully indicating their sources and the historical forces working towards 
overcoming them” (Lunn 13-14).  
Brecht argued against the finished unchangeable art-object that Lukácsian realism 
favoured as being conceptually too narrow.  He regarded the attempt at closure of 
conflict through the reconciliation of contradictions as a naïve position, driven by an 
aesthetic harmonizing humanism without regard for historical reality; he called it Lukács’ 
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“utopian idealism.”181  Brecht sought to dismantle the illusion of reality in realism with his 
new experimental theatre and argued that it did not employ a dehumanising formalism 
but was “wide and political, sovereign over all conventions” (Brecht 50).  He went on to 
justify the discontinuity between art and life by claiming that art should not merely reflect 
existing patterns of thought, action and feeling, but project a world with a peculiar logic 
of its own, which echoes T. S. Eliot, who wrote in his essay collection on poetry and 
criticism, The Sacred Wood, that “the worlds created by artists like Jonson are like 
systems of non-Euclidean geometry. They are not fancy, because they have a logic of their 
own; and this logic illuminates the actual world, because it gives us a new point of view 
from which to inspect it” (“Ben Jonson” 116-17).  Brecht wanted not only to portray the 
changes in the social environment, but moreover, to reveal the causal complexes of 
society, the interconnection of private and public life, psychology and history.  His device 
of “estrangement” was aimed to disrupt the expectations of the audience through the 
foregrounding of the materiality of aesthetic production and Brecht stated that “[t]he 
parts of the story have to be carefully set off one against another by giving each its own 
structure as a play within a play” (Brecht in Doris Lessing: Border Crossings, 53).  
“Estrangement” affects the audience; firstly, it compels them to engage with the 
performance; secondly, it stimulates them to reconsider their relationship with the socio-
political world outside the theatre.  In short, Brecht did not endorse passive consumption, 
but rather, he incited the audience to find the meaning of the performance outside the 
performance in the real world by shocking them “out of their involuntary adjustment to 
lives ‘reified into things,’ Verfremdung (‘estrangement’) effects [are] designed to actively 
overcome Entfremdung (‘alienation’)” (Lunn 26).  Brecht’s modern humanism 
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encompassed a political and philosophical vision of the world, where humanity is 
embroiled in “a process of continual historical change,” which contrasted with Lukács’ 
teleological view that sought “the realization of some ‘essence’” (Lunn 28).   
By the nineteen-sixties, there was a widespread feeling that novelty and 
innovation in the arts had reached its apogee in the aesthetic of high modernism.  In 
1967, John Barth lamented that the present state of writing has degenerated into a 
“literature of exhausted possibility.”182  At this time he prophesised that the future of 
the novel was at a dead end, because “the forms and modes of art live in human history 
and are therefore subject to used-upness.”  In 1984, he specified his former view and 
declared that “the effective ‘exhaustion’ [is] not of language or of literature but of the 
aesthetic of high modernism.”183  Postmodernist fiction takes off from modernism but 
moves beyond, invigorated with “an essentially parodic mode of replenishment.”184  
This is similar to Brecht’s axiom that contemporary writing must develop its own forms, 
because new problems “demand new methods. Reality changes; in order to represent it, 
modes of representation must change. Nothing comes from nothing; the new comes 
from the old, but that is why it is new […] for the people today are not what they were 
yesterday.” (Brecht 51).  The Golden Notebook both responds to and challenges its 
modernist predecessors by putting a realist narration into a metafictional structure; it 
marks the transition from modernism to a new kind of literature, the postmodern. 
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The Crisis in Experience and an Experiment with a New Form of Fiction 
 
Political writers such as Lessing, in the nineteen-fifties, had turned away from 
what Brecht had indicated as high modernism’s alienated subject and individual ego-self, 
but equally found problematic the idea of a return to a realistic/naturalistic 
descriptiveness or the mimetic value of conventional realism.  In the late nineteen-fifties, 
the discussion about the political meaning and the value of the realistic novel reached 
another peak.  The cultural critic Raymond Williams argued for the revival of the realistic 
novel in which every aspect of personal life is radically affected by the quality of life in 
general and this new form would “represent a particular kind of mature realism in 
experience.”185  However, in his 1962 introduction to The New Poetry, Al Alvarez 
defended modern experimental techniques by arguing that “[t]he great moderns 
experimented not just to make it new formally, but to open poetry up to new areas of 
experience.” 186  He argued that the political violences of the modern period left an 
imprint on modern consciousness, which made it even more pertinent to express that 
new kind of experience and he attacked Robert Conquest’s verse collection, the New 
Lines anthology, by claiming that it merely perpetuated the concept of rational gentility 
by ignoring the mass evil that had been perpetrated in the last half of the twentieth 
century.  In his introduction to New Lines II (1963), Conquest retaliated by refuting the 
idea that profound changes in modern life and attitudes had taken place; even if this 
were true, there was “no reason whatever to draw from it the conclusion commonly 
seen, that poetry should ‘reflect’ it, or ‘cope with’ it by itself falling into violence and 
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disproportion.”187  Alvarez evaluated Conquest’s favouring of “the cardinal traditions of 
English verse” as an attempt to preserve English politeness for the status quo against 
what he perceived to be raw and violent emotions, deemed out of proportion and written 
in a style judged as “gross and extreme” (Conquest xiii, xxiii).  In defence of his collection, 
Alvarez argued for a renewed seriousness that did not shy away from dealing with the 
impact of two world wars, the concentration camps, genocide and the threats of nuclear 
war, “the forces of disintegration which destroy[ed] the old standards of civilization” 
(Alvarez 23).  Outside, evil forces had reached proportions beyond individual 
comprehension by being “magnified to match the scale of mass society” (Alvarez 26).  
Furthermore, the incommensurability of these atrocities with the individual capacity for 
reflection and containment produced profound insecurities in individuals, such that their 
psychological states became mirrors of the mood of the social world.  Alvarez writes that 
the “recognition of a mass evil outside us has developed precisely parallel with 
psychoanalysis; that is, with our recognition of the ways in which the same forces are at 
work within us” (Alvarez 27). 
 In The Golden Notebook, Lessing leaves behind an earlier orientation toward 
realism as her favoured form, aesthetically and politically, because the conventions of 
realism seemed “entirely inadequate vehicles for the expression of any contemporary 
experience and, in particular, the experience of women.”188  At this point in time, Lessing 
was both dissatisfied with the limiting narrowness of mimesis, characteristic of the 
conventional nineteenth-century realist novel and with the atrophy of the modernist 
novel with its perceived aestheticism and lack of ethical or political emphasis because of 
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an intense focus on subjective experience at the expense of objective or external reality: 
what Lukács identified as “a major tendency in modernist literature: the attenuation of 
actuality” and “the dissolution of personality.”189  Contrary to Lukács’ negative evaluation 
of modernism, however, Lessing values the power of  formal innovations and in this 
respect, The Golden Notebook is written as “a critical and philosophical investigation into 
the nature of fiction itself and the relationship between literary form and politics” 
(Bentley 44).  Lessing’s artistic vision demanded a more complex novel form that could 
incorporate the paradigm of ethical complexity and portray the changing nature of the 
evolving contemporary Western consciousness in its relation to social, political and 
material realities.  
Lessing recognized the profound social and cultural changes that had taken place 
in the late 1950s and, although she thought of realism as flawed, she held on to its 
usefulness as a vehicle with which to articulate political imperatives.  In this respect, 
realism appeared to provide the most obvious aesthetic correlative to her ethics, her 
sympathy for humankind, and her socio-political commitment to broader social 
sympathy: “[l]ike Anna in the world, Lessing in her novel takes upon herself the 
unglamorous role of a ‘boulder-pusher’, of one who with little faith and scarcely more 
hope strives to understand and to act responsibly.”190  For Lessing, to write is to act and it 
is better to work stubbornly as a “boulder-pusher,” though not in the sense of the absurd 
heroism of Sisyphus, whose labour was caught in a futile circle of hopeless repetition.  
Lessing, through Anna, believes that modern boulder-pushers work together in the hope 
for slow progress such that when “they’ve got a few feet up, there’s a war, or the wrong 
                                                          
189
 Georg Lukács, The Meaning of Contemporary Realism, 1963 (London: Merlin, 1972) 25, 26. 
190
 Dennis Porter, “Realism and Failure in The Golden Notebook,” Modern Language Quarterly 35.1 (1974): 
56-65 at 61. 
215 
 
sort of revolution, and the boulder rolls down — not to the bottom, it always manages to 
end a few inches higher than when it started” (TGN 604).  While Lessing appears to 
question the grand narrative and the idea of the ‘universal intellectual’ behind it, she 
believes in the capacity of the novelist to find a form in which to encompass and critique 
the age.  
Accordingly, Lessing combines experimental form with a committed agenda in 
order to reflect the human condition as she saw it in the 1950s and 1960s.  Like Anna, she 
wants to respond to the new world of violence and terror by writing a novel that is 
“powered with an intellectual or moral passion strong enough to create order, to create a 
new way of looking at life” (TGN 80).  In this respect, the novel manifests her belief that 
“one must have a vision to build towards […] a vision of good which might defeat the 
evil.” (“The Small Personal Voice” 7).  Lessing has faith “in historical progress through 
collective engagements which do not require foundations of truth or value” (Waugh in 
Bentley, Contemporary British Fiction 114).   
Lessing portrays contemporary writers’ anxieties about the commitment of the 
artist and the inefficacy of traditional realism to adequately express political 
consciousness.  Anna is set up in the role of the “artist-as-exemplar”, who examines the 
collision of the individual consciousness with events outside the self; just as with Lessing, 
Anna is aware of the incomprehensibility of the world and of her feeling of impotence to 
effect change; Lessing speaks of “the disparity between the overwhelming problems of 
war, famine, poverty, and the tiny individual who was trying to mirror them” (Preface to 
TGN 12).  Anna suffers from political disillusionment as much as from failed personal 
relationships; she feels that both her social and private selves are under threat and her 
crisis in experience is the result of her  struggling to assert and preserve the unity and 
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wholeness of her self against feelings of isolation and alienation.  The Golden Notebook 
experiments with metafiction for the structural undermining of convention that could 
result in a new committed literary form, an attempt to depict the complexity of the 
modern individual in relation to society because society had changed such that people are 
not merely linked “by one kind of relationship – work, friendship, family – but in many, 
interlocking kinds” (Williams 24).  In this respect, the novel shows a distinct movement 
from the modernist focus on personality to a postmodernist notion of the decentred 
subject by employing a “particular method of realism as discussed by Lukács [which] 
involves a surface/depth model in terms of the expression of a subjective personal 
experience set against and underlying objective socio-economic framework” (Bentley 46-
47).  
 
Formal Structure: Making a Statement through the Shape of the Novel 
 
Lessing claims that she intended to give primacy to formal aspects so that the 
structure could make an argument – an implicit statement about the alienation of the 
modern individual – through the actual shape of the narrative.  The Golden Notebook 
breaks through the form by combining “two projected books, a fictional work dealing 
with a novelist suffering from a ‘writer’s block,’ and a book of literary criticism which 
would employ various styles so that ‘the shape of the book and the juxtaposition of the 
styles would provide the criticism’.”191   The fragmented structure is predicated on Anna’s 
inability to overcome her “writer’s block” and the novel at once explores its causes and 
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the problems of the artist.  In order to infer the intended meaning of the novel through its 
shape, Schweickart draws on Derrida’s example of the double meaning inherent in the 
word brisure, which combines “broken, cracked part […] split, fragment” with a hinge, 
“the brisure [folding-joint] of a shutter […] The single term la brisure designates both 
‘difference’ and ‘articulation,’ both the fact of division into distinguishable parts and the 
fact of connectedness.”192  The proposition is that the meaning of the novel is articulated 
structurally in a double-function through the hinge that holds together the broken parts 
in folding joints. Thus, the hinge at once joins together and separates the different planes; 
it is the point where “[e]ach part hinges (depends) on the others, but because the hinge is 
not a rigid joint, each part remains differentiated; each enjoys a relative autonomy” 
(Schweickart 268).  
As a structural feature, the independent notebooks not only separate Anna’s 
experiences, they also succeed in “fixing life” inside a framework where each frame 
reveals its interconnectedness through the juxtaposition of the private realm and the 
political sphere. The yellow notebook traces the personal relationship between Ella and 
Paul, which is a fictional reworking of Anna’s troubled relationship with Michael in “Free 
Women”.  In this respect, the fictionalized love affair articulates “feelings about the social 
situation […] expressed in apolitical terms, or more precisely, without reference to 
Marxist theory” (Schweickart 268).  The relation of an individual notebook that is part of 
the whole of the novel is quite different from the relation of the other notebooks to the 
whole: the red notebook focusses on Anna’s struggle with political ideology and the 
Communist Party; it exemplifies the political power structure that also governs the 
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private realm.  The placement of the two texts, the yellow and the red notebook, side by 
side, makes it possible for Lessing to make a wordless statement, where “each account 
shows us what has been omitted or slighted by the other” (Schweickart 268).  The hinge 
that connects the two frames is the place where the relational dimension of meaning is 
produced, “so that the truth may be articulated through the play of meaning made 
possible by their difference” (Schweickart 270).  The Derridian brisure is the point in a 
structural system that “renders visible the space between frames.”193  The hinge is the 
structural backbone of the novel that at once connects and separates so that each 
notebook creates the space for the organization of Anna’s different roles; but, at the 
same time, it also divides her experiences as writer, mother, lover, friend and political 
activist.  The conflict between her gendered roles produces a conscious and perpetual 
torment on an individual level that seeks release through separation.  Anna splits herself 
up and at one point she realizes that the “two personalities – Janet’s mother, Michael’s 
mistress, are happier separated. It is a strain having to be both at once.” (TGN 332).  
Charles Taylor similarly describes the series of changing but essentially deterministic ends 
that make up identity: “We end up relating to each other through a series of partial roles” 
(Taylor, SS 502). 
 
Framing of Social Roles 
 
Each of her roles requires Anna to “wear” a different mask and according to 
Goffman, social behaviour is conducted as a performance in roles that represent “the 
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conception we have formed of ourselves – the role we are striving to live up to – this 
mask is our truer self, the self we would like to be.”194  The myth of an inherent self is 
replaced by splitting roles into the notebooks, giving an outer form to the idea “that in 
each one of us live several personalities” (Lessing, “Writing Autobiography” 160).  Anna 
sees herself as a role player who becomes a calibrated counterpart in response to the role 
of another when Michael 
 
was speaking in his role of East European exile, ex-revolutionary, toughened by real 
political experience, to me in my role as ‘political innocent’. And I replied in that role, 
producing all sorts of liberal inanities. Fascinating – the roles we play, the way we play 
parts. (TGN 167)   
 
 
Anna’s heightened analytical self-consciousness makes her and Michael 
caricatures of role-play which, seen together with the device of splitting herself into the 
textual framework of notebooks, constitutes “almost a parody of Goffmanesque theories 
of the fragmentation of social roles and subjective identity and their collapse and failure 
can be interpreted as Lessing’s indictment of such rationalistic and sociological dissections 
of the self” (Waugh, HS 135).   
 
Anna discovers the inescapable contradictions inherent in every form of writing or 
presenting, because once the frame is chosen, it governs the work: 
 
What both Goffman and metafictional novels highlight through the foregrounding and 
analysis of framing activities is the extent to which we have become aware that neither 
historical experiences nor literary fictions are unmediated or unprocessed […] Frames are 
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essential in all fiction. They become more perceptible as one moves from realist to 
modernist modes and are explicitly laid bare in metafiction. (Waugh, MF 30)  
 
 
The Golden Notebook pushes beyond modernism and challenges modernist notions of 
subjectivity by presenting 
 
fragmentation as a function of Being itself rather than as the result of a plethora of 
subjective interpretations, the novel has stepped decisively from modernism to 
postmodernism […] Postmodern identity can in fact be viewed as a set of dynamic roles, 
since postmodernism insists that human beings constantly take up and give up various 
sociocultural subject positions and thus have no singular, unified, stable subjecthood.” 
(Michael 50) 
 
  
Parody of Realism in the Form of Literary Critique 
 
The Golden Notebook is genuinely experimental and presents a conceptual 
breakthrough in writing, it is “a metafictional text which draws on a whole plethora of 
parodistic effects, both stylistic and structural” (Waugh, MF 74).  Writing implies the 
intervention of a human subject: it is the writer, who attempts to give experiences a form.    
A. S. Byatt said that “Lessing’s novel is about the breakdown of language and of fictive 
forms adequate to describe the sexual and political reality of the immediate present 
[Anna] expresses exasperation that a text is no longer possible that can draw the whole 
world together as Tolstoi could.”195  Anna comes to realize that she cannot invent fictional 
analogues that could adequately represent the disorder she encounters and her 
suggestion of using symbols instead of words is an ironical hint at language’s inadequacy 
to represent authentic experience; she thinks “bitterly, that a row of asterisks, like an old-
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fashioned novel, might be better. Or a symbol of some kind, a circle perhaps, or a square. 
Anything at all, but not words.” (TGN 609).  Lessing tries to overcome the limits of 
language by amalgamating Lukács’ realism with Brecht’s theory for a new responsible 
social drama.  The preeminence of style in the notebooks is shown ironically as an 
impasse, marked at the end of each book with double black lines.  By putting the mimesis 
of conventional realism in fictional frames with editorial notes that introduce and order 
the fragments, realism is put into quotation marks and takes on a parodic mode that 
reveals “the extent of the inadequacy of realist writing, [and] it also represents the ironic 
end of self-discovery for Doris Lessing the novelist” (Waugh, MF 76).   
The disparate and fragmented texts function as a meta-commentary on each 
other whereby an ethical basis and a dialogue with realism is maintained, although 
Lessing reminds readers that they are reading fiction and not viewing a world without 
meditation.  Realism fails because it is governed by a retrospective pattern and is 
therefore deemed inauthentic; it gives an “analysis after the event” (TGN 231).  In this 
respect, the novel contains its own critique by “self-consciously challenging the realist 
techniques in which it seemed initially to put its trust” (Porter 57).  Anna’s self-critical 
review of her successful novel Frontiers of War mirrors Lessing’s own literary criticism, 
“Lessing, through Anna, begins to question the validity and veracity of realism as a form 
of writing” (Bentley 47-48).  After rereading the text, the novel seems to have nothing in 
common with her past experience, it appears to Anna “[a]s if it had been written by 
someone else” (TGN 78).  She realizes that it was written through a filter of nostalgic 
sensibility, a false consciousness that precluded her from giving a correct account of the 
political and emotional realities as a young woman living in South Africa.  Now she judges 
it as too personal, contaminated with and corrupted by imaginings that turns it into “an 
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immoral novel because that terrible lying nostalgia lights every sentence” (TGN 82).  
Anna’s parody synopsis, written in a style that mocks populist film scripts, further rejects 
the authenticity of her past experiences and shows that the attempt to capture the truth 
in writing “is far from a simple process and is inevitably caught up in the ideology of the 
form in which one chooses to write. Truth becomes contingent and dependent on the 
way in which it is presented” (Bentley 48).   
The staggered sequence and interpenetrations of the conventional novel and the 
notebooks achieve a distancing and ironic detachment, which Arlett links to Brecht’s 
dialectical theatre and describes as Lessing’s “own system of dialectics.”196  The 
poststructuralist model of hinged articulation is supplemented by a dialectical model, 
based on the “motif of naivete”, and Schweickart argues that naivete must be 
distinguished from innocence because it comes as the consequence of loss and therefore 
it “is not innocence but nostalgia for lost innocence” (271).  It could equally be argued 
that Lessing, through Anna, is nostalgic for a faded dream of wholeness, which is now 
counterbalanced by writing with cynicism: 
  
On the one hand, then, we have naive nostalgia for lost innocence, and on the other, the 
nihilistic, petulant – and equally naive – readiness, in relation to a major defeat, to ‘throw 
everything overboard,’ or to seek comfort in dry, sterile irony. Every aspect of Anna’s life 
is blocked by naivete in this dual aspect as nostalgia and nihilism. (Schweickart 271)  
 
 
Anna remembers the double feeling shared by the leftist group of friends at the 
beginning of the war, when they were at once complacent and ironic about the situation 
in Africa:  the war gave an economic boost and did not “interfere with the enjoyment of 
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life” (TGN 83).  But at the same time, the war amplified the hypocrisy of Apartheid 
politics, when white men went to defend their African soil against a racialist regime 
elsewhere.  Looking back reveals that her nostalgia was never innocent because it had 
always been tainted by guilt and shame about their inability to effect changes, their 
escapist fantasies at the Mashopi hotel.  Anna questions her emotions, “Nostalgia for 
what? I don’t know. Because I’d rather die than have to live through any of that again.” 
(TGN 162).  Her memory of Africa is not a retrospective valorisation of a group of young 
people in concert; at the time there was already an uneasiness about the Communist 
view.  The novel “Free Women” is written in a style that parodies conventional realism by 
revealing its inadequacies with the effect that  “‘reality par excellence’ is represented by 
the misrepresentational, inauthentic language […] which freezes the everyday – ‘British 
life at its roots’ – into a mocking parody of itself” (Waugh, MF 53).  Parody culminates in 
the last part of the “Free Women” narrative when major characters suddenly show ironic 
detachment from former beliefs: instead of living with and battling out their conflicts, 
they submit to conventionality and make compromising adjustments.  At this point, the 
“Free Women” narrative “has returned to the ironical nature of its title, has become ‘a 
comment about the conventional novel’” (Arlett 77).   
Tommy’s blindness ironically turns out to be a liberating force which enables him 
to take over his father’s business, because it has resolved “the problem of too many 
options – figured as a problem of identity, of too many possible people to become” (Hite, 
“(En)gendering Metafiction” 488).  Anna remarks that some people “are whole at all 
because they’ve chosen to block off at this stage or that. People stay sane by blocking off, 
by limiting themselves” (TGN 456).  Blocking off is exactly what many characters choose 
at the end of “Free Women” when they decide to slip back into conventional roles.  
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Reintegration into the fabric of society signals that the idea of a free woman is as illusory 
as that of a free society.  So Anna’s decision to abandon her career as a writer and to go 
back to traditional female occupations indicates an ironic negation of her exclusive 
commitment to writing as well as her resignation as a “boulder-pusher.” However, the 
soppy conventionalism of “Free Women” stands in ironic contradiction to the fact that 
ostensibly, and according to the inner logic of the text, “Free Women” is the second novel 
that Anna will write, which makes the whole of The Golden Notebook a novel that was 
written by Anna Wulf.  
 
Moving into Postmodernism: Presenting the Unpresentable 
 
Ostensibly, the notebooks contain the compartmentalized experiences of Anna 
that make up the raw material for “Free Women”.  It also divides the narration into five 
different perspectives, which produces a complex pattern of repetitions and variations on 
ideas, images and events that link the frame novel with the notebooks.  The division 
produces a duality that mirrors the formal organization of the novel in the psychological 
state of its protagonist such that “the structure of the novel becomes an objective 
correlative of the central character’s consciousness” (Rubenstein 76).   
Lessing’s dissatisfaction with the limitations of conventional novels to express the 
postmodern paradigm197 induced her to explore different formal techniques in the hope 
of finding one that could become the aesthetic equivalent of social reality and the ways in 
which it shapes the modern individual, “the fragmented society, the fragmented 
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consciousness” (TGN 79).  The novel moves into a postmodernist mode of writing that is 
concerned with presenting the unpresentable.  To capture the essence of individuals in 
writing is a moral imperative for Anna, she says that “I should describe Willi and Maryrose 
so that a reader can feel their reality. […] the human personality, that unique flame, is so 
sacred to me, that everything else becomes unimportant” (TGN 89).  At this point, a 
postmodern paradox emerges when Lessing, through Anna, discovers the impossibility of 
capturing the reality of human existence in writing.  In consequence, the human 
personality takes on the quality of the sublime, which can be connected to Lyotard’s 
reading of the Kantian sublime: 
 
For Lyotard, the sublime is identified by the impossibility of presenting it to the human 
consciousness, and it is its very unpresentable nature that established its power […] What 
Lessing takes from this moment, however, is the necessity to continue writing despite the 
inadequacy of the medium in which she is working. (Bentley 55-6)   
 
 
Lessing’s persistence in continuing to write allows Bentley to argue that “the novel 
parallels Lyotard’s sense of the postmodernist (rather than modernist) response to the 
unpresentability of the sublime” (Bentley 45).  In his seminal essay “What Is 
Postmodernism?” Lyotard describes postmodern art as “that which searches for new 
presentations, not in order to enjoy them but in order to impart a stronger sense of the 
unpresentable” (The Postmodern Condition 81).   Although Lessing continues to prefer “a 
Brechtian model of political engagement through experiment with form,” Bentley 
concludes that her metacritical engagement with the nature and limitations of writing 
reflects the postmodern impasse, which “remains as an unsettling presence in the novel” 
(Bentley 56). 
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The Divided Self in Opposition to Formlessness and Chaos 
 
Poststructuralist theories of subjectivity posit “a centerless, dispersed subject who 
is literally a composite of various socially and culturally constructed roles or positions – 
not perspectives – that cannot be reconciled” (Michael 40).  The different roles that a 
modern subject has to fulfil lead increasingly to inner conflicts that undermine any 
achieved sense of unity.  Self-alienation results from the tensions that the self 
experiences in trying to live up to contradictory roles, which divide human beings such 
that they “are becoming more and more divided, and more subdivided in themselves, 
reflecting the world […] It is a blind grasping out for their own wholeness” (TGN 79).  So 
authenticity in The Golden Notebook is associated with formlessness: “Anna appears to 
understand her world and her experience of that world as fragmenting and fragmented 
and to see ‘unity’ as a totalizing fiction.”198  Her attempt to contain her different selves in 
the rigid structure of the notebooks gives her merely a factitious and precarious order 
aimed as a protection 
   
against real madness; but, in the end, she cannot sustain the inherent 
contradictions of this enforced division in the name of an illusion of wholeness. 
Not until Anna deliberately ends her four separate notebooks and begins to write 
in a single notebook does she finally accept the formlessness of life and of the 
individual. (Michael 49-50) 
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Anna’s inability to write coherently in just one big book is a sign of her 
proliferating disorder that will culminate in an existential crisis: the room in which she 
breaks down is a mirror of the chaos that rages in her mind.  Lessing shows chaos as the 
ordering principle: the fragmented form of the novel reflects the final stage of Anna’s 
psyche in which “the chaotic fragmentation of her mad thoughts and hallucinations is 
essentially an exaggeration of her usually fragmented existence.”199  There seems to be a 
meaning in madness when Lessing shows that anxieties are shared by mad people and by 
society at large: a mad person’s paranoia is not unique to itself but draws upon outside 
information and influences, which are then reworked in the break-down.  
Saul’s repeated assertion of his masculinity threatens Anna when he spits bullets 
of egoism at her.  His volley of “I”s is a sign of his thinking in terms of exclusion of the 
other, for the preservation of his ego “against women. Women the jailors, the 
consciences, the voice of society, and he was directing a pure stream of hatred against 
me, for being a woman” (TGN 606).  Virginia Woolf pointed to the preeminence of the 
male ego in literature that obliterates the female other.  Famously, she criticized the 
single-sexed mind as uncreative and likened its dominance to “a straight dark bar, a 
shadow shaped something like the letter ‘I.’”200  Saul needs to protect himself against 
Anna’s presumption that he is like herself a mere “boulder-pusher”, which is in sharp 
contrast to his aspiration to become “one of the great men on top of the mountain” and 
consequently, Anna feels that “he was not seeing me, except as an enemy he had to 
shout down” (TGN 604-5).  
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Lessing explains that before Anna and Saul can regain their unity, they have to 
“break through the false patterns they have made of their pasts, the patterns and 
formulas they have made to shore up themselves and each other” (Lessing, Preface to 
TGN 7).  The chaos or “cracking up” accompanies the breakdown of social conventions 
and the writing of the inner golden notebook becomes central to Anna’s reorganization of 
the different narratives of herself.  Her breakdown into madness initiates a process of 
healing that exorcises the false selves and by uncoupling from any single identity, she 
achieves formlessness.  
Sass writes that the act of uncoupling breaks up “two different selves: a hidden, 
‘inner’ self that watches or controls, usually associated with the mind, and a public, outer 
self that is more closely identified with bodily appearance and social role and that tends 
to be felt as somehow false or unreal” (Madness and Modernism 33).  The disintegration 
of her individual subjectivities can be viewed as a struggle toward self-realization that is 
related to the Hegelian concept of the accession of Spirit to a higher level of conscious 
life.  Sass explains:  
 
Hegel can speak of the existence of the self ‘on its own account’ as being ‘strictly 
speaking, the loss of itself’ (meaning the loss of any particular identity). In this sense, to 
negate the self is the only way to find it, the only way to affirm its true (if paradoxical) 
nature.” (104-5)   
 
 
First, to give up on the unity of the self and second, to acknowledge chaos as the 
principally ordering factor in the world, brings to the fore that fragmentation and chaos 
lie at the root of life and this essential formlessness constitutes "a terrible irony, a terrible 
shrug of the shoulders and it's not a question of fighting it, or disowning it, or of right or 
wrong, but simply knowing it is there, always" (TGN 609-10).  
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Breaking Down and Breaking Through 
 
Lessing was influenced by the intellectual anti-rationalist and anti-psychiatric 
counterculture of the sixties that stood in opposition to the dominant modes of 
technocracy, clinical psychiatry, and institutionalized psychoanalytical explanatory 
models.  The Golden Notebook is Lessing’s exegesis of “the countercultural Laingian 
notion of psychic breakdown as a means to break through to new psychic wholeness” 
(Waugh, HS 133-4).  Laing’s proposal that schizophrenia could be a sane response to an 
insane world would be criticised as a romantic idealization of madness by more 
traditional psychoanalysts, who were conservatively focussed on the ideal of a normal 
functioning organism.  Anna critiques their values; in her view, any psychoanalytic 
methodology “stands or falls on whether it makes better human beings, morally better, 
not clinically more healthy” (TGN 457). 
Laing had argued against the dominant psychiatric and psychoanalytic paradigms, 
because in his view, none of their theories considered the relational dimension of 
experience: Freud’s theory of ego psychology focussed too narrowly on individual 
experience in that it lacked the concept of a ‘me’, except as an objectified ‘ego’ and 
behaviourist theories were predominantly concerned with the interactions or 
transactions between people conceived as rationalized machines.  Neither concept was 
able to identify what experience really was and, moreover, nor could they articulate the 
relationship between experience and behaviour in social collectivities of experience, 
which Laing saw as crucial for bridging “the gap between persons”, and he identified that 
it is precisely “the relation between persons that is central in theory, and in practice. 
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Persons are related to one another through their experience and through their 
behaviour.”201  In Politics of Experience, Laing favours an overarching structure that places 
“all theories and practices within the scope of a total vision of the ontological structure of 
being human” in a framework that examines at once the impact that one person has on 
another, what happens in “the meeting of an ‘I’ with ‘an other’” (41, 42). 
Opposition to psychoanalytic interpretation is evident in Anna’s conviction that 
psychoanalysis uses explanatory models in order to normalize and, as Porter elucidates, 
she “detects at the heart of psychoanalysis the will to anesthetize individual experience 
by defining it in terms of mythic precedents” (59).  In speaking out against the therapeutic 
universalization of experience, Anna suggests the failure of the Jungian viewpoint: Anna 
cannot believe that people in the past were as terrified by the crossbow as people are 
today by nuclear weapons and she rejects the consolation that her therapist had offered 
in her advice that mental equilibrium must be obtained at the price of blindness towards 
the growing possibility of annihilation.  Instead, she refuses to be normalized by 
mollification and considers “that perhaps the word neurotic means the condition of being 
highly conscious and developed. The essence of neurosis is conflict. But the essence of 
living now, fully, not blocking off to what goes on, is conflict” (TGN 456).   
For Lessing and Laing, the schizoid contemporary subject is essentially a healthy 
subject, but the pathological split personality is in effect an extreme version of the same 
that developed out of an “intensification of the divisions within the normal self” (Vlastos 
247).  Laing examined the transition from sanity to madness by employing an existential 
phenomenological approach, based on an evaluation of “the nature of a person’s 
experience of his world and himself” that lets him differentiate between a “sane schizoid 
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way of being-in-the-world” and a “psychotic way of being-in-the-world.”202  Lessing shows 
madness as a painful catharsis with a potentially therapeutic effect when Anna “emerges 
from insanity to a tentative but fresh state of balance, self-respect, and independence” 
(Vlastos 245).  Tentative is a cautionary word that indicates the precariousness of her 
newly found balance, because it becomes questionable when at the end of “Free 
Women” she “reconnects herself to the same social structures that had initially prompted 
her self-estrangement” (Rubenstein 217).  Despite her return to relative health, she has 
not solved her problem as a writer, which points to the dilemma that Lessing faced: like 
Anna, Lessing has not found a form of fiction in which she can believe.  Viewed 
optimistically, Anna’s breakdown into madness confronted her fears; she examined the 
hidden aspects of her nature and, in this respect, it might have been liberating.  The 
revelation of evil within herself and her acceptance that evil forces exist in the world 
provide a new kind of knowledge and her “understanding of the real movement of the 
world towards dark, hardening power” (TGN 568).  
The idea that self-division is a prerequisite for the survival of the modern self was 
first made evident in Rousseau’s Confessions, when he attributed his suffering to the 
disparity between his public appearance and what he saw as his inner true self.  Laing 
examined mental illness under a new auspice: the psychotic breakout is a sign of the 
breakdown of the false self and the first step in liberating the repressed essential self.  
The split personality might be a feature of a new development in the evolution of men, 
and Anna tells her psychoanalyst that she perceives cracks in persons “like a gap in a dam, 
and through that gap the future might pour in a different shape — terrible perhaps, or 
marvellous, but something new” (TGN 460).  For Lessing, the loss of her ideals 
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consequently meant the loss of her vision for a better future, the promised Communist 
paradise.  In an interview with  Lesley Hazelton in 1982, she confirmed that in the past 
she had been an idealistic, utopian Communist: “I and the people around me really 
believed – but, of course, this makes us certifiable – that something like 10 years after 
World War II, the world would be Communist and perfect.''203  
In accordance with the Laingian notion that sees the mad person at once as a 
symptom and a victim of modern society, Lessing had explored the causes of the complex 
fragmentation of late modernity and had tentatively implied “that insanity is not an 
abandonment of the real but a potentially intelligible attempt to achieve ontological 
security through the expression of a self fragmented by the pressures and violences of a 
competitive and exploitative society” (Waugh, HS 6).  In Politics of Experience, R. D. Laing 
had argued that so-called normality is achieved through estrangement from the structure 
of being and is in fact “a product of repression, denial, splitting, projection, introjection 
and other forms of destructive action on experience” (23-4).  Laing goes on to explain that 
“[w]e are potentially men, but are in an alienated state, and this state is not simply a 
natural system. Alienation as our present destiny is achieved only by outrageous violence 
perpetrated by human beings on human beings.” (12).  
 
 
Lessing explained to Lesley Hazelton that Laing had failed her just as Communism 
had, because he had no larger philosophy to offer, no sense of purpose or ontological 
security: ''I was once an idealistic and utopian Communist […] I am not proud of it. The 
real politicos are a very different animal, and I'm angry that I didn't notice that very 
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evident fact.”  Anna’s disillusionment with Communism results from the realization that 
the Party employs anti-humanist totalizing language games, which she senses in her 
reading of Comrade Ted’s story: at first, she thinks of it as “an exercise in irony”, until she 
realizes that it was in effect seriously intended, but be read otherwise, “as parody, irony 
or seriously” (TGN 302). In this respect, The Golden Notebook shows a move towards a 
postmodern sensibility where “[t]he grand narrative has lost its credibility” (Lyotard, The 
Postmodern Condition 37). 
The interview concludes with Lessing illuminating her turn to the mystic 
philosophy of Sufism with its goal of universal harmony that acknowledges the spirit of an 
“Absolute Being” but furthermore seeks to maintain involvement in worldly affairs.  Both 
preoccupations aim for the development of mankind into a higher stage of evolution.  
Hazelton summarizes Lessing’s gloomy prediction that conceives the future of the world 
as one that is  
 
plowed under by economic, environmental and nuclear disaster. Now the end is in itself a 
beginning. The writer who espoused R.D. Laing's concept of mental breakdown as a 
breakthrough to a higher plane of reality has now expanded that same idea to global 
proportions.  'Look,’ she says: ‘'we live in a world of incredible suffering. This brief 
paradise in the West since the end of the last war, which is about to end, has educated 
two generations into thinking we live in some sort of Shangri-La. As usual we – that is, the 
human race – are in for a hard time. But that is our history. When have we not had a hard 
time? (Interview with Doris Lessing, 1982) 
 
 
Lessing’s disenchantment with both politics and the power of novels written in a mode of 
realism to express the fragmentation of the self is a turning-point in late modernist 
literature.  The Golden Notebook is positioned on the threshold to post-modernists’ self-
conscious reworking of realism in new structural forms and it could be viewed as opening 
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the way for subsequent writers and their reworking of previous genres for expressing the 
condition of the postmodern self.  
 
In the next section, A. S. Byatt and J. M. Coetzee provide examples of 
postmodernist fiction that continue with realism in a new mode: in Possession, the 
temporal double plot structure connects the formation of present-day identity through 
the engagement with nineteenth-century fictional writers; Summertime builds up a 
fictional identity that is constructed by and seemingly dependent on the opinions of 
others. 
 
Section 2: Self-Conscious Realism: Filling in the Gap of History in A.S. 
Byatt’s Possession (1990) 
 
 
Novels are romances – but romances which have to negotiate the prosaic world of 
modern civilization […] If the novel is a romance, however, it is a disenchanted one, which 
has nothing to learn about baffled desires and recalcitrant realities. (Eagleton 2-3) 
 
Shortly after writing Possession: A Romance in 1990, A. S. Byatt comments, in her 
introduction to a collection of essays, Passions of the Mind, on her ambitions for 
employing a particular structure of narration that “would explore the continuities and 
discontinuities between the forms of nineteenth- and twentieth-century art and 
thought.”204  Described as a neo-Victorian novel, Possession is also an example of 
postmodern biographic metafiction that reworks past authors, voices, and styles, and 
which highlights the palimpsest texture of life-writing and the ways in which it is shaped 
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by other texts.  Neo-Victorianism’s imaginative (re)turn to the Victorian past enacts and 
simultaneously undercuts its performance of textual illusionism.  Traces of intertextuality 
are interwoven in the double structure of two different temporal narratives: one 
narrative is set in the late twentieth century and the other in the mid-nineteenth century; 
Possession is a novel in which romantic idealism and disenchanted realism meet.  Susanne 
Becker goes further and argues that “Possession marks the end of postmodernism, or, at 
least, the threshold between postmodern thought and new forms of more realist 
representation.”205  Byatt uses an expanded frame of realism for keeping the Victorian as 
well as the modern world self-contained and separate, but with one exception: the novel 
ends with a “Postscript 1868”, in which an omniscient narrator claims to disclose an 
event, unknown to the contemporary biographers of the novel, to tell readers “how it 
was.”206  The knowledge-gap about the Victorians consists in a message that did not get 
into the possession of its addressee because it was lost by a child.  Catherine Burgass 
concludes that the ending of Possession shows that there is always something omitted 
from knowledge about the past and “this final scene drives home the point that while the 
truth of a real life will elude the most committed sleuth-biographer, fiction can provide 
the reader with imaginative access to a different kind of truth.”207  Throughout the novel, 
the truth about the Victorian poets is refined by textual discoveries until after the 
conclusion of the main plot, a last piece of knowledge emerges for “the readers’ eyes 
only” regarding a serendipitous encounter between father and child, which produces a 
truth which, in a postmodern twist, has become inaccessible to later generations.   
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The two narratives are connected through the engagement of the twentieth-
century protagonists with documents of the past which have effects on the present.  In 
particular, the novel is concerned with re-assessing the identities of two famous, but 
fictional Victorian writers: although in the context of Possession, the works of Randolph 
Ash and Christabel LaMotte have been studied extensively by literary critics, the 
prevailing interpretations are to be overturned in the light of new textual evidence that 
reveals a heretofore unknown connection between the two Victorian writers.  The 
discovery of hidden letters by two twentieth-century literary scholars, Maud Bailey and 
Roland Michell, not only gradually reveals the personal relationship between Ash and 
LaMotte, but also leads to a rereading and reinterpretation of their imaginative and 
poetic writings.  The cooperation in the investigation gives Maud and Roland opportunity 
to probe and address their own personal insecurities and doubts by engaging with the 
Victorian subjects through their textual remains.  They discover that underneath the 
previously assumed surface of poised Victorian appearance simmered a clandestine affair 
and this knowledge emerges from the juxtaposition of different kinds of texts whose 
hermeneutic significance is read differently once new facts about the writers’ lives are 
revealed.    
The presentation of the Victorians as being devoted to their work emphasises 
their strong self-conceptions as poets, which shows that Byatt sees a close link between a 
literary text and the identity of the author.  Ash and LaMotte are described as intricately 
tied to, and, at the same time, constituted by their texts.  LaMotte writes: “I am a 
creature of my Pen, Mr Ash, my Pen is the best of me,” and Ash affirms that he recognizes 
the unity of work and self when he writes, “dearest, I love your soul and with that your 
poetry […] your thought clothed with your words is uniquely you, came with you, would 
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vanish if you vanished” (P 87, 200).  Both believe that the intrinsic self finds expression in 
poetry and thoughts; Ash claims that “where my thoughts are, there I am, in truth” (P 
181).  At the end of the novel, the modern researchers Roland and Maud succeed in 
constructing their own identities through their engagement with the past and Steveker 
concludes that “Possession thus conceptualizes literary texts, which as cultural texts form 
part of the content of British cultural memory, as decisive elements of individual identity 
formation.”208  
Opposite the Victorian poets, the modern couple appear reluctant, self-doubting 
and self-consciously concerned with the question of identity.  Roland suffers from a highly 
insecure sense of selfhood that is partly due to his living in poor socio-economic 
circumstances: as an unemployed literary researcher, who depends on his girlfriend’s 
income, he conceives of “himself as a failure” (P 11) and is described that “he hardly 
qualified as a full-blooded departmental male” (P 118).  Another impediment to gaining a 
sense of stable identity is Roland’s academic intellectual training; prevailing literary 
theory has trained him to repress notions of selfhood according to “the post-structuralist 
deconstruction of the subject” (P 9), which resulted in his detached and ironic view of the 
self as being dispersed in different systems:  
 
Roland had learned to see himself, theoretically, as a crossing-place for a number of 
systems, all loosely connected. He had been trained to see his idea of his ‘self’ as an 
illusion, to be replaced by a discontinuous machinery and electrical message-network of 
various desires, ideological beliefs and responses, language-forms and hormones and 
pheromones. Mostly he liked this. He had no desire for any strenuous Romantic self-
assertion. (P 424) 
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Roland betrays his nostalgia for a more grounded and material sense of self when 
he turns to Randolph Ash as a model of identification in order to escape from a 
disappointing life.  Although the respected feminist scholar Maud is financially secure, she 
too is deeply insecure about postmodern theories that render the self as an unstable 
entity, which is caught in “a nexus of competing discursive formations.”209  Maud 
expresses her anxiousness about: 
 
Narcissism, the unstable self, the fractured ego, Maud thought, who am I? A matrix for a 
susurration of texts and codes? (P 251) 
 
We are very knowing. We know all sorts of other things, too – about how there isn't a 
unitary ego – how we're made up of conflicting, interacting systems of things – and I 
suppose we believe that? (P 267) 
 
Both think of themselves as decentred and deconstructed through the paradigms of 
poststructualist theory, which does not address “the question of the awkward body”: 
Maud ponders her own physical reality, “[t]he skin, the breath, the eyes, the hair, their 
history, which did seem to exist” (P 251).  The Victorians’ seemingly secure self-esteem is 
juxtaposed with the insecure sense of self felt by both Roland and Maud.  
 
Thinking Minds and Feeling Bodies 
 
In juxtaposition to the dry language-world of post-structuralism, the third person 
narrator lavishly describes sensuous experience and  declares that “[i]t is possible for a 
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writer to make, or remake at least, for a reader, the primary pleasures of eating, or 
drinking, or looking on, or sex” (P 470).  Alexa Alfer states that 
 
Possession does indeed invite us to imagine a fictional world we can see, hear, smell, taste 
and touch. This emphasis on sensuous experience not least proved a foil to Maud and 
Roland’s rather dry and intellectualised vision of reality as a discursive phenomenon, and 
of themselves as constructed subjects.210  
 
Byatt blends a modernist attachment to ‘qualia’ with a postmodern awareness of 
the questioning of language as able to render the experiential, through a neo-Victorian 
novel that again interrogates fundamental questions about the genre. Her detailed 
descriptions of the gargantuan quantities of food, rich landscapes and settings are 
characteristic of formal realism that shows “’language as plenitude’, a language that 
joyously defies Derrida’s claim that language never denotes, but only defers” (Alfer 98). 
The richness of Byatt’s language is characteristic of her belief in the possibility of 
representing some aspects of the world accurately; she believes that “language has 
denotative as well as connotative powers” (PM 24) and although it has no  “privileged 
relationship to truth, social or psychological […] it leaves space for thinking minds as well 
as feeling bodies” (PM 4).  Possession extends “the premise, or primary convention, that 
the novel is a full and authentic report of human experience” (Watt in Sheehan 1).  
Moreover, meals served in hotel restaurants, compatible rhythms in walking together or 
the description of the countryside are all examples for the many parallels in action and 
linking imagery that make the reader aware of the connections between the Victorian 
and the modern plot in “a series of images, motifs and meaning that float across the 
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various texts.”211  Many occasions and experiences are mirrored in the past and present 
sojourns and it happens at such points that the reader becomes aware that “the plot lines 
converge and the lives of the protagonists mimic each other […] the past abuts and 
intrudes upon the present” (Burgass 48).  La Motte’s enclosed princess in her story ‘The 
Glass Coffin’ becomes significant in the context of the narration of Roland’s overnight stay 
at Maud’s flat and the description of her bathroom as a “chill green glassy place” (P 56).  
Not only do glass and impenetrable surfaces later become metaphorically connected to 
the description of Maud as “a chilly mortal” (P 144), but they are also linked with other 
motifs and themes in the novel that have mythical or folk-tale roots.  The place of the 
bathroom is connected to the myth of Melusina, which was the inspiration behind 
LaMotte’s poem ‘The Fairy Melusina’, in which a woman in the privacy of her bathroom 
changes into a mermaid, which her husband discovers by spying through a peephole with 
disastrous consequences for the woman.  The revelation of Melusine’s ‘real’ identity is 
transferred to Maud at the scene at Seal Court, when Roland looks through the keyhole of 
the bathroom and sees her emerging like a modern Melusine but without a slivery tail; 
instead, she wears a silk kimono with hair “running all over her shoulders and neck” and 
her whole appearance gives the impression of a mermaid: “running with water, all the 
runnels of silk twisted about her body” (P 147).  Roland feels an electric shock but has 
doubts whether Maud felt the same, for “[h]e did not trust his body”, although “[h]is 
body knew perfectly well that she felt it” (P 147).  Burgass explains that “[t]he tragic end 
of Melusine does not prefigure a similar conclusion to Maud and Roland’s incipient affair, 
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but the correspondences between Victorian poem and contemporary action further 
reinforces the connection between the two couples” (54). 
 
Self and Other: Self-Possession as a Defence against being Possessed 
 
The myth’s central metaphor is the bathroom as a space of privacy, the only place 
where Melusine can be “her ‘true’ self – half woman, half snake” and Steveker explains 
that it is a spatial metaphor that connotes independence: “this room symbolizes the 
autonomy on which her identity depends” (57).  The violation of that space by her 
husband is connected to Ash’s attentions that would jeopardize the autonomy of LaMotte 
and Blanche Glover in their cottage as independent women artists.  Initially, LaMotte 
thinks of Ash as a threat to her autonomy (P 170) and fears with good reason that her 
affair with Ash will actually result in the loss of her financial independence and ruin her 
“self-possession” (P 502). LaMotte describes her loss in a spatial metaphor when she asks 
herself how her ambition to become a great poet might have come true if she had closed 
herself up and resisted giving in to Ash’s advances: “I wonder –  if I had kept to my closed 
castle, behind my motte-and-bailey defences –  should I have been a great poet – as you 
are?” (P 502).  Her story fits Virginia Woolf’s dictum that it is necessary for a writer “to 
have five hundred a year and a room with a lock on the door” (A Room of One’s Own 
158).  LaMotte’s cottage is her protective egg just as Maud’s flat protects her, although it 
equally distances her from others: “Why could she do nothing with ease and grace except 
work alone, inside these walls and curtains, her bright safe box? Christabel, defending 
Christabel, redefined and alarmed Maud” (P 136-7).  Burgass summarizes that the 
metaphorical correspondence links the symbols of glass coffin, closed castle and safe box 
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in the three narrative strands:  “the princess in the story is literally imprisoned, Christabel 
is constrained by circumstance and convention, and Maud is metaphorically imprisoned, 
bent on self-preservation […] a learned defence” (58).    
There is another meaning implicit in the closed space of castle, egg, or flat, which 
paradoxically implies both freedom and captivity not only for the three women, but also 
in connection to the hidden letters that contain a mystery and therefore stand for the 
vitality of the past.  Roland is motivated to take the letters in order to rescue them from 
oblivion: “[I]t was suddenly quite impossible to put these living words back into page 300 
of Vico and return them to Safe 5” (P 8).  The letters promise to tell a story that could 
change the prevailing interpretation of Ash’s and LaMotte’s works but only if their voices 
are allowed to be read in the present instead of being locked away safely.  
The connection between different descriptions of self-possession and the violation 
of autonomy through metaphorical “eggs” occur in three different narratives: 
remembering her affair with Fergus Wolff, Maud again feels discomfort about the bed 
they shared in an image of broken eggs; the sheets on the “empty battlefield” (P 56) 
remind her of “ old whipped eggs, like dirty snow” (P 141).  The image of “a bed like dirty 
egg-white” is later connected to the kind of possessive twentieth-century literary 
scholarship represented by Fergus Wolff and Leonora Stern (P 222).  The spoiled egg 
metaphor with its unsavoury sexual connotation contrasts with La Motte’s fairy tale in 
which a tailor describes the smoothness of the coffin that contains the princess as “a 
green ice egg, a tiny keyhole. And he knew that this was the keyhole for his wondrous 
delicate key, and with a little sigh he put it in and waited for what should ensue” (P 63).  
The tailor’s gentleness in the romance of the fairy story echoes in Maud’s mind when she 
thinks of Roland as “a gentle and unthreatening being” (P 141).  The analogy of two 
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unlikely heroes, who win over a princess, also extends to Ash and his successful wooing of 
LaMotte.  The romantic connotations of the story find their apex in the last scene that 
describes Roland’s tentative but finally successful amorous advances towards Maud: “And 
very slowly and with infinite gentle delays and delicate diversions and variations of 
indirect assault Roland finally, to use an outdated phrase, entered and took possession of 
all her white coolness that grew warm against him” (P 507).  The fairy tale predicted the 
short-lived happiness that the Victorians enjoyed and the happy ending for the modern 
couple on the last page of the novel, but the fairy story’s unconventional ending is 
prophetic of the anxiety for lost independence that is characteristic of both LaMotte and 
Maud.    
In one of her earliest letter to Ash, Christabel implores him to respect her way of 
life and explains that she must remain impenetrable like an egg in order to feel whole and 
secure, even if it means solitary imprisonment:  
 
An Egg is my answer. What is the Riddle?  
I am my own riddle. Oh, Sir, you must not kindly seek to ameliorate or steal away my 
solitude. It is a thing we women are taught to dread – oh the terrible tower, oh the thickets 
round it - no companionable Nest - but a donjon.  (P 137) 
 
In her last letter to Ash, Christabel reminds him that their affair had dire 
consequences: the birth of a child destroyed her precarious financial and consequently 
intellectual independence and forced her to rely on the mercy of her sister’s family in 
order to avoid social ostracism.  She explains that her image of an egg is an idealized form 
of solitude and self-possession, which is echoed when Maud tells Roland that she 
identifies with Christabel’s feelings:  “I feel as she did. I keep my defences up because I 
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must go on doing my work. I know how she felt about her unbroken egg.  Her self-
possession, her autonomy. I don't want to think of that going” (P 506). The discovery of 
meaning behind various images of eggs – Ash’s allegorical penetration of the egg as a life-
giving act and LaMotte’s metaphor of seeing herself as an egg in fear of being destroyed 
by Ash – connect with Maud’s disturbing sense of broken eggs; her sense of having been 
spoilt by Fergus Wolff: she comprehends the significance of Ash’s and LaMotte’s thoughts 
in relation to her own conflicting impulses.  
 
Sexual Desire hampered by Postmodern Awareness 
 
Both Roland and Maud are reluctant to acknowledge sexual desire but draw closer 
to each other when they discover a shared vision of “a clean empty bed in a clean room, 
where nothing is asked or to be asked” (P 267).  Burgass understands their scepticism that 
is directed towards “romantic love, romance in toto” (P 423) as “excessive self-possession 
[…] highly resistant to any aspect of love, including sexual involvement, which threatens 
autonomy, hence the tentative progress of their romance” (31).  Through authorial 
intervention and remarks that betray a post-Freudian awareness in sexual matters, the 
couple is described as “children of a time and culture which mistrusted love” (P 423).  
Ironic intrusion and metafictional remarks “complicate and diversify the treatment of the 
Romantic subplot from a post-modernist point of view.”212  
It is indeed symptomatic that their awareness of theoretical knowledge has 
become an impediment to their identity as sexual beings and they feel overpowered by 
poststructuralist and psychoanalytic theories, and the scientific explanatory models that 
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govern consciousness in an anonymous structure of language: “sexual language, linguistic 
sexuality, analysis, dissection, deconstruction, exposure” (P 423).  Byatt challenges anti-
humanistic models of hermeneutics that regard language not as a medium by means of 
which man expresses himself, or gives meaning to his world, but instead, reduces being 
human to codes that deny the networks of myths and texts that constitute culture and 
the social structures that constitute society.   
In Possession, the Victorian cousin of LaMotte, Sabine de Kercoz, writes about the 
progression of the phallus myth in time: women used to dance around the Standing 
Stones “to have strong sons”, today, the village girls’ vile dance is performed as a rite, a 
“relic of an ancient sacrifice, perhaps Druidic”,  which is also connected to Christianity: 
“the church spire was only this ancient stone in a metamorphic form – a slate column […] 
instead of granite […] and the women huddled beneath it like white hens, as in earlier 
times they danced before the other” (P 351). 
Leonora Stern’s allegiance to psychoanalytic feminist interpretation regards 
Christabel’s sexuality as the single most important factor in her poetry and her 
interpretation is preoccupied with lesbian sexuality that is also her own sexual 
predilection, which Roland objects to: “it all reduced like boiling jam to – human sexuality. 
Just as Leonora Stern makes the whole earth read as the female body – and language – all 
language. And all vegetation is pubic hair” (P 253).  Indeed, Leonora is clearly a caricature 
of intellectualized sexuality, “the epitome of the new feminist criticism, insisting as she 
does on seeing everything LaMotte wrote as a metaphor for feminine sexuality” (Buxton 
205).  In the voice of an omniscient narrator, Byatt reflects on literary theory that wants 
to ignore the possibility of original meaning and concentrates instead on the significance 
of a text for the reader who dissects it through “personal readings, that snatch for 
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personal meanings” (P 471).  Narrow-minded criticism that focuses on sex at the expense 
of the literary text confirms Leonora’s satiric status in her convoluted psychoanalytic 
analysis of LaMotte’s poem “Melusina”: 
 
the drowned women in the city might represent the totality of the female body as an 
erogenous zone if the circumambient fluid were seen as an undifferentiated eroticism, 
and this might be possible to connect to the erotic totality of the woman/dragon stirring 
the waters of the large marble bath, or submerging her person in it as LaM. tellingly 
describes her. (P 154) 
 
Ironically, Fergus Wolff epitomizes the circularity of hermeneutic interpretative 
models: his current textual project faces him with "the challenge" of "deconstruct[ing] 
something that had apparently already deconstructed itself" (P 37). The method of 
deconstruction is mocked as a futile, destructive and focussed on superimposing 
meaning.  Louisa Hadley summarizes Byatt’s treatment of postmodern theorists: 
  
These theoretical readings are revealed to be reductive in their focus on a single concern, 
usually sexuality. Moreover, the novel suggests that these approaches are motivated 
more by contemporary concerns; consequently, such readings wrench the nineteenth-
century texts out of their historical context and impose present structures of 
understanding onto them.213  
 
Textual possessiveness is at its core and sexual possessiveness is also part of Fergus 
Wolff’s character: he once succeeded in luring Maud into an affair with insincere 
language that mimics Romance: “You are the most beautiful thing I have ever seen or 
dreamed about. I want you, I need you, can't you feel it, it's irresistible" (P 64).  
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Postmodern Storytelling  
 
Byatt describes herself as a “self-conscious realist”, who wants to write tales and 
stories in “the alternative tradition of the literary tale, or fairy tale” (OHAS 4).  Through 
the juxtaposition of the Victorians and the symbolism in their texts with the concerns of 
the late twentieth-century characters, Byatt shows that their preoccupation bears a 
strong resemblance to the problems of the present time.  The Victorians are different 
from Roland and Maud, but are also the same in their need to find love and 
independence.  The “childe” who chooses the mysterious and rather restrained third lady 
in Christabel’s fairy tale “The Threshold” can be linked to Roland through literary allusion. 
The lady, who wore “her hair, unlike that of the others […] caught back under a masking 
veil” (P 152) alludes to Maud, who hides her hair under various covers.  The golden lady 
promises the riches of world, the silver fairy beguiles with the pleasures of the night, but 
the childe remembers the wise words of the father and chooses the unimposing and 
withdrawn third lady at the end of story, because she “tender[s] The Herb of Rest” (P 
154).  Byatt was interested to employ “small discrete stories rather than pervasive and 
metamorphic metaphors as ways of patterning and thinking out a text” (OHAS 130).  
Apparently, the story is told by LaMotte, who comments on the choice of the childe that 
in all fairy tales the third choice must be the right one, and Byatt states that by retelling 
the story in a new context, she partakes in the continuity of the tale, “Christabel’s 
commentary was ‘knowing’ about inevitability; my own writing was ‘knowing’ about 
Freud. But the story was primary and had its own life” (OHAS 131).  Byatt states that the 
third leaden fairy offers mystery instead of power or sex, but she also offers tranquillity 
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“the herb of rest” which connects to Roland’s and Maud’s longing for solitude and self-
possession. 
It is no coincidence that Possession bears the subtitle “a Romance”, because its 
plot is interspersed with fairy stories and poems that relate to the development in the 
twentieth century. Furthermore, the novel has a conventional ending that recognizes the 
personal growth of the main characters and a wish-fulfilling postscript that provides an 
element of fantasy.  Thus, Possession is preoccupied with fabulation and the various ways 
in which history and selves are constructed, which matches Nathaniel Hawthorne’s 
definition of the Romantic tale that “attempt[s] to connect a bygone time with the very 
present that is flitting away from us.”214   
 
The Quest for Identity in a Double Plot 
 
The progress of Maud and Roland’s investigations provides a double plot structure 
where the preoccupation with the Victorian past affects the twentieth-century 
characters; it shows that their personal quest for identity is interwoven with a literary 
search.  Byatt explains that her main motive for writing Possession was to show “the 
relations between living and dead minds […] there should be two couples, a man and 
woman, one alive and one dead. The novel would concern the complex relations between 
these two pairs.”215   United in their research, Maud and Roland gradually uncover the 
previously hidden relationship between Ash and LaMotte; the discovery of textual clues 
moves along as a parallel development to their own growth and tentative romance, which 
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“can be read as a double quest for identity […] the protagonists’ search for their 
biographical subjects is closely connected to their own search for themselves” (Steveker 
1).  The detective story involves the discovery of a secret Victorian relationship analogous 
to the progress of Roland and Maud in finding out who they are and who they want to be 
in the future.  Nick Bentley summarizes Byatt’s construction of a fictional image of the 
Victorian epoch by including examples of the poets’ works that act “as a textual and 
historical hinge between the two narratives” (140).  Steveker concludes that “Byatt’s 
rendering of the Victorian Age represents a means of reshaping identity in the present” 
(124).  Possession combines two kinds of romances or quests: the research into the past 
reveals a romance that is closely linked to the development of a romance in the present.  
The genre patterns of quest, thriller and romance provide an intertextual net that 
links the various texts that make up Possession to each other.  Moreover, Byatt’s creation 
of fictional Victorians for the pseudo-Victorian texts is a strategy to authenticate the neo-
Victorian world, which stresses the intertextual links with the past.  Hadley goes beyond 
the argument that Possession is written as a pastiche or parody of the past; instead she 
proposes that it gives a resurrection of historical characters that shows the continuity of 
the present with the past which takes the “form of ventriloquism” that “involves both 
‘speaking like’ and ‘speaking as’ a Victorian” (160).  Employing ventriloquism circumvents, 
as Byatt explains, the use of parody “in a sneering or mocking way, but as ‘rewriting’ or 
‘representing’ the past” (Choices 17).  
 
Writing in the Mode of Ventriloquism 
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Similarly to Byatt’s seriousness, Ash remarks on the difference between the 
bogusness of séances that aim to entice the dead to speak directly and the duty to pass 
on the stories of the past in the tradition of the storyteller:  
 
I myself with the aid of the imagination, have worked a little in that line, have 
ventriloquised, have lent my voice to, and mixt my life with, those past voices and lives 
whose resuscitation in our own lives as warnings, as examples, as the life of the past 
persisting in us, is the business of every thinking man and woman. (P 104) 
 
Byatt defends storytelling as a perpetuating and reworking of something true that is 
transcendent:  
 
Narration is as much part of human nature as breath and the circulation of the blood. 
Modernist literature tried to do away with storytelling, which it thought was vulgar, 
replacing it with flashbacks, epiphanies, streams of consciousness. But storytelling is 
intrinsic to biological time, which we cannot escape. […] Storytelling in general […] 
consoles us for endings with endless new beginnings […] Stories are like genes, they keep 
part of us alive after the end of our story. (OHAS 166) 
 
The distinguishing factor between ventriloquism and parodic modes of writing is 
that the fictional characters Ash and LaMotte “are clearly based on historical models” 
(Hadley 160): Randolph Ash is closely modelled on Robert Browning and the intertextual 
connection between the two is highlighted by the inclusion of an extract from Browning’s 
poem "Mr Sludge, 'the Medium'" as an epitaph to chapter one, which echoes Ash’s 
spiritualist poem “Mummy Possest,” that makes up the whole chapter twenty-one, which 
in turn takes its title from the last two words of “Love’s Alchemy” and is therefore, as 
Professor Blackadder knows, “a quotation from John Donne” (P 299).  Many of Ash’s 
poems have intertextual links to Browning’s poems and “Ash’s use of the dramatic 
monologue can be seen as a ventriloquism of the form perfected by Browning” (Hadley 
161).  Instead of ironic playfulness, Byatt’s ventriloquism shows her inclination to sincerity 
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that is similar to Browning’s idea of authorial function.  Browning claimed that in his 
works he “only make[s] men and women speak, –   give you truth broken into prismatic 
hues”, which “describes his art as a process through which ‘something dead may get to 
live again’ (The Ring and the Book 1.729).”216    
Byatt rereads Victorian poetry and internalizes “the rhythms of Tennyson and 
Browning, Rossetti and Keats” for writing the poems of Ash and LaMotte, which is a 
process of “‘inventing’ the self of another person” (Sturrock 20).  The resurrection of past 
voices shows that the artistry of the writer acts as an intermediary between the living and 
the dead.  Byatt describes the strangeness she experienced in the process of writing the 
poetry in Possession: “I found I was possessed – it was actually quite frightening. The 
nineteenth-century poems wrote themselves, hardly blotted, fitting into the metaphorical 
structure of my novel, but not mine, as my prose is mine” (Choices 17).  Elsewhere, Byatt 
explains that Possession is about respect for the dead and she sees her role as a mediator, 
who intends to give authenticity to “the presence of literary texts as the voices of 
persistent ghosts or spirits. […] ventriloquism became necessary because of what I felt 
was the increasing gulf between current literary criticism and the words of the literary 
texts it in some sense discusses” (OHAS 45).  Burgass explains that acting as a medium, 
Byatt makes the Victorian voice “‘live’ for the reader in a fictional context in the way that 
a critical commentary could not, just as she can present the life of a poet to the reader in 
a way which would be presumptuous in a conventional biography” (51).  Through the 
fictive Ash and LaMotte, Byatt resurrects the Victorian frame of mind, which includes 
nineteenth-century preoccupations with faith and doubt, exemplified in the Victorians 
interest in amateur biology, Darwinism and spiritualism. 
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Negative Ways of Possessing and Being Possessed  
 
The double meaning of the word possession plays an important role for positing 
an ethical reflection on possessiveness: most characters either show a penchant to 
possess – objects or people – or they desire to be possessed by others. Some scholars and 
biographers become entangled with their biographical subject to such an extent that they 
are reduced to a life in the shadow of their admired object.  This is the case with 
Mortimer Cropper, whose morbid obsession with Ash drives him to own every object 
connected to the poet. Cropper’s attachment to objects shows that he needs to fill his 
feeble sense of identity by transferring Ash’s remains onto himself:  “he believed the 
watch had come to him, that it had been meant to come to him, that he had and held 
something of R. H. Ash. It ticked near his heart. He would have liked to be a poet” (P 387).  
Cropper builds his identity on collecting, possessing and assimilation, as if wearing Ash’s 
pocket watch and signet ring could turn him into the object of his desire, but apart from 
the satisfaction of owning, Cropper experiences the stifling of his creative energy: his own 
autobiographical project comes regularly to a halt after the inclusion of an inherited letter 
from Ash to his great-grandmother; at this point, he feels overpowered, “as though he 
had no existence, no separate existence of his own after that first contact with the 
paper’s electric rustle and the ink’s energetic black looping” (P 105). Hadley summarizes 
that Cropper’s attitude violates the past, because “it is not the collector who gives a 
coherent identity to the collection, but rather the collection which gives an identity to the 
collector” (129).  In comparison with Maud’s and Roland’s passionate research and 
253 
 
respect for the Victorian poets, the sarcastic and possessive Cropper is a caricature of an 
egotistical academic, who has a negative relationship with the past. 
 
Criticism of Modern Literary Theory: Against the Hermeneutics of 
Suspicion 
 
In their novels, Doris Lessing and Vladimir Nabokov critiqued the models of culture 
in which humans are situated and the ways in which identities are shaped by assigning 
names to ontological selves.  They pointed out why the literary pursuit of writing novels 
still provides an important instrument for examining, explicating and challenging the 
different possibilities that are available in the quest to arrive at a sense of authenticity for 
a self that is situated in the (post)modern world.  The importance of looking back on the 
whole tradition of writing about the self can be evaluated on its ability to keep open other 
ways of thinking about the self.  
Possession exemplifies Byatt’s ideas about the proper role of criticism that 
involves a positive engagement with the past and, what she describes as misguided 
reductionist criticism that is centred on any particular theoretical model and reads literary 
texts through the lenses of feminism, Marxism, or post-colonialism.  Roland and Maud are 
identified as historical and textual researchers, as “old-fashioned textual crititc[s]” (P 50), 
who engage in a positive way with the past in that both try to reimagine the beliefs and 
attitudes of their Victorian subjects instead of constructing them from a modern 
viewpoint.  Roland suggests that "[i]t makes an interesting effort of imagination to think 
how they [Ash and LaMotte] saw the world” (P 254), which is echoed in Maud’s phrase 
that “we have to make a real effort of imagination to know what it felt like to be them” (P 
254 
 
267).  Hadley concludes that both “combine a scholarly approach that is committed to the 
historical specificity of the past with an emotional response to the past that stems from 
the past itself, rather than from the present” (129).  Similarly, Steveker evaluates their 
interpretive approach as an imaginative reconstruction of the author’s intention as the 
source of meaning by “relating to other individuals. Hermeneutically speaking, Possession 
represents imagination as a means that allows for understanding the other by sharing 
her/his experience” (27). The positive appreciation of the author shifts from a concern 
with establishing the meaning of the text to a concern with the acts of understanding, a 
theory that goes back to Johann Herder, who believed that with sufficient effort of the 
imagination one could feel one’s way into different mentalities (Einfühlung), a strive to 
‘live in the spirit of the author’.  E.D. Hirsch elaborated on the distinction between 
meaning and understanding by insisting that an interpreter must distinguish between the 
meaning of a text and its significance.  He claims that textual meaning is an effect of the 
author and is therefore permanent, self-identical and reproducible through “objective 
interpretation.”217  Significance, in contrast, is variable: the value or relevance of a text 
always depends on changing historical, social, and personal conditions and is produced by 
readers who project their own attitudes onto the text.  Hirsch explains the difference: 
 
Meaning is that which is represented by a text; it is what the author meant by his use of 
particular sign sequence; it is what the signs represent. Significance, on the other hand, 
names a relationship between that meaning and a person, or a conception, or a situation, 
or indeed anything imaginable. […] Significance always implies a relationship, and one 
constant, unchanging pole of that relationship is what the text means. (8) 
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Thus, Hirsch asks to go back to the “unchanging pole” of the author as the only 
valid source for meaning, but he also concedes that there is latitude for variation in 
interpretation; a responsibility that rests with the reading subject.  In opposition to New 
Critic’s “radical historicism” (Hirsch viii), and their “theory of authorial irrelevance” 
(Hirsch 3), which implicitly denies the accessibility of the author’s meaning, Hirsch 
advocates a reconstructive process for determining the “author’s horizon” in order to 
circumvent the conundrum of critics projecting their own preoccupations on to the text.  
Once the historical set of typical expectations, prohibitions, norms, and limits that define 
the author’s intentions as a whole is established, it would ground and sanction inferences 
about probable textual meaning(s) since genuine certainty in interpretation is impossible.  
Hirsch cautions not to confuse “the impossibility of certainty in understanding with the 
impossibility of understanding” (17, emphasis added).  Understanding, he says, results 
from “the imaginative reconstruction of the speaking subject” which, in Hirsch’s view, is 
the proper function of the interpreter, whose “primary task is to reproduce in himself the 
author’s ‘logic,’ his attitudes, his cultural givens, in short his world” (242).  It follows that 
the author does not possess a text in any absolute sense but should be respected as a 
source; as the person who had a definite meaning in mind at the time of writing.  
Against Hirsch’s project of going back to the author as the original source, Jacques 
Derrida, in the same year (1967), claimed that any text is discourse and therefore 
confined in the “structurality of structure” that makes up a language system in which “the 
central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present 
outside a system of differences. The absence of the transcendental signified extends the 
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domain and the play of signification infinitely.”218  The freeplay of language constitutes a 
world of its own, a network of signs, without any reference either outside itself or to a 
centre within; in effect it abandons “all reference to a center, to a subject, to a privileged 
reference, to an origin, or to an absolute archia” (“Structure, Sign and Play in the 
Discourse of the Human Sciences” 361).  Structuralism argues against the presence of the 
human voice, because meaning is contained in a closed system that explains everything 
from within: “the structures of language are powerful as systems with their own rules and 
do not need to take account of the referent (the real life object to which the language 
refers).”219  
Maud and Roland believe in the integrity of the Victorians and read that integrity 
in their texts.  Byatt’s sympathies clearly are with them: at the end of the novel, Roland 
not only receives offers from several universities, but also starts to free himself from the 
shadow of Randolph Ash.  Burgass explains that there is “a thematic opposition set up 
between the artist and the critic, which moves towards resolution” in the moment when 
Roland finds his own creative voice; at that point, “Roland effectively grows out of 
structuralism” (15, 17).  Roland has detached himself from the shadow of the nineteenth-
century poet and from the reductionism of Leonora Stern and Fergus Wolff, who hide 
behind the ostensible objectivity of interpretive models that are based on scientific 
methods or ideology.  Academics who read the texts of the past through the lens of 
psychoanalytic theory are followers of the “hermeneutics of suspicion” in which 
scepticism creates “a dichotomy between a text as it is presented and the possible deeper 
meaning of that text that go beyond what the author intended” (Scott-Baumann 68).  
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Byatt satirizes their contemporary concern with and focus on sexuality as destructive to 
the specific meaning that the writer had intended and Hadley concludes that “such 
readings wrench the nineteenth-century texts out of their historical context and impose 
present structures of understanding onto them” (127).  Byatt’s scepticism is directed 
towards “artistic stances which say we explore only our own subjectivity” and 
poststructual “theories of language as a self-referring system of signs, which doesn’t 
touch the world” (PM 11).  
 
The Defence of the Nineteenth-Century Novel 
 
Possession shows a postmodern fascination with the past by presenting characters 
in the present preoccupied with the reconstruction of selves from the past as a pathway 
for constructing their own selves.  The novel respects the radical difference of a bygone 
era but also critiques possessive postmodern attitudes by presenting scholars who have a 
critical predilection to find their own meanings in the texts of others. Their possessiveness 
reveals a desire to gain power and fame for their critical work, or they seek financial 
benefits from owning the legal rights to documents, or they turn Victorian objects into 
fetishes in order to prop up a weak ego.  These self-centred preoccupations frame the 
Victorian subjects in a postmodern ironic way that at once explores the fictionality of the 
past and the boundaries of an acceptable sense of possession/interpretation.  Byatt 
implicitly critiques Roland Barthes’ apocalyptic suggestion that “the author is absent”220, 
which would allow new readings that would eliminate the author at all levels.   
                                                          
220
 Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” 1967, Image, Music, Text (London: Fontana, 1977) 42-148, 
145. 
258 
 
Contrary to Barthes’ poststructuralist theories, Byatt, like Lessing, believes that 
the nineteenth-century realist novel is inherently bound up with an interest in character 
building and in giving representative examples of human nature.  In Possession, she 
defends the use of the third-person narrator as the voice of the writer, whose intrusion 
functions similarly to a Greek chorus, in order to tell “what can be told about the world of 
the fiction” (OHAS 102).  The narrator’s voice is deliberately used three times to complete 
past events, “to tell what the historians and biographers […] never discovered, always to 
heighten the reader’s imaginative entry into the world of the text (OHAS 56).  Similarly to 
Doris Lessing, Byatt shows nostalgia for writing in the mode of the nineteenth-century 
novel that could portray a coherent world.  According to Alexa Alfer, the third-person 
narrator “invites readers temporarily to suspend their twentieth-century scepticism and 
imagine themselves into a world in which spiritualism, the science of phrenology and the 
realist novel are all still part of the intellectual landscape” (96).   
Moreover, the contemporary quest narrative shows that nostalgia for the past is 
born out of exhaustion with the present, “a state that we turn to at the end of the 
century: ‘Where we fear the chaos of the contemporary, with its bombs at airports and 
other uncontrollable threats, we turn to a nostalgia for a past that suggests order and 
familiarity.’” (Interview with A. S. Byatt in Becker 24).  Byatt and Lessing share an 
awareness about the impossible task of re-using the nineteenth-century form without 
reflecting the ironic distance that has become part of the human condition in the 
twentieth century.  Kathleen Kelly analyses the tensions between realist and postmodern 
modes in Byatt’s work and notes that she is caught between sceptic impulses; she “is a 
realist novelist who questions the project of realism; at the same time, she is also a 
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postmodern novelist who questions the postmodern project.”221  In their different ways, 
both writers seek to position themselves as writers who still believe in the traditional 
novel and its potential for further development.    
Doris Lessing’s parody of the conventional realist novel reflects on the future of 
the novel form: realism is extended through formal invention in order to present the 
changed condition of the post-war era.  Through the fictional author Anna Wulf, The 
Golden Notebook questions the process and possibilities of writing in a new form, which, 
as Max Saunders states, “shows the author Doris Lessing moving […] from the 
conventional novel to the breakdown of convention” (495).  Lessing’s novel stands 
uneasily at the dawn of the age of metafiction and evokes her conflicting impulses: the 
wish to continue to write realism but in a reformed and self-conscious mode.   
Byatt successfully merges realism and experimentation in Possession, and, as a 
defence of realism against poststructuralist nihilism, she places within the fiction an 
authorial commentary which extends the possibilities of realism; thus she stands in the 
mainstream of realism whilst also exploring postmodern alternatives for self-reflexive 
awareness.  Celia Wallhead summarizes her stance as being “at the fore of the impulse to 
reconceptualise realism in the wake of modernist and postmodernist critique.”222  In 
Possession, Byatt continues Nabokov’s critique of New Critics’ attempts to postulate the 
autonomy of a literary text only to superimpose the text with individual meaning.  
Kinbote fails to read the poem and succeeds only in reading himself; he fails to respect 
the integrity of the poet in the same manner as the literary critics do in Possession.  The 
denial of alterity, the difference of another individual, results from a self-serving 
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insistence on personal themes at the expense of the poet: Pale Fire is a prescient novel 
that shows that the author is not quite dead yet, as Roland Barthes would later argue in 
the postmodern turn, but that he is already irrelevant to interpretation.  
The future role of the writer is another theme that preoccupies Lessing and Byatt 
and both engaged with reclaiming authorial presence in their texts.  In this respect, both 
novels show auto/biographical contents on several levels: “The Golden Notebook is a 
portrait of the artist as a woman, in which Anna Wulf is an imaginary self-portrait of 
Lessing, and Anna’s imaginary fiction, Free Women is the imaginary self-portrait of a 
fictional character” (Saunders 498-9).  Whereas Lessing was preoccupied with truth and 
fictiveness, exploring writing styles in various degrees of realism and searching for her 
position as a writer, Byatt breaks the conventions of realism by including her own 
metanarrative comments and those of the twentieth-century characters on the various 
perspectives of criticism.  Both echo a scepticism toward traditional biography.  Saunders 
concludes that Possession “not only creates portraits of its two imaginary Victorian 
authors, but reads their imaginary writings as imaginary self-portraits of their authors, 
while showing their biographer-readers discerning these portraits, and thus furnishing 
their own imaginary self-portraits in the process” (498).  In this sense, Possession focusses 
on the role of interpretation in narrating the past, which shows that Byatt is occupied 
with the act of reinterpretation and profoundly defies “the aesthetic imperative that all 
good fiction now is overtly fictive and about fictiveness” (PM 25).  
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Section 3: Autre-Biography, or Meta-Autobiographiction? J. M. 
Coetzee’s Summertime (2009) 
 
J. M. Coetzee’s earlier novels show his persistent interest in pushing the 
boundaries between fiction and autobiography by introducing Coetzee-like characters 
that allow a return to the metaphysical and moral preoccupations that link Augustine, 
Rousseau, Montaigne and the literature of the double.  Summertime takes the distancing 
of the authorial voice a step further by merging the fictional and the biographical genres 
completely and thereby creating a new sub-genre that Coetzee terms autre-biography.   
 
The postmodern contention that universal statements are inevitably partial and 
relative is imaginatively elaborated in Summertime, which exemplifies the postmodern 
idea that the self is never constituted simply by itself but through its relations with the 
other and through its engagement with the other.  The paradigmatic shift in postmodern 
characterization explores perspectivism from a higher vantage point that presents an 
alter-ego-character as an absence or objectified as a “he” instead of a subject “I”.  
Summertime explores the interchangeable object-subject relation that exists within the 
self (John) and also opposite others who in turn perceive and objectify (John) in a double 
narrative structure: “According to Sartre, it is crucial to distinguish between the other, 
whom I perceive, and the other, who perceives me, that is, it is crucial to distinguish 
between the other as object, and the other as subject.”223  The novel begins and ends 
with diary excerpts of a fictional self perceiving itself in stories that offer a fragmentary 
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portrait of an unnamed writer who is troubled by his conscience and who ends his entries 
with notes to himself.  In the interviews, the subject John stands as a blank surface, an 
object for others, who project their memories onto him and the interviewees remember 
primarily their past selves and secondarily their relations with John.  The accounts written 
down by the unnamed self are juxtaposed with the stories that others tell about him; 
they partly confirm each other in facts, however, they emerge incongruent in regard to 
the different motivations that are applied to the subject.   
The character John comes to stand in for a voiceless, absent being, which can be 
interpreted as an extension of Coetzee’s efforts to excavate some fundamental truth 
about human experience “by searching for ways in which the novel might recover an 
ethical basis, in full appreciation of the political context.”224   The notion of art as critique 
that once characterized modernism becomes again a crucial preoccupation in 
postmodern ultra-realism, which chimes with ethical responsibilities that are elaborated 
in Coetzee’s oeuvre, where he repeatedly generates “a discussion of ethics in fiction or of 
the relationships between ethical and fictional discourses.”225  In this respect, Coetzee 
redefines the possibilities of critique in postmodern terms.  Literature has to fulfill at once 
a social responsibility and an ethical responsibility and Coetzee does this by presenting 
different perspectives: firstly, he embodies ideas in characters and secondly, he 
represents ideas thematically in different contexts.   
The negation of the self in presenting the self as an absence is a radical 
decentring, but it allows the author to start up an epistemological enquiry by recreating 
himself as an imagined other and to construct different characters opposite that other; a 
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writer demonstrates his artistic sensibility by assuming “a negative capability which can 
imaginatively project itself into and inhabit the view of other embodied subjects in the 
world” (Waugh, “Postmodernism” 302).  The writing of oneself as another explores the 
concept of personal identity by investigating the subjectivity of the self, or, what being 
oneself implies and Summertime shows a two-pronged approach on two narrative planes:  
firstly, the diary excerpts explore how a sense of self can be gained through self-
investigation and self-interpretation, according to Charles Taylor’s dictum that “[h]uman 
beings are self-interpreting animals” and it follows that “our interpretation of ourselves 
and our experience is constitutive of what we are, and therefore cannot be considered as 
merely a view on reality.”226   Secondly, the interview section expands on that view and 
shows how the self is seen by others and the subject John is constructed through the 
memories of five interviewees.  Imagined otherness is doubled and gives a double vision 
in which the author imagines truth(s) about himself: how he thinks that he is seen, or, in 
the case of the fictional John, how he is mostly misperceived by others.   
 
Formal Aesthetic in Postmodern Autobiography: Political Engagement 
and Philosophical Critique 
  
Although the formal strategy disrupts the novel’s ontological status and obscures 
the idea of an auto/biographical subject, the author remains as the mastermind behind 
the whole of the book: he controls the time and perspectives that shift from diary 
excerpts, written by a supposedly dead author in the early nineteen-seventies, to the 
recollections of acquaintances about that time.  Their memories appear to be 
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manipulated by individual interests or subsequently altered in form by the interviewer by 
either rewriting them or by translation.  The author distances himself by handing over the 
agency of telling to others, but in effect, he obscures himself to the point where he 
“seems to be saying on the one hand that this is an objective view, but then on the other 
hand that this is a work by Coetzee.”227  Postmodern autobiography has no unified 
subject that can be transparently present to itself through a simple reflective 
consciousness and in consequence, the character John emerges as different selves, 
depending on the different perspectives of five acquaintances and through the textual 
remainder of supposedly authentic diary entries, written by a deceased author with the 
name John Coetzee.  The author depersonalizes himself by assuming that he is dead; he 
therefore literally embodies T.S. Eliot’s idea that “[t]he progress of an artist is a continual 
self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality.”228 The fictional negation of a self 
allows realism to be understood in another way: by embodying ideas in characters and 
inventing situations that exemplify abstract ideas that cannot be simply expressed in 
conventional realism.  
 
Realism as Embodying: “Fictioneering” the Self – The Centrality of 
Narrative 
 
In an interview, Coetzee states that “[a]ll autobiography is storytelling, all writing 
is autobiography” and although autobiographers have “privileged access to information”, 
their capacity for telling the truth is hampered by self-interest that brings about a 
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“selective vision, even a degree of blindness” (DP 391).  Assessing the self in the way of 
direct introspection is open to myopic indulgence and the biographer Vincent suspects 
John Coetzee made up a fiction for himself in his diaries, “for his own eyes, or perhaps for 
posterity” and therefore it contains little truth, which should be excused “because he was 
a fictioneer.”229  Virginia Woolf had already stated that the self is changeable in the flux of 
time and that in thinking about one’s past it is necessary for memory to make scenes that 
order past moments of being from the perspective of the present: “one’s life is not 
confined to one’s body and what one says and does; one is living all the time in relation to 
certain background rods or conceptions” (“A Sketch of the Past” 73).    
Contemporary cognitive neuroscience found evidence for an intimate connection 
between remembering and storytelling: both activities take place in similar neural 
systems and both need language for expression.  But moreover, autobiographical 
memories are mental constructions that change over time, because they are affected by 
processes of reconstruction as well as by reconsolidation.  The mutability of memory in 
combination with the need to give a coherent account in the present, results in the 
confabulation of past events.  The importance of narrative in weaving a story that fits the 
reality of the rememberer is a “key organizational force in autobiographical memory, 
allowing memories to represent the passage of time and the human push towards the 
reaching of personal goals. Memories are told like stories, to others and to oneself.”230 
The importance of personal goals points to the idea of the writer as a public 
intellectual, who has the critical power that can bring into being ideas about the self in a 
personal, social and political context and in this way, the writer reconnects with reality.  
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The alter-ego character John in the diary fragments embodies ideas that amount to a 
subjective account of historical experience in South Africa, but not in the sense of 
traditional realism:   
 
Realism has never been comfortable with ideas. It could not be otherwise: realism is 
premised on the idea that ideas have no separate existence, can exist only in things. So 
when it needs to debate ideas, as here, it is driven to invent situations – walks in the 
countryside, conversations – in which characters give voice to contending ideas and 
thereby in a certain sense embody them. The notion of embodying is cardinal. In these 
debates, ideas do not and indeed cannot float free: they are tied to the speakers by 
whom they are enounced, are generated from the matrix of individual interests out of 
which their speakers act in the world. 231 
 
 
It is the concept of embodiment that fuses realism with postmodern narration, 
but John lacks bodily presence in the memory of others, who describe him as 
disembodied, a “wooden man”, which suggests a clinical picture of a deficit of bodily  
proprioception, a deficiency in coordinating parts of the body; this is even succinctly 
stated by Adriana, observing John trying to dance: “He moved as though his body were a 
horse that he was riding, a horse that did not like its rider and was resisting” (S 183).  But 
Adriana’s family name, Nascimento, also hints at the idea that her scathing 
characterisation of John is a creative act; in her account she is “giving birth”, as her name 
translates, and brings into being a “John” of her own making, which displaces the other 
John, the one who was already there. 
 
The Importance of Subjective Experience in Remembering 
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The interviewee Martin embodies a paradox: he supposedly obtained the teaching 
appointment at the University of Cape Town that J. M. Coetzee held at that time and 
comments on Coetzee as a former departmental colleague, although they first met as 
applicants to be interviewed for the same position.  His reluctance to speak about John’s 
personal relations mirrors John’s “strain of secretiveness that seemed to be engrained in 
him” (S 212).  He also seems to be speaking for the author when he queries the scope of 
only five sources – four of them women, who comment on John’s sexual presence – and  
summarizes that the result will be “an account that is slanted towards the personal and 
the intimate at the expense of the man’s actual achievements as a writer” (S 218).   
Summertime gives a perfectly plausible portrait of the writer in the sense that 
readers’ expectations are reaffirmed, albeit the scale of ridicule enlarges that image out 
of proportion and the self-critical memos to himself pick up on many topics that are then 
retold as stories in the interviews.  For example:  the diary entry of 1 September 1972 
describes the confusion of mistaking cubic metres for square metres (S 7), and this event 
is later retold by Julia in dialogue form:  
  
‘I was out by a factor of six’, he was saying (or maybe it was sixteen, I was only half 
listening). ‘Instead of one ton of sand, six (or sixteen) tons of sand. Instead of one and a 
half tons of gravel, ten tons of gravel. I must have been out of my mind.’ (S 30) 
 
The constant self-deprecation and repetition of failures in exercising practical skills 
and emotional remoteness paint a portrait of interpersonal ineptitude that makes the 
novel an exaggerated mirror of Coetzee’s public image, which some critics have 
disseminated over the years.  Doubts that personal interests obscure the truth are 
everywhere: all interviewees suspect that Mr Vincent’s biographical project is skewed:  it 
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does not engage with the works of the writer and focusses solely on the opinions of 
randomly selected acquaintances.   
 
Meta-Representations and Autobiographical Self-knowledge 
 
In Summertime, the author removes himself from the position of a subject and 
becomes an object that can be analysed and discussed in a sequence of hermeneutic 
conversations in which the subject is reconstructed in a particular way.  By occupying the 
position of others, subjective experience can be articulated through the act of meaning-
making in a narrative structure, a concept that Coetzee subscribed to when he “insisted 
on literature as a specific kind of discourse, distinct from the discourses of history, 
politics, and ethics, or, as he put it, ‘storytelling as another, an other mode of 
thinking.’”232  The structural form of Summertime challenges conventional expectations of 
realism in autobiography; it is a new form of telling the story of the self, which allows for 
new forms of experiential insight.  The episode of interpreting a legal clause, related early 
on in John’s diary, could be read as a metaphorical cue for the idea behind the 
construction of the novel and how it should be read.  When narrative is used to express 
human subjectivity, it does so symbolically and indirectly and this idea goes back to Paul 
Ricœur’s conviction “that metaphorical statements and narrative plots function not for 
their own sake – for the self-celebration of the creative act – but ‘to bring into language 
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an experience, a way of living in and of Being-in-the-world that precedes it and demands 
to be said.’”233 
The widow’s self-interest constructs meaning by focussing on a single aspect and 
she insists that “notwithstanding” can only mean that her demands cannot be refused, 
but in fact she misapprehends the phrase as a whole: “notwithstanding the aforesaid” (S 
11).  Similarly, various ideas about the subject John are patterned throughout the novel, 
but the reference point that emerges in Summertime is not a biological subject, or the 
author J.M. Coetzee, but his ideas about thinking about himself and how he thinks that he 
is thought of from the outside.  Summertime could be said to undertake a 
phenomenological enquiry that is part of philosophical anthropology that attempts 
 
to elucidate the basic constitution of human subjectivity, where the human subject is 
understood as a being whose own being is a matter of self-interpretation. The fact that 
the subject is a self-interpreting being means that it can only be understood through its 
modes of mediation and externalization, rather than in an immediate conscious self-
presence. (Nicholas Smith 23) 
 
 
The writing of the self in the form of an other converts autobiography to a 
different mode of narration that Coetzee termed autrebiography (DP 394). 
Autrebiography involves the conscious fictionalizing of the self, and, to use a term from 
cognitive science and from the philosophy of cognition, it allows the metarepresentation 
of past experiences.  Coetzee attempts to escape his own ego and assumes a position that 
negates the self, which is similar to John Keats’s concept that the literary artist must have 
a negative capability that defines the poetical character as a self that rejects an egotistic 
centre: the poet willingly surrenders himself and thus is able to fill himself with different 
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characters.  Linking the poetic identity-void to the character of a chameleon, Keats writes 
that “[a] Poet is the most unpoetical of any thing in existence; because he has no Identity 
– he is continually in for – and filling some other Body.”234  Summertime meta-represents 
Coetzee’s own as well as other people’s thoughts about himself.  Charles Fernyhough 
writes about novelists and their making of fictional memories that “they are putting 
together many different kinds of information, from the conceptual to the immediately 
experiential and arranging them in a way that meets the needs of the present act of 
storytelling” (274-5). 
 
Postmodern Truth and the Conscience of the Writer 
 
Although the story about the self is inevitably a mixture of historic and poetic 
truth, the difference in genre between novel and autobiography becomes evident in the 
intentionality of the author, in his attempt to convey an authentic impression of reality. 
The articulation of truth in fiction  
 
can be identified or interpreted through a close attention to stylistic and rhetorical 
devices. These devices will betray or carry the signature of the one who means or at least 
the relation of the one who is trying to express the meaning to the meaning one is 
seeking to express. (Uhlmann 751) 
 
Uhlmann’s view of intentionality comes closer to the older notion of sincerity, which does 
not involve so much an adherence to an objective truth but is a subjective expression of 
the truth of the self, a sincere appeal to the metaphysical, which goes beyond the social 
duty of a writer.  Coetzee points to the transcendental aspect in his writing: 
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duty can be of two kinds: it can be an obligation imposed on the writer by society, by the 
soul of the society, by society in its hopes and dreams; or it can be something 
constitutional to the writer, what one might loosely call conscience but what I would 
tentatively prefer to call an imperative, a transcendental imperative. (DP 340) 
 
A writer has a duty to society, but as an individual, he also has a duty to his own 
conscience.  Summertime moves beyond the modernist impasse, the infinite regress of 
reflexive self-consciousness, by writing from the “outside, or perhaps alongside, 
rationality with a particular kind of ethical consciousness, a consciousness that does not 
belong to formal philosophy and that includes a recognition of one’s participation in the 
precariousness of being” (Attwell 37).  Author-identity is the sum of an entire oeuvre, but 
“[t]o deny any relation between creator and creation would be as foolish as to identify 
the two. The reality is, one might say, that they are embedded in one another.”235 The 
textual body provides a reflective stance on life; the art of storytelling gives, what Susan 
Barton in Foe calls, “the substance of the truth.”236 
 
Writing the Self as the Other: Autobiography as Autrebiography 
 
In his first two autobiographical memoirs, J. M. Coetzee reflected on the way in 
which narrative modes and “telling” a story affect the reader.  The uncategorized third-
person voice produced a distance between the writer and the “he” on the page, which 
served “to alienate the author from a self he reluctantly claims as his own while 
simultaneously disrupting our notion of authorial and narratorial verisimilitude in the 
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realm of autobiography.”237  In Boyhood and Youth, the protagonist John appeared to be 
a biographical object rather than an autobiographical subject.  This effect of distancing 
allowed the contemplation of a past self from a higher vantage point by turning the self 
into another, which indicates a “slippage of remembering and imagining, always in the 
service of emotional truths, but from another perspective than one’s own.” (Hustvedt 
111).  The first three interviewees in Summertime give emotional accounts; unanimous in 
their verdict that John was practically, socially and sexually inept. The question-and-
answer sections, which are bracketed by diary excerpts, disturb the genre of 
autobiographical writing and cut through any simple notion of narrative and temporal 
coherence.  Summertime might thus be described as an assemblage of unfinished texts or 
as a fictional biography in the process of becoming.  It stands as a mere collection of raw 
material and in this respect, the novel makes a formal statement through its apparent 
incompleteness in which the autobiographical character is displaced in diary fragments 
and working documents.  The naming of the subject as John Coetzee confuses in its slight 
deviation from the proper name of the author with the effect that autobiographical 
reading is further complicated.  The subject John Coetzee is deliberately set up as a 
postmodern figure that differs from the putative author-self and Thomas Docherty 
explains that the negation of coherent identity in postmodern narrative is an effect of the 
preoccupation with representation in which “character as such is never produced (it 
‘disappears’); rather, we have the seduction of the process of characterization, a scenario 
of seduction which radically involves the confusion of the ontological status of character 
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with that of reader and author.”238  It could therefore be argued that throughout the text 
the subject John makes “a series of ‘appearances’ which do not act as the cover for a 
‘deeper’ reality for it is that very notion of a material or essential reality which 
postmodern characterization denies” (Docherty 64). 
The interview structure of the novel also raises the question of who is authorized 
to speak when the authorial voice is seemingly displaced.  Anthony Uhlmann sees the 
purpose of anachronism in auto/biography as “a deliberate strategy of distorting relations 
with a view to moving as close as possible to an inexpressible ‘higher truth’” (749).  
Summertime can be read as an imaginatively elaborated allegory of the plurality of the 
self, evident in the postmodern contention that universal statements are inevitably 
partial and relative with the effect that the character John emerges as a farcical, almost 
pathological, subject.  Summertime only pretends to be an autobiography and, similarly to 
Pale Fire, the repetition of themes creates a matrix of mirrors that is intrinsically self-
conscious and parodies the literary forms of biography and autobiography.     
Paul Ricœur enquires about the reference of the individual self in relation to itself 
and suggests that “the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree 
that one cannot be thought of without the other, that instead one passes into the 
other.”239  The importance of thinking about oneself as an other, opposite and yet 
engaged with others, is evident in Vincent’s answer to Margot’s question why he wants to 
include so much about her and other family members in a biography about Coetzee: “You 
were part of your cousin. He was part of you. That is plain enough, surely” (S 152).   
But instead of revealing facts that could be taken as a serious autobiography, 
Summertime constructs an eccentric alter-ego figure through the accounts of others, who 
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attribute neurological deficiencies to the fictive John, that are somewhat reminiscent of 
Oliver Sacks’ case studies (The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical 
Tales, 1985).  Women, especially, mistake his intentions and motivations: Julia declares 
that she was offended by John’s proposal to accompany their love-making with 
Schubert’s music and she suggests that he suffers from visual agnosia: “The man who 
mistook his mistress for a violin” (S 83).  Adriana is indignant about John’s suggestion of 
the sublime power of music and cannot understand what it meant “that listening to 
Schubert had taught him one of the great secrets of love” (S 175).  Evidently, the women 
cannot understand the concept behind John’s feelings. 
 
The Truth of the Self: Phenomenology of Self-Reflexive Subjectivity 
 
The central question in autobiography is the nature of the truth of the self, or, 
how one can express some kind of truth of the self in writing. Coetzee supposes that the 
search for the truth about oneself is a salient preoccupation, “because we are born with 
the idea of the truth” (DP 395) and David Attwell explains this idea further by relating it to 
the self-reflexivity of writing: “all writing is autobiographical; but for a novelist the two 
genres cannot be on the same footing: autobiography is secondary to fiction” (DP 3).  
Coetzee’s first two memoirs, Boyhood (1997) and Youth (2002), showed elements of a 
traditional, confessional mode of writing and a return to the tradition of modernist 
writers, evident in repeated allusions to Stephen Dedalus’s phrase “Agenbite of inwit”.  
Joyce’s phrase is also used by the fictional John in Summertime, where it signifies his 
particular ‘prick of consciousness’:  “How to escape the filth: not a new question. An old 
rat-question that will not let go, that leaves its nasty, suppurating wound. Agenbite of 
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inwit” (S 4).  After reading the news about atrocities, committed by South African 
politicians, John initially responds emotionally with “fits of rage and despair” (S 5), but he 
also makes a resolve to do private penance in the hope of fending off his shame: instead 
of using black labourers to concrete an insulation apron around the house, he decides to 
do “his own dirty work” (S 7).  Alas, his good intentions go awry in the miscalculation of 
material and time involved in completing the task.  In his essay “Self-interpreting 
animals”, Charles Taylor claims “that our interpretation of ourselves and our experience is 
constitutive of what we are, and therefore cannot be considered as merely a view on 
reality, separable from reality, nor as an epiphenomenon, which can be by-passed in our 
understanding of reality” (Taylor, Human Agency 47).  John’s failure shows the 
helplessness of an individual response to social problems with insurmountable 
proportions; the simple compassion that he feels towards the subjects of cruelty proves 
to be not only helpless, but also useless and pointless.  The background to that 
experience is given by Martin, the only male interviewee, who embodies another alter-
ego figure of Coetzee: he is a twin in the sense that they “are the same kind of person […] 
both are white South Africans” (S 208).  In their precarious position as legal aliens and 
intruders, both feel guilt in taking part as successors to colonialism: “We were reluctant 
to invest too deeply in the country, since sooner or later our ties to it would have to be 
cut, our investment in it annulled” (S 211).  Cutting his ties with South Africa is precisely 
what J. M. Coetzee did by emigrating to Australia and it seems that Martin is a 
mouthpiece for a larger historical guilt.   
The notion of guilt gets even more complicated in John’s emotional responses to 
the country: although an original feeling of ontological security in childhood was already 
expressed by the narrator in Boyhood, who says “I belong on the farm” (95), this 
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sentiment has changed in the retrospective account of the adult John in Summertime, 
who still feels nostalgic, but is also mourning for something that he has lost: “this place 
wrenches my heart […] It wrenched my heart when I was a child, and I have never been 
right since” (97).  The moral quandary in deciding whether to stay or to leave South Africa 
is metaphorically expressed in the stultified response to the terminally ill father’s need for 
care: “I cannot face the prospect of ministering to you day and night. I am going to 
abandon you. Goodbye. One or the other: there is no third way” (S 266).  John is trapped 
in a moment of choice where he has to accept responsibility or leave with shame: the 
father-figure in the novel stands for South Africa, Coetzee’s “fatherland”.   
Charles Taylor explains that feelings such as shame are irreducible emotions that 
require an irreducible language to name them; they are part of the ethical position of self-
esteem or moral obligation and they define the self as a human subject: “[s]ubject-
referring properties are experience-dependent […] in fact shame is about an aspect of the 
life of the subject qua subject” (Taylor, Human Agency 54).  Language is essential for 
subject-referring emotions to be articulated, “because our sense of dignity, and shame, 
and moral remorse, and so on, are all shaped by language” (Taylor, Human Agency 69).  
Self-interpretation is an ongoing process and essential to human existence, which 
depends on language to constitute emotions, which in turn define the understanding of 
the self: “To say that man is a self-interpreting animal is not just to say that he has some 
compulsive tendency to form reflexive views of himself, but rather that as he is, he is 
always partly constituted by self-interpretation, that is, by his understanding of the 
imports which impinge on him” (Taylor, Human Agency 72). 
The subject of John’s shame is his Afrikaner identity, his belonging to and being 
implicitly involved in a political system that offends his feelings of moral justice.  As a 
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writer, Coetzee articulates his struggle against apartheid obliquely as an internal conflict 
of conscience and overtly in the words of Martin, another white South African, who, 
speaking in the third person plural, includes the fictional John and, by extension, the 
author: “our presence there was legal but illegitimate […] grounded in a crime, namely 
colonial conquest, perpetuated by apartheid” (S 209).  The character of Martin represents 
a political stance that relates to Coetzee’s political consciousness and guilt. 
 
The Truth-revealing Mode of Confessional Fictioneering 
 
Derek Attridge states that for Coetzee “confession is never simple or direct, it is 
always what Derrida calls a circumfession, an avoidance as well as an admission, a staging 
of confession as well as a confessing.”240  The open-endedness of guilt, the ineffectiveness 
of confession, and the impossibility of attaining forgiveness or grace whilst alive, is a 
major theme of Summertime: John recounts in his notebooks a struggle between his 
father’s love of Italian opera and what he calls a teenage obstinacy in preferring Bach.  As 
a youth, he simply thought that his taste in music was superior, but now he understands 
that there is another truth that needs to be confessed:   
 
What has been wrong with him all these years? Why has he not been listening to Verdi, to 
Puccini? Has he been deaf? Or is the truth worse than that: did he, even as a youth, hear 
and recognize perfectly well the call of Tebaldi, and then with tight-lipped primness (“I 
won’t”) refuse to heed it? (S 251) 
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Gillian Dooley regards  this passage as “one of the most amusing passages in 
Summertime: once again using the comic device of a string of rhetorical questions, he 
mocks not only his former intolerant attitude but also his present agony over what that 
attitude might betoken” (111).  Comical on the surface perhaps, but Summertime is filled 
with guilt and shameful memories that are the result of meanness or ignorance towards 
living subjects:  Margot reminds John of his cruel treatment of a locust when they were 
children and he confesses that since that time he has been haunted by shame, although 
he asks every day for “the poor things forgiveness” (S 96), but he knows that he cannot be 
forgiven.    
The figure of the father is a problematic figure in Coetzee’s obliquely 
autobiographical writing where the father becomes a mirror of the son and vice-versa. On 
the last page, the ethical question of love for a parent is stated but not answered and it 
remains questionable whether John’s decision will be based on a guilty conscience or 
compassion.  Guilt as motive would concur with Julia’s critique of John’s filial affection: 
“John did not love his father […] But he did feel guilty and therefore behaved dutifully” (S 
48).  Julia does not explain why he felt guilty, but the final notebook section relates a 
childhood episode when John deliberately destroyed his father’s favourite record, and he 
confesses that “[f]or that mean and petty deed of his he has for the past twenty years felt 
the bitterest remorse, remorse that has not receded with the passage of time but on the 
contrary grown keener” (S 249).  When Julia tells Vincent that her decision to become a 
therapist resulted from her witnessing the suffering of her father in a sanatorium, it is a 
projection of her guilt at having failed her responsibility as a daughter and to her patients; 
as a professional, she wants to “save people from being treated as my father was treated 
there” (S 49).  Guilt about her lack of compassion in relation to her father is also projected 
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in her judgement of John’s relation with his father; she suggests that the sadness of the 
old Mr Coetzee was caused by “that cold fish his elder son”, although she admits that 
“[a]t least he was looking after his father” (S 47).  
 
The Truth of Others: Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity 
 
The salient question to ask is not how much verifiable autobiographical data is set 
against inventions in Summertime; besides, the text foregrounds its own distance from 
any simple correspondence to reality.  The picture of John Coetzee exists only in different 
imaginary worlds, invented by each of the various narrators, who are evidently bent on 
presenting their own selves in a particular light and some truths about themselves 
emerge in their stories.  The continued exploration of the relationship between selfhood, 
self-identity and otherness is at the core of Summertime. The character John is portrayed 
subjectively in the realm of social interaction, where the self is constituted by and 
through the experiences of others.  In this sense, the viewpoints of others displace the 
autobiographical subject, but in return, their opinions allow the author to escape writing 
about himself directly; instead, he is written by others, who misperceive and misinterpret 
the fictional John.   
Charles Taylor writes about the emotional life of man that it “incorporates a sense 
of what is really important to him, of the shape of his aspirations, which asks to be 
understood, and which is never adequately understood” (Human Agency 74).  In 
Summertime, an ethical position of self-esteem is gained through self-interpretation, but 
both positions are susceptible to the risk of provoking “controversy, dispute, rivalry […] 
The adequation of interpretation involves an exercise of judgement which, at best, can 
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aspire to plausibility in the eyes of others” (Ricœur, Oneself as Another 179-80).  The 
postmodern notion of being emerges as a construct out of the continuous dialogical 
relation between the self that is interpreting the self and the self as seen and interpreted 
by others.  Thus, in the narratives of the first three interviewees, John emerges as a 
hopelessly overdeveloped mental specimen, a “homo sapiens sapiens” (S 58), which 
stands for a man capable of thinking about himself, a metaphor for self-knowledge or for 
the human ability to think reflexively, which according to Julia, makes John less human, 
because his idealistic principles deprive him of “his animal self” (S 58).  
 
Postmodern Comedy and Irony  
 
Gillian Dooley says that her initial perception of the novel was that of “an 
unrelievedly grim, self-lacerating work,” which changed after a second reading: “I could 
see moments of humor and even began to wonder whether the whole book were not in 
fact intended as an extended joke directed against all the earnest and humorless readings 
his novels have attracted” (88).  Comic effects are the product of supplanting the voice of 
the author with opinions of people who are perplexed by the suggestion that they played 
significant parts in his life.  None of them cares about Coetzee’s literary career or shares 
Mr. Vincent’s admiration of the artist.  Within the context of the novel, J. M. Coetzee 
repeatedly deprecates the man and his work, which is judged to be lacking in “ambition. 
The control of the elements is too tight” (S 242).  This harsh statement might be an 
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allusion to Harold Bloom’s suggestion, as Coetzee purports, that “Borges would have 
been a greater writer if he had exercised a less iron control over his creative impulse.”241  
The irony is that the tight structure in layers makes Summertime a very ambitious 
novel that only purports to give authority over to fictional characters, who comment on 
incidences and character traits that reflect the self-doubts of an imaginary other in 
fictional diary fragments.  Their stories about John’s inadequacies in different contexts 
effectively back up the negative image, which is then reinforced by John’s self-reflexive 
mirroring of how he feels opposite others: “A gloomy fellow: that must be how the world 
sees him, when it sees him at all. A gloomy fellow; a wet blanket; a stick in the mud” (S 
248).  But every retelling hardens the facts in the mind of readers until the build-up of 
derogatory remarks raises doubt about the truth-value of every statement that is made 
about John, which again, undermines any autobiographical intention.  Instead, a 
composite self emerges out of a synthesis of revised and edited stories.  
The self-lacerating confession of shameful or careless deeds and the unflattering 
assessments of those actions from multiple viewpoints correspond and therefore enforce 
a negative picture that confirms Coetzee’s public image as a loner and loser, which can be 
interpreted as the author’s satirical reply to the body of criticism that tends to focus on 
the personal level instead of engaging with his works.  It confirms negative opinions of 
critics who describe Coetzee as obscure, unsociable and emotionally withdrawn.  In 
portraying John as a young artist-to-be who embodies the preconceptions that circulate 
about the real writer, self-critical autobiography becomes clichéd vaudeville.  That some 
of the interviewees’ memories double back on the diaries entries and expand on them is 
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more than mere repetition; it is characteristic of “the reflexive self-consciousness which 
characterizes all Coetzee’s work” (Introd. DP 3).   
Although Summertime mirrors the recluse image of J. M. Coetzee in the 
testimonies of fictional characters about a fictional John, the author also makes a self-
reflexive protest through Julia’s poignant comment: “I know he had a reputation for being 
dour, but John Coetzee was actually quite funny” (S 63).  Although the character John 
does not come across as funny, the author seems to have fun in playing with the 
transference and countertransference of opinions between Vincent, the interviewees and 
the diary; ultimately, however, the author-figure, and by extension the author, remains 
mysterious and inconclusive, a mere subject-matter for interpretation.  Summertime 
eclipses personal identity and John Rees Moore notes that Coetzee indulges in “the 
delicious irony of writing about his younger self after he is dead.”242  Barthes’s proposition 
of the “Death of the Author” is taken literally and expanded in order to undermine the 
truth-value of Coetzee’s accepted public image.  Beyond the structuralists’ declaration of 
“the death of the Author”, there emerges one of the paradoxes of the postmodernist 
crisis of representation and Summertime is at once a reinvestment in the authorial voice 
and a parody of believing in such a proposition: the premise of the novel is that only the 
notebook sections with additional italicized comments were written by the dead author 
as “memos to himself, written in 1999 or 2000 when he was thinking of adapting those 
particular entries for a book” (S 20).  But ironically, the book in front of the reader is the 
realization of the comments on the page, which Sue Kossew sees as an example of the 
book’s ironic humour, a “teasing self-referentiality (the book we are reading is, of course, 
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the third memoir that never saw the light of day disguised as a partial and perhaps even 
unfinished biography).”243  
 
The Subjective Experience of Remembering: Memories of the Past 
 
In Summertime, Coetzee satirizes the reader’s search for a stable, originating voice 
by structuring the novel in three distinct frames: the outer framework is the dust jacket, 
which states that the book is the third instalment of Coetzee’s memoirs, the narrative 
opens with dated and ends with undated diary fragments that frame the kernel of the five 
interviews.  Uhlmann argues that Summertime shows an original response to the question 
of how the self can tell the truth about the self and that Coetzee opens an unpassable 
path of aporia by using a stylistic device that deliberately distorts by employing “error and 
anachronism as a formal strategy for generating the truth” (748).  The errors made with 
regard to J. M Coetzee’s life are evident in all layers of the book: in Julia’s interview the 
reader learns that the author of Duskland is dead, which confirms the blurb on the dust 
jacket that states that Summertime is “about the late writer John Coetzee.”  When the 
reader learns that the unnamed “he” of the notebook section shares a house with his 
widowed father, the combination of false premises turns the text into a provocative 
thought-experiment with regard to the biography of the real author: firstly, the blatant 
fact is that J. M. Coetzee cannot be dead because he wrote the book, and secondly, in the 
nineteen-seventies, he did not live as a bachelor with his father, but had his own family.  
The displacement of autobiographical data provokes readers to suspect that “many other 
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details, which, in the absence of a detailed biography of Coetzee, readers do not yet have 
access to, are also wrong in small or large part” (Uhlmann 759).  
Because biographical concordances and discordances are mingled in Summertime, 
autobiographical reading is unsettled and “the truth-value of autobiography is doubly 
displaced […]:  firstly, onto Mr. Vincent, the biographer, who is supposedly transcribing 
but also editing the interviews, and, secondly, onto the interviewees whose own 
memories make up the text” (Kossew 17).  It seems that Coetzee denies his readers an 
overt and easily consumable autobiography by pointing to the futility of attempting to 
fully represent a past self that can only be accessed through memory.  Cognitive 
neuroscience engages with a new science of mind and proposes that past experience is 
always encoded in the brain, a perspective that leads to the insight that “memories are 
records of how we have experienced events, not replicas of the events themselves.” 
(Schacter 6).  By extending the work on memory to the formation of the self in time, 
cognitive  neuroscientists have put forward a new conception of autobiography that 
assumes that the autobiographical subject is constructed from fragments of experience 
that change over time.  The interviewees in Summertime retell episodes from their past 
and by remembering the subject John they remember themselves in a “mental time 
travel” that allows the rememberer to re-experience the past (Schacter 17).  Julia remarks 
that her recollections of John cannot be separated from the totality of her experiences of 
that time: “You asked me to give an idea of John as he was in those days, but I can’t give 
you a picture of him alone without any background, otherwise there are things you will 
fail to understand” (S 23).  
Daniel Schacter explains how the self is involved in the working of episodic 
memory: “[i]n order to be experienced as a memory, the retrieved information must be 
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recollected in the context of a particular time and place and with some reference to 
oneself as a participant in the episode” (17).  Julia remembers many details and can even 
quote dialogues that had been passed between herself and others, although she 
recognizes that her memories cannot be a verbatim recollection. Charles Fernyhough 
writes that “memory doesn’t allow for that kind of faithful representation of past events 
[and] vividness does not guarantee authenticity” (275).  Although memories are mutable, 
Julia assures Vincent that her memories have a true meaning, not ultimately true, but 
emotionally true, they are  “true to the spirit” (S 32).  She remembers herself as being 
part of the scenes that she recounts, which  indicates an original perspective, what 
Schacter terms remembering from a “field perspective” (21).  Memory works along “the 
ways in which we think about and analyze the world” which points to the mutability of 
memories in repeated acts of their recall.  
Fernyhough explains that confabulation is necessary not only for the story-teller, 
but also for the memoirist, because memory cannot give a faithful representation of past 
events and therefore “the force of coherence can win over the force of correspondence, 
leading individuals to weave stories that fit their own reality better than they fit the 
reality out there” (273).  Before the interview, Julia read John’s notebook pages, which 
means that she received retrieval cues for her remembering and “successful recall 
depends heavily on the availability of appropriate retrieval cues” (Schacter 63).  It seems 
that Julia edits her memories according to her self-importance, but she also confirms 
almost verbatim John’s account of his calculation mistake in the diary (S 6-7). 
  There is a visibly notable editorial transition in typeset between the part that 
Julia controls to the story of Margot in which Vincent’s agency takes over.  By italicizing 
Margot’s comments, the subject is turned into an object and Margot is reduced to the 
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same level as John: it is significant that Vincent changed the shape from question-and-
answer format to story-telling so that it can read “as an uninterrupted narrative spoken in 
your voice” (S 87). Under the pretense that he has made improvements on her 
recollections, Vincent has not only edited out her direct voice, but has also denied Margot 
the status of a subject, even though he insists that “the she I use is like I but is not I” (S 
89).  By replacing Margot’s original memories with his own confabulation, Margot is 
reduced to an actress in her own memories.  The effect of Vincent’s transformation is not 
only a stylistic change but gives in fact a different point of view, one that produces an 
altered version of Margot’s original recount.  Vincent occupies a position of power for 
representation, which exemplifies Coetzee’s conviction that changes in style affect the 
substance because styles have ethical implications; therefore, “[s]tyle and content are not 
separable” (DP vii).   
 
Confabulation of the Self: The Present Self imagines the Past Self 
 
Autobiographical memory acts as a mirror in which we become others to 
ourselves through the projection of the self to another point in time. “Giambattista Vico 
regarded memory and imagination as part of the same faculty rooted in sense 
perceptions. The imagination, he wrote, is ‘expanded or compounded memory,’ and 
memory, sensation, and imagination are skills of the body” (Hustvedt 176).   Not only the 
author or the author-figure John are fictioneers, but everybody makes up his or her own 
fiction in remembering past incidents from their own vantage-point.  Daniel Schacter 
explains the process of remembering the past: “In order to be experienced as a memory, 
the retrieved information must be recollected in the context of a particular time and 
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place and with some reference to oneself as a participant in the episode” (17).  Julia 
remembers herself as the dominant partner in her affair with John and her confessional 
digressions are motivated by an impulse to explain her feelings of isolation and 
frustration about her role of accommodating hostess for her husband’s business partners 
in the White South African coterie.  Fernyhough explains that “[m]emory narrativises us; 
it turns us into characters in a novel. It makes motives and context matter. What we 
remember is shaped by the people we were then – not just what happened to us, but 
what kind of individuals we were – as well as by the people we are now” (239).  Julia’s 
memories state her boredom at being trapped in a domestic role and her fits of rage after 
learning about the clandestine affair of her husband.  She frankly admits that her memory 
imaginatively reconstructs episodes and she senses a similar impulse in Vincent.  She 
explicitly warns him against appropriating her story to suit his own agenda:  
 
You commit a grave error if you think to yourself that the difference between the two 
stories, the story you wanted to hear and the story you are getting, will be nothing more 
than matter of perspective – that […] by dint of a quick flip, a quick manipulation of 
perspective, followed by some clever editing, you can transform it into a story about John 
and one of the women who passed through his life. (S 43-44)  
 
Julia’s story is permeated with her own emotional valence and the need to show her 
motives in a good light.  Therefore, she has to defend the reasons for her own infidelity, 
which she does by foregrounding her bodily needs: she proudly remembers her sexual 
prowess and the thrill of having relations with two men at the same time: “I was not one of 
his conquests. If anything, he was one of mine […] I fed him lasagne and then I completed 
my conquest of him […] a woman at the peak of her womanly powers, living a heightened 
sexual life” (S 35-6, 37, 43).  Her view of sexual conduct at that time was highly 
competitive, a bodily challenge in “a contest, a variety of wrestling in which you do your 
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best to subject your opponent to your erotic will” (S 52).  In portraying herself as an expert 
in sexual matters, she hints at her obsession with sexual dominance, which she makes 
explicit: “my verdict on John Coetzee, after seven nights of testing, was that he was not in 
my league, not as I was then” (S 52).  Remembering her sexual self as a supreme sports 
buddy, sex with John was a disappointment, “I never had the feeling that he was with me, 
me in all my reality” (S 52).  On the one hand, she likens John’s love-making to an autistic 
automaton, on the other hand, she plays down her own emotional investment, admitting 
that she was self-centred, focussing merely on the “erotic” (S 59).  Her self-esteem was 
built on her ability to attract men, but her preference for vigorous physicality also shows 
undertones of a predilection for violence and exhibitionism that her husband fulfilled, but 
not her lover John, which becomes explicit in her pejorative judgement of John’s 
gentleness, “he was going to block cruel and violent impulses in every arena of his life – 
including his love life, I might say” (S 58).  Her memories show bitterness and are clouded 
by disappointment about the break-up of her marriage and John’s final refusal to become 
her “Prince Charming” (S 83).  Fernyhough writes that in the story we tell ourselves, 
“confabulations serve the needs of the self. […] Memory wants to be true to the way things 
are, but it also wants to tell a story that suits the teller.” (186).  
  
Intertextuality, Literary Tradition and the Value of Literature 
 
Summertime has a structural conception of the work as a whole in which the 
different planes of narrative mirror each other: the writer of the diary appears to be the 
same John who is talked about in interviews and both characters are connected by a 
pattern of interlacing themes.  Intertextual references foreground that for a writer the 
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memory of texts exert an influence on the present; what has been read becomes part of 
the self, which inevitably influences the work; in Summertime, John’s identity emerges as 
a text, as a confabulation depending on intersubjective meaning-making: John states that 
the character of Jacobus Coetzee in Duskland was modeled on a real illiterate ancestor 
and Julia observes that he quoted Nietzsche.  Although Julia studied German literature, 
which she derogatorily judges a waste of time, “a preparation for my life as housewife 
and mother” (S 57), she fails to pick up the teasing in John’s reply that spells out the 
anachronism of a nineteenth-century philosopher being quoted in the eighteenth 
century: “’Well, they were surprising fellows, those eighteenth-century frontiersmen. You 
never knew what they would come up with next’” (S 56).  Furthermore, what Julia really 
fails to understand is that the character Jacobus is a fictional creation, a confabulation 
built out of historical facts and textual knowledge. The life of a writer is always 
constituted in relation to his literary precursors and Coetzee subverts all the opinionated 
voices by making erudite intertextual references that betray his thinking presence: after 
Julia has introduced herself, John cites a line from Upon Julia’s Clothes by the 
seventeenth-century poet Robert Herrick which she does not understand (S 33).  Margot 
is baffled by her cousin’s seemingly nonsensical utterance, which is a citation from Lucky’s 
soliloquy, taken from Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, (S 112), and is confused by his 
invocation of “Kaggen […] The mantis god. He has lost her” (S 96).  Although John appears 
emotionally withdrawn, even autistic, the intertextual remarks defend his position as an 
intellectual writer.  They foreground the way that a writer thinks of himself as constituted 
by and being part of a literary tradition such that literature is as real to the mind as any 
experience, because it is part of a “semantic memory, which contains conceptual and 
factual knowledge” (Schacter 17).   
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The interviewees are preoccupied with their own history and they reveal  more 
about their own past than about John, which makes it seem unlikely that the novel was 
written, like Wordsworth’s The Prelude, in the mode of autobiography, “in which the 
dead man speaks to us, addressing us, as it were, from his own tombstone” (Anderson 
13).  The blurb on the cover makes the anachronistic premise that the author of the book 
is already dead, and in this light, it seems that Summertime: Scenes from Provincial Life at 
once caricatures and confirms Derrida’s redefinition of “autobiography as ‘thanatography’ 
(thanatos gk: death), a writing not of a living but a dead author […] since the name with 
which one signs will always outlive the bearer of that name.” (Anderson 81).  The John in 
the diary ponders if “[t]he slabs he is laying will outlast his tenancy of the house, may 
even outlast his spell on earth; in which case he will in a certain sense have cheated 
death” (S 7).  There is a noticeable change from the John in the diary to Julia’s story, 
where John states that a book is a writer’s “bid for immortality”, because it survives 
“beyond one’s physical demise” (S 61).  Hoping that his name as the author of Dusklands 
will live on as  part of a literary canon shows confidence about the value of books in 
general, because even people of the future “will still like to read books that are well 
written” (S 62).  Literature has its own value and transcends time but is detached from its 
originator, as  Jorge Luis Borges wrote in his self-reflexive essay “Borges and I”: good 
writing “belongs to no one, not even to him, [that is not even to my other] but rather to 
the language and to tradition.”244  
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Section 4: Trajectory from Narrative Self to Experiential Self and the 
Condition of Inauthenticity: Tom McCarthy’s Remainder (2005) 
 
The Condition of Inauthenticity 
The need to establish the unity of a personal Identity through autobiographical 
narratives has a long philosophical tradition that interprets actions and events of the past 
and gathers them into a coherent story.  The narrative model emphasizes the temporal 
dimension of selfhood, based on the hypothesis that memory is the locus of the self and it 
follows that “[i]f I were unable to form memories of my life history, or were unable to 
access such memories, then I have nothing to interpret, nothing to narrate sufficient for 
the formation of self-identity.”245  Ironically, the narrator in Remainder attempts a reverse 
path to authenticity by reclaiming or reconstructing memories in order to build up an 
autobiographical self in the hope to regain an unadulterated feeling of being alive.  
Narrative certainly plays an important role, but there are other elements in the 
on-going flow of experiencing being and having a self, and indeed, “there are limits to the 
kind of understanding of self and others that narratives can provide.” (Zahavi in Narrative 
and Understanding Persons, 201).  The phenomenological dimension of the self takes into 
account the world in which the perceiver is situated, which is closer to the Husserlian 
notion of an ego that “constitutes itself for itself in the unity of a (his)story [Geschichte]’” 
(Zahavi 181).  The “itself for itself” points to the experience of the self as a conscious 
embodied agent for whom the body is at once subject and object: the feeling body is also 
a body that is felt and is therefore constitutive for human experience.  Certainly, there is 
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an interrelationship between the self in time, the “autobiographic self or extended self” 
and its store of autobiographical memories, but the self also has biological roots in 
consciousness on a minimal level that entails a more primitive and fundamental notion of 
a “core self.”246  In Remainder, the narrator calls the feeling of having a presence to 
oneself, “the background noise we all have in our head that stops us from forgetting 
we’re alive”247; it is the feeling of existence that he has lost.  Antonio Damasio claims that 
the experiential structure of human perception is grounded in the feeling body that is 
aware of itself, it is “our own perception of our own being, at any given moment” (256).  
Mark Johnson firmly situates the mind in the body and postulates: “What could be more 
self-evident than the fact that the human mind is intrinsically incarnate?” (46).  Bodies are 
physical substances, extended in space and time, and Cartesian dualism should give way 
to the representation of mind as inexorably connected to body.  The tradition of seeing 
the self as connected to a representation of the body has a long tradition in 
phenomenological and existentialist philosophers such as Nietzsche, William James, 
Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, or the analytical psychologist Carl Jung, 
who regarded “psychic phenomena as largely dependent on the body. Somewhere the 
psyche is living body, and the living body is animated matter; somehow and somewhere 
there is an undiscoverable unity of psyche and body.”248   
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A New “Age of Authenticity”? 249 
The narrator is obsessed with matter and material remainders that he regards as 
clues which constitute the remnants and signifiers of genuine authentic experiences: for 
the recreation of a shooting scene he uses a drop of his own blood on a scaled street 
model as a marker for the spilt blood to signify that events “must leave some kind of 
mark” (R 185).  The close alliance between art and life is made visible in an analogy of 
structure between the two subjects: the blood on the street is represented by the 
fingerprint of blood on a model, an aesthetic self-enhancement that stands as a paradigm 
for the post-postmodern project of reconstituting an authentic self through acts of 
imaginative remembering.   
Bodily experiences as embodied schemata manipulate abstract structure in 
mental space where “understanding is an evolving process or activity in which image 
schemata (as organizing structures) partially order and form our experience and are 
modified by their embodiment in concrete experiences” (Johnson 30).  Imagination links 
cognitive and bodily structures in patterns and Merleau-Ponty explains the affective 
relation of the body to “the fabric of the visible and world”, where sensation aims to 
grasp “the nature of ‘sensory matter’, the ‘sensible for itself’, (sensible pour soi), the 
world which is made up of the same stuff that I am. I experience ‘a segment of the 
durable flesh of the world.’”250  Putting a blood-red fingerprint on cardboard gives the 
narrator the closest phenomenological experience to the puddle of blood that was left on 
the street after a shooting.  Remainder critiques models of authenticity by investigating 
the value of the authentic as the cornerstone of subjectivity and challenges reductionist 
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or exclusive biological, phenomenological and cognitive constructions of identity by 
pointing out that aesthetic concepts form and constitute an irreducible part of the human 
condition:   
 
The narrator's conscious and painstaking self-recreation does not negate the possibility of 
an inner core, nor does it illegitimize the profundity of his epiphanies of belonging, but it 
does imply that the path to authenticity for the postdeconstructive and posttraumatic 
subject involves the intricate micromanagement of the aestheticized object of the self.251  
 
 
 
Proust’s aesthetics of perception accounts for modernity’s visual sense of speed; 
he invented “a new way of treating time and situating oneself in space”, which put “a 
new distance between us and things” (Ortega y Gasset 505, 507).  Modernist aestheticism 
explored the plurality of perspectives and the changing internal experience of the self as 
situated in space and time, which has its post-postmodern equivalent in Remainder’s 
foregrounding of materiality where the need to collapse the distance between the self 
and the object world speaks of the need to find an immanence of an imaginary 
attachment by mimicking the blood-stained street surface on a miniature copy.  But the 
narrator’s experiments with compacting the space between self and the material world 
fail repeatedly; in the above instance, the giant blood print is on the wrong scale, “legible 
only from above, a landing field for elevated, more enlightened beings” (R 186).   
The traumatized narrator suffers from an altered state of perception in which the 
lost sense of unity between body and mind leads to feelings of insufficiency.  In this 
respect, he is more than a novelistic character, but a prototype for the ultimate sovereign 
individual who is only governed by projects of self-realization and the novel shows the 
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fundamental transformation in the way postmodern subjectivity can be understood in the 
context of contemporary neo-corporatism and the economic and social pressures on 
individuals living under its sway.   
Remainder, however, is not so much concerned with a postmodern textual 
hermeneutics, but more with the investigation of the material and immaterial realms, 
where the mind constructs patterns that transubstantiate into matter like prints that can 
be captured by pouring plaster into a mould that turns “space hollowed out by action into 
solid matter” (R 175).  Remainder’s obsessive reconstruction of dislocated memory offers 
patterns of meaning which inspire the reader to expand on these patterns and to 
extrapolate meaning, to reflect on the pervasive spatial dimension that gestures beyond 
the postmodern fascination with fiction and simulacra.  The novel is much concerned with 
the physicality of the world that clashes with idealism; it shows a world in which material 
objects obstinately resist conforming to the concepts that the mind constructs and where 
physical events can “speak about the thing itself and not just ideas about the thing”, a 
new form of realism that indicates that "matter matter[s]."252  The unnamed narrator 
resembles a tragicomic Beckettian character, who is obsessed with endless mechanical 
reproduction, which goes back to the tradition of the Theatre of the Absurd where 
Krapp’s life is reduced to a series of independent details, fixed on physical remainders, 
but the tapes that he replays sporadically have become devoid of personal significance 
over the years of his life.  In contrast to Krapp’s chronic disillusionment with his recorded 
memory, Remainder’s narrator becomes emotionally attached to the only specific 
memory he still possesses, a moment that is “defined through a collection of sounds, 
images, smells and other sensations, […] then played out indefinitely, as an ongoing 
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reconstruction. Memory, in this case, is not just a product of the past, but also a singular, 
defining narrative of the present.”253    
There is no evidence that would suggest that what the protagonist is attempting 
to reconstruct has actually happened.  The project of remembering can be linked to 
imagining which, according to Husserl, is “a special way of making objects present”, but 
imagination should recognise the absence of the object and Sartre specifies the 
dichotomy that underlies reality and the mental act: “the imagined object is rather 
limited, never fully itself, possessing an ‘essential poverty’” that is to say “we find in the 
image only what we have put there” (Morat 381, 382).  Against these somewhat 
disparaging accounts regarding the usefulness of imagination, Johnson posits the 
phenomenological valence of embodied imagination in image-schematic experiential 
structures that he regards as central and indispensable for human meaning and 
rationality: “there is the functioning of preconceptually meaningful structures of 
experience, schematic patterns, and figurative projections by which our experience 
achieves meaningful organization and connection, such that we can both comprehend 
and reason about it” (Johnson 17).  The brain works not only through a merely passive 
reflection on external influences but engages in process of organizing and, for the 
narrator, in painful re-programming.  The recovery of fluent bodily experiences  demands 
a self-steering effort in imaginatively breaking down the sequence of movement and 
anticipatory  imagining: “picturing yourself lifting the carrot to your mouth, again and 
again and again, [which] cuts circuits through your brain that will eventually allow you to 
perform the act itself” (R 20). 
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Remainder’s narrator believes that imagination can order the chaos of the world 
in meaningful repetitive patterns, but during his last journey he comes to realize that all 
matter is bound to move towards exhaustion and death:  at some point in time, the world 
will ultimately cease to exist.  The frenzied image of a plane looping without end or, at 
least until the fuel runs out, gives a final image of imaginatively structured wholeness, 
only to become “undercut, as is every other example in the text, with the failure of 
transcendence and a pained scepticism toward the possibility of authenticity as anything 
other than a momentary appearance of self-coherence” (Lea 469).  The impossibility of 
recovery at the threshold of death marks the significance of the moment and the novel 
ends in a postmodern non-teleological aesthetic imaginary:  “Eventually the sun would 
set forever – burn out, pop, extinguish – and the universe would run down like a Fisher 
Price toy whose spring has unwound to its very end. Then there’d be no more music, no 
more loops” (R 284).  As death is imminent, the attainment of authenticity seems to 
become “a genuine possibility. Yet this death is itself doomed to fail, the act of ‘falling 
from the sky’, if indeed it occurs, closing the loop of the text and resetting the character’s 
situation to where he was at the start of the novel” (Jim Byatt 257). 
 
Failed Transcendence 
The story of a brain damaged trauma victim, who has a pathological compulsion to 
repeat remembered or imagined scenes, theatricalizes memory to reveal that there are 
several conceptual levels of existence that seem to violate each other:  the various 
phenomenal, existential and metaphysical dimensions of human consciousness never 
quite make up a unifying whole.  According to Tom McCarthy, the novel is “about history 
and time, simulation, questions of authenticity and, by extension, of our whole state of 
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being-in-the-world […] the world's state of being-in-the-universe as well: the world, 
matter, this shard left over from some unnameably violent disaster - a remainder.”254     
McCarthy says elsewhere that at the core of the novel is “the experience of failed 
transcendence.”  The narrator’s desire to accommodate the idea of subjectivity as self-
identical and/or as a self-fashioned is shown as a failed project:    
 
Where the inherence of biological authenticity fails the test of its own interiority, so self-
posited authenticity fails the test of artistic transcendence. And yet neither is dismissed 
by the novel as a fantasy; indeed, both are presented as somehow irreducibly part of the 
human condition, without which the concept of subjectivity is fatally impoverished. (Lea 
469) 
 
McCarthy shows the difficulty in our accepting that existence is seemingly 
meaningless in the narrator’s persistence in trying to transcend the physical and temporal 
limits of the body in some form or other.  Yet the need to overcome the human condition 
by accepting its limitedness and finiteness is a notion which comes close to Simon 
Critchley’s disillusionment with meaning and interpretation, which leaves a fascination for 
“the sheer mereness of things. In other words, when we learn to shake off the delusions 
of meaning and achieve meaninglessness, then we might see that things merely are and 
we are things too.”255  To ascribe to the basic meaninglessness of life seems to be a 
safeguard against transcendence theories which, according to Simon Critchley, are just 
“competing narratives of redemption” (Critchley 32).  
Much of the comic irony in Remainder comes from the narrator’s belief that the 
wholeness of his former existence can be restored through the financial compensation 
received for an unspecified accident and the story proceeds as an allegory of neo-
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corporatism, where existence becomes a project that is mediated and aesthetically 
manipulated through professionals, who facilitate obsessive and amoral re-enactments.  
The narrator’s depression increases in the same measure as his projects of self-realization 
become unmanageable and frustrating; all re-enactments turn out to be comically stained 
by materiality and contingency. 
The first project of materializing emotionally affective memories in an imaginary 
space with scenes that the protagonist can inhabit turns out to be ineffective: the 
external world invades when the smell of cordite prevails and the cats fall off the roof.  
Then, his obsessive reconstruction extends from the remembered past to newly acquired 
memories: the second project restages scenes from a tyre shop, but the evaporation of 
the car’s washer fluid fails to become a miraculous transubstantiation of matter.   
In his next project, the narrator attempts to merge with matter that surrounds his body 
by lying on the ground, which leaves him in a stupor for days.  Remainder's terminal 
movement from re-enactment to real event in the climactic bank heist actually affects 
reality: when a re-enactor misses his studied trip over a carpet edge, the fictional 
enactment impinges on reality and results in the death of a man.   
 
Materializing Memories  
Patricia Waugh states in her essay “The Naturalistic Turn, the Syndrome, and the 
Rise of the Neo-Phenomenological Novel” that the rediscovery of the felt body as a 
crucial medium and vehicle of personal life led to a significant revival of phenomenology 
in philosophy and she argues further that contemporary fiction shows a strong affinity 
with phenomenological philosophy.  This current movement towards embodied, 
embedded, extended and enactive approaches in philosophy of mind and cognitive 
300 
 
science has emerged out of the growing dissatisfaction with medical materialism and the 
neurobiological treatment of mind and culture.  Neo-phenomenology is concerned with a 
more inclusive perspective on human experience and seeks to explain the corporeal 
communication between the body and the world of experiences with the aim to regain an 
undistorted access to the phenomena of lived human experience.  In the contemporary 
novel of mental alienation and suffering in a bio-medical age the literary and the 
phenomenological come self-consciously together.  McCarthy’s novel extrapolates the 
materialist philosophy of the self as reduced to the property of the brain and its neural 
networks that orchestrates the confabulation of the real as memory, dream and 
perception.  
In order to compensate for the loss of his bodily and affective attunement to the 
world and in the hope to gain access to the content of his lost autobiographical self, the 
narrator decides to control his reality by physically bringing into being what he can 
remember from his past.  According to Merleau-Ponty there is always a disturbance in the 
network of relations between time, memory and the self:   
 
our temporal existence is both a condition for and an obstacle to our self-comprehension. 
Temporality contains an internal fracture that permits us to return to our past 
experiences in order to investigate them reflectively, yet this very fracture also prevents 
us from fully coinciding with ourselves. There will always remain a difference between the 
lived and the understood.256  
 
The staged scenarios might be a delusion or a confabulation built on remainders 
from his previous life, but they come together in a meaningful structure of embodied 
patterns, which “operate as organizing structures of our experience and understanding at 
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the level of bodily perception and movement” (Johnson, BM 20).  The ability to 
manipulate abstract structure in mental space becomes even more salient in subsequent 
projects that are determined to turn reality into a series of stylized events by breaking 
physical reality into its constituent parts of time and space as a purely phenomenological 
experience.  The temporal extension of movements tend towards stasis: “My two 
assassins took their time in killing me. The slowed-down pace at which they raised and 
fired their guns, the lack of concern or interest this seemed to imply, the total absence on 
my part of any attempt to escape although I had plenty of time to do so –all these made 
our actions passive. We weren’t doing them: they were being done” (R 199-200).   
The logic of Remainder’s re-enactments is specifically cinematic in that they depend on 
the temporal reversibility and manipulation of time.  The rewinding and slowing down of 
movements fragments the event to such an extent that the narrator at the core of the 
action can participate in their impersonal unreality.   
On the other hand, a road surface is perceived minutely and full of detail: “There’s 
too much here, too much to process, just too much” (R 188).  It seems as if the narrator is 
overwhelmed by the density of information that exceeds his mind’s ability to deal with it.  
The complexity of reality seems to have become unmanageable and the narrator seeks to 
control the physical impact by analytically breaking down time.  The breaking of physical 
movements into their component parts and slowing them down is a specific post-
postmodern aesthetic that “forces us to recognize space as a nonneutral thing – unlike 
Realism, which ignores the specificities of space” (Zadie Smith).  The slowing down of time 
and the extension of space explodes the structure into an infinite number of perceptions, 
images and events that the narrator hopes to understand as fragments that will come 
together in a whole.  Since his accident, a sense of unreality had prevailed, which could be 
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taken as a sign of contemporary depression in which symptoms are manifested in “the 
slowing of the movements of both body and mind” (Ehrenberg 166).   
Ironically, the narrator takes the slowing down of time and spatial expansion 
literally, so that he can encounter objects perspectivally in an almost meta-ethical way: 
“I felt a huge wave of sadness for the three men who’d been killed, and an even greater 
one at not having managed, in my re-enactments, to fill the instant of their death with 
so much space that it retrieved them, kinked them back to life. Impossible, I know, but I 
still felt responsible, and sad” (R 221-2).   Ehrenberg writes that “Depression is a 
pathology of time (the depressed person has no future) and a pathology of motivation 
(the depressed person has no energy, his movement is slowed, his words slurred)” 
(Ehrenberg 233). 
 
Nostalgia for a Lost Self and the Authenticating Feeling of Remembering  
The narrator mourns the loss of the most concrete and particular core of 
subjectivity: the existential feeling of being unselfconsciously or pre-reflectively embodied 
in a fluent, unrehearsed, and therefore authentic way, “what phenomenologists call the 
sense of ipseity, which is a pre-reflective (proprioceptive), ecological sense of self” 
(Gallagher in Narrative and Understanding Persons 207).  The cognitive impairment after 
suffering traumatic brain injuries makes it difficult for some people to remember “what 
they were or were not capable of, and they compared their present status to their pre-
injury status while mourning their ‘lost’ past self.”257   
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Ipseity or selfhood is the basic phenomenal self-consciousness.  Jean-Paul Sartre 
argues “that consciousness is at bottom characterized by a fundamental self-givenness or 
self-referentiality” (Zahavi 187).  Shaun Gallagher argues that selfhood is not only 
constituted as narrative, but that there is also the phenomenological concept of the 
minimal sense of self; an immediate and present self that not only retains experiences, 
but knows about itself experiencing and therefore, “Ipseity is the sense that this 
experience is my experience” (Narrative and Understanding Persons 208, emphasis 
added).  In a parody of Cartesian Dualism, the narrator laments that he cannot 
understand how the body is supposed to function after the accident as he describes the 
struggle to retrain his motor system: “each movement: I had to learn them all. I had to 
understand how they work first, break them down into each constituent part, then 
execute them” (R 21).  The necessity for conceptualizing actions before they can be 
transformed into physical acts underscores the Cartesian belief that the workings of the 
mind govern the body.  Antonio Damasio talks about a “background feeling because it 
originates in ‘background’ body states rather than in emotional states […] a minimalist in 
tone and beat, the feeling of life itself, the sense of being.” (Descartes’ Error 150).  For the 
narrator, the detached body has become a screen between the self and the world, which 
is a loss of his primary way of being-in-the-world, the authenticity of feeling. 
Although after the accident some autobiographical memories eventually return, 
they come back in a cinematic quality of “instalments, like back episodes of some 
mundane soap opera” (R 6).  Even though mobility is regained, the narrator perceives his 
own movements as unnatural and inauthentic and ironically, movie actors come to 
embody the authentic ideal: Robert De Niro was perfect because “he seemed to execute 
the action perfectly, to live it, to merge with it until he was it and it was him and there 
304 
 
was nothing in between” (R 23).  Daniel Lea explains that contemporary society longs for 
genuine and unvarnished experiences as part of the “New Realism” movement in art and 
life: in “the second decade of the twenty-first century, the reemergence of authenticity as 
an ethical marker of contemporary subjectivity is gaining significant traction” (Lea 459).  
Authenticity is equated with minimum distance that allows one to live in an 
undifferentiated pure presence that is not conscious of itself, which is the motivation for 
the narrator to materialize his memories so that he could “merge […] with them, run 
through them and let them run through me until there’d been no space between us. 
They’d been real; I’d been real – been without first understanding how to try to be: cut 
out the detour” (R 62).    
In Remainder, the representation of this selfhood is a symptom of and stands in 
for a poststructuralist allegory of neo-corporatism: the settlement is large enough to fund 
a project which can build more than a static locale that simply looks like what he 
remembers, but attempts to recreate an entire slice of lost life, complete with people 
who inhabit the scenery, as if they too were part of a movie-set turned real.  Whereas the 
taste and smell of tea and cake gave Proust’s Marcel access to buried memories through a 
sensation in the present, the narrator has a visual experience through a pattern of colours 
and lines on the wall that gives him access to what his body remembers.  He experiences 
his self in the setting, “how all this had felt […] in these spaces, all my movements had 
been fluent and unforced. Not awkward, acquired, second-hand, but natural” (R 62).  The 
present and the past merge in a single moment of déjà vu, which gives “both an illusory 
sense of the repetition of a previous experience and an actual repetition, a simultaneous 
reliving of that which both does and does not precede it” (Nicholas Royle in Jim Byatt 
255).   
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Gallagher writes about the pathological disruption in the sense of self where 
something “goes wrong at the metacognitival level and problems with ipseity are 
generated in the resulting narrative” (Narrative and Understanding Persons 223).  Like the 
schizoid character Kinbote in Pale Fire, the narrator hopes to appropriate an aestheticized 
reality for the substantiation of what he remembers or imagines about a particular 
environment, which to him, seems to be the locus of selfhood, the confirmation of his 
being, “by forging fragile human intimacies with it.”258  The building with its surrounding 
aims to exteriorize the remainders from his memory in toto, to improve on his state after 
the accident, which had been “a blank: a white slate, a black hole” (R 5).  No wonder that 
the building resembles a design set for movies with partial décor with “loads of neutral 
space – after all, you only have to make the bit the camera sees look real; the rest you 
leave unpainted, without detail, blank” (R 114).  Through the reproduction of memory in 
matter, the narrator struggles to articulate himself as anything other than a mechanical 
reproduction. 
 
Postmodern Anxiety of Inauthenticity: Creating Reality through Simulations  
McCarthy portrays the postmodern anxiety of inauthenticity, the feeling of the 
loss of selfhood that reduces the world to “an aesthetic environment where to be oneself 
is to be an imitation of others” (Lea 460).  The narrator is a depressed individual with an 
acute sense of his inability to measure up and has a hyperawareness of appearing as a 
second-rate model.  The idea of being and living as a degenerated reproduction is a 
reference to Plato’s philosophy that relegates art to an ontological reality – three steps 
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removed from the ideal form.  The postmodern conception of art sees reproductions as 
parody, and the self-consciously faked as a response to the exhaustion of representation.  
The portrayal of the self as an artistic self-construction becomes an “explicit value 
judgement in the second-rate-ness of inauthenticity [which] implies McCarthy's 
discomfort with postmodernism's ludic self-reflexivity, and his confidence in a core that 
renders matters [sic] "fundamental" suggests [that he is] writing back to older traditions 
of phenomenology” (Lea 465). 
The novel is much concerned with the opposition between form and matter: in 
Platonic philosophy, matter is imperfection or inauthentic: it calls for forms that 
transcend it through a conceptual or spiritual striving.  Remainder emphasizes matter and 
what it means subjectively:  only the extra free coffee that comes after the sequence of 
paid cups is worth having, as the narrator tries to communicate to the coffee shop 
assistant: "'You can strip the other eight away. The other nine, I mean. It's only the 
remaining one I want. The extra one'" (R 269).  Repetition is the locus of inauthenticity 
and the on-going repetition of a repetition induces a waning of affect; the narrator wants 
to get out of the mise en abyme of inauthenticity by insisting on the cup outside the 
pattern, which, ironically is in no respect different in form or substance to the coffees he 
could have had before.  The extra cup that comes gratuitously stands symbolically outside 
the circle of stamped loyalty cards and the mechanism of repetition.  Economically, the 
logic of getting something for free is false, and in this respect, the novel caricatures the 
culture of neo-corporatism with customer cards that entice a repetitive experience of 
standardized consuming in ubiquitous franchised businesses.  For the narrator, the 
circuitry of coffee cards promises a never ending experience of completing a circle, an 
ending that is followed immediately by a new beginning: “if I got all ten of its cups 
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stamped then I’d get an extra cup – plus a new card with ten more cups on it. The idea 
excited me: clocking the counter, going right round through the zero, starting again” (R 
49).  The picture of a full circle points to a mocking version of redemption, the possibility 
of eternal life in the loop of consumerism that becomes an end in itself.  
In the absence of emotion and empathy for an African development project, the 
narrator imagines Africans and their continent as an abstraction from a higher-level when 
he tries “to visualize a grid around the earth, a kind of ribbed wire cage like on the 
champagne bottle, with lines of latitude and longitude that ran all over, linking one place 
to another, weaving the whole terrain into one smooth, articulated network” (R 35-6).   
In the afterlife of modernism, media and information technology’s promise to overcome 
insularity through globalization was at first valued positively as a welcomed mechanical 
extension of human faculties.  The narrator in Remainder explores the fantasy of total and 
seamless connectivity in which the grid is a metaphor for the postmodern dystopian 
infrastructure: “I looked down at the interlocking, hemmed-in fields, and had a vision of 
the whole world’s surface cordoned off, demarcated, broken into grids in which self-
duplicating patterns endlessly repeated” (R 282).  In McCarthy’s view, the postmodern 
self sees itself as part of the universal, it “is ‘not a self, but a network’ of transmissions” 
(quoted in Nieland, 580). 
 
The Doubling of Reality in Simulations  
The re-enactment of a bank heist, which is again meticulously rehearsed ad 
nauseam in a warehouse, does not differ in its procedure from all the re-enactments that 
went on before, but it still shows “obsessions with walls and structures, with systems and 
fantasies, and above all with repetition and reproducibility serving as persistent 
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reminders of the protagonist’s dependence upon the artificial, a dependence which 
suggests a terminal departure from the real, authentic world.” (Jim Byatt 247).  But the 
narrator also realizes that there is a possibility for this particular re-enactment to become 
a pre-enactment, a marker that promises the merging of art and reality by 
    
lifting the re-enactment out of its demarcated zone and slotting it back into the world, 
into an actual bank whose staff didn’t know it was a re-enactment: that would return my 
motions and my gestures to ground zero and hour zero, to the point at which the re-
enactment merged with the event. It would let me penetrate and live inside the core, be 
seamless, perfect, real. (R 244-5) 
 
Remainder’s movement from re-enactment to real event exemplifies Baudrillard’s theory 
that a faked hold up effaces the borders between simulation and reality and that a 
simulation can actually interfere “with the very principle of reality.”259  Baudrillard 
emphasizes that a faked hold up provokes a confrontation with the real by infiltrating 
reality with simulacra where reality takes over: “such a simulated hold up cannot avoid 
leaking into the realm of the real, as there can be no objective difference between a real 
and a simulated hold up.”260  As a variation on Baudrillard’s possible scenarios, Remainder 
underlines not the merging but the doubling of reality, which produces a material 
remainder that connects back to the “reality” of the re-enactment.  Pieter Vermeulen 
explains:  
 
[T]he simulation does not fail when it is confronted with the real, or even with the 
resistance of something substantial, but rather when the friction between the real 
simulation and the rehearsals for this simulation produce a material remainder. In the 
rehearsals, one of the reenactors always trips on a "kink in the carpet"; in the real 
reenactment of these rehearsals, there is no such kink, and as the "half-trip" has become 
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"instinctive, second nature" for the actor, he falls over when he fails to encounter the kink 
he had anticipated (267). The actor falls against another actor, and the clash sets off the 
latter's gun, which kills a third actor. The novel here offers another instance of its 
signature logic; a residue is generated through the friction generated by an attempt to 
cancel one reality by the imposition of another. The simulation generates real-world 
effects "Thanks to the ghost kink, mainly—the kink the other kink left when we took it 
away" (273). Even if the friction between the rehearsals and the reenactment is nothing 
substantial (such as a real, tangible kink in a real carpet), it does generate real-world 
effects." (560-1) 
 
As the re-enactments encompass more and more space of reality they 
nevertheless become more frustrating: the short moments of harmony and oneness with 
the world that he can experience during re-enactments do not last, which leads to 
depression: “Melancholia is a disturbance of élan vital, while depression is a mood 
disorder that turns all feelings grey and, for that reason, affects movement” (Ehrenberg 
167).  Ironically, the narrator thinks that he can escape his predicament of feeling 
inauthentic in the present by recreating what he remembers as having felt authentic in 
his post-traumatic past.  The crack in wall plaster extends into a Baudrillardian simulacra, 
an aesthetic space of simulation that feels more real than actual reality.  Before 
Baudrillard wrote his concept of postmodern hyperreality and about the threat that it 
poses to the self, José Ortega y Gasset had already stated that artistic creation “gives rise 
to an unreal, “virtual” world. The poetic metaphor is key to such virtuality as long as it 
takes human reality away from the object and links it to a new world without any 
references to the real.”261  Another level of hyperreality replaces the existing artificial 
setting when the narrator requests a small-scale model of his recreated building that he 
can control and manipulate on his own: “I placed my model on my living-room floor. I 
moved the figures around once more and issued instructions down the phone to Naz […] 
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Just knowing it was happening was enough” (R 165).  The manipulations executed on a 
model scale collapse space to an ideal of instantaneous transmission and reception to the 
actors via Naz. 
The differences in scale and scope between models, re-enactments and reality, 
are still apparent as they are in the Platonic distinction between likenesses ("eikons") and 
semblances ("phantasms").  They are bridged at the end of the novel when the likeness of 
the re-enactment setting is identical with reality.  Now the real world seems to have 
become an imitation of the former re-enactment such that the narrator remarks that the 
real van has “a perfect likeness of the van we’d used up at the warehouse. More than 
perfect: it was identical in make and size and registration, in the faded finish on its sides, 
the way its edges turned” (R 284).  Suddenly the real van conforms to the Platonian sense 
of likeness-making, as an “eikon” it was “executed according to the proportions of the 
original, similar in length and breadth and depth […] its appropriate colour.”262  
Paradoxically, the van used in the simulations is regarded as an original and the real van is 
relegated to be no more than an excellent full-scale copy, indistinguishable from the one 
that was built specifically for the re-enactment.  According to Maurice Blanchot, “to 
whom McCarthy attributes the premise, the simulation being less a replication of that 
which already exists than a unique event in itself” (Jim Byatt 255). The simulation 
penetrates the real and subverts the dichotomy of model and copy, original and 
reproduction, which also reverses the order of priority: the re-enactment is no longer a 
secondary event but comes first, it is a “preenactment” (R 241).   
 
Idealized Form and Surplus Matter 
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Art is conceived here with the imagination that takes away the inessential 
properties of things and turns them into purely intentional objects.  Aesthetic reality is 
fictitious and the protagonist remembers his art teacher’s advice that the form is always 
already there, it is only concealed to the mind and the “task isn’t to create the sculpture 
[…] it’s to strip all the other stuff away, get rid of it. The surplus matter” (R 87).  
Classically, the imperfection of reality is due to matter that form must transcend either in 
a conceptual or in a spiritual striving, which goes back to Plato’s idealism and his theory of 
forms in which he describes the world as a mere reflection of a more complete and true 
essential reality on a higher plane of existence.  This world of ideas resembles a blueprint 
after which the objects of the physical world are fashioned and Remainder treats the self-
sustained concept of ideal form ironically in the literal disfigurement of the narrator’s 
bank account: “The eight was perfect, neat: a curved figure infinitely turning back into 
itself. But then the half. Why had they added the half? It seemed to me so messy, this 
half: a leftover fragment, a shard of detritus" (R 9).  The extra half million is regarded as a 
surplus, an excess of matter that refuses to be contained within an idealistic system 
where it violates the unity of a perfect loop that symbolizes infinity and eternity.  The 
structure of eight is embedded throughout the novel as an emblem that stands for the 
desire to define oneself: “the perfection of the authenticity that the narrator seeks, a 
closed circuit that refers to nothing outside itself and yet sustains its own energy” (Lea 
468).  The dynamic of entropic spatio-temporal systems, such as endless regression in re-
enactments, is symbolized in the loop and in the doubling of the loop.  
Modernism emphasized the perfection of the work of art at the expense of social 
engagement and was, in particular, accused of political abstention that came out of a 
“belief in the autonomy of art; the artist was free to pursue purely aesthetic goals without 
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having to worry about morality, religion, and politics.”263  The artistic Imagination creates 
images of perfection, a notion which Remainder treats with irony, but also with a hint of 
nostalgia for something that ultimately remains elusive and cerebral. 
Tom McCarthy is a founding member of the International Necronautical Society 
(INS), who declare themselves to be the “modern lovers of debris, radio and jetstreams”, 
which points to their view that it is matter that matters foremost and their manifesto 
states that “[w]hat is most real for us is not form, or God, but matter, the brute 
materiality of the external world. We celebrate the imperfection of matter and somatize 
that imperfection on a daily basis.”264  Humans, as corporeal beings, partake in the 
material condition of the world and share the inherent imperfections of all creatures; 
they cannot know anything to a level of certainty nor can humans sense beyond the 
phenomena of their experience.  The surplus matter is part of realism and not idealism, a 
reminder of the tendency for all matter and energy in the universe to evolve toward a 
state of inert uniformity and formlessness as opposed to the Platonic world of forms.     
The narrator becomes obsessed with transcending the material plane after he 
experiences the accidental disappearance of the car’s washer fluid in almost religious 
terms: “[i]t was as though I’d just witnessed a miracle: matter – these two litres of liquid – 
becoming un-matter – not surplus matter, mess or clutter, but pure, bodiless blueness” (R 
159).  For a moment, mundane matter seems to have become immaterial through a 
process of transubstantiation that left nothing behind, but without technical 
manipulation there is no repetition in dematerializing the liquid so it can indeed “become 
sky” (R 223).  The transubstantiation of matter turned out to be no more than a 
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momentary illusion, but the transcendence of material plane is still a driving motivation 
for the narrator.  The totalizing, mystical transcendence in space between living and dead 
matter, that the narrator experiences during the killing scene re-enactments, again 
promises the merging of the self with matter, but it turns out to be deceptive and, as 
before, the narrator is left only with short moments of “feeling intense and serene” (R 11, 
101).  Remainder is a comedy of failure in which the narrator insists on applying aesthetic 
processes that reproduce human concepts in matter without realizing that inauthenticity 
is intrinsically bound up with the repetitive mechanism of art that functions through 
copies or performances.  Aesthetic manipulations may attempt to hide the imperfection 
of matter and the narrator may want to feel connected, but “there is always ‘a remainder 
that remains: a shard, a leftover, a trace, a residual,’ and this remainder is the ‘mark of 
inauthenticity’" (Schwenger in Lea 467).   
 
The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience in Re-enactments 
The pursuit of authenticity takes an aesthetic form of highly stylized formal 
operations mapped out on a grid , which remind the narrator of “abstract paintings, 
avant-garde ones from the last century […] But they’re not abstract at all. They’re records 
of atrocities. Each line, each figure, every angle – the ink itself vibrates with an almost 
intolerable violence, darkly screaming from the silence of white paper: something has 
happened here, someone has died” (R 173).  Art makes it possible to structure 
contingency through manipulation and the repetitive loops of re-enactments strive for an 
ever-increasing perfection similar to the forensics of death that in Remainder become an 
aesthetic project of performance art in calculated measures where the “narrator grows 
increasingly aware of the tendency of forensic science to break down each event, each 
314 
 
symbol and each trace, into its constituent parts, in a process which can conceivably bring 
time to a near-standstill” (Jim Byatt 256).  The narrator is fascinated by the structuring of 
time and movement: “you do it slowly, breaking down your movements into phases that 
have sections and sub-sections, each one governed by rigorous rules. You even wear 
special suits when you do it, like Japanese people wearing kimonos as they perform the 
tea ceremony” (R 174).   
Justus Nieland writes that the formalism of forensics is linked to the modernist 
grid with its abstract system of ordering in patterns and recording them to approximate a 
“degree zero of representation [which] is bound tightly to death” (589).  From a 
phenomenological perspective, embodiment starts at birth and ends in death and the 
experience of dying entails passivity in the face of death.  The INS manifesto states “[t]hat 
death is a type of space, which we intend to map, enter, colonise and, eventually, 
inhabit,” and furthermore that “[o]ur very bodies are no more than vehicles carrying us 
ineluctably towards death. We are all necronauts, always, already.”265  Death transcends 
the anxiety of the fundamental existential condition of finality and Heidegger had already 
described the human condition as “being-towards-death (Sein-zum-Tode)” under the 
premise that “death can only be authentically experienced by us if we become totally 
secure with our first-person experience of dying – our genuine anticipation of death. We 
cannot experience other people’s deaths in the same authentic manner” (Moran 241). 
The repeated re-enactments of a death scene, in which the narrator takes on the role of 
the victim, indicate his desire for the fusion of the self with matter.  He hopes to achieve 
authenticity in being-towards-death, or a state of pure being, by transcending the space 
between living and dead matter.  He envies the dead man because  
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In dying beside the bollards on the tarmac he’d done what I wanted to do: merged with 
the space around him, sunk and flowed into it until there was no distance between it and 
him – and merged, too, with his actions, merged to the extent of having no more 
consciousness of them. He’d stopped being separate, removed, imperfect. Cut out the 
detour. Then both mind and actions had resolved themselves into pure stasis. (R 184-5)  
 
The sensation of connectedness encompasses not only the consciousness of 
another person, but also the substrata of the material world, which could imply that the 
creative imagination could bridge the split between the Cartesian picture of the two 
distinct entities – body and mind – with an embodied view of imaginative structures of 
understanding that extends the “Kantian view of imagination as a capacity for ordering 
mental representations into unified, coherent, meaningful wholes that we can 
understand and reason about” (Johnson, BM 194).  The salience of the human 
imagination, understood as acquired evolutionary image schemata in which the physical 
world of surfaces, distances and forces exist, manipulates and transforms matter into 
metaphorical extensions: “Imagination, in this sense, mediates between sense perception 
and our more abstractive conceptualizing capacities: it makes it possible for us to 
conceptualize various structural aspects of our experience and to formulate propositional 
descriptions of them” (Johnson, BM 194).  
 
The Experiential Dimension of Selfhood: Building a Self and a World 
The highest human challenge is to live authentically.  Jean-Paul Sartre’s philosophy 
of existentialism claims that there is “no blueprint for human existence, no framework 
which could be adopted to make life meaningful. Rather we must face up to the dizzying 
formlessness and groundlessness of our existence, an experience which provokes 
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anxiety” (Morat 362).  At various times the narrator feels dizzy when he is faced with 
instants of contingency and he believes that his remembered building must be found 
systematically by his staff circling in on it; their joint efforts “would scare my building out, 
like beaters scaring pheasants out of bushes for a Lord to shoot – six beaters advancing in 
formation, beating to the same rhythms, their movements duplicating one another” (R 
91).  Ironically, the strategic plan of eliminating possibilities rationally and systematically 
seems too rational to him to be successful and he decides to search for himself, because 
“it wouldn’t be my building unless I found it myself” (R 91).  It happens in a vivid dream, 
when buildings and streets flash past, that the narrator gets glimpses of his remembered 
building: “I sensed the rhythm things were moving at, the patterns they were following, 
and let my imagination slip inside them. I could sense when my building was about to 
come by. I waited for it to go by twice, and just before it reappeared a third time shouted: 
“Stop!” (R 94).  In the next moment, the narrator not only experiences seeing the building 
with inner eyes, but he is also gripped by a corporeal experience: he can move around 
freely and occupy the space.  Although he is in a dream, he feels that his body has 
become manifested in a “corporeal orientation in the world in contexts of perception, 
action and spatial navigation.”266  In his random search through London, the narrator 
avoids entering Plato road, which “might have short-circuited things” (R 97).  Instead, he 
concentrates on his walking body and instantly recognizes a building as the one that had 
appeared in his dream (R 99).  The fact that many features inside and outside are 
different to what he remembers is irrelevant as he believes that the money at his disposal 
gives him the power to change anything that does not fit.  The diffuse meaningfulness of 
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imagining, of “projecting all this in” (R 102) promises a rich mode of experience, and the 
tingling in his body that he feels during simulations could be interpreted as the 
manifestation of “holistic corporeal impressions”, which, according to Schmitz et al., are 
the result of “sensing by means of the felt body [which] is a holistic exchange of corporeal 
dynamics, a vibrant attunement to meaningful surroundings. Correspondingly, the world 
shows up not as a neutral realm of already separate entities but as the atmospheric fields 
of significant situations” (244).   
The narrator’s first project of finding “his” building inverses the Madeleine 
episode and the name of the location for the re-enactment, Madlyn Mansions, is a nod to 
the serendipitous Proustian Epiphany that precipitated a flood of memories in Marcel.  
But instead of remembering after tasting tea and cake, the protagonist becomes 
obsessively proactive in changing the basic building to make the space fit what he 
remembers with the aim to turn it into a defining environment where he can “relieve his 
affective neutrality by reliving moments of presence, plenitude, or authenticity” (Nieland 
588).  To feel nothing or neutral means to be cut off from experiencing the body, whereas 
the tingling gives the narrator an almost erotic feeling, it is “both intense and serene at 
the same time” (R 11).  The expansion of the body and the inhabitation of space are 
characteristic of immediate affective involvement in a pre-reflective and not yet 
articulated self-consciousness that has “the quality of mineness [where] experiences are 
characterized by first-personal givenness. That is, the experiences are given (at least 
tacitly) as my experiences, as experiences I am undergoing or living through” (Zahavi “Self 
and Other” 189).   
Eventually, the narrator comes to reflect on his re-enactments that have failed to 
provide him with the permanence of feeling authentic or real, because “[t]he realness I 
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was after wasn’t something you could just ‘do’ once and then have ‘got’: it was a state, a 
mode – one that I needed to return to again and again and again” (R 223).  The parody of 
transcendence is pervasive throughout the novel and even after every detail is perfect 
and the timing is finally minutely executed, the feeling of the building with all its props 
and smells can satisfy the narrator only to a point, until reality interferes with the illusion.   
 
Post-Postmodern Imperative for Ethical Self-Determination 
Neurosis – the individual divided by his conflicts – dominated the clinical diagnosis 
of mental disorders in the first half of the twentieth century.  The terminology appears to 
have been replaced by the pathology of the depressed self; a self that is ceaselessly 
challenged by its own sovereignty: Alain Ehrenberg distinguishes between the terms and 
explains that “[i]f neurosis is the tragedy of guilt, depression is the tragedy of inadequacy” 
(11).  The narrator’s self is essentially narcissistic: “My project was a programme, not a 
hobby or a sideline: a programme to which I’d given myself over body and soul. The 
relationships within this programme would be between me and my staff. Exclusively. 
Staff: not friends” (R 118).      
As the narrator lacks all affective relations, he feels insulated and seeks to limit 
himself to professionalized relationships that he can control.  In postmodern society, the 
individual is faced with the ethos of self-realisation and responsibility in which the ability 
to articulate a self has become a social imperative.  The consumerist milieu of neo-
corporatism, Foucault’s society of disciplinary obedience and prohibition, has been 
replaced by one of personal decision, initiative and networking, and the vast amount of 
compensation money gives the narrator the economic power and opportunity to 
instrumentalize others.  The self has become a new management project.  The narrator’s 
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own project of building a completely aestheticized world in search of a different kind of 
self is a parody of contemporary consumer technology in which the self is situated in a 
culture of networking and information management: “the walls of Naz’s office became 
caked with charts: planning charts, flow charts and Venn diagrams, lists and indexes and 
keys to charts and indexes to lists” (R 236).  Art and technology seem to offer, however 
superficially and illusorily, a solution for filling the void of weariness by making “each of 
us the center of our own universe of choices and gratifications.”267  The effect is that an 
individual “becomes depressed because he must tolerate the illusion that everything is 
possible for him” (Ehrenberg 232).  The project management for bringing the narrator’s 
vision into being starts in the restaurant of the Design Museum, aptly named Blueprint 
Café, in a meeting with the executive of Time Control UK, Nazrul Ram Vyas, who manages 
excessive logistical details and massive amounts of information with the precision of a 
computer networker: “Naz facilitated everything for me. Made it all happen. He was like 
an extra set of limbs – eight extra sets of limbs, tentacles spreading out in all directions, 
coordinating projects, issuing instructions, executing commands. My executor” (R 73).  
Managing the lives of their clients logistically, the company takes a managerial approach 
that parodies an existential view of the self as “not something given, but something 
evolving, something that is realized through my projects. There is no such thing as who (in 
contrast to what) I am independently of how I understand and interpret myself” (Zahavi, 
“Self and Other” 179).  The narrator induces and facilitates a merely instrumental stance 
of total control towards his “enlisted” re-enactors: “My pyramid was like a Pharaoh’s 
pyramid. I was the Pharaoh. They were my loyal servants, all the others; my reward to 
them was to allow them to accompany me on the first segment of my final voyage” (R 
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255).  As he projects his meanings onto the world, he is oblivious to the underlying 
amorality of dehumanizing others as fixed and dead objects in his tableau vivant:  “I 
generally put the building into on mode for between six and eight hours each day – 
mostly in stretches of two hours” (R 149).  The thought of a plane exploding with his re-
enactors on board reminds him of an artistic act “a pillow ripping open, its stuffing of 
feathers rushing outwards, merging with the air” (R 255).   
 
The Dark Side of Limitless Possibilities: The Break with Reality  
Remainder portrays the human condition of the postmodern self which has the 
freedom of an autonomous individual, but lives in a pathological tension of being equally 
burdened with the project of realising himself and the threat of failing to do so.  The 
feeling of estrangement from inner reality has its equivalent in outside reality: the world 
feels as unreal as the narrator himself, who thinks that his movements appear distorted:  
“jerking back and forth like paused video images do on low-quality machines. It must 
have looked strange. I felt self-conscious, embarrassed. […] It was a performance for the 
two men watching me, to make my movements come across as more authentic” (R 15).  
The narrator becomes increasingly and catatonically disconnected from reality as his 
consciousness drifts in and out of his private fantasies, or “waking comas: I wouldn’t 
move for long stretches of time, or register any stimuli around me – sound, light, anything 
– and yet I’d be fully conscious: my eyes would be wide open and I’d seem engrossed in 
something. I’d remain in this state for several hours on end” (R 219). 
A borough councillor takes on a double persona that appears several times 
unexpectedly in the narrator’s presence.  That the short councillor is part of the narrator’s 
increasingly delusional state becomes clear when his existence is subsequently 
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questioned by Naz: “What short councillor?” (R 270). Their dialogues bring to mind the 
situation between psychiatrist and patient; his ‘slightly’ Scottish voice might even be a 
reference to the radical psychiatrist of the nineteen-sixties, R. D. Laing.  It was Laing who 
connected individual to social pathology.  In Ehrenberg’s view, the pathology of 
irresponsible freedom in an individualistic society now produces a condition of depression 
and dependency: “Depression, then, is melancholia plus equality, the perfect disorder of 
the democratic human being. It is the inexorable counterpart of the human being who is 
her/his own sovereign” (219).  The pathology of depression acknowledges the 
responsibility of the self to realize its potential, but the self is hampered and fatigued with 
becoming itself.   From a sociological point of view, the postmodern individual is 
threatened with the dissolution of identity, and depression ensues when “the distance 
between the self and the self is at its maximum. On the other hand, dependency tends 
towards an identity fusion, with distance being minimal” (Ehrenberg 220).   The trajectory 
of Remainder encompasses both extremes:  a longing for unity that leaves no distance 
between the self and the physical world and an addiction to increasingly elaborated 
simulations that replace any semblance of formal reality.  He lives in a simulation and 
works tirelessly to create new simulations, but his movements in situ and his participation 
in projects do not provide in any on-going way the sought after feeling of being real.  Only 
occasionally does he experience a sensory response in his body, the atavistic “tingling” 
that signals the “perfect convergence where the consciousness of existence falls away, 
and he is left in a condition of messianic transportation […] rare moments of transcendent 
being, when he feels instrumental to the moment, that he comes closest to achieving a 
form of authenticity as an experience of immanence” (Lea 466).  The tingling is a signal 
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that portrays “the actual state of the body as modified by emotions in response to 
interactions with the environment” (Damasio, “Feelings of Emotion and the Self” 253).   
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CONCLUSION 
 
Whilst I had initially hoped to find some evidence for a unified or, at least a 
conclusive self, now, at the end of this thesis, I have arrived at the position that from the 
first instance of human awareness about the profound temporal split of the ontological 
self into past, present and future through memory and anticipation, there has always 
been a desire to articulate the self in terms that reflect that fundamental experience.  
Writing about the self has served since Augustine both as the vehicle to express that split 
and to show the dilemma of substantiating the self in text where it emerges as the 
product of a writer’s inevitable self-reflexivity.   
In the present post-postmodern condition, it is not only the narrative self that is in 
disarray: the very core of the self – understood as a kind of affective proto-self – seems 
also to be emptied out too.  I chose to end my thesis, therefore, with a text that explicitly 
traces its origins through Platonic ideas, religious and secular confessional narratives, 
material psychology, aesthetic and phenomenological accounts, paranoia and 
postmodern autobiografiction.  Remainder curiously and ironically re-enacts almost all of 
the positions on writing the self that I have covered in this thesis.   
I have tried to demonstrate that the (post)-postmodern self neither arrived ex 
nihilo, nor descended from a single line of development, or from the rupture with 
modernism, as Al Alvarez had claimed.  Increasingly, critics and writers are recognizing 
the need to exceed postmodernist frameworks and, rather than assigning novelty to the 
post-postmodern self, I have tried to explicate the self’s situatedness in a complex 
network of ideas; the history of ideas that was and still is perennially revisited and 
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reworked by the cultural, intellectual and scientific forces of each period that has shaped 
and continues to shape the ways in which ideas about the self were and are expressed.  
 
The Moral Self in the Twenty-first Century and the Future of Literature 
Whilst literary writing has always provided data about the structure of the human 
self, cognitive neuroscience provides an empirically well-supported set of theories and 
hypotheses that can benefit literary studies generally.  The future orientation of the novel 
in the aftermath of the theory wars can be thought of in terms of an “aesthetic sea 
change, then, as being inspired by a desire to reconnect language to the social sphere or, 
to put it another way, to reenergize literature's social mission, its ability to intervene in 
the social world, to have an impact on actual people and the actual social institutions in 
which they live their lives.” (McLaughlin 55).   
The examination of the dominant discourses for articulating the self, from St 
Augustine to contemporary life-writing, shows that a moral function has always been a 
central aspect of its definition.  It is therefore pertinent to understand the preoccupation 
with ethical issues as a further key concept for understanding the self.  In his seminal 
work Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity, Charles Taylor claims that the 
autonomy of the self rests on the idea that the self is exclusively to be understood as 
“something that can exist only in a space of moral issues” (49).  He views constitutive 
goods as subject-transcending sources that have a “capacity to empower us morally” and 
goes on to explain that, once their value has been acknowledged, they become an ethical 
response to reductive strains of the Enlightenment that “functions in a field of moral 
assessment along with our antecedent sense of what is right, and our identification of the 
325 
 
possible illusions which could vitiate our moral intuitions.”268  Constitutive goods are 
paradigmatic for the shifts that have taken place in the modern period and every 
individual moral stance is viewed as potentially authentic as part of the process of self-
interpretation.  The personal dimension is significant because “what I am as a self is 
essentially defined by the ways things have significance for me” (SS 34).  Self-
understanding is achieved through articulating the visions that direct one's life such that 
“[r]ecovering moral sources opens us to something which empowers […] the metaphysics 
or theology comes indexed to a personal vision, or refracted through a particular 
sensibility” (SS 490, 491).   
Taylor’s idea about moral sources as constitutive for selfhood is echoed in Antonio 
Damasio’s hypothesis regarding the value of art for the articulation of thoughts and 
feelings, which provide “the biological counterpart of a spiritual dimension in human 
affairs […] a way to explore one’s own mind and the minds of others, a means to rehearse 
specific aspects of life, and a means to exercise moral judgment and moral action.”269   
A crucial characteristic of post-postmodern literature is its specific treatment of 
subjectivity and there seems to be an emerging movement against the postmodern 
hermeneutics of suspicion and its anti-essentialist, anti-humanist notion of 
fragmentation, undecidables and social constructivism.  In evaluating the critical potential 
of poetics in the contemporary social world, Jeffrey Nealon suggests that artists are now 
concerned with a “post-postmodern hermeneutics of situation.”270  Literature appears to 
be at a historical juncture where it can take on a synoptic role by staying in close contact 
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with other disciplines, without the risk of being entirely assimilated by them.  Literature 
must therefore put up resistances to being subsumed and subordinated to other 
institutional or academic forces and show that it is not a passive recipient but has a 
productive function of its own, “a life of its own, but one which is not in opposition to all 
other forms of life. On the contrary, the life that literature evinces comes from its ever-
shifting modes of dealing with and transforming whatever lies outside it. Every individual 
work of literature seeks to address us in its own manner and for its own ends.”271   
Contemporary literature goes beyond the power of interrupting reified truth 
claims and subverting them; the critical engagement works in subtler ways: it is a product 
that comes out of “those features of the work which institutionalism cannot assimilate 
and digest, and which for want of better words, we had better call its imaginative, formal, 
and moral elements.” (Lansdown 7).  Contemporary writing hints at another structure of 
feeling, intimating another discourse and in this view, literary works can act as an 
incubator for speculative ideas that have a potential to cross over into the cognitive 
sciences or stimulate and enrich empirical and philosophical research.  By positing 
themselves as alternative paradigms for accounts of human life, works of literature have 
cognitive value.  Jeffrey Nealon puts forward the idea of literature as an “equipmental” 
force for post-postmodern life in a globalized world and, as such, sees it affecting readers 
by “intensifying and expanding our sense of ‘the poetic’ as a robust form of cultural 
engagement or analysis, whose force is enabled not by its distance from dominant 
culture, but its imbrication with contemporary socioeconomic forces” (154).    
The dominant mode of irony, apathy, plurality and scepticism that had 
characterized the condition under which much of postmodernist literature was produced 
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seems to have been abandoned by postmillennial writers.  Writers like Tom McCarthy 
engage in political and ethical objectives in an age in which the self is confronted with 
radical economic instability on a global scale, increasing ubiquity and dominance of new 
communications technologies, and widespread anxieties set against a backdrop of 
profound political disillusionment.  Contemporary writing gives a renewed impetus to the 
belief that literature still is the preeminent discourse in which art, ethics, and politics are 
inextricably linked. 
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